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CHRONICLE.

1916-1917

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THE OXFORDSHIRE & BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY CHRONICLE, 1916–1917.

AN ANNUAL RECORD OF THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS, FORMERLY THE 43RD AND 52ND LIGHT INFANTRY.

TOGETHER WITH THE

WAR RECORDS

OF THE

OTHER BATTALIONS OF THE REGIMENT.

Compiled and Edited

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN.

VOLUME XXVI.

From 1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

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[Owing to the ban on cameras on the Western Front, it has been possible to obtain only a few photographs of regimental interest wherewith to illustrate this volume.]

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THE
OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY.

DIARY OF THE WAR.

1ST JULY 1916 TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

Battalions of the Regiment in existence during this period :—

1st Battalion (newly formed)—Mesopotamia.
2nd Battalion—France.
3rd Battalion (Reserve)—England.
1/4th Battalion (T.F.)—France.
2/4th Battalion (T.F.)—France.
3/4th Battalion (T.F. Reserve)—England.
1/1st Bucks Battalion (T.F.)—France.
2/1st Bucks Battalion (T.F.)—France.
3/1st Bucks Battalion (T.F. Reserve)—England.
5th (Service) Battalion—France.
6th (Service) Battalion—France.
7th (Service) Battalion—Salonika.
8th (Service) Battalion (Pioneers)—Salonika.
9th (Service) Battalion (Reserve)—England.
1st Garrison Battalion—

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JULY.

1	S	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* moved to Mailly Maillet for opening phase of the BATTLE OF THE SOMME. *5th Bn.* to trenches (H Sector). *6th Bn.* to Zillebeke trenches. *7th* and *8th Bns.* in camp in neighbourhood of Salonika.
2	Su	*2nd Bn.* to trenches at Carency. 1/4*th Bn.* marched to Mesnil, and thence back to Mailly.
3	M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Couin.
4	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* to Hebuterne trenches. 2/4*th Bn.* to billets at Riez Bailleul.
5	W	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to bivouacs at Sailly-au-Bois.
6	Th	*2nd Bn.* from trenches to Support Battalion position.
7	F	
8	S	1/4*th Bn.* moved to bivouacs between The Dell and Coigneux, on relief in Hebuterne trenches by 1/1*st Bucks Bn.*
9	Su	*2nd Bn.* back to the trenches. *6th Bn.* to billets in Ypres.
10	M	*6th Bn.* to Vlamertinghe.
11	Tu	
12	W	1/4*th Bn.* to Hebuterne trenches, in relief of 1/1*st Bucks Bn.*, to Sailly. 2/4*th Bn.* to Richebourg trenches. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Richebourg St. Vaast.
13	Th	2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Croix Barbée.
14	F	*2nd Bn.* to Estrée-Cauchie. *6th Bn.* to billets at Erquinghem. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in motor lorries to Senlis.
15	S	*2nd Bn.* to Camblain-Châtelain. *5th Bn.* to trenches. *6th Bn.* to trenches at Rue Pettilion.
16	Su	1/4*th Bn.* from Hebuterne trenches to bivouacs.

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JULY.

17	M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Bouzincourt.
18	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* moved to the Albert-Bapaume Road, ready for carrying out attack. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* preparing to attack.
19	W	1/4*th Bn.* took part in attack between Ovillers and Pozières, losing 2 officers and 99 men, and later moved to huts at Bouzincourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to gun-pits near Albert. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* heavily engaged and suffered 322 casualties.
20	Th	2*nd Bn.* by rail from Pernes to Saleux (near Amiens), thence marched to Corbie. 1/4*th Bn.* moved to near Albert, in reserve for resumed attack. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Estaires. 6*th Bn.* in Rue Pettilion trenches lost 2 officers and 33 men killed and wounded.
21	F	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in attack south-west of POZIÈRES lost 9 officers and 145 men.
22	S	6*th Bn.* to billets at Croix du Bac. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in Albert gun-pits.
23	Su	2*nd Bn.* marched to Happy Valley. 1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* attacked east of POZIÈRES, and gained objectives with hard fighting. 6*th Bn.* to billets near Meteren.
24	M	1/4*th Bn.* to bivouacs outside Albert, having lost 11 officers and a great many men; in evening moved to huts at Bouzincourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Albert gun-pits, having lost 5 officers and 83 men.
25	Tu	2*nd Bn.* marched to Montauban, in reserve. 6*th Bn.* by rail and road to billets at Lecheux (Somme). 7*th Bn.* to Ambarkoj.
26	W	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks* moved to Arqueves. 6*th Bn.* to Vauchelles.
27	Th	5*th Bn.* marched from Arras to Sus-St. Leger.
28	F	2*nd Bn.* to front-line trenches near Waterlot Farm. 6*th Bn.* to billets at Courcelles. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Beauval.
29	S	1/4*th Bn.* to Beauval. 5*th Bn.* marched to Mezerolles. 6*th Bn.* moved into trenches. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Domleger.
30	Su	2*nd Bn.* took part in ATTACK ON GUILLEMONT; 5 officers killed and 7 wounded. 1/4*th Bn.* to Agenville.
31	M	2*nd Bn.* relieved from trenches. 5*th Bn.* to Berneuil.

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AUGUST.

1 Tu	2*nd Bn.* to Waterlot Farm trenches. 8*th Bn.* at Dragomir.
2 W	2*nd Bn.* Major R. M. Owen (2nd in command) killed.
3 Th	2*nd Bn.* moved back to reserve position.
4 F	2/4*th Bn.* in rest billets at Robermetz.
5 S	7*th Bn.* engaged on Kidney Hill, Macedonia.
6 Su	6*th Bn.* from trenches to billets at Courcelles.
7 M	5*th Bn.* by rail and road to Buire (Somme).
8 Tu	2*nd Bn.* in support to 6th Brigade, attacking Guillemont.
9 W	2*nd Bn.* rejoined 5th Brigade in bivouac in Sandpit area. 7*th Bn.* to Bujuklu Ravine. 1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Beauval. 2/4*th Bn.* to Laventie. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Fanquissart trenches.
10 Th	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Varennes. 2/4*th Bn.* to trenches and front posts (Fanquissart).
11 F	2*nd Bn.* to Ville-sur-Ancre. 1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Bouzincourt bivouacs.
12 S	5*th Bn.* to bivouacs near Fricourt.
13 Su	2*nd Bn.* moved by rail and road to Ailly-sur-Somme. 1/4*th Bn.* to trenches east of Ovillers, heavily shelled all day. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to gun-pits on Usna Hill. 6*th Bn.* to Sailly Dell bivouacs.
14 M	1/4*th Bn.* relieved by 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in front trenches, having lost 6 officers and 147 men. At night 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* attacked Sky Line Trenches (west of Pozières) successfully, but with heavy losses.
15 Tu	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* holding Sky Line Trenches.
16 W	2*nd Bn.* marched to Montonallers. 1/4*th Bn.* relieved 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in trenches. 6*th Bn.* to Amplier Camp.

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AUGUST.

17	TH	*2nd Bn.* to Candas. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* on Albert-Bouzincourt Line.
18	F	*2nd Bn.* to Bus-lez-Artois. 1/4*th Bn.* came out of trenches, having lost 1 officer and 45 men. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Aveluy and Usna Hill. *6th Bn.* to Candas. *7th Bn.* at CAPTURE OF HORSESHOE HILL, lost 5 officers and 60 men.
19	S	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Bouzincourt. *5th Bn.* to Montauban. *7th Bn.* lost 2 officers and 19 men (Macedonia).
20	SU	*6th Bn.* by rail and road to billets at Ville-sous-Corbie.
21	M	*6th Bn.* moved into camp. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Donnets Post and Ovillers Post. *7th Bn.* moved from trenches to Troupel.
22	TU	*6th Bn.* to trenches in Old German Line.
23	W	*2nd Bn.* moved into the trenches. 1/4*th Bn.* to trenches north of Ovillers. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to trenches between Thiepval and Ovillers, and at 3 p.m. delivered attack, losing 4 officers and 108 men. *5th Bn.* moved to assembly trenches for attack.
24	TH	*5th Bn.* took part in ATTACK ON DELVILLE WOOD; casualties, 10 officers and 160 N.C.O.'s and men.
25	F	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Aveluy and Usna Hill gun-pits. *5th Bn.* relieved from trenches at night.
26	S	1/4*th Bn.* moved to dug-outs near Ovillers Post. *5th Bn.* to camp near Fricourt.
27	SU	**Rumania joined the Allies.** *5th Bn.* to Pommier Redoubt.
28	M	1/4*th Bn.* to Bouzincourt (central). 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Bouzincourt gun-pits. *5th Bn.* to Fricourt camp.
29	TU	*2nd Bn.* from trenches to Courcelles-au-Bois. 1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* moved to huts in Bus Wood (Bus-lez-Artois). *7th Bn.* to Bujuklu Ravine.
30	W	*5th Bn.* to Dernancourt. *7th Bn.* to trenches west of Horseshoe Hill.
31	TH	*5th Bn.* marched to Albert; by rail to Arraines; marched to Epaumesnil.

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SEPTEMBER.

1	F	
2	S	6*th Bn.* to assembly position for attack. 8*th Bn.* making light railway on Struma Front.
3	Su	6*th Bn.* ATTACK ON GUILLEMONT. Casualties, 8 officers and 270 N.C.O.'s and men.
4	M	2*nd Bn.* returned to trenches (Beaumont left sub-sector).
5	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* to trenches east of Auchonvillers. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Beaumont Hamel trenches. 6*th Bn.* relieved and withdrew to Sherwood Trench.
6	W	6*th Bn.* after attack on Guillemont moved back to craters. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in Beaumont Hamel Trenches (White City).
7	Th	6*th Bn.* to bivouacs in Bois-les-Tailles.
8	F	1/4*th Bn.* to billets at Bus. 6*th Bn.* to Corbie. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Mailly-Maillet. 7*th Bn.* to Jenikoj.
9	S	
10	Su	2*nd Bn.* to huts at Coigneux Wood. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to bivouacs and huts in the Bois de Warnimont (Bus). 7*th Bn.* to Mihalova.
11	M	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Beauval. 6*th Bn.* to Méaulte.
12	Tu	2/4*th Bn.* in Moated Grange trenches.
13	W	2/1*st Bucks Bn.* H.Q. at Ebenezer Farms with companies in Moated Grange Section.
14	Th	5*th Bn.* bivouacked near Montauban in position of assembly for attack. 6*th Bn.* to camp at the Citadel.
15	F	5*th Bn.* ATTACK ON GUEDECOURT; casualties, 6 officers and 150 men. 6*th Bn.* to Carnoy Valley.
16	S	2*nd Bn.* returned to the trenches. 5*th Bn.* to Montauban, and in evening attached to 43rd Brigade for fresh attack. 6*th Bn.* to Waterlot Farm, and into the trenches (Triangle).

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SEPTEMBER.

17	Su	*5th Bn.* came out of action and moved to Pommier Redoubt, and later to Fricourt Camp.
18	M	1/*4th Bn.* to Fienvillers. *6th Bn.* moved up into front-line trenches. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Berneuil.
19	Tu	*2nd Bn.* to huts north of Bus-lez-Artois.
20	W	*2nd Bn.* to billets at Sarton.
21	Th	*5th Bn.* by motor-bus to Grand Rullecourt *6th Bn.* moved to the Citadel.
22	F	*6th Bn.* marched to Ville-sur-Ancre.
23	S	
24	Su	
25	M	*6th Bn.* returned to the Citadel.
26	Tu	*6th Bn.* moved forward (behind Morval).
27	W	
28	Th	*6th Bn.* to Carnoy Valley.
29	F	1/*4th Bn.* to Warlusel. *6th Bn.* marched to Trones Wood trenches. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Coullemont.
30	S	

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OCTOBER.

1	Su	1/4*th Bn.* to Warlencourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to St. Amand.
2	M	2*nd Bn.* moved to huts at Bus-lez-Artois.
3	Tu	2*nd Bn.* to huts in Mailly Wood.
4	W	
5	Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Hebuterne trenches (Y Sector).
6	F	2*nd Bn.* to trenches (Serre left sub-sector).
7	S	6*th Bn.* took part in great attack on enemy's trenches; casualties, 13 officers and 230 men. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Souastre.
8	Su	2*nd Bn.* to billets in Lealvillers. 6*th Bn.* to Bernafay Wood. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Henu.
9	M	6*th Bn.* to camp on Bray-Albert Road. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Warlencourt.
10	Tu	7*th Bn.* at Piton des Zouaves (Hill 420).
11	W	
12	Th	
13	F	
14	S	7*th Bn.* took over Doldzeli trenches.
15	Su	6*th Bn.* marched to Daours.
16	M	

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OCTOBER.

17	Tu	2*nd Bn.* to billets at Arqueves. 1/4*th Bn.* to Warlusel.
18	W	6*th Bn.* to billets at Cardonette.
19	Th	6*th Bn.* to Vignacourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Warlusel.
20	F	
21	S	
22	Su	2*nd Bn.* to billets in Mailly-Maillet. 1/4*th Bn.*, and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Beauval.
23	M	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Talma. 7*th Bn.* to Mihalova.
24	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Lahoussoye.
25	W	2*nd Bn.* moved into the trenches.
26	Th	
27	F	2*nd Bn.* returned to Mailly-Maillet.
28	S	
29	Su	
30	M	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.*, throughout October, in and out of Moated Grange trenches.
31	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets and camp at Millencourt.

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NOVEMBER.

1	W	1/4*th Bn.* marched through Albert and Fricourt to billets. 2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* in billets at Robecq for rest and training. 6*th Bn.* to Le Quesnoy-sur-Airaines.
2	Th	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support and reserve trenches between Martinpuich and Le Sars.
3	F	2/4*th Bn.* to Magnicourt-en-Comte. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Monchy Breton.
4	S	2/4*th Bn.* to Tinques. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Averdoignt.
5	Su	1/4*th Bn.* moved up to front line in front of Le Sars; and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support trenches (26th Avenue).
6	M	1/4*th Bn.* moved back to support trenches, on relief by 1/1*st Bucks Bn.*
7	Tu	1/4*th Bn.* moved to Reserve area near Martinpuich.
8	W	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support trenches (26th Avenue). 7*th Bn.* to Bare Hill trenches (Doiran Front).
9	Th	2*nd Bn.* to trenches (Redan Sector). Captain K. Peploe killed.
10	F	1/4*th Bn.* moved back to bivouacs in Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Contalmaison (Acid Drop Camp).
11	S	2*nd Bn.* from trenches to Mailly.
12	Su	2*nd Bn.* moved to assembly positions for attack.
13	M	2*nd Bn.* ATTACK ON THE ANCRE; had 2 officers killed, 7 wounded, and 2 missing.
14	Tu	2*nd Bn.* ATTACK ON THE ANCRE; 1 officer killed.
15	W	2*nd Bn.* ATTACK ON THE ANCRE; casualties during the 3 days, 13 officers and 235 other ranks. 1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* returned to the trenches.
16	Th	6*th Bn.* to Corbie. 7*th Bn.* in Doldzeli trenches.

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NOVEMBER.

17	F	1/4*th Bn.* relieved 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in front line, when latter moved to support trenches (26th Avenue).
18	S	2*nd Bn.* marched to Bertrancourt.
19	Su	2*nd Bn.* to Amplier. 2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets in Albert.
20	M	2*nd Bn.* to Canaples. 1/4*th Bn.* relieved by 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in front trenches.
21	Tu	2 *nd Bn.* to St. Ouen. 1/4*th Bn.* to Peake Wood Central Camp. 2/4*th Bn.* to trenches about Mouquet Farm and Ovillers. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to huts at Ovillers.
22	W	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Peake Wood Camp (Contalmaison).
23	Th	2*nd Bn.* to Le Ménage (Cramont). 7*th Bn.* to Hill 420 trenches; lost 38 men.
24	F	2*nd Bn.* to Maison-Ponthieu. 1/1*st Buck Bn.* to Scotts Redoubt Camp, Contalmaison.
25	S	2*nd Bn.* to Canchy. 1/4*th Bn.* returned to trenches in front of Le Sars.
26	Su	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Middle Wood Camp.
27	M	2*nd Bn.* to Fontaine-sur-Maye, for rest and training.
28	Tu	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* in Mouquet Farm trenches.
29	W	1/4*th Bn.* to Scotts Redoubt Camp. 6*th Bn.* to the Citadel.
30	Th	6*th Bn.* marched to Mansell Camp. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Shelter Wood Camp.

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DECEMBER.

1	F	
2	S	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets and huts at Hedauville.
3	Su	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Le Sars trenches.
4	M	1/4*th Bn.* moved to Middle Wood Camp.
5	Tu	
6	W	
7	Th	6*th Bn.* moved to Méaulte. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Scotts Redoubt.
8	F	1/4*th Bn.* moved to Shelter Wood Camp (North).
9	S	7*th Bn.* to Doldzeli trenches.
10	Su	6*th Bn.* to Guillemont.
11	M	1/4*th Bn.* returned to trenches in front of Le Sars.
12	Tu	6*th Bn.* went into the trenches. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Middle Wood Camp. 2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to huts in Martinsaart Wood.
13	W	1/4*th Bn.* to Scotts Redoubt Camp (South).
14	Th	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to camp at Bécourt.
15	F	6*th Bn.* to camp at Carnoy.
16	S	

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DECEMBER.

17 Su	
18 M	6*th Bn.* to huts at Guillemont.
19 Tu	6*th Bn.* to the trenches.
20 W	
21 Th	6*th Bn.* to Carnoy Camp.
22 F	6*th Bn.* to Méaulte Huts.
23 S	
24 Su	2/4*th B*[illegible]. and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to front-line trenches.
25 M	
26 Tu	
27 W	
28 Th	1/4*th Bn.* and 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* moved from Bécourt to Breslé.
29 F	2/4*th Bn.* to Martinsaart Farm. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Aveluy huts.
30 S	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Hedauville.
31 Su	

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JANUARY.

1 M	2*nd Bn.* in training at Fontaine-sur-Maye. 5*th Bn.* in Dainville trenches, near Arras. 6*th Bn.* moved to dug-outs near Bouleaux Wood. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* at Breslé.
2 Tu	6*th Bn.* moved into the trenches.
3 W	7*th Bn.* to Commandant—Palliasse Camps.
4 Th	6*th Bn.* from trenches to Bronfay Camp.
5 F	
6 S	
7 Su	6*th Bn.* to Combles.
8 M	2*nd Bn.* to billets at Prouville. 6*th Bn.* returned to the trenches.
9 Tu	2*nd Bn.* to Gezaincourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* by road and rail to Neuville and Forceville.
10 W	6*th Bn.* from trenches to Bronfay Camp.
11 Th	2*nd Bn.* to Talmas.
12 F	2*nd Bn.* to Rubempré.
13 S	2*nd Bn.* by motor-bus to Wolf Huts, west of Pozières. 6*th Bn.* to Bouleaux Wood area.
14 Su	6*th Bn.* into trenches, as before.
15 M	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Puchevillers.
16 Tu	2*nd Bn.* moved into the trenches; 6*th Bn.* from trenches to Bronfay Camp.

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JANUARY.

17 W	
18 Th	
19 F	
20 S	*2nd Bn.* to Bouzincourt
21 Su	*6th Bn.* in trenches.
22 M	
23 Tu	
24 W	*6th Bn.* to Bronfay Camp.
25 Th	*6th Bn.* to billets at Méaulte.
26 F	
27 S	
28 Su	*2nd Bn.* to Ovillers and Wolseley Huts, as Work Bn.
29 M	
30 Tu	*1/1st Bucks Bn.* to Hamel.
31 W	*6th Bn.* training at Méaulte.

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FEBRUARY.

1 Th	
2 F	*5th Bn.* from trenches to billets at Agny.
3 S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in camp at Cappy.
4 Su	2/4*th Bn.* to Brucamps. 2/1st *Bucks Bn.* to Villers.
5 M	2*nd Bn.* to Ovillers Huts in reserve. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support trenches at Biaches. 5*th Bn.* to Arras.
6 Tu	5*th Bn.* to Ronville; 6*th Bn.* to Guillemont.
7 W	6*th Bn.* to trenches.
8 Th	
9 F	2*nd Bn.* to trenches; 6*th Bn.* from trenches to Camp No. 5 Carnoy.
10 S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in reserve trenches at Herbecourt.
11 Su	5*th Bn.* returned to the trenches.
12 M	6*th Bn.* marched to Guillemont.
13 Tu	2*nd Bn.* from trenches to Ovillers Huts; 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Barleux trenches. 6*th Bn.* to trenches.
14 W	2*nd Bn.* as Works Bn. near Aveluy.
15 Th	6*th Bn.* returned to Carnoy Camp.
16 F	5*th Bn.* to billets in Dainville.

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FEBRUARY.

17 S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Camp Cappy.
18 Su	6*th Bn.* to Guillemont. 7*th Bn.* to Hill 420 camps.
19 M	6*th Bn.* to trenches.
20 Tu	
21 W	2*nd Bn.* moved to billets in Albert ; 6*th Bn.* to Carnoy Camp.
22 Th	
23 F	2*nd Bn.* returned to trenches (Dyke Valley).
24 S	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* in trenches (Ablaincourt and Spuds).
25 Su	
26 M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support trenches at Bois Achille.
27 Tu	2*nd Bn.* moved up into forward position. 5*th Bn.* returned to the trenches.
28 W	2/4*th Bn.* trenches raided by Germans.

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MARCH.

1	TH	2*nd Bn.* relieved from forward position and moved back into trenches. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Herbecourt (reserve).
2	F	2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Rainecourt.
3	S	2*nd Bn.* to Albert. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Marly Camp.
4	SU	
5	M	5*th Bn.* to Ronville.
6	TU	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Herbecourt (Sophie). 7*th Bn.* to Cugunci.
7	W	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in trenches between Barleux and La Maisonette.
8	TH	
9	F	
10	S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* had 3 officers and 15 men killed. 5*th Bn.* to Arras.
11	SU	2*nd Bn.* to Ovillers Huts. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* moved back into support.
12	M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* at Bois Achille.
13	TU	2*nd Bn.* to Dyke Valley and neighbourhood. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Camp Cappy. 5*th Bn.* marched from Arras to Fosseux.
14	W	7*th Bn.* to Doldzeli trenches, D sector.
15	TH	5*th Bn.* from Fosseux to Sombrin. 6*th Bn.* since 23rd February in and out of trenches.
16	F	6*th Bn.* to trenches, Morval sector.

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MARCH.

17	S	
18	Su	2/4*th Bn.* to Tour Carrée.
19	M	2*nd Bn.* digging on the Bidacourt Line, moved to Wolf Huts; 6*th Bn.* from front-line trenches to support area.
20	Tu	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to billets at Peronne.
21	W	2*nd Bn.* to Bruce Huts.
22	Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* Doignt Woods outpost line.
23	F	5*th Bn.* from Sombrin to Fosseux; 6*th Bn.* to Sailly-Saillisel.
24	S	2*nd Bn.* to Herissart. 7*th Bn.* to La Tortue trenches.
25	Su	6*th Bn.* camp near Guillemont Station.
26	M	2*nd Bn.* to Gezaincourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Tincourt.
27	Tu	2*nd Bn.* to Ligny-sur-Cauche. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Hamel and took over outposts.
28	W	2*nd Bn.* to Hericourt; 6*th Bn.* to Barastre.
29	Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Dobbins Column at Cartigny. 5*th Bn.* to Arras.
30	F	2*nd Bn.* to Floringhem.
31	S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* at Cartigny in reserve.

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APRIL.

1	Su	*6th Bn.* from Barastre to outpost line.
2	M	
3	Tu	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Longavesnes. *5th Bn.* to the trenches.
4	W	*5th Bn.* to Dunedin Caves.
5	Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in Brigade reserve at St. Emilie.
6	F	**America declared War on Germany.** *5th Bn.* at Christchurch Caves.
7	S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Marquaix.
8	Su	2*nd Bn.* proceeded to the Hermin-Frevillers area. *6th Bn.* relieved fr m trenches.
9	M	*5th Bn.* BATTLE EAST OF ARRAS: ATTACK ON THE HARP; casualtie , 12 officers and 180 other ranks.
10	Tu	2*nd Bn.* to Marœuil.
11	W	2*nd Bn.* to trenches in front of Roclincourt.
12	Th	*5th Bn.* to billets at Dainville; *6th Bn.* to Ruyaulcourt.
13	F	2*nd Bn.* moved forward to Farbus-Point du Jour line (in support). 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support north of St. Emilie. *5th Bn.* to billets at Lattre St. Quentin. *6th Bn.* to camp in Vallulart Wood.
14	S	2*nd Bn.* moved into front-line trenches. *5th Bn.* to billets at Liencourt.
15	Su	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* into the line about Malarris Farm.
16	M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* attack on TOMBOIS and PETIT PRIEL FARMS and CATALET COPSE; 5 officers wounded.

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APRIL.

17	Tu	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support at Villers-Faucon.
18	W	2*nd Bn.* moved back into support.
19	Th	6*th Bn.* to billets at Neuville.
20	F	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* in pursuit of Germans, at Holnon.
21	S	2*nd Bn.* exchanged lines with 2nd H.L.I.
22	Su	
23	M	5*th Bn.* marched to Fosseux; 6*th Bn.* to Havrincourt Wood support line.
24	Tu	5*th Bn.* to Bellacourt, and at night to The Harp. 7*th Bn.* ATTACK ON DOIRAN FRONT; 81 casualties. 8*th Bn.* also present as Pioneer battalion.
25	W	2*nd Bn.* moved to Bray. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support at Lempire. 5*th Bn.* to trenches near Wancourt.
26	Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support at Tombois Farm.
27	F	2*nd Bn.* moved to Transport bivouac and equipped for attack. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to front line.
28	S	2*nd Bn.* ATTACK ON ARLEUX-OPPY LINE; casualties, 7 officers and about 200 N.C.O.'s and men. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support. 2/4*th Bn.* C.-S.-M. Edward Brooks gained the Victoria Cross at Fayet.
29	Su	2*nd Bn.* holding ground gained. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Hamel. 5*th Bn.* to The Harp. 6*th Bn.* Capt. Boissier captured a German machine gun.
30	M	2*nd Bn.* relieved by a composite battalion. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Mons-en-Chausée and Estrée-en-Chausée.

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MAY.

1	Tu	*2nd Bn.* to trenches near Roclincourt.
2	W	*2nd Bn.* moved to Ecouvres.
3	Th	*5th Bn.* ATTACK ON HILLSIDE WORK (Vis en-Artois); casualties, 8 officers and 291 other ranks. *6th Bn.* to Vallulart Wood.
4	F	*2nd Bn.* to billets at Villers Brulin. *5th Bn.* moved from Niger trench to The Harp. *7th Bn.* to Vladaja Ravine; lost 24 men
5	S	*2nd Bn.* to Camblain Châtelain.
6	Su	
7	M	*7th Bn.* to La Tortue trenches.
8	Tu	*7th Bn.* ATTACK ON DOIRAN FRONT; casualties, 15 officers and 456 men. *8th Bn.* also engaged, and lost 35 all ranks.
9	W	*7th Bn.* to Vladaja Ravine.
10	Th	*5th Bn.* to Cojeul Switch.
11	F	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Flammicourt.
12	S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Maurepas. *6th Bn.* to billets at Equancourt.
13	Su	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Le Transloy. *6th Bn.* to trenches.
14	M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* took over line at Demicourt.
15	Tu	*5th Bn.* to The Harp area. *7th Bn.* to Bare Hill.
16	W	

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MAY.

17	TH	*2nd Bn.* marched to Bray. *2/4th Bn.* to Vicogne.
18	F	*2nd Bn.* to Les Quatre Vents Camp.
19	S	*1/1st Bucks Bn.* in support at Beaumetz.
20	SU	*7th Bn.* marched to Moravca.
21	M	*2/1st Bucks Bn.* to Barly. *7th Bn.* to Ereselli.
22	TU	*6th Bn.* from trenches to Ytres.
23	W	*6th Bn.* to Beaulencourt. *2/4th Bn.* to Barly.
24	TH	*2nd Bn.* took up support position in front of Willerval. *1/1st Bucks Bn.* to Hermies. *5th Bn.* to support trenches. *6th Bn.* to Favreuil.
25	F	*6th Bn.* relieved 56th Australians in trenches in front of Noreuil.
26	S	
27	SU	
28	M	*2nd Bn.* to front trenches in front of Arleux.
29	TU	*1/1st Bucks Bn.* to Velu Wood. *8th Bn.* employed on the Vardar Front. *5th Bn.* to front-line trenches.
30	W	
31	TH	*2nd Bn.* returned to Willerval position; *6th Bn.* to Vraucourt.

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JUNE.

1 F	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* at Velu Wood.
2 S	6*th Bn.* moved into support at Noreuil.
3 Su	2*nd Bn.* to Roclincourt. 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* in trenches at Hermies. 5*th Bn.* to Cojeul Switch.
4 M	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* carried out raid from Hermies.
5 Tu	2*nd Bn.* moved into support position; 6*th Bn.* to A Camp, Vraucourt.
6 W	2/4*th Bn.* to Monchy trenches; 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to trenches east of Guemappe.
7 Th	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* carried out raid from Hermies. 7*th Bn.* to Moravca.
8 F	2*nd Bn.* to Ecurie Wood Camp. 7*th Bn.* to Hirsova.
9 S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Beaumetz. 5*th Bn.* marched to Monchiet. 7*th Bn.* to Kalinova.
10 Su	5*th Bn.* to Laherlière. 2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Tilloy.
11 M	5*th Bn.* to Raincheval. 2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Berneville.
12 Tu	
13 W	5*th Bn.* to La Rosel Farm (Doulens-Amiens Road). 6*th Bn.* moved into reserve at Vaulx.
14 Th	2*nd Bn.* to camp east of Roclincourt.
15 F	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to front line, Hermies.
16 S	

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JUNE.

17 Su	*6th Bn.* moved from Vaulx into support line.
18 M	
19 Tu	
20 W	
21 Th	*2nd Bn.* by motor-bus to Bethune; 1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Velu. *6th Bn.* moved into front-line trenches.
22 F	*2nd Bn.* to trenches (Canal right sub-sector).
23 S	2/4*th Bn.* and 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* moved to Noeux and Frohen-le-Grand.
24 Su	
25 M	*6th Bn.* returned to A Camp, Vraucourt.
26 Tu	*6th Bn.* to billets at Achiet-le-Petit.
27 W	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to front line, Hermies. 2/1*st Bucks Bn.* to Rougefay
28 Th	
29 F	
30 S	1/1*st Bucks Bn.* to support at Beaumetz. *6th Bn.* by rail to billets at Montrelet, where remained until 21st July. *7th Bn.* to trenches Mamelon Noir—Wagon Hill.

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THE ARMY LIST.—1ST JULY, 1916.

THE OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY.

Regimental Dist. No. 43. [No. 7 District.]

The United Red and White Rose.

"Quebec, 1759." "Martinique, 1762, 1794." "Havannah." "Mysore." "Hindoostan." "Vimiera." "Corunna, "Busaco." "Fuentes d'Onor." "Ciudad Rodrigo." "Badajoz." "Salamanca." "Vittoria." "Pyrenees," "Nivelle." "Nive." "Orthes." "Toulouse." "Peninsula." "Waterloo." "South Africa, 1851-2-3." "Delhi, 1857." "New Zealand." "Relief of Kimberley." "Paardeberg." "South Africa. 1900-02."

Agents—Messrs. Cox & Co.

Regular and Special Reserve Battalions.
Uniform—Scarlet. Facings—White.

1st Bn. (43rd Foot) | **3rd Bn.** (Oxford Mil.) | **Depôt** .. .. *Oxford.*
2nd „ (52nd „) | | **Record Office** .. *Warwick.*

Territorial Force Battalions.

4th Bn. .. .. *Oxford* | **Buckinghamshire Bn.** .. *Aylesbury.*

Service Battalions .. **5th Bn.** | **6th Bn.** | **7th Bn.** | **8th Bn.**
2nd Reserve Battalion .. .. **9th Bn.**

Allied Regiment of Canadian Militia.
52nd Regiment (Prince Albert Volunteers,. *Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.*

Allied Regiment of Dominion of New Zealand.
6th (Hauraki) Regiment.

Colonel .. .. Colvile, Hon. Lt.-Gen. *Sir* F. M., *K.C.B.*, ret. pay [R] .. 14 Sept. 13

Officer Commanding Depôt Cuyler, Lt.-Col. *(temp.) Sir* C., *Bt.*, Maj. Res. of Off. 6Aug.14
Adjutant .. .. Maul, Maj. H. C., T.F. Res. 13Mar.15
Quarter-Master .. Pearson, Maj. C. C., Res. of Off. 6Aug.14
Attached .. .. Carnell, Qr.-Mr. *(hon. capt.)* C., ret. pay 8Aug.14
Boyd, 2nd Lt. *(temp.)* T., 9th Bn. 7Mar.16

1st and 2nd Battalions. (Regular.)

Lt.-Colonels.

1Lethbridge, E. A. E., *D.S.O.* 25Oct.13
2Eden, A. J. F., *D.S.O.* 18Sept.15
3June15

Majors.

2Ruck-Keene, H. L., *D.S.O.* 14Sept.07
(3) 2Darell-Brown, H. F., 18Sept.07
2Marriott-Dodington, W., *p.s.c.* 23Oct.11
bt. lt.-col. 1Jan.16
1Carter, L. J. 23June13
s. Pope-Hennessy, L. H. R., *D.S.O., p.s.c.* *[I]* 25Oct.15
26Mar.06
s. Stapleton, F. H., *p.s.c.* 18Sept.15
Clayton, E. R., *D.S.O., p.s.c.* 18Sept.15
s. Frith, C. H. 18Sept.15
Ballard, J. A. *(Empld. 17 Bn. R. W. Fus.)* 18Sept.15
1Henley, C. F. 18Sept.15
Bayley, A. G., *D.S.O., p.s.c.* 18Sept.15
s. Brooke-Popham, H. R. M., *D.S.O., p.s.c.* [F] *(temp. Brig.-Gen.)* 18Sept.15
bt. lt.-col. 3June16
s. Wood, H. L. 18Sept.15
s. Fuller, J. F. C., *p.s.c.* 18Sept.15
Keyworth, R. D. *(empld. 19 Bn. K.R. Rif. C.)* 18Sept.15

Majors—contd.

Weatherby, J. T., *D.S.O., p.s.c.* 18Sept.15
18Feb.15
s. Sullivan, G. A., *D.S.O.*, [F] 18Sept.15
2Higgins, C.G., *D.S.O.* *[I] (empld. 17 Bn. R. Fus.)* 18Sept.15
(3) Tunnard, L. 18Sept.15
Pollock, J. A. 18Sept.15
2Dillon, H. M., *D.S.O.* 18Sept.15

Captains.

1Morland, W. E. T. 22Jan.14
c.o. *Parr, B. C.* 14Mar.14
Stephens, R 14Mar.14
t. *Bartlett, J.J.N.* 22Mar.14
f.c. *Bourke, C.J. D.* 18Apr.14
s. *Blewitt, G.* 18Apr.14
bt. m j 3June16
f.c. *Holt, F.V.*, D.S.O. 25July14
s.s. Sanderson, A.E. 25July14
(2) Scott, L. F., *Res. of Off.* —
Fitzgerald, C., 3 *Bn.* —
s. 1Whittall, G. E. 8Jan.15
c.o. *Portal, J. L.* 17May15
2*Crosse, R. B.*, D.S.O., *(temp. m j* 1 *Mar.* 16) 17May15
bt. m j 3June16
(6) Boyle, C. R. C. 17May15
s. *Terry, W. E. C.* 10June15
Tolson, W. G. *(Off. Cadet Bn.)* 10June15
s. *Paget, B. C. T.* 10June15
Powell, J. J. 10June15
(5) Plowden, G. F. 10June15
2Southey, J. A. 10June15
1Mundey, S.A.C.B. 10June15
Paris, A.C.M. (Empld. under Admy.) 18Oct.15
Baines, C. S., D.S.O. 18Oct.15
s.s. *Brett, R. J.* 18Oct.15

Captains—contd.

(2) Rawson H. W. H., *3 Bn.* —
(2) Goodwyn, L. J., *3 Bn.* —
2Owen, R. M. 25Nov.15
Birch-Reynardson, H. T. 25Nov.15
2Boardman, J.H. 25Nov.15
i.c. *Horan, K.* 14Dec.15
1Titherington, G. W., 2Mar.16

Lieutenants.

Hanbury-Williams, C. F. R. *(Recog. Duties)* 6Aug.14
2Barran, C. A. 28Feb.15
2Withington, T. E. 17May15
2*Sewell, D. A. D. *(A.D.C., Inf. Base* 10June15
Wade, J. W. G. 10June15
Whitfield, E. H. G. 10June15
Barnes, C. W. H. *(attd. Rif. Brig.)* 10June15
1Maude, J. W. 10June15
2Carly, A. G. *(attd. Hamps. R.)* 10June15
Eighteen, W. J. 10June15
1Mason, A. E. 10June15
(2) Chevallier, C. T., *3 Bn.* —
1Lovcrock, R. C. 18Aug 15
1Naylor, G. 27Sept.15
1Murphy, D. 27Oct.15
Webster, P. L. C., *3 Bn.* —
2Field, G. 25Nov.15
2Dean, C. 25Nov.15
1Wooding, W.W. 25Nov.15
2Kite, R. B. *(temp. Capt. 6 Apr. 16)* 25Nov.15
2Barnard, W. L. 14Dec.15
*Barnes, R. M. 13Feb 16
2Belgrave J. D. 13Feb.16
2Littledale, W. J. 2Mar.16

2nd Lieutenants.

(2) Slocock, C. H. B., *3 Bn.* —
2*Gibbons, A. G. 22Dec.14
*Farnes, D. T. 22Dec 14
2*Harrison, N. S. 23Dec.14
2*Baker, C. B. 1Jan.15
2*Martin, V. C. *(attd. Rif. Brig.)* 1Jan.15
(3) Slade-Baker, J. B. 13Jan.15
(3) Clarke, N. G. 13Jan.15
2*Walding, T. W. 25Jan.15
s. 1*Solomon J. B. 27Jan.15
f.c. *Pendaris, L. V.*, D.S.O. 31Jan 15
2Peploe K. 17Feb.15
*Banham, G. W. R. *(attd. Hamps. R.)* 26Feb.15
2Grant, J. G. 6Mar.15
2*Ware, W. I. B. 12May15
2*Middleditch, A. W. 10June15
(2) Rathbone, J. E. V., *3 Bn. Dorset R.* —
(3) Fanning V. E. 16June15
1Smyth, H. E. F. 16June15
(2) Dixon, F. C., *3 Bn. Dorset R.* —
(2) Warde, B. C. C., *3 Bn.* —
(2) Chown, W. L., *3 Bn. Dorset R.* —
2Caulfeild-Stoker, T. G. C. 2July15
2Tyrwhitt-Drake, T. 14July15
2Ionides, T. A., *3Bn.* —
2Hardcastle, J. B. *(temp. Capt. 14 Mar. 16)* 11Aug.15
(3) Sturges, O.H.M. 11Aug.15
2*Parkes, M.F.M. 14Aug.15
(2) Chippindale, F. W. C., *Spec. Res.* —
1Hardie, F. M. 15Sept.15
(3) Dowson, L. S. 15S pt.15
2*Bobby, P. A. 30Oct.15

* Temporary.

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1st and 2nd Bns.—*contd.*

2nd Lieutenants—contd.

2 Hill, N. W. 20Oct.15
Packe, E. A. 4Nov.15
i.r. Sumption, P. 7Nov.15
(3) Blackwell, R. 24Nov.15
(3) Giles, L. W. 24Nov.15
(3) Booth, P. 24Nov 15
*Bristowe, A. H. (*Empld. under Min. of Munitions*) 29Nov,15
2* Ellam, H. J. 12Dec.15
Tipping, F. W. (*Musk. Duties*) 18Dec.15
2* Murray, J. B. 16Jan 16
2* Webster, R. E. A. 23Jan.16
3 Neville, J. E. H. 26Jan.16
2 Vigars, E. H. 13Feb.16
f.c. McKeay, E. 27Feb.16
2* Fielding, M. G. 5Mar.16
2* Maul, R. S. L. 5Mar 16
2 Horley, C. R. 4Apr.16
(3 Lowndes, F.C L.A. 7Apr.16
(3) Whitehead, P.H.R. 7Apr.16
(3) Vernon, H. 7Apr.16
2 *Holland, J.D.C. 23Apr 16
2 *Pluckrose, R.G. 23Apr.16
Wykeham-Martin, C. C. (*attd.* 10 *Bn. K.R. Rif. C.*) 4May16

Adjutants.

2 Whitfeld, E. H., *lt* 1Mar.16

Quarter-Masters.

r. *King, T.* 24Nov.97
hon. maj. 24Nov.12
1 Ivey, T. 22Sept.03
hon. capt. 22Sept.13
5 Roberts, F.M., *hon. lt.* 25Aug.14
2 Warnock, A., *hon. lt.* 10Mar.15

Attached.

(1) Crake, Maj. R. H., K. O. Sco. Bord

Special Reserve.

Captain.

Button, G. T. (*H*) 6Nov.15

Lieutenant.

(2) Chippindale, F.W.C. to Aug 15

3rd Battalion. (Reserve.)

(See page xl. *as to honorary Army rank granted on account of Militia embodiment.)*

Hon. Colonel.

✕*Marlborough*, Rt. Hon. *C. R. J.*, Duke of, K.G. TD. (*Lt. Col. ret. T.F.*) (*temp. Lt.-Col. in Army*) (*Spec. Appt.*) 14June08

Lt.-Colonel.

Higgins Bernard, F. T. (Q) (*H*) 31Mar.12

Majors.

p.s. Blyth, J., *hon. l.c.* (*H*) 5May06
s. ✕Paske, G. F., *hon. l.c.* (*Hon. Capt. in Army* 2 *Nov.*00) (*H*) 12Sept.06
r.e. ✕Darell Brown, H. F. 18Sept.07

Majors—contd.

s. ✕Fitzwilliam, W. C. de M., *Earl, K.C.V.O., D.S.O.* (*Bt. Lt.-Col. W. Rid. R.H.A.*) 10Mar.16

Captains.

p.s. Barrington, *Hon.* W. R. S., *hon. m.* (*H*) 6Jan.07
North, A. K., *late* 2nd Lt. A.S.C. 4June02
Godsal, P. (*H*) 7June02
s. ✕*Cardwell, C. A.*, Capt. ret. (*H*) ⑨ 7Apr.06
✕*Salkeld, R. E.* (*Dist. Commr., E. Africa Prote.* 12 *July* 06) (*Empld.* 5 *Bn. Glouc. R.*) 12July06
p.s. Dashwood, R. H. S., Capt. ret. pay (*H*) ⑨ *s.* 1Dec.07
(2) Fitzgerald, C., Lt. ret. pay 8May11
Jackson, H. N., Lt. ret. pay (*Instnl. Duties*) 14Aug.13
Maul, H. C. (*H*) 10Oct.14
p s. Tatton, R. H. G. (*H*) 10Oct.14
✕*Spencer, A. V.*, D.S.O. (*H. Adjt.*) 2Feb.15
Smith, J. N. (*Asst. Dist. Offr. N. Provs. Nigeria,* 1 *Jan.*14 to 19 *Sept.*10) 6Nov.15
(5) ✕Fowke, C. A. F. 6Nov.15
(2) Rawson, H. W. H. 6Nov.15
(5) Tuck, D. J. 6Nov.15
Johnston, J. L. 6Nov.15
Newbolt, A. F. 6Nov.15
(2) Goodwyn, L. J. 6Nov.15
Minifie-Hawkins, S. M. 6Nov.15
s. Walters, F. P. 6Nov.15
Evetts, A. F. 10Mar.16
Ridout, P. M. 10Mar.16

Lieutenants.

(?) Chevallier, C. T. 17Aug.15
(2) Webster, P. L. C. 6Nov.15
(2) Slocock, C. H. B. 17Feb.16
(6) McConnell, R. L 17Feb.16
s. Dashwood, H. G. 17Feb.16
(5) Foreshew, T. W. C. 17Feb 16
Griffith-Williams, M. S. 17Feb.16
m.g. Stephens, C. G. 17Feb.16

2nd Lieutenants.

‡Williams, T. P. 16Dec 14
Radford, H.D.H. 30Dec.14
‡Griffith, E. N. 2Jan.15
Rowe, W. C. 27Feb 15
Riddle, A. E. S. 30Mar.15
Foreshew, C. E. P. 31Mar 15
Huggard, G. C. 18Apr.15
Atkins, C. 23Apr.15
Griffin, S. J. 23Apr.15
‡Coles, W. T. 23Apr.15
‡FitzGerald, R. A. 25Apr 15
Gardner, A. E. 5May15
‡Webster-Jones, A. O. W. 9May15
Adams, H. C. 14May15
Riley, C. H. 19May15
Rance, W. 20May15
‡May, R. A. 26May15
Davenport, C. T. 29May15
Tunnard, T. E. 29May15
‡Kellet, J. A. 10June15
‡Watts, L. R. 11June15
Milford, T. R. 11June15
‡Campbell, H. D. C. 14June15
‡Seccombe, P. 14June15
(6) ‡Fussell, J. W. H. 14June15
‡Rock, L. J. 17June15

2nd Lieutenants—contd.

‡Holiday, W.G. 24June15
Crocombe, F.R. 26June15
‡Roberts, B F. 26June15
(2) Wards, E.C.C. 26June15
‡Reddy, T. H. 26June15
(2, ‡Ionides, T. A. 14July15
‡Scott, J. H.F. 24July15
‡Lester-Smith, W. C. 24July15
‡Rose, J. J. T. 24July15
‡Walden, H. R. 31July15
‡Line, W. 4Aug.15
‡Owen, L. V. D. 26Aug.15
‡England, R. 26Aug.15
‡Hutchison, T. 26Aug.15
‡Osborne, V. E. 26Aug.15
‡Moore, E. 25Sept.15
‡Vidal, C. J. 25Sept.15
‡Brindley, W. T. 25Sept.15
‡Porteous, F. P. 4Oct.15
‡Harper, C. C. 7Oct.15
‡Brooke, A.H.B. 27Oct.15
‡Rayner, H.E.W. 16Nov.15
‡Riley, C. R. 24Nov.15
‡Clifton, W. G. T. 27Nov.15
‡Fullbrook-Leggatt, L. E. W. O. 29Nov.15
‡Huntley, E. K., 24Dec.15
‡Owen, D. G. 22Jan.16
Ramsay, W. A. 2June16

Adjutant.

✕Spencer, A. V., *D.S.O., capt* 17Jan.16

Quarter-Master.

✕King, T., *hon. maj.*

4th Battalion. (Territorial.)

"South Africa, 1900-01." St. Cross Road, Oxford.

Hon. Colonel.

North, W. H. J., Lord, TD. *late* Lt. 1 L.G. 9Jan.95

Lt.-Colonels.

2*p.s.* Ames, W. H. TD (Q), *hon. c.* *8Sept.14 11June04
p.s. Schofield, F. W. (*H*) (Q), TD, *s.* 1Jan.15
3*p.* Stockton, A., TD, (*H*) (8). *30Apr.15 30Nov.09

Majors.

1*p.* ✕Ovey, R.L., *D.S.O.* (*Lt.-Col. 28 Dec.* 15) 30Nov.09
2 Beaman, G. P. R. Maj. ret. Ind. Army *27Sept.14
3 ✕Slessor, A. K., Capt. ret. pay *29Sept.14
3 Seymour, G. W., *late* Capt. R. Ir. Fus. *30 Sept.14
p.s. 3 Rowell, R. R. S. 1Jan.15

Captains.

2*p.s.* Rose, D. M. (*H*) (*Mj 14 Apr.* 16) *Adjt.* 20Dec.05
1*p.s.* Fortescue, E. C. 1Apr.08
c.p.s. Fox, T. S. W. (*H*) 1Dec.09
3*p.* Coleman, E. G. *5Aug.14
Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes, Hon. *L. J. E., f.c.* 27Oct.14
1 Jones, F. B. 10Dec.14
✕*Long, B.* (*H*) (*Brig. M.G. Offr.*) 11Dec.14

Captains—contd.

1 ✕Pickford, P. 1Jan.15
Taylor, F. W. (*Jun. Supt. Educn. Dept., Nigeria*, 17 *June* 14) 19Oct.15
Jee, A. C. 19Oct.15
Brakspear, A. R. *20Nov.15 8Oct.14

Lieutenants.

2 Brucker, A.H. (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) *14Sept.14
Gray, W. T., late Lt. Impl. Yeo. (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) *14Sept.14
2 Bennett, H.J. (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) *14Sept.14
2 Davenport, H. N., (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) *14Sept.14
2 Cuthbert, R.F. (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) *14Sept.14
3 Barton, C. J. 28Nov.14
1 ✕Rose, G. K. (*Capt. 10 June* 15) 10Dec.14
2 Abraham, R. L. 1Jan.15
3 Deacon, H.J. (*Capt. 27 June* 16) 12May15
3 Cranmer, J. E. A. 4June15
2 Stockton J. G. 26July15
Wilsdon, H. A. (*Empld. Mily. M.G. Cos*) 19Oct.15
1 Wayman, W. A. 20Oct.15
Robinson, G. A. H. *4Nov.15 3Feb.15
1 Brooks, B. B. B. (*Capt. 20 Feb.* 16) 11Jan.16
1 Gibson, A. K. 19Feb.16

2nd Lieutenants.

1 Grisewood, F. H. (*Lt. 10 June* 15) 12Sept.14
Barnett, J. C. L., *s.* (*Lt. 9 Dec.* 14) 14Sept.14
2 Boyle, R. F. R. P. (*Capt. 28 July* 15) 14Sept.14
2 Marcon, C. S. W. (*Lt. 25 July* 15) 14Sept.14
2 Harris, H.T.T. (*Capt. 9 Dec.* 14) 14Sept.14
1 Bridges, E.E. (*Lt. 20 Dec.* 15) *Adjt* 14Sept.14
Brown, D. C. 14Sept.14
2 Brown, K. E. (*Lt. 14 Apr.* 16) 14Sept.14
2 Sanderson, J. F. B., *s.* 6Oct.14
1 Greenwell, G. H. (*Lt. 3 Oct* 15) 8Oct.14
3 Andrews, A. N. (*Capt. 5 June* 15) 8Oct.14
1 Edmunds, M. W. (*Capt. 23 Apr.* 16) 8Oct14
2 Scott, W. D. (*Capt. 14 Apr.* 16) 11Jan.15
m.g. Cooper, M. C. (*Lt. 12 Nov.* 15) 16Jan.15
2 Simpson-Hayward, G. H. (*Capt. 14 Apr.* 16) 20Jan.15
2 Parsons, C. R. 20Jan.15
Strang, M. 21Jan.15
1 Fortescue, T. R. (*Lt. 11 Jan.* 16) 23Jan.15
1 Hall, T. N. 1Feb.15
3 Etty, J. L. 1Feb.15
2 Tiddy, R.J.E. (*Lt. 29 July* 15) (*Instnl. Duties 7 Dec.* 15) 16Feb.15
2 Proctor, A.W. (*Lt. 14 Apr.* 16) 19Feb.15
Mitchell, J. G. 26Feb.15
1 Craig, C. C. (*Lt. 11 Jan.* 16) 5Mar.15

* Temporary. ‡ On probation.

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THE OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY—Regtl. Dist. No. 43—*contd.*

4th Bn.—*contd.*

2nd Lieutenants—contd.
1Judson, H. L. 9Mar.15
1Lake, R. St G. (*Lt. 20 Feb.* 16) 9Mar.15
Mason, C. R. 19Mar.15
Coombes, J. C., t.m. 7Apr 15
1Frieake, G. M. 7Apr.15
3Wood, G. R. (*Capt. 1 May* 15) 1May15
3Hunt, A. S. (*Lt. 1 May* 15) 1May15
2⚔Zeder, J. H. 1May15
3Stockton, H.O. (*Lt. 15 Dec.* 15) 3May15
3Gamlen J.C.B. *Adjt.* (*Lt. 15 Dec.* 15) 6May15
3Stevenson, G. H. (*Lt. 6 May* 15) 6May15
3Hunter, L.W. (*Lt. 15 Dec.* 15) 6May15
1Lakin, C. 6May15
3Stainer, C. L. (*Lt. 6 May* 15) 6May15
3Greey, F. L. 12May15
2Shepherd, G. H. G. (*Lt. 14 Apr.* 16) 15May15
1Shepherd, J. G. 15May15
1Hunt, R. N. C. 19May15
3Wallace, W. J. L. (*Lt. 15 Dec.* 15) 1June15
3Palmer, G. H. E. 12June15
2Miller, J. G. R. (*Lt. 14 Apr.* 16) 19June15
1Smith, E. E. 5July15
1Enoch, W. H. 15July15
2Moberley, W. H. 17July15
1Wrong, H. H. 20July15
3Callender, J. C. 23July15
3Searby, H. R. 23July15
1Blake, J. E. 24July15
2Coombs, H. E. 24July15
1Rawlinson, G. M. 4Aug.15
Hancock, C. V. 20Sept.15
1Jeffreson, H. 20Sept.15
3Affleck, R. 27Sept.15
3Hunt, C. S. 27Sept.15
1Sherrington, C. E. R. 28Sept.15
2Roche, R. E. 30Oct.15
Raby, G. H. 6Oct.15
2Bulmer, J. L. 7Oct.15
3Fowler, H. C. 7Oct.15
2Hopkinson, J. 7Oct.15
Sharpe, C. P. 8Oct.15
1Taylor, H. S. 8Oct.15
Webb, E. N. F. 15Oct.15
Guest, H. R. 19Oct.15
3Eldridge, W. M. 20Oct.15
1Townsend, F.O. 22Oct.15
1Millard, W. M. 22Oct.15
1Powell, A. H. 28Oct.15
1Early, J. H. 19Nov.15
3Harrington, M. J. 20Nov.15
2Roffey, J. S. 23Nov.15
2Bianchi, E. A. 25Nov.15
3Loveday, W. T. (*Lt. 15 June* 16) 28Nov.15
1Hunt, A. N. 28Nov.15
Mitchell, W. F. 30Nov.15
1Pearson, H. F. 5Dec.15
1Pearson, G. E. 5Dec.15
1Jones, F. E. 12Dec.15
1Lay, F. C. 19Dec.15
3Loveday, D. G. 20Dec.15
3Mackay, J. E. (*on prob.*) 26Jan.16
1Lidsey, W. J. (*on prob.*) 12Feb.16
3Eldridge, J. G. 12Feb.16
1Smith, S. 9Apr.16
Shilton, A. V. (*on prob.*) 9June16

Adjutants.
2Rose, D. M., Capt. (*Maj.*) 13Oct.15
3Gamlen, J. C. B., 2nd Lt. (*Lt.*) 4Jan.16
1Bridges, E. E., 2nd Lt. (*Lt.*) 10Feb.16

Quarter-Masters.
1*p.s.*⚔Bridgewater, A. A., *hon. m.* 30Dec.05
2Hobbs, W. A., *hon. lt.* 24Nov.14
3King, W. G., *hon. lt.* 1May15

Medical Officers.
1Summerhayes, Maj. J. O., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd.*) 25Apr.15
2Howard, Capt. V., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*Maj. 17 Jun.*15) (*attd.*) 8Feb.13
Meikle, Capt. R.W., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd*) 5Aug.14
Gauntlett, Capt. H. L., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd.*) *14Sept.14
2Worsley, Lt. A.N., *M.B.* R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd.*) 1Apr.15
1Apr.13
1Dec.15

Chaplains.
Curry-Elwes, *Rev.* A., *M.A.*, Chapl. 4th Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 1Apr.08
Smith, *Rev.* E. F., *M.A.*, Chapl. 4th Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 14Mar.08
Streatfeild, *Rev.* F., Chapl. 4th Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 1Apr.08
28Mar.06
10Oct.14

Attached.
3Thompson, Capt. P.T.L., 79 Inf. 10Oct.14

[Uniform—*Scarlet* Facings—*White.*]

Cadet Units affiliated.

Cowley Cadet Corps.
Burford Grammar School Cadet Corps.
Lord William's Grammar Sch., Thame, Cadet Corps.

Buckinghamshire Battalion. (Territorial.)

"South Africa, 1900–02." Aylesbury.

Hon. Colonel.
p.s. Fremantle, Hon. *T.F.* VD (*T*) (*H*) 24 Mar.06
2Sept.15

Lt.-Colonels.
2*p.* Williams, H. M., VD. (*T*) *14 Aug.14
18Apr 11
1Doig, C. P., *D.S.O.*(*M j. Sco. Highrs.*) *9Mar.15

Majors.
Hooker, J. H. †17Oct.11
2Chadwick, J. VD. 18Apr.14
3Gilbey, A., VD. (*Lt.-Col. and Hon. Col. ret. Vols.*) (*to command Bn.*) (*Lt.-Col.* 5 Nov. 15) *11Apr.15

Captains.
1⚔Hawkins, L. C. (*Hon. Lt. in Army* 18*June* 01) (*Lt.-Col. 27 Feb.* 16) 31Aug.01
1*p.s.* Reynolds, L. L. C. (*M. j. 27 Feb.* 16) 18July08
2*p.s.* Barrett, H. L. C. (*M. j. 20 Feb.* 16) 19Mar.04
1*Baker, A. B. L.* 19June12
1*p.s.* Crouch, L. W. (Q) (*H*) 19June12
3*p.s.* Addington, J. G., *Lord* (*H*) 20Sept.13
1Birchall, E. V. D. 5Oct.13
Mitchell, C. J., Capt. Res. of Off., (*M j.* 1 *Sept.* 14) 18Apr.14
2*p.s.* Christie-Miller, G. (*M. j. 3 Mar.* 16) *A j.* *5Aug.14
5Aug.07
2*p.s.* Vernon, S. R. (*Capt. ret. T.F.*) *5Aug.14
21Jan.11
2Bowyer, G. E. W., *A j.* 18Sept.14
p. *Hankin, G. T.* (*sp. emp.*) (q.) *3Nov.14
17July08
⚔*Harding, R. W.*, Capt. ret. pay, (*Res. of Off.*) (*A j.* 11 Dec. 15) *s* *11Nov.14

Lieutenants.
Littledale, E. H. (*temp. Lt. R.E.*) 1July11
3Crouch, G. R. (*B.*) (*Capt. 1 Sept.* 14) 10June12
1Hall, P. A. (*H*) (*Capt. 1 Sept.* 14) 17Sept.12
1⚔Reid, N. S. (*Capt. 12 Sept.* 14) 17Sept.12
1Jackson, G. G. (*Capt. 1 Sept.* 14) 6Nov.13
1⚔Combs, H. V. (*Capt. 21 May* 14) 12Feb.14
1(*p.*) Vernon, A. S. (*Capt. 6 June* 15) *5Aug.14
12Sept.02
3Viney, O. V. (*Capt. 6 June* 15) 18Sept.14
Buckmaster, R. A. 28Sept.14
Fremantle, *Hon.* W. *21Sept.14
Green, B., m.g. 20Oct.15
Simpson, G. H. (*Capt. 5 May* 15) 20Oct.15
List, A. P. (*Capt. 10 Oct.* 14) 20Oct.15
Kennish, A. C. E. F. 20Oct.15
1Reynolds F. G. B. 20Oct.15

2nd Lieutenants.
c.c. Bowen, M. 18Sept.14
1Norwood, R. C. 28Sept.14
1⚔Burnett Brown, A. D. (*Lt. 6 May* 15) 28Sept.14
1Young, R. E. M. 28Sept.14
1Woolterton, E. N. C. (*Lt. 6 May* 15) ‡Sept.14
3Hobbs-Hampden, G. M. A. (*Lt. 6 May* 15) *28Sept.14
Wright, E. L. (*Capt. 10 June* 15) *s. 3Sept.14
1Earl, F. D. (*Lt. 1 July* 15) 5Sept.14
2Stewart Liberty, I. (*Capt. 25 July* 15) 6Sept.14
1Hill, J. S. B. (*Lt. 10 Sept. 14*) 10Sept.14
2Stevens, G. C. (*Capt. 2 Apr.* 16) 21Sept.14
2Buckmaster, H. S. G. (*Capt. 5 May* 15) 21Sept.14

2nd Lieutenants—contd.
1Rolleston, J. M. 21Sept.14
1Gregson-Ellis, R. G. (*Lt. 10 June* 15) 21Sept.14
2Cummins, W. A. (*Capt. 8 Oct.* 15) 30Sept.14
1Troutbeck, G. L. 20Oct.14
2Ranger, V. W. H. (*Capt. 2 Apr.* 16) 20Oct.14
2Phipps, C. P. (*Lt. 2 Apr.* 16) 31Oct.14
2Chadwick, D. G. (*Lt. 18 Aug.* 15) 31Oct.14
3Firminger, J. E. (*Lt. 15 June* 16) 31Oct.14
2Church, H. (*Capt. 25 July* 15) 31Oct.14
2Greene, W. A. (*Capt. 22 Aug.* 15) 21Dec.14
2Symonds, R. F. (*Lt. 2 Dec.* 15) 24Dec 14
Ollard, F. D. 29Jan.15
1Wright, P. L. (*Lt. 10 June* 15) 4Feb.15
1Neave, G. V. 18Feb.15
1Hales, J. B. 20Feb.15
2Letts, E. M. (*Lt. 2 Apr.* 16) 20Feb.15
3Bishop, S. D. (*Lt. 2 Dec.* 15) 20Feb.15
2Atkinson, G. W. (*Lt. 2 Apr.* 16) 20Feb.15
Williamson, N. B. (*Empld. Brig. M.G. Cos.*) 20Feb.15
3Newbery, R. J. 19Mar.15
1Pullman, H. J. 23Mar.15
3Gilbey, A. R. (*Capt. 11 Jan.* 16) 5May15
22Jan.15
3Gray, J. McC. T. (*Capt. 2 May* 16) 15May15
1Chapman, J. P. (*Lt. 4 Dec.* 15) 1June15
1God[illegible], A. P. (*Lt. 1 Oct.* 15) 2June15
3Rowland, R. (*Capt. 2 May* 16) 3June15
2Wells, P. E. (*Lt. 2 Apr.* 16) 9June15
1Hall, C. (*Lt. 4 Dec.* 15) 18June15
3Irby, G. N. (*Capt. 2 May* 16) 10June15
2Long, E. W. (*Lt. 20 June* 15) 20June15
2Hudson, R. B. 20June15
3Vaughan, F. G. 17July15
3Heath, W. R. (*Lt. 8 June* 16) 19July15
Sanford, J. C. 21July15
1Bates, E. G. H. 27July15
3Foster H. R. (*Lt. 6 Feb.* 16) 1Aug.15
3Flint, N. S. (*Lt. 6 Feb.* 16) 14Aug.15
2Phillips, A. H. 24Aug.15
3Frith, P. L. (*Capt. 2 May* 16) *A j* 28Sept.15
Rutherford, J. S. 28Sept.15
1Mason, H. C. E. 26Sept.15
2Quayle, J. B. 30Sept.15
3Pratt, H. J. 8Oct.15
1Rover, F. H. 15Oct.15
1Rigden, B. C. 15Oct.15
3Borman, F. E. 28Oct.15
1Abrey, C. G. 29Oct.15
2Capdeville, F. J. 1Nov.15
1Hoff, W. H. 4Nov.15
2Tubbs, A. (*Lt. 2 Dec.* 15) ‡6Nov.15
*9Apr.15
1Aitken, R. 7Nov.15
2Pitcher, A. T. 10Nov.15
1Trimmer, W. C. 27Nov.15
‡1Molloy, H. E. 27 Jan.16
‡3Hathorn, C. K. 14Apr.16
‡Fallon, D. (*Lt. 11 June* 16) 11June16

* Temporary

‡ On probation.

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THE OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY—Regtl. Dist. No. 43—*contd.*

Bucks Bn.—*contd.*

2nd Lieutenants—contd.

‡Reeves, C. D. 11June16
‡Duxbury, A.M. 18June16
‡Hughes, R. G. 18June16
‡Hill, C. V. 18June16
‡Taylor, H. S. 18June16

Adjutants.

Bartlett, A. J. N. Capt Oxf. & Bucks. L.I. 25Feb.13
Christie-Miller, G., Capt. (*Maj.*) 29Apr.15
2Bowyer, G. E. W., *Capt.* 10May16
Frith, P. L., 2nd Lt. (*Capt.*) 10May16

Quarter-Masters.

2Waller, D., *hon. lt.* 25Sept.14
1⚔Nichol, E., *hon. lt.* 17Feb.15
3Inder, H. J., *hon. lt.* 8May15

Medical Officers.

2Wilson, Lt. J. E. S., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd.*) 4Dec.15
3Thompson, Lt. M., R.A.M.C. (T.F.) (*attd.*) 22Feb.16

Chaplains.

Wethered, *Rev.* O. H., *M.A.*, TD., Chapl. 2nd Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 2June12 2June97
Whitechurch, *Rev.* V. L., Chapl. 4th Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 2Dec.14
Phipps, *Rev. Canon* C.O., *M.A.*, Chapl. 4th Class (T.F.) (*attd.*) 2Dec.14

Attached.

2nd Lieutenants.

Markham, T. S., Hunts. Cycl. Bn.
Ionides, A. A., 7 Bn. Devon R.
Floyd, F. R., 7 Bn. Devon R.
Relf, T. J., 7 Bn. Devon R.

[Uniform—*Dark Grey.* Facings—*Scarlet.*]

Cadet Units affiliated.

Aylesbury Grammar School Cadet Corps.
Slough Secondary School Cadets.

5th (Service) Battalion.

In Command.

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

Majors.

*⚔Webb, W. F. R. (*Bt. Maj. 22 Punjabis*) (*temp. Lt.-Col.* 1 *Oct.* 15) 13Mar.15

Captains.

⚔Plowden, Capt. G. F., Oxf. & Bucks. L.I. 1Oct.14 10June15
*⚔Barwell, N. F. 26Apr.15
*Maude, E. W. 26Sept.15

Captains—contd.

*Cooke, B. K. 18Oct.15
*Tuck, D. J., Lt. 3 Bn. 25Oct.15

Lieutenants.

*Crawford, C. B. 1Oct.14
*Ridge-Jones, A. (*temp. Capt. 7 Mar.* 16) 7Oct.14
*Day, H. J. T., (*Empld. Recg. Duties* 23 *May* 16) 3Nov.14 24July15
*Bird, S. H. 28Dec.14 24July15
*Newman, L. S. M. 10Jan.15 24July15
*Higgins, D. S. 2Feb.15 13Dec.15
*Smith, H. V., (*temp. Capt.* 26 *Oct.* 15) 5Feb.15 5Oct.15
*⚔Walker, A. C., 28Apr.15 18June15
*Sweet-Escott, L. W. 13May15
McConnell, R. L. 3 *Bn.*
Foreshew, T. W. C., 3 *Bn.*
*Greene, G. S. 8Dec.15 22Apr.16

2nd Lieutenants.

*⚔Lee, L. S. 26Aug.14
*Beckingham, W. T. 22Sept.14
*Statt, C. C. 22Sept.14
*Walter, C. H. 10Oct.14
*Gray, G. G. 22Dec.14
*Clutsom, C. A. 22Dec.14
*Beaver, H. A. 23Dec.14
*Le Messurier, H. A. 30Dec.14
*Prodger, S. E. 14Jan.15
*Bradley, G. 26Jan.15
*⚔Rodocanachi, T. E., 3 Bn. Hamps. R.
Sebastian, S. R., 3 Bn. Hamps. R.
*Carter, K. V. 10Mar.15
*⚔Cupper, H. J. 20Mar.15
Robinson, H. W. 7 *Bn.*
*Turner, A. G. 10June15
*Weston-Webb, H. 10June15
Fussell, J. W. H., 3 *Bn.*
*Mitchell, J. M. G. 15Aug.15
*Tolley, C. H. 15Aug.15
*Tompkins, A. L. 7Oct.15
*Farmer, B. H. 20Oct.15
*Robertson, H. A. 26Oct.15
Packe, E. A., Oxf. & Bucks. L.I. —
*Shaw, A. J. 5Dec.15
*Ford, W. A. 30Jan.16
*Jacks, O. L. 5Mar.16
*Walrond, F. H. 5Mar.16
‡*Styles, H. G. 23Apr.16

Adjutant.

Quarter-Master.

Roberts, F. M., *hon. lt.* 25Aug.14

6th (Service) Battalion.

In Command.

⚔White, Lt.-Col. E. D., *C.M.G.*, 6Sept.14 23Oct.11

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

*Osborne, J. E. 19Nov.15

Major.

*Boyle, C. R. C, (Capt. Oxf. & Bucks. L.I.) 11Mar.16

Captains.

*Williams, R. M. 11Oct.14
*Pears, T. 5Jan.15
*Bryant, J. E. 18Jan.15
*Stephens, H. E. 5Feb.15
*Baines, A. B. 1Oct.15
*Boissier, J. S. 17Oct.15
*Shaw, E. A. 19Nov.15

Lieutenants.

**Anderson, E. J., *Adjt.* 22Oct.15
*Hunt, R. L. G. 5Feb.15
*Middleditch, G. E. 26Mar.15
*Johnston, C. F. 5July15
*Rogers, R. B. 1Oct.15
*Fagan, B. W. 17Oct.15
*Sutherland, H. J. 17Nov.15
*Gosset, A. C. V. 20Nov.15

2nd Lieutenants.

*Burn, D. C. 27Nov.14
*Benson, C. S. 22Dec.14
*Boissier, G. D. 29Dec.14
*Green, C. H. 24Jan.15
*McIlroy, W. E. C. 25Jan.15
*Long, W. B. 7Nov.15
*Squire, L. G., 7Nov.15
*Clarke, J. W. D. 5Dec.15
‡*Morland, K. I. T. 7May16

Adjutant.

Anderson, Lt. (*temp.*) E. J. 30Apr.16

Quarter-Master.

*Baker, A. C., *hon. lt.* 23Oct.14

7th (Service) Battalion.

In Command.

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

*Wheeler, C. 11July15 9Feb.15

Major.

*Debenham, F. 11July15

Captains.

⚔Martin, G. B. 17Dec.14
**Ellis, L. J., *Adjt.* 1Jan 15
*⚔Guise, J. 15Feb.15
*Royal-Dawson, O. S. 11June15
*Salvesen, C. A. 10July15
*Arnett, M. G. 10July15
*Simpson, B. L. 10July15
*Henry, H. A. 12July15

Lieutenants.

*Pemberton, R. B. 3Nov.14
*Wicks, C. L. 17Dec.14
*Miller, G. C. 17Dec.14
Durno-Steele, F. A. 17Dec.14
*Peirson, N. J. 12June15
*Ditchburn, A. H. 8July15
*Keble, J. H. C. 10July15
*Baker, C. P. 11July15
*Bowman, T. 12July15

2nd Lieutenants.

*Ker, C. P. 24Oct.14
*Symonds, S. L. 14Nov.14
*Garland, W. 24Nov.14
*Riley, E. 27Nov.14
*Hoey, J. T. S. 7Dec.14
*Collier, L. J. 15Dec.14
*Young, W. A. 18Dec.14
*Boor, A. P. 28Dec.14
*Molyneux, P. L. 11Jan.15
*Gibson, L. A. 14Jan.15
*Manning, C. A. W. 25Jan.15
*Blake, W. T. 25Jan.15
*Eagle, H. S. 26Feb.15
*Holiday, A. S. 1Apr.15
(5) *Robinson, H. W. 7Apr.15
*Riley, G. W. 9Apr.15

Adjutant.

Ellis, Capt. (*temp.*) L. J. 1Jan.15

Quarter-Master.

8th (Service) Battalion. (Pioneers.)

In Command.

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

Majors.

*Darnley, R. 10May15
Cruddas, B. (*temp. Lt.-Col.*, 19 *Feb.* 16) North'd Fus. —
*Burt, A. E. 1Jan.16

Captains.

*Lowe, A. H. 14Nov.14
*Tardrew, C. G. 1Mar.15
*Dunthorne, R. G 1Mar.15
*Eales, T. F. J. 1Mar.15
*Bartrum, G. 10May15
*Medcalf, E. F. 18Sept.15
*Giffard, W. L. 1Jan.16

Lieutenants.

*Leman, S. C. 14Nov.14
*Thompson, H. W. A. 14Nov.14
*Payne, E. H. 1Mar.15
*Edwards, A. R. 1Mar.15
*Morris, G. P. 1Mar.15
*Maul, G. B. 1Mar.15
*Rayner, C. S. W. 10May15
*Straight, F. S. 18Sept.15
*Calder, A. 18Sept.15
*Benjamin, A. F. 18Sept.15

2nd Lieutenants.

*Haggen, G. L. 7Dec 14
*Elliott, N. W. 23Dec.14
*Smith, J. E. P. 7Jan.15
*Watts-Watts, T. N. 9Jan.15
*Brimblecombe, P. Y. 29Jan.15
*Rose, G. S. 24Feb.15
*Sheppard, C. W. 1Mar.15
*Curtis, H. E. 10Mar.15

Adjutant.

Quarter-Master.

Woollen, W., *hon. lt.* 9Nov.14

* Temporary. ‡ On probation.

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THE OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY—Regtl. Dist. No. 43—*contd.*

9th (Reserve) Battalion.

In Command.

⚔Dyas, Bt. Col. J. R., *p.s.c.* [*l*] . 7Aug.15
22Dec.08

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

*⚔Crum. A. S. (*Hon. Capt. in Army* 25*Jan.*01) 6May15
10Oct.14

Major.

Captains.

*Vyner, R. J. 23Sept.14
7Mar.16
*Williams, C. H. 28Dec.14
*Knighton, G. G. 28Dec.14
**Labouchere, A. M., Adjt.* 20Jan.15
*⚔Birch, W. R. 17Dec.15
*Fuller, A. W. F. 17Jan.16

Lieutenants.

*⚔Jacob, V. V. 14Dec.14
*Calderon, G. 9Jan.15
*Lack, V. J. H. 5Feb.15
2June16
*Forwood, L. L. 1Mar.15
18Sept.15
*Guy, G. R. 15Sept.15
*Muriel, W. G. 15Sept.15
*Morris, C. G. N. 17Apr.16
*Bartlett, J. C. 20Apr.16

2nd Lieutenants.

*Streatfeild, R. C. 22Sept.14
*Ford, W. O. 9Nov.14
*Dick, J. G. 19Nov.14
*de Pass, G. P. B. 24Nov.14
*Robinson, E. L. D. 24Nov.14
*Northcote, D. S. 27Nov.14
*Whitehead, H. M. 7Dec.14
*Peel, R. 18Dec.14
*Beaver, H. A. 23Dec.14
*Thomas, A. L. 24Dec.14
*Walker, T. (*temp. Capt. 8 Mar. 16*) (*Spec. appt.*) 29Dec.14
*Andrews, P. E. 3Jan.15

2nd Lieutenants—contd.

*Harris, A. V. D. 12Jan.15
4Jan.16
*Spary, V. C. 22Jan.15
*Thomas, T. 26Jan.15
*Scott, R. M. 30Jan.15
*Stukeley, A. T. W. 26Feb.15
*Parsons, F. S. 26Feb.15
*Edwards, A. H. 26Feb.15
*Sims, H. V. 10Mar.15
*Johnson, F. H. 13Mar.15
*Barrell, E. G. 20Mar.15
*Hutchins, W. T. 25Mar.15
*Shaw, J. W. 27Mar.15
*Grosvenor, G. R. 14Apr.15
*Creswell, R. A. 22Apr.15
*Parkinson, E. B. 22Apr.15
*Allday, E. C. J. 3May15
*Norman, B. A. K. 3May15
*Cox, T. J. 5May15
*Henry, B. J. 5May15
*Bedford, D. E. 6May15
*Spurge, H. W. 12May15
*Best, J. H. 12May15
*Field, H. T. C. 12May15
*Freeth, E. (*temp. Capt.* 31*Mar.*16) 12May15
*Garrard, G. F. 12May15
*Wilmot, D. A. T. 12May15
*Phillips, G. W. 20May15
*Cook, E. C. 28May15
*Carew-Hughes, C. F. 10June15
*Daye, A. J 10June15
*Winder, J. F. E. 10June15
*Marsh, V. B. 10June15
*Orr, H. W. 10June15
*Wordsworth, O. B. 11June15
*Peel, D. K. McL. 24June15
*Banks, C. M. 12July15
*Davies, H. 12July15
*Malcolm, R. G. 12July15
*Thomas, M. V. 12July15
*Walker, H. S. 12July15
*Anderson, F. E. 12July15
*Atkinson, G. FitzG. 14Aug.15
*Makeig-Jones, T. G. R. 14Aug.15
*Bishop, D. 14Aug.15
*Davis, A. L. 14Aug.15
*Francis, F. S. 14Aug.15
*Paige, R. H. 14Aug.15
*Pitt, C. W. 23Aug.15
*Skuse, A. 26Aug.15

2nd Lieutenants—contd.

*Percival, R. T. 26Aug.15
*Boyd, T. 26Aug.15
*Thompson, A. L. 25Sept.15
*Traylen, J. P. 25Sept.15
*Dilley, L. S. 25Sept.15
*Edwards, A. G. 25Sept.15
*Hill, R. C. 25Sept.15
*Ellis, A. D. 25Sept.15
*Bleeze, H. W. 4Oct.15
*Deller, W. E. 19Oct.15
*Money, H. 19Oct.15
*Joyce, H. C. 2Nov.15
*Hall, R. E. 5Nov.15
*Knighton, F. C. 5Nov.15
*Burborough, A. W. 16Nov.15
*Richards, A. 16Nov.15
*Brown, J. R. 18Nov.15
*Charman, W. S. 18Nov.15
*Dowell, C. S. 18Nov.15
*Grant, J. G. 18Nov.15
*Ashman, S. 18Nov.15
*Byrt, R. G. 18Nov.15
*Willcox, F. R. 18Nov.15
*Allsopp, A. T. W. 2Mar.16
18Dec.14
*Ferriman, F. S. 2June16
*Blencowe, O. C. 2June16
*Neale, A. A. 2June16

Adjutant.

Labouchere, Capt. (*temp.*) A. M. 7Aug.15

Quarter-Master.

*Brazier, W., *hon. lt.* 22Sept.14

Attached.

2nd Lieutenants.—(*temp.*)

Southam, F. 27Nov.14
Harris, T. N. C. 12Jan.15
Copeman, H. G. H. 25Jan.15
Bell, R. H. 26Apr.15

1st Garrison Battalion.

Lt.-Colonel.

Codrington, Capt. (*temp. Lt.-Col.*) R. P. J., ret. pay 24Sept.15
26Sept.14

Major.
(*2nd in Command.*)

Majors.

*Vaughan-Williams, F. (Hon. Maj. ret. pay) 14Oct.15
*Stretton, W. L., Capt. ret. pay (*Hon. Maj. ret. Spec. Res.*) 2Dec.15

Captains.

*Belcher, H. M. F. 12Nov.14
20Oct.15
*Gidley, J. 7Dec.14
17Oct.15
*Inman, H. J. 7Jan.15
25Oct.15
*Hallam, D. E. 8Jan.15
20Oct.15
Craddock, A. B., R. War. R. —
*Gilbert, B. J. 22Feb.15
20Oct.15
*Watts, C. G. N. 4Oct.15
⚔Snelling, C. G., 4 Bn. Leins. R. —

Lieutenants.

*Wasbrough, H. C. S. 9Sept.14
20Nov.15
*Wedderspoon, W. G. F. Devon R. 17Jan.15
*Haigh, J. F. 22Feb.15
20Nov.15
*Willis, R. G. 9Apr.15
20Nov.15
*Gibbs, F. J. 4Oct.15
*Fenwick, J. S. 31Jan.16

2nd Lieutenants.

*Merton, J. 3Dec.14
20ct.15
*Mills, A. A. 24Dec.14
4Oct.15
*Burns, J. 29Dec.14
4Oct.15
*Jones, B. L. 14Jan.15
24Nov.15
*Coburn, F. 15May15
17Dec.15
*Prior, E. G. 28May15
28Oct.15
*Mare, E. J. 10June15
2Oct.15
*Martin, A. J. 10June15
24Nov.15
*Underhill, W. E. 9Dec.15

Adjutant.

Quarter-Master.

Hayes, G. F. L., *hon. lt.* 22Sept.15

* Temporary.

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OFFICERS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND BATTALIONS EXTRA-REGIMENTALLY EMPLOYED BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

LIEUT.-COLONEL A. J. F. EDEN, D.S.O. Commanding 2nd Battalion, until 7th July 1916; commanding 24th Infantry Brigade (temp. Brigadier-General), 8th July 1916 to 8th January 1917; Home duty, attached to 173rd Infantry Brigade, February to May 1917; commanding 52nd Infantry Brigade, 1st June 1917.

MAJOR AND BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL W. MARRIOTT-DODINGTON, *p.s.c.* Commanding 161st Infantry Brigade (temp. Brigadier-General), since June 1916, in Egypt, Sinai, etc.; Dispatches.

MAJOR H. L. RUCK-KEENE, D.S.O. Serving with 3rd (Reserve) Battalion; Comdt. Escort 5th Army (France), June, 1917.

MAJOR H. F. DARELL-BROWN. Serving with 3rd (Reserve) Battalion.

MAJOR L. J. CARTER. In India, wounded, from Mesopotamia; to England; serving with 3rd (Reserve) Battalion; Dispatches; awarded D.S.O.

MAJOR L. H. R. POPE-HENNESSY, D.S.O. G.S.O. 2nd Grade, 41st Division (France), till 1st July 1916; to command 1st Battalion (Mesopotamia), September 1916 (acting Lieut.-Colonel); G.S.O. 1st Grade, 3rd (Lahore) Division (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 19th March 1917; Dispatches twice; Legion of Honour, Chevalier (France).

MAJOR AND BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL F. H. STAPLETON, *p.s.c.* D.A.A.G., since 10th January 1916; rejoined 1st Battalion, March 1917, to take command; Dispatches; White Eagle, 3rd Class, with Swords (Serbia).

MAJOR E. R. CLAYTON, D.S.O. G.S.O. 2nd Grade. Dispatches.

MAJOR C. H. FRITH. D.A.A.G., War Office, 27th July 1916.

MAJOR J. A. BALLARD. Commanding 17th R. Welsh Fusiliers (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), from November 1915 to March 1917, and 2/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment from April 1917; Dispatches.

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MAJOR A. G. BAYLEY, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* G.S.O. 2nd Grade, since February 1916.

MAJOR AND BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL H. R. M. BROOKE-POPHAM, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* H.Q. Royal Flying Corps, D.A. and Q.M.G. (temp. Brigadier-General); Dispatches.

MAJOR H. L. WOOD. Brigade-Major, 97th Infantry Brigade, since November 1915; G.S.O., 2nd Grade, 5th Division, 16th October 1916 to 15th February 1917, and 30th Division, 15th February to 31st March 1917; in command of 5th (Service) Battalion (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 31st March 1917.

MAJOR J. F. C. FULLER, *p.s.c.* G.S.O., 2nd Grade, since February 1916; G.S.O., 1st Grade, 24th April 1917 (temp. Lieut.-Colonel); Dispatches; D.S.O.

MAJOR R. D. KEYWORTH. Commanding 19th (Reserve) Battalion K.R.R.C. (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 17th February 1916; commanding 109th Training Reserve Battalion, 1st September 1916.

MAJOR J. T. WEATHERBY, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* G.S.O., 2nd Grade; G.S.O., 1st Grade (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 47th Division, 28th November 1916; Dispatches.

MAJOR G. A. SULLIVAN, D.S.O. Assistant Provost Marshal; Provost Marshal (A.A.G.), temp. Lieut.-Colonel, 16th September 1916; Dispatches.

MAJOR C. G. HIGGINS, D.S.O. Commanding 17th Royal Fusiliers (temp. Lieut.-Colonel); Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 1st January 1917; Dispatches; Brigade-Commander (temp. Brigadier-General), 21st April 1917.

MAJOR L. TUNNARD. At home wounded from Mediterranean Exped. Force; awarded Order of the Nile, 4th Class; D.A.A.G., 21st June 1917.

MAJOR J. A. POLLOCK. Egyptian Army; awarded Order of the Nile (4th Class); D.A.A. & Q.M.G.; Commandant L. of C. (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 13th May 1917.

MAJOR H. M. DILLON, D.S.O. Attached West Yorkshire Regiment; commanding 6th Battalion, April, 1917.

CAPTAIN B. C. PARR. On service in West Africa, with 2nd Nigeria Regiment.

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CAPTAIN R. STEPHENS. A.D.C. to H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in India.

CAPTAIN A. J. N. BARTLETT. Commanding 1/4th (T.F.) Battalion (temp. Lieut.-Colonel); Dispatches; awarded D.S.O. 1st January 1917.

CAPTAIN U. J. D. BOURKE. Royal Flying Corps, Wing Commander (temp. Lieut.-Colonel).

CAPTAIN AND BREVET-MAJOR G. BLEWITT, M.C. Brigade-Major; G.S.O., 2nd December 1916; Dispatches; awarded the Order of Danilo, 5th Class (Montenegro), and D.S.O.

CAPTAIN F. V. HOLT, D.S.O. Wing Commander, R.F.C. (temp. Lieut.-Colonel).

CAPTAIN A. E. SANDERSON. G.S.O., 3rd Grade, 24th January 1917.

CAPTAIN G. F. WHITTALL. Embarkation Staff Officer (D.A.Q.M.G.), Mesopotamia; awarded Military Cross, December 1916; rejoined 1st Battalion, *q.v.*

CAPTAIN J. L. PORTAL. Serving with 1st King's African Rifles, since 1914; Major, Second in Command, 22nd January 1917; with General Northey's Force in Nyasaland; Dispatches; D.S.O.

CAPTAIN C. R. C. BOYLE. Serving with 6th (Service) Battalion; temp. Major.

CAPTAIN W. E. C. TERRY. Staff Captain H.Q. Advanced Base, L. of C., B.E.F., till 15th July 1916; joined 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia, 10th October 1916. *See* 1st Battalion.

CAPTAIN W. G. TOLSON, M.C. R.M.C. Sandhurst, Officer of a Company of Gentlemen Cadets, 28th August 1916.

CAPTAIN B. C. T. PAGET, M.C. Brigade-Major, 42nd Infantry Brigade; Dispatches; Brevet-Major, and Italian Medal for Military Valour.

CAPTAIN J. J. POWELL. Doing duty with 3rd (Reserve) Battalion; R.M.C. Sandhurst, Officer of a Company of Gentlemen Cadets, 20th November 1916.

CAPTAIN G. F. PLOWDEN, M.C. Serving with 42nd Machine Gun Company.

CAPTAIN J. A. SOUTHEY. Cadet School, G.H.Q., since March 1916; to 5th (Service) Battalion for duty, April 1917.

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CAPTAIN A. C. M. PARIS. Employed under the Admiralty; Brigade-Major, 5th February 1917; awarded M.C.

CAPTAIN C. S. BAINES, D.S.O. Temp. Major, attached 2/6th Warwickshire Regiment (A/Major); rejoined 2nd Battalion as Senior Major, August 1916.

CAPTAIN R. J. BRETT. Second in Command, 17th Royal Fusiliers (temp. Major), 30th March 1917.

CAPTAIN K. HORAN. Invalided from Mesopotamia; seconded for duty with Indian Volunteers.

CAPTAIN D. A. D. SEWELL. Staff Captain; War Office, 1st March 1917.

CAPTAIN J. W. G. WYLD. Staff Captain; G.S.O., 3rd Grade, 4th November 1916; Dispatches; awarded M.C.

LIEUT. C. W. H. BAILIE. Attached to 2nd Rifle Brigade. Transport Officer; 25th Brigade Transport Officer, 20th January 1917; promoted Captain, 1st January 1917; Dispatches.

LIEUT. R. C. LOVEROCK. Assistant Embarkation Staff Officer, Mesopotamia (temp. Captain), since July 1915.

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FORMER OFFICERS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND BATTALIONS EMPLOYED OR RE-EMPLOYED BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

I.

ACTIVE LIST.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. HANBURY-WILLIAMS, K.C.V.O., C.M.G. Chief of the Military Mission with the Russian Army in the Field (temp. Lieut.-General); Dispatches; K.C.B., June 1917.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. FANSHAWE, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* Commanding 48th (South Midland) Division; Dispatches; K.C.B.

BREVET-COLONEL (TEMP. BRIGADIER-GENERAL), H. R DAVIES, C.B. Brigade-Commander (3rd Infantry Brigade); commanding Plymouth Special Reserve Brigade, 29th November 1916; commanding 33rd Infantry Brigade, 9th March 1917; commanding 11th Division (temp. Major-General), 10th May 1917; Dispatches; awarded Belgian Croix de Guerre.

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. D. WHITE, C.M.G. Commanding 6th (Service) Battalion; promoted Colonel, 3rd September 1916; employed with Home Forces as Brigade Commander (temp. Brigadier-General).

II.

RETIRED LIST.

LIEUT. A. D. R. ALDRED. Lieutenant, ret. pay; temp. Captain, Royal Engineers; employed under Ministry of Munitions.

CAPTAIN THE HON. C. A. J. ANNESLEY. Lieutenant, ret. pay; Captain, 1st Royal Dragoons Special Reserve.

CAPTAIN C. B. BENSON, D.S.O. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Brigade-Major.

CAPTAIN E. T. C. BOWER. Ret. pay; Special Appointment (Censor, G.S.O., 3rd Grade).

MAJOR C. J. BOYLE. Ret. pay; Royal Defence Corps.

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CAPTAIN C. A. CARDWELL. Ret. pay; Captain, 3rd Battalion; Staff Captain; D.A.A.G., 6th August 1916.

MAJOR C. O. CHICHESTER. Ret. pay; Officer Commanding Depôt Special Brigade R.E., B.E.F.

MAJOR E. M. CHILDERS. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Commandant, Divisional School (temp. Lieut.-Colonel); Administrative Commandant, 4th Army Areas (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 15th May 1917.

COLONEL P. T. CLARK. Ret. pay; Spec. Appoint. Combatant Member Travelling Medical Board, August to December 1916; invalided; Second in Command, 3rd Vol. Battalion, Devonshire Regiment, June 1917.

MAJOR G. N. COLVILE, D.S.O. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Lieut.-Colonel commanding 7th D.C.L.I.; Dispatches; Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel; Brigade-Commander (temp. Brigadier-General), 18th August 1916.

MAJOR A. S. CRUM. Hon. Captain in the Army; late Lieutenant, 2nd Battalion; Major, Second in Command, 9th (Service) Battalion; same appointment 36th Training Reserve Battalion, 1st September 1916.

CAPTAIN H. R. S. COTTON. Ret. pay; employed on Recruiting Duties.

MAJOR SIR C. CUYLER, BART. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; commanding Depôt, Oxford (temp. Lieut.-Colonel).

COLONEL THE HON. A. E. DALZELL, C.B. Ret. pay; Brigade-Commander (temp. Brigadier-General), 207th Infantry Brigade (69th Division).

MAJOR J. D. W. DAVY. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; temp. Lieut.-Colonel, commanding 15th (Service) Battalion Hampshire Regiment.

CAPTAIN G. DRAGE. Ret pay; Res. of Off.; commanding 7th R. Munster Fusiliers, and later 6th R.M.F., with which it was amalgamated (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) in Macedonia; Dispatches twice; D.S.O.

MAJOR R. M. FEILDEN. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; employed under Sudan Administration. Dispatches.

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CAPTAIN C. FITZGERALD. Ret. pay; 3rd Battalion, late 2nd Battalion; serving with 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia, *See* 1st Battalion Record.

CAPTAIN THE HON. G. W. F. S. FOLJAMBE. Temp. Lieut.-Colonel, commanding 21st (Service) Battalion K.R.R.C. (Yeoman Rifles), 16th September 1916.

CAPTAIN R. E. U. HERMON-HODGE. Late Lieutenant, 1st Battalion; Captain (temp. Major), Q.O. Oxfordshire Hussars.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. G. H. HUGHES. Ret. pay; Draft Conducting Officer.

CAPTAIN W. C. HUNTER. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Officer in charge of Prisoners of War Section; Commandant, Prisoners of War Camp, 21st February 1917.

COLONEL F. G. L. LAMOTTE. Ret pay; Res. of Off.; Commander No. 3 Section Portsmouth Defences until 29th November 1916; as Colonel, attached to H.Q. VIIIth Corps, B.E.F.; mentioned for services, February 1917.

MAJOR R. C. LUARD. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Assistant Embarkation Staff Officer.

MAJOR C. J. MITCHELL. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; late Captain, 2nd Battalion; Major, Bucks Battalion; G.S.O., 3rd Grade; Brigade-Major, 16th September 1916.

MAJOR G. F. MOCKLER. Ret. pay; Special Appointment (Cable Censor), graded as Staff Lieutenant, 1st Class.

LIEUT.-COLONEL A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN. Ret. pay; G.S.O., 1st Grade, 63rd Division; mentioned for services, February 1917.

CAPTAIN G. S. F. NAPIER, *p.s.c.* Ret. pay; on H.Q. Staff of Grand Duke Nicholas, commanding the Armies of the Caucasus; Military Attaché, Persia, December 1916.

LIEUT.-COLONEL F. J. NEWTON-KING. Late 1st Battalion; Employed as King's Messenger.

CAPTAIN H. C. NISBET. D.A.Q.M.G., 4th Mounted Division, 2nd Cyclist Division, since March 1916; temp. Lieut.-Colonel Machine-gun Corps, 21st September 1916; Special Appointment, Machine-guns, G.H.Q., 1917.

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CAPTAIN J. E. OSBORNE. Late 2nd Battalion; Second in Command, 6th (Service) Battalion (temp. Major); temp. Lieut.-Colonel, commanding the Battalion, 9th November 1916.

MAJOR R. L. OVEY, D.S.O. Late 2nd Battalion; Major, 4th (T.F.) Battalion; temp. Lieut.-Colonel, commanding 10th (T.F. Reserve) Battalion (83rd Prov. Bn.), 19th September 1916; commanding Transportation Troops Depôt, Boulogne, 22nd January 1917.

MAJOR R. C. R. OWEN, C.M.G. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; employed under Sudan Administration as Governor of a Province.

CAPTAIN W. OWEN. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Assistant Officer, Infantry Record Office, London; Officer in Charge, W.A.A.C. Records (temp. Major), 20th June 1917.

MAJOR C. PARR. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Officer in charge of Records; mentioned for services, February 1917; Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel.

MAJOR C. C. PEARSON. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Adjutant of the Depôt, Oxford.

CAPTAIN R. E. SALKELD. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Second in Command, 2/5th Gloucester Regiment (temp. Major); to command of 2/4th R. Berks (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), July 1916.

CAPTAIN L. F. SCOTT. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Town Major (France), July to December 1916; to 3rd (Reserve) Battalion for duty, February 1917.

MAJOR E. A. STANTON. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Military Secretary to the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Dominion of Canada (temp. Lieut.-Colonel; awarded C.M.G.; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.

CAPTAIN L. E. S. WARD, D.S.O. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; temp. Lieut.-Colonel, commanding 172nd Brigade, R.F.A.; commanding 180th Brigade, R.F.A., January 1917; Dispatches thrice.

MAJOR R. E. WATT. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; Infantry Record Office, Warwick.

CAPTAIN C. J. WILKIE. Ret. pay; Res. of Off.; commanding 17th (Service) Battalion Welsh Regiment; *killed in action*, October 1916.

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

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SKETCH OF THE WAR, 1ST JULY 1916 TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

A GENERAL outline of the operations in the various theatres in which battalions of the Regiment were fighting during the above period will assist the reader in following events recorded in the battalion diaries, etc. The Battalions of the Regiment in the field at this time were: 1*st Battalion*, newly formed in Mesopotamia, since the remnants of the original 1st Battalion were captured at Kut-el-Amara, as related in the last Volume; 2*nd Battalion*, 5*th* (*Service*) *Battalion*, 6*th* (*Service*) *Battalion*, 1/4*th* (*T.F.*) *Battalion*, 1/1*st Bucks* (*T.F.*) *Battalion*, 2/4*th* (*T.F.*) *Battalion*, 2/1*st Bucks* (*T.F.*) *Battalion*, all on the Western Front; the 7*th* (*Service*) *Battalion* and 8*th* (*Service*) *Battalion* (Pioneers) in Salonika.

SALONIKA.

(*Map* 4.)

Little of importance occurred during the first nine months. The Allied Army of Occupation continued to hold its defensive lines to the east and north of Salonika, and only minor operations took place until April, when both the 7th and 8th (Service) Battalions of the Regiment were engaged in the attacks on the Doiran front.

MESOPOTAMIA.

The forces on the Tigris, after their abortive but strenuous attempts to relieve Kut, were obliged to rest for some months. Sir Percy Lake handed over the chief command to General Maude, who forthwith commenced a thorough reorganization of his reinforced troops. This occupied him until the middle of December, after which he consolidated his position on the Hai, preparatory to the recapture of Kut and the advance on Baghdad. Before the New Year the forward movement had commenced; in February the

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Turks, manœuvred out of their position at Sannaiyat, evacuated Kut, and were pursued by Maude even to Baghdad, which was entered by British troops on the 11th March 1917. Still the Turks were given no rest, and before the summer the advancing British had captured Samarrah, and firmly established their hold on the country.

THE WESTERN FRONT.

People at home expected the great offensive of 1916 to come in the spring of the year, but Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre had decided otherwise. Everything was in favour of waiting until the early summer, when the British Armies would have increased in numbers, and the supply of munitions be vastly augmented. It was the enemy's purpose to force our hand, and to hasten us into operations before we were prepared. He redoubled his energy against the French at Verdun, and the Austrians struck so hard on the Italian front that the Russian offensive was somewhat precipitated—opening early in June.

May and June 1916 on the Western front were months of busy preparation; every one who could be spared from the trenches went back to training grounds to rehearse for the coming struggle. The world behind the front was one huge school of instruction.

As time went on and the Germans found that we were not to be hurried, they made two determined attempts to draw us on. The first was on the 21st May, when they attacked Vimy Ridge, and succeeded in gaining a little ground, after forcing our troops to withdraw to a position in rear, while the final attempt was made on the 2nd June between Mount Sorel and Hooge, when again we were driven out of our position on a front of about a mile and a half. As the southern portion of this was of importance, Sir Douglas Haig decided to recover it, and on the 13th June it was won back. Neither of these affairs affected the preparations for the great offensive in any way, and by the end of June 1916 all was ready.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

(*Maps* 1 *and* 2.)

This so-called battle, which commenced on the 1st July and lasted for four and a half months, in olden days would have been described as a campaign. To-day there is no thought of a one-day battle, with victory or defeat before nightfall; there is no pre-

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liminary manœuvring, no cavalry combat and no affair of outposts to usher in the fight. Instead, there is a bombardment by hundreds if not thousands of guns of every calibre, by means of which it is hoped to destroy the enemy's wire entanglement and flatten out his defences. For days before the offensive is launched every detail has been worked out secretly to programme; nothing is left to chance; and failure can only result from the resistance of the enemy being greater than it was possible to anticipate. No doubt exists as to where the enemy will be found, and the distance to be covered to get to close quarters with him is only a few hundred yards, though every inch of the ground is an inferno of bursting shells and machine-gun bullets. And over this ground the infantry advance, close behind the creeping barrage of its own artillery. Such are the opening phases of a modern battle. How the fight continues will be discovered from the extracts from Divisional, Brigade, and Battalion Orders and Reports given in these pages. In previous volumes these orders and reports have been quoted very fully, and it is proposed to continue to deal with them in a similar manner, because they explain of themselves the growth of new methods of warfare, and help one to form an idea of the changes in tactics which from time to time were introduced.

To describe the battle of the Somme in its several stages with any degree of accuracy at the present time is quite impossible, and even were it possible, a full account of a battle in which innumerable units were at one time or another engaged would be out of place in a volume which professes to be concerned with only one Regiment. The Regiment, however, had seven battalions in France at this time, and five of the seven played their part in the battle, its respective Brigades and Divisions being thrown in in relief of others who had already had their period of fighting and required time to recuperate. For, under conditions which prevail nowadays, it is beyond the physical powers of human beings to withstand the shock of battle for more than a given number of hours, when, as in a "relay race," fresh men come in to replace the jaded and to fill up the gaps caused by casualties. In this way the hammer of the offensive is maintained at its original weight.

As will be seen from the records of each battalion, the Regiment was represented in various stages of the battle, and in order to show the sequence of events which led up to the entry into the fight of each battalion of the Regiment, we give the briefest possible account of the great offensive of 1916.

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Its object was described by Sir Douglas Haig, in his Dispatch, as threefold :—

(1) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.

(2) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the Western front.

(3) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.

Without entering into topographical details, the area of operations may be described roughly as lying between Albert on the west and Bapaume and Peronne on the east, within which area the opposing front lines, prior to the commencement of operations, ran somewhat as follows :—

German.—Immediately west of Gommecourt, Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, Ovillers, La Boisselle, Fricourt. Thence the line turned due east for about four miles, covering Mametz. Turning south again, it crossed the Somme just west of Curlu; while south of the Somme it ran to the east of Frise and to the west of Dompierre and Fay.

British.—Facing the above line at varying distances from it. The VIIIth Corps (Hunter-Weston) on the left or north; then in succession to the south, the Xth Corps (Morland), the IIIrd Corps (Pulteney), the XVth Corps (Horne), and the XIIIth Corps (Congreve), facing north opposite Mametz, and having the French on its right.

French.—Astride the Somme, and facing east opposite Curlu, Dompierre, Fay, etc., the 6th French Army (Fayolle).

The main British attack was to be launched all along the line between the River Ancre and Maricourt, just north of the River Somme, with a subsidiary attack north of the Ancre as far as Gommecourt; while the French attacked simultaneously, on the right of the British, north and south of the Somme.

First Stage. 1*st to* 13*th July.*

Objective—The German First Position.

On the 1st July the subsidiary attack, delivered from Gommecourt to Thiepval, succeeded in entering the enemy's position and capturing many prisoners, but meeting with heavy opposition it could make no headway, and having fulfilled its object it was withdrawn. Meanwhile the main attack, between the Ancre and

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Maricourt, forged ahead into the German line, reaching the outskirts of Ovillers and La Boisselle, and plunging deeply into the north of Fricourt. Mametz was carried, as also were Montauban and the Brickfields to its south-east. The French on our right, attacking simultaneously on a front of eight miles, met with equal success, capturing Dompierre, Berquincourt, Bussu, and Fay, and holding on to the outskirts of Hardecourt and Curlu. The result of the opening day was that the German First Position on a frontage of fourteen continuous miles (between Mametz and Fay) was captured and consolidated, while north of Mametz it was severely bitten into. Prisoners were taken in great numbers.

On the 2nd slight way was made at Ovillers and La Boisselle; Fricourt was taken; Bernafay Wood (east of Montauban) was entered; and the French, capturing Curlu, Frise, Mereaucourt Wood, and Herbecourt, pushed on eastward. On the 3rd there was heavy fighting about Ovillers and La Boisselle, but with little result; farther south, however, the advance was pressed well forward towards Mametz Wood, and the French moved on in the direction of Peronne. The 4th was a wild and stormy day, and about Ovillers and La Boisselle little advance was made, but farther south Mametz Wood was entered and Bernafay Wood taken. On the 5th La Boisselle was captured, and the advance continued towards Bailiff Wood and Contalmaison. Sir Douglas Haig, in his Dispatch, says :—

"To sum up the results of the fighting of these five days, on a front of over six miles, from the Briqueterie to La Boisselle, our troops had swept over the whole of the enemy's first and strongest system of defence, which he had done his utmost to render impregnable. They had driven him back over a distance of more than a mile, and had carried four elaborately fortified villages.

"The number of prisoners passed back at the close of July 5th had already reached the total of 94 officers and 5,724 other ranks."

There was a pause in the general attack on the 6th July, to give time for the artillery to prepare the way for further assaults; but, during the three following days, heavy fighting resulted in several successes; Contalmaison and the greater part of Mametz Wood were taken, the outer defences of Ovillers were entered, and our troops occupied the southern end of Trones Wood. From this, however, they were counter-attacked out on the night of the

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9th/10th, but returning to the attack on the 11th, the British swept through the wood, and occupied all except the extreme northern corner.

The French, meanwhile, had done magnificently, having on a front of ten miles captured no less than fifty square miles of fortified ground, with prisoners to the number of 236 officers and 12,000 men, and an immense quantity of war material.

By the 13th July our troops were in positions from which it became possible to deliver an assault on the enemy's second system of defences.

Second Stage. 14th July to 13th September.

Objective—The German Second Position.

Before daylight on the 14th July the new assault was delivered; Trones Wood was immediately carried, and a footing was gained in Longueval. Later in the day Bazentin-le-Grand, Bazentin-le-Petit, and High Wood were captured, and the enemy's Second Position had thus been penetrated on a front of three miles. At nightfall the Allies held a line running eastward from Ovillers, through La Boisselle and the two Bazentins, to Longueval, and thence south and south-east by Hardecourt, Biaches, and La Maisonnette. The 15th saw further fighting: Arrow Head Copse, Waterlot Farm, and Delville Wood were occupied, but our advanced troops in High Wood were forced to withdraw. Next day Ovillers was captured, and an advance was made towards Pozières.[1] Two thousand prisoners and many guns had been taken in these three days.

Bad weather prevented much movement during the following two days, but on the 18th the enemy counter-attacked Delville Wood and recovered the northern and north-eastern portion; and our troops also had to give way before him at Longueval, our hold on which was reduced to the southern half of the village. On the 20th the greater part of High Wood again fell into our hands, and the French made a considerable advance eastward. Then followed two days of heavy bombardment by our guns, and on the 23rd the attack was resumed on a front extending from Guillemont to near Pozières. The gain of ground was slight, but it paved the way for the capture of Pozières, which took place on the 25th. Two days later our troops won back a large portion of Delville Wood, and on

[1] The 1/4th Battalion of the Regiment engaged.

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the 29th the enemy was driven out of the village of Longueval and its orchards in front; while Guillemont was attacked on the 30th, but without permanent success.[1]

During the next four days there was a lull in the fighting; then, on the night of the 4th/5th August, came the capture of the Windmill on the ridge beyond Pozières. A second attack on Guillemont on the 7th failed, and it was then decided that British and French forces should squeeze the place from the flanks. Meanwhile the British commenced the process of slowly nibbling into the enemy front in every possible direction, while the French worked steadily forward both north and south of the Somme, gaining much ground and taking many prisoners. On the 18th August a combined attack was launched, but was not wholly successful, although considerable progress was made in the neighbourhood of Guillemont; and Guillemont Station was occupied. The Allied line then ran eastward from the Ancre through a point midway between Ovillers and Thiepval, through the Pozières Windmill, High (Foureaux) Wood, and the centre of Delville Wood. Thence it turned south to Guillemont Station, and, joining the French, passed south-eastward through the outskirts of Maurepas, Clery, and away south through La Maisonnette, etc.

Desultory fighting went on for the next few days; our line drew nearer to Thiepval, and on the 24th Hindenburg Trench was carried. On that same day the French captured Maurepas, and our troops succeeded in clearing Delville Wood.[2] The enemy counter-attacked fiercely and frequently at several parts of our line, but without avail, and both the French and ourselves held all the ground won.

By the 3rd September preparations for a general assault were complete, and at 12 noon British and French delivered simultaneous attacks all along the line. Guillemont was stormed and carried; next came Ginchy, a part of which was captured; and the French seized Cléry-sur-Somme and Le Forest, and pushed their line northwards to the outskirts of Combles. At one point the attack failed; this was at Falfemont Farm (south of Ginchy and south-west of Combles), which, although in the first instance rushed by British troops, could not be consolidated that day. It fell, however, two days later, when Leuze Wood to its north was also occupied, thus

[1] The 2nd Battalion engaged.

[2] The 5th Battalion of the Regiment engaged

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bringing the British line within three-quarters of a mile of the north-west corner of Combles.

On the 9th September Ginchy was finally won, and afterwards further progress was made east of Delville Wood and south and east of High Wood. By the 10th the whole of the German Second Position between Thiepval and Estrées had been captured, and the Allies were now in possession of the high ground. Since the 1st July the British had taken no fewer than 17,000 prisoners, and the French an even greater number.

Third Stage. 14*th September to* 10*th November.*

Objective—The German Third Position.

The systematic bombardment of the enemy's positions commenced on the 12th September, preparatory to the launching of the infantry assault on the morning of the 15th.

On the night of the 14th, in order to clear the ground on the left (i.e. south-east of Thiepval), the Hohenzollern trench and the "Wonderwork" Redoubt were stormed with the greatest success by a brigade of the Fifth Army, and at 6.20 next morning the whole Allied line swept forward. Courcellette was captured, as also was Martinpuich; High Wood was cleared; Flers was carried; and the line was thrust forward eastward and north-eastward of Delville Wood, though not as far as had been intended, for the day's plan included the capture of Morval, Lesbœufs, and Guedecourt.[1] Still, more ground on the whole had been gained than was expected, and the "Tanks," used on this day for the first time, proved their value in this species of warfare.

The next few days were devoted to beating off the German counter-attacks, which failed everywhere. The work to the east of Ginchy, known as the Quadrilateral, was captured on the 18th September, and our line well advanced towards Morval.

During these days the French, co-operating on our right, made great strides both north and south of the Somme. Bouchavesnes, Le Priez Farm, Vermandovillers, Berny, and Deniécourt fell into their hands.

Wet weather now intervened, but it cleared up before the 25th September, on which day the next great general attack took place. It started at 12.35 p.m., and was a most brilliant success. Before nightfall Lesbœufs and Morval had been captured, and the

[1] The 5th Battalion of the Regiment took part in the attack on Guedecourt.

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line had been advanced in other parts. On the 26th Guedecourt was carried, and the French swept over Combles, which the enemy had evacuated, while British divisions on the left of the line drove the Germans out of the Zollern Redoubt and the outskirts of Mouquet Farm, and early next morning stormed and captured Thiepval.

By the 30th September the enemy had been forced out of his Third Position, and since the 14th of the month had lost to the British alone nearly 10,000 prisoners, 27 guns, 200 machine-guns, and 40 trench-mortars.

A wet October was detrimental to any great advance, but there was no lack of activity. On the 7th Le Sars was captured by the British, and Sailly-Saillisel by the French; but during the remainder of the month, the fighting, although incessant, resulted in only small local gains of ground, yet of importance as favourable starting-points for the next big assault. The process of wearing down the enemy had been going on steadily. What numbers he had lost in killed and wounded it is not possible to say, but between the 1st July and 1st November the Allies had captured in the Somme area nearly 1,500 German officers and 72,000 other ranks, with (in round numbers) 130 heavy guns, 170 field guns, 200 trench-mortars, and 1,000 machine-guns.

In the first days of November the Allies were up against the Fourth German Position, and at one point had already broken into it.

Fourth Stage. November.

The Attack on the Ancre.

North of Thiepval the Germans were still holding their original position up to and beyond Gommecourt. A subsidiary attack, it will be remembered, was made against this part of the line on the 1st July, but without success, and it had been left to be dealt with when the remainder of our line should have been pushed up behind it. The northernmost point of our general front was now just north of Le Sars, and almost touching a straight line drawn on the map between Thiepval and Bapaume. The time had come to clear the enemy out of the Ancre area.

On the 11th November the bombardment began, and in the dark hours of the morning of the 13th a surprise attack was delivered by the Fifth Army (Hubert Gough) from the west. St. Pierre Divion on the east bank of the Ancre was carried at once, and

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its captors swept forward. The central attack, after bitter fighting, captured Beaucourt Trench and Beaumont Hamel. Next morning (14th) Beaucourt was carried by storm, and the line extended north-west along the road from Beaucourt to Beaumont Hamel. Further advances were made on the three following days, and on the 18th November the line had reached the western outskirts of Grandcourt.

This closed the operations on the Somme, which had lasted continuously for four and a half months. In summing up the result, Sir Douglas Haig said that with less unfavourable weather much more might have been achieved, but that all that the Allies had set themselves to do had been done: "Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces had been held on the Western front; and the enemy's strength had been very considerably worn down."

In this long battle the British had taken 38,000 prisoners, including over 800 officers, 29 heavy and 96 field-guns and howitzers, 136 trench-mortars, and 514 machine-guns, while the number of prisoners and amount of war material, which fell into the hands of the French almost doubled the above figures.

1917.

(*Map* 2.)

With the Somme battle at an end, another trying winter in the trenches commenced; but it was not an idle winter, for there was much work to be done in preparation for the spring offensive which had been decided on. The war-worn roads of the Somme area had to be repaired, light railways constructed, and communication generally improved, while such troops as could be spared from time to time were sent to the rear for periods of rest and training. Apart from this, the Commander-in-Chief had no intention of leaving the Germans alone throughout the winter, knowing, as he did, that "the enemy's strength had been considerably reduced by the severe and protracted struggle on the Somme battlefields." As early as the 11th January, therefore, activity set in in the vicinity of Beaumont Hamel, where the enemy was driven from the dominating spur which was in his possession, and thence pushed gradually back beyond Grandcourt and Serre. Pressure was maintained against him during February and March, and the process of push continued without ceasing, until such places as Peronne and Bapaume came well within our line. By the 1st April the British

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front extended in an almost direct line from Arras to St. Quentin though the latter town itself was still in German occupation.

This forward movement had been facilitated in no small measure by the retreat of the enemy to a new and shorter defensive line which he had prepared while the later stages of the Somme fighting were in progress. The line thus prepared was known to the Germans as the Siegfried Line, to ourselves as the Hindenburg Line, and back to this boasted stronghold the Germans withdrew—not hastily, but willingly fighting a rearguard action whenever opportunity offered. Sometimes the rapidity of the British advance forced the enemy to quicken his pace ; but, on the whole, the withdrawal was conducted with skill and deliberation, and by the end of the first week in April the enemy troops were all behind the new line.

BATTLE OF ARRAS.

(*Map* 2.)

The following up of the Germans in their retreat caused little alteration in the plans already laid for the spring offensive. Preparations went on without intermission, and the beginning of the second week in April found everything ready. The German front facing the British then ran somewhat as follows : From St. Quentin to Tilloy-lez-Mofflaines (south-east of Arras), thence across the Scarpe River to Vimy Ridge, and onwards through the western outskirts of Lens to the old Flanders line (east of Ypres) to the sea. Opposite St. Quentin was the British Fourth Army (Rawlinson); then to the northwards in succession came the Fifth Army (Gough), the Third Army (Allenby), the First Army (Horne), and in the neighbourhood of Ypres the Second Army (Plumer). Thence to the Channel the Allies' line was held by Belgians and French, while the bulk of the French forces, ready to co-operate on the right of the British, lay covering Soissons Rheims, Verdun, etc.

The 9th April was the day fixed for the opening attack, and for three weeks before that date the enemy's positions were subjected to a continuous and heavy bombardment, in which our aircraft played no minor part. Gas also was freely discharged, and night raids were frequent. The First and Third Armies were detailed for the attack, which was to be carried out to their immediate fronts by short advances ("limited objectives"), separate troops being told off for the assault on each successive objective. Lastly, Tanks, which had already proved their value, were to be used for

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special purposes; and the cavalry were held ready to take advantage of any opportunity that presented itself.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th, then, the general attack was launched. Covered by a heavy barrage, our infantry ran right over the German lines, and within three-quarters of an hour the whole of the enemy first-line system was in our hands; Vimy Ridge was captured, and by 9.30 a.m. the Germans had been turned out of their second position. The only battalion of the Regiment engaged in this day's fighting was the 5th, who took part in the attack on the Harp, which will be found described in that Battalion's Record in this volume.

On the 10th and 11th, despite the rain and snow, the battle continued, and at 5 a.m. on the 12th a further advance was made, and more positions and villages were captured. The enemy no longer showed an inclination to counter-attack, and on the 13th April it became evident that he had decided to withdraw. Keeping in contact with him, our troops pressed forward, and on the 14th had a fierce fight for the possession of Monchy-le-Preux. It now became necessary to pause so that the artillery should be brought up, but the gains had already been far beyond the most sanguine expectations. The British line had been pushed four miles farther east of Arras, and 13,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been captured.

On the 16th April the French commenced their attack on the Aisne, and on the 23rd we were ready to continue our progress. For twenty four hours the fighting was very heavy, and the battle swayed, but in the end we gained possession of the high ground and some more villages, as well as 3,000 prisoners and a few guns.

Although Haig's plan of campaign had now been successfully carried through, it was necessary to maintain pressure on the enemy to prevent him from reinforcing his troops opposing the French on the Aisne. Further attacks were therefore delivered, and desultory fighting went on for some weeks. On the 28th April the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment took part in the attack on the Arleux-Oppy line, and on the 3rd May the 5th Battalion distinguished itself in the assault on Hillside Work (Vis-en-Artois). By the 5th May the French on the Aisne had completed their task of capturing the enemy positions on the Chemin des Dames, but it was not until the end of June that the Battle of Arras and its subsequent minor operations died down.

The German losses on the Western Front during this period were estimated at no fewer than 350,000; how many were killed is,

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of course, not known, but the British alone took upwards of 20,000 prisoners, 260 guns, and innumerable trench-mortars and machine-guns

MESSINES.

(*Map* 3.)

In the meanwhile all was ready for the next offensive farther north, where it had been determined to eject the Germans from the commanding Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. For a week from 7th June this great battle was fought to a successful finish by Plumer's Second Army; but we will not enter into the details of the fighting, as no battalion of the Regiment had the good fortune to be at the time on that particular part of the front. It is enough to know that Messines yielded 7,000 German prisoners and some 70 guns, that the desired ground was captured, and that the way was paved for the coming Third Battle of Ypres.

So ended the third year of the Great War on the Western Front. Looking back, we notice how each year differed from the previous one. The first will be remembered as the year in which we were hard put to it to hold our own; it has been called the year of the "Old Contemptibles"—that small army of British Regulars who were sneered at by the Kaiser until he discovered that they were capable of holding his legions and upsetting all his plans. The second year saw the arrival in the field of the New Voluntary Army, who proved themselves able not only to stand up to the Germans, but also to strike back. With the third year came the "nation in arms," and it was a year of great enterprises, by means of which the enemy's numbers were considerably reduced; but even with all its successes, it did not produce results calculated of themselves to end the war.

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THE DEPÔT.

1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

The following officers were employed at the Depôt on the 1st July 1916:—

Lieut.-Colonel Sir C. Cuyler, Bart. (Res. of Off.), Commanding.
Major C. C. Pearson (Res. of Off.), Adjutant.
Major H. C. Maul (T.F. Res., late 3rd Battalion).
2nd Lieut. T. Boyd (9th Battalion).
2nd Lieut. R. H. Paige (9th Battalion).
Captain and Quartermaster C. Carnell (Res. of Off.).

INFANTRY DRAFTS DESPATCHED FROM THE DEPÔT, COWLEY BARRACKS, TO RESERVE BATTALIONS OF THE REGIMENT AND TO OTHER CORPS.

Month	3rd Bn.	9th Bn.	3/4th Bn. (T.F.)	4th Bn. (Res.)	10th Bn.	Command Depôts.	Other Corps.	Total.
1916								
July	192	194	–	–	–	40	376	802
August	338	–	–	–	–	–	174	512
September	126	–	–	120	–	–	157	403
October	207	–	–	69	–	–	835	1,111
November	123	–	38	47	–	–	365	573
December	38	–	–	51	–	32	451	572
1917								
January..	156	–	–	–	19	12	673	860
February	81	–	–	7	–	–	1,092	1,180
March	250	–	–	174	–	–	1,134	1,558
April	89	–	–	33	26	–	520	668
May	51	–	–	21	17	–	409	498
June	19	–	–	7	–	–	443	469
Total	1,670	194	38	529	62	84	6,629	9,206

Note.—The 3rd (Reserve) Battalion continued to send drafts to the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 9th (2nd Reserve) Battalion, which hitherto supplied drafts to the Service Battalions, now disappeared, and its duties were carried out by the 36th Training Reserve Battalion, which received a quota of recruits from the Depôt included in the column "Other Corps" in the above table. The 10th Battalion was formed as a reserve for the Territorial Force Battalions.

The sick and wounded of the Expeditionary Force who reported at the Depôt between August 1914 and 31st July 1917 numbered 5,803.

From the commencement of the war up to the 14th August 1917 28,999 Infantry recruits passed through the Depôt.

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THE 1ST BATTALION
OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
IN
MESOPOTAMIA.
1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

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RECORD OF THE 1ST BATTALION,

1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

WE propose, first of all, to give extracts from the diary of the new 43rd for the twelve months, and then to revert to certain matters connected with the old 43rd and the Mesopotamian Campaign, which were crowded out of the last volume of the CHRONICLE.

The last half of 1916 was spent in re-creating the Battalion, by gathering together and training men. The few survivors of the unfortunate repulse at Sannaiyat (April 6th) were gradually reinforced by drafts from England and from the convalescent depôt in India. Lieut.-Colonel L. H. R. Pope-Hennessy, D.S.O., had been sent out from home to take command, but the greater number of the officers were attached from other regiments. The time spent at Amara was uneventful from the point of view of military operations, but there was plenty of leisure for getting the new Battalion into order, and by the end of November it had been stiffened up by the return of a considerable number of old soldiers who had recovered from wounds received in the earlier battles on the Tigris. In December the Battalion moved up to Sheikh Saad, for duty on the line of communications, and occupied the Blockhouse Line guarding the railway from Sheikh Saad to Atab. On this and similar duty higher up the Tigris the Battalion was employed until the summer of 1917, at which time Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Stapleton was in command, having replaced Lieut.-Colonel Pope-Hennessy, employed on the Staff.

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FROM THE BATTALION DIARY.

July 1st.—The strength of the Battalion this day is 16 officers and 312 other ranks.

July 6th.—The Provisional Battalion will in future be known as the 1st Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.[1]

July 8th.—Lieut. Kinghorn, 2 machine-guns and Section, and 6 signallers embarked for Qualat Saleh.

July 9th–31st.—The Battalion remained at Amara, Perimeter Camp, Tigris right bank, employed on fatigues and in training.

During the month 3 men died of enteric, 1 of cholera, and 1 of dysentery.

The strength of the Battalion on the 31st July was 13 officers and 287 other ranks.

August 4th.—2nd Lieut. Griffin assumed command of A Company; 2nd Lieut. Roberts and 2 N.C.O.'s commenced a course at the Machine Gun School, Amara.

August 14th.—2nd Lieut. Wilmot and Regimental Sergeant-Major Dancy proceeded on one month's leave to India.

Major R. H. Crake (King's Own Scottish Borderers) arrived from Basra, for duty with the Battalion, and took over the command from Captain Titherington, who had assumed temporary command on the 28th July, when Major the Hon. W. R. S. Barrington was admitted to hospital.

August 22nd.—A draft of 220 O.R. joined the Battalion from Magil and England.

August 23rd.—A draft of 35 joined from Basra. C and D Companies were formed, 2nd Lieut. Field in command of the former, Lieut. Kinghorn of the latter.

August 28th.—2nd Lieut. P. G. Wells (2nd King's Liverpool Regiment) joined the Battalion for duty.

August 31st.—The whole of the month of August was devoted to training of various kinds, including night operations, musketry, etc. The strength of the Battalion was now 15 officers and 530 other ranks.

[1] A G.H.Q. telegram intimated that this change of nomenclature had come into force on the 30th April.

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September 1st.—The following was received from the A.A.G., 3rd Echelon :—

"Extract from *Gazette of India*, No. 776, 13.7.16 : 'Officers, N.C.O.'s, and men under Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., brought to notice for Gallant and Distinguished Service in the Field from 5th October 1915 to 17th January 1916 :—

"'Lieut.-Colonel E. A. E. LETHBRIDGE, D.S.O.
"'Captain W. E. T. MORLAND.
"'Captain S. C. B. MUNDEY.
"'2nd Lieut. F. BROWN (*since deceased*).
"'Captain Hon. J. C. W. S. FOLJAMBE (*since deceased*).
"'Captain and Quartermaster T. IVEY.
"'8540 Private L. GREY (*since deceased*).
"'5574 A/R.S.M. J. LOVE.
"'8361 Private A. APPS.
"'8148 A/C.Q.M.S. W. ROBINS.
"'7452 A/Corporal W. DONOHOE.
"'9015 Private A. EVANS (*since deceased*)
"'9687 Private J. HARVEY.
"'6907 A/Sergeant A. PURSEGLOVE.
"'8057 A/Sergeant F. SMITH.
"'5768 A/C.Q.M.S. H. ARLETT.
"'8397 Sergeant ARMITT.
"'7315 Private E. LEACH.
"'9099 Private DAY.'"

September 5th.—A draft of 55 N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion, including 28 Serving Soldiers from the 2nd Durham Light Infantry (Nowshera).

September 16th.—Major the Hon. W. R. S. Barrington returned from hospital, and took up the duties of Second in Command.

September 18th.—In Part II. Orders a list of 23 N.C.O.'s and men who died at Kut or Baghdad between 23rd April and 4th September was published to-day; of these 20 belonged to the 43rd, and 3 were attached.

Lieut. G. Heawood (2/4th Wilts, attached) and 23 N.C.O.'s and men, taken prisoner at Kut (29th April), and subsequently exchanged, left Basra for India on the 9th September; 18 belonged to the 43rd, and 5 were attached to it from other regiments.

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September 29th.—A draft of 66 other ranks (including 44 N.C.O.'s and men who had previously served with the 43rd) joined the Battalion.

September 30th.—Strength of Battalion, 16 officers and 654 other ranks.

MAJOR THE HON. W. R. S. BARRINGTON.

The Battalion remained at Amara, in the same camp on the right bank of the Tigris, the training being continued as before.

One man died of cholera on September 3rd.

October 1st.—Part II. Musketry Course was concluded.

October 5th.—Lieut.-Colonel L. H. R. Pope-Hennessy, D.S.O., joined from England and took over command of the Battalion. Captain W. E. C. Terry also joined from England, and took command of C Company.

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October 6th.—2nd Lieut. J. R. Brown and 150 O.R. joined from the 3rd Battalion. The draft came from various regiments and had an average service of 3 months.

October 11th.—2nd Lieuts. F. E. Anderson and H. W. Bleeze, with 150 O.R., joined the Battalion from England, being the remainder of the last draft.

October 16th.—2nd Lieut. Wilmot and R.-S.-M. Dancy returned from leave in India.

October 22nd.—Company Training started.

October 23rd.—The Amara Column mobilized. The 2/7th Gurkhas proceeded last evening to raid an Arab village 14 miles east of Amara with one troop of cavalry. Agents had reported that the village contained hidden rifles. The surprise was not successful, but 300 sheep were captured. The Battalion, with other troops, started at 5 a.m. and met the Gurkhas returning at 9.30 a.m., the whole force reaching camp at 12.30 p.m. The day was hot and still, and about 50 men of the Battalion fell out, three of whom were admitted to hospital, while the others rejoined in the evening.

2nd Lieut. H. T. C. Field took over the command of B Company from Captain H. C. Butcher, admitted to hospital.

October 24th–31st.—Company Training continued. One company now finds the guards and duties daily. The guards take 19 N.C.O.'s and 105 men, and are over hospital, blockhouses, railway, various offices in Amara, etc.

October 28th.—Captain T. H. Wheelwright (1st Garrison Battalion) joined from England and was posted to A Company.

October 31st.—The present strength of the Battalion is 22 officers and 914 other ranks.

November 1st.—Company Training continued.

November 6th.—2nd Lieuts. G. C. Huggard, H. E. F. Smyth, T. R. Milford, rejoined from India, and a draft of 61 men joined from Bangalore.

November 18th.—Company Training completed to the 13th day. N.C.O.'s and men rejoined from courses, 16 qualified instructors in Lewis Gun, 32 1st Class Bombers, 16 1st Class Snipers. The Battalion is still waiting for Lewis and Vickers guns.

November 19th.—The Battalion was warned to be prepared to move to Sheikh Saad at short notice.

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November 22nd.—Second Bombers' Course (under 2nd Lieut. Bleeze) and second Snipers' Course (under 2nd Lieut. F. E. Anderson) commenced.

Winter scale of clothing issued, viz. : serge, 3 blankets, and waterproof cape. In future in "marching order" a cardigan and a waterproof cape will be carried.

November 27th.—Barges were allotted, and the Battalion was ordered to embark at 12 noon to-morrow on P. 55. Loaded the barges, and handed over the camp to the 1/6th Devons, but the embarkation orders were subsequently cancelled.

November 28th.—Ordered to embark on P. 52 at 8 a.m. to-morrow.

November 29th.—P. 52 did not come alongside until 8 p.m. The Battalion then embarked in the dark.

November 30th.—P. 52 left Amara at 6 a.m. and stopped for the night at Ali Garbi.

The following did not embark, having been ordered to march from Amara to Sheikh Saad : Captain E. C. Kinghorn, 2nd Lieut. B. F. Roberts, and 2nd Lieut. E. B. Parkinson, with 70 animals and 160 N.C.O.'s and men, viz. : Machine Gun Section, 60; Followers, 16; Grooms, 10; D Company (to complete), 74.

The strength of the Battalion this day was 24 officers and 918 other ranks.

December 1st.—P. 52 left Ali Garbi in the morning, and arrived at Sheikh Saad at night.

December 2nd.—Sheikh Saad (right back of Tigris). At 9 a.m. the Battalion started disembarkation, and unloaded the barges in two hours. The rest of the day was spent in pitching camp 800 yards from the river and settling in. There was no transport, and it was found that the tents (thirty-five 160 lb. tents), which had been supplied to us from the Ordnance at Amara, were deficient of poles, so we had to borrow tents from the 2nd Dorsets. The Battalion took over internal defence guards, amounting to about 100 men nightly.

December 3rd–5th.—Battalion Training and fatigues.

December 7th.—Ordered to be ready to move at short notice on various detachments.

December 11th.—2nd Lieut. G. R. Grosvenor and one platoon of C Company left, by road, for the Advanced G.H.Q. at Sinn.

December 12th.—C Company less one platoon, and two platoons of A Company, left by road under Captain W. E. C. Terry, for

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Advanced G.H.Q. at Sinn, to be Army Commanders' Guard and Prisoners-of-War Guard.

Two platoons of B Company, under 2nd Lieut. D. A. Wilmot, left, by river, for Arab village, for G.H.Q. Guard.

December 13th.—The Battalion was relieved of all garrison duties.

December 14th.—Mobile Column (Xth Lancers, section 2/105th Battery, half battalion 43rd) moved off at 7 a.m. in the direction of Lots Mound, south-west of Sheikh Saad. We halted about 3 miles out from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., in support of the cavalry, who patrolled up to Lots Mound. No enemy encountered, and the Column returned to camp at dark

December 15th.—The Battalion found the garrison fatigues.

December 16th.—Instructions received that the Battalion would take over the Blockhouse Line [1] from No. 31 (near Twin Canals) to No. 66 (near Imam-el-Mansur and garrison S.P. 4).

The detachment at Sinn left 1 platoon of A Company there, and the remainder moved to the most distant end of the Blockhouse Line (western end). The Arab Village detachment moved to S.P. 4.

December 17th.—Signallers, Machine Gun Section, with two Maxim-guns and 30 men of B Company, left for S.P.4; transport, 20 camels; arrived 11 a.m. on the 18th.

2nd Lieut. Grosvenor left for Basra, to relieve Lieut. Murphy as A.P.M. at Magil.

December 19th.—Regimental H.Q. moved to S.P. 4. C Company occupied S.P. 12 with one machine-gun.

Surplus stores, etc., dumped at Sheikh Saad awaiting transport.

At 7 p.m. 100 men of the 2nd Norfolks arrived at S.P.4 with orders to relieve the garrison of S.P. 4 and the company occupying Blockhouses 31 to 42, who were to move forthwith to Dujailah Redoubt.

December 21st.—Regimental H.Q. moved to Blockhouse 55—a central position near Sinn.

Dujailah started rationing from Sinn, whence companies had been drawing independently. Major R. H. Crake took over command of Dujailah.

400 mounted Arabs reported to be on Jumailiat. The Xth Lancers made a reconnaissance in that direction.

[1] In December 1901 the 43rd were carrying out similar duties on the Blockhouse Line across a portion of the Orange River Colony.—ED.

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December 22nd.—The piquets along the old Turkish position thrown out by Dujailah towards Atab were withdrawn. The left of the 119th Infantry connects with Imam.

2nd Lieut. L. R. Watts admitted to hospital.

December 23rd.—The Battalion came under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Darley (2/119th Infantry), commanding the West Section of L. of C. Defences. The garrison of Dujailah was reduced to 200, so B Company returned to H.Q. The Cavalry Division bivouacked near Blockhouse 54, prior to raiding Gossar's Fort.

December 24th.—H.Q. moved to old IIIrd Corps H.Q. camp (Sinn), which was found in a most unsanitary condition.

December 25th.—1 platoon of A Company, relieved from G.H.Q. Guard, rejoined the Company. All companies are now complete units, less Lewis-gun crews still at Dujailah.

Private Heath was attacked by four Arabs, at 8.15 p.m., between Blockhouses 54 and 55, and was slightly wounded.

December 26th.—The Battalion took over the Prisoners of-War Camp at Sinn from the Squadron Xth Lancers.

December 27th.—Rain. Commenced wiring Blockhouse Line from the Imam end.

December 28th.—Training impossible, owing to the state of the ground.

December 29th.—Sergeant-Major G. Dancy promoted Hon. Lieut. and Quartermaster (*London Gazette*, 16th December), and took over the duties from Lieut. W. W. Wooding, who had been acting in that capacity since 16th February last.

December 30th.—Rain. Inter-company reliefs between H.Q. Blockhouse Line, and Dujailah.

A new line of blockhouses (south of Dujailah Depression and east of Imam) is proposed.

December 31st.—H.Q. at Sinn. Ground drying, but movement still difficult, owing to mud. Blockhouse 61 destroyed by rain; the blockhouses east of Sinn are surrounded by water.

Field Firing from Dujailah with Lewis-guns.

Strength of the Battalion, 22 officers and 860 other ranks.

Steps have been taken to obtain officers for the Battalion: Lieut. Meade from England, Captain Fitzgerald from Basra, Lieut. Murphy from Magil, Major Stapleton from India, also N.C.O.'s from such duties as Pay Sergeant at the Depôt in India, etc.

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ROLL OF OFFICERS, 1st BATTALION.

31st December 1916

Headquarters

Lieut.-Colonel L H. R. Pope-Hennessy, D.S.O., Commanding.
Major R. H. Crake (K.O.S.B.), Second in Command.
Captain G. W. Titherington, Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. B. F. Roberts (*3rd Battalion*), Machine Gun Officer.
2nd Lieut. E. B. Parkinson (*9th Battalion*), Transport Officer.
2nd Lieut. H. W. Bleeze (*9th Battalion*), Bombing Officer.
2nd Lieut. F. E. Anderson (*9th Battalion*), Sniping Officer.
2nd Lieut. T. R. Milford (*3rd Battalion*), Signalling Officer.
Hon. Lieut. G. Dancy, Quartermaster.

A Company.

Captain (Hon. Major) the Hon. W. R. S. Barrington (*3rd Battalion*).
2nd Lieut. P. G. Wells (*2nd King's Liverpools*).
2nd Lieut. F. M. Hardie.

B Company.

Captain T. H. Wheelwright (*1st Garrison Battalion*).
2nd Lieut. H. E. F. Smyth.
2nd Lieut. D. A. T. Wilmot (*9th Battalion*).
2nd Lieut. J. R. Brown (*9th Battalion*).

C Company.

Captain W. E. C. Terry.
Lieut. W. W. Wooding.
2nd Lieut. L. J. Rock (*3rd Battalion*).

D Company.

Captain G. E. Whittall.
Lieut. E. C. Kinghorn (*2/4th Border Regiment.*)
2nd Lieut. G. C. Huggard (*3rd Battalion*).

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1917.

January was spent by the Battalion (forming part of Line of Communication troops below Baghdad) in the construction and occupation of the Blockhouse line protecting the railway from Sheikh Saad to Atab. Headquarters were at Sinn, and one platoon acted as guard to prisoners-of-war.

Dujailah Redoubt was occupied by 200 men, under Major R. H. Crake (K.O.S.B., attached to the Battalion as Second in Command), the men there undergoing specialist training as Vickers and Lewis Gunners, Battalion Bombers, Company Bombers, Snipers, Scouts, etc. It was, in fact, the Battalion School of Instruction, and courses succeeded one another continuously.

The companies in occupation of the blockhouses underwent training in the mornings, and found working-parties and fatigues in the afternoons. Building the new blockhouses and keeping the old ones in repair necessitated a considerable amount of work, no fewer than 17,000 sandbags being used in a few days. Wire fences also took much time to put up. Twice during the month Arabs made attempts to cut the wire and break through the line, the first time with some success, but on the second occasion checked by Lewis-gun fire.

It was found that the system of splitting up companies in occupying blockhouses 300 yards to 600 yards apart put difficulty in the way of training, nor was the scheme particularly efficacious in keeping out marauding Arabs armed with wire-cutters. It was thought, however, that when once a continuous wire fence, properly constructed and "aproned," had been put up, there would be very little fear of serious attack on the line from this class of enemy. On the other hand, marauding Arabs very soon learned to recognize bomb traps, which are, moreover, useless unless placed in every bay, involving great waste of bombs, which are ruined by rain and by continual exposure to the sun.

To obviate these various difficulties of blockhouse defence, the Commanding Officer put forward the following suggestion : When a unit is allotted a line for protection against Arabs, an efficient fence should first be erected. Then small posts to hold 3 men each should be constructed along the line at intervals of not more than 100 yards, and at every 1,000 yards a post to hold 12 men or more, with a machine or Lewis gun. Special attention to be paid to nullahs, etc., leading through the line—not to be blocked, but used

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as traps. These posts would be occupied by night, and would make it impossible for Arabs to remove horses and large gear, although they might still be able to crawl through singly, but after a few had been shot by the occupants of the posts the Arabs would probably find that the game was not worth the candle. Under this arrangement, by day companies on blockhouse duty would return to a central camp, near the line and equipped with a crowsnest, whereby training, supervision, rationing, watering, etc., would be greatly simplified. Thus would be obviated the tendency which the prolonged occupation of small detached posts has towards lowering discipline. In flat country a crowsnest look-out 30 feet high would give ample warning of the approach of enemy, mounted or otherwise.

January 7th.—Captain T. H. Wheelwright left for Basra, to relieve Captain Fitzgerald in 3rd Echelon Office.

2nd Lieut. H. T. C. Field took command of B Company.

January 10th.—Lieut. D. Murphy joined from Magil, and was posted to A Company.

January 17th.—A draft of 16 other ranks joined from India.

January 22nd.—Captain H. K. Bicknell joined from the 3rd Battalion in England, and was posted to D Company.

January 25th.—Captain C. Fitzgerald joined from Basra, and took up the duties of Machine Gun Officer temporarily.

January 31st.—The present strength of the Battalion was 25 officers and 835 other ranks.

The following extracts from the *London Gazette* of December 22nd, 1916, were published :—

Honours and Rewards.

Distinguished Service Order, Major L. J. CARTER.
Military Cross, Captain G. E. WHITTALL.
Promoted Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel, Major F. H. STAPLETON.

February 22nd.—Major the Hon. W. R. S. Barrington proceeded to India on duty. Captain C. Fitzgerald took command of A Company.

February 28th.—Major R. H. Crake (K.O.S.B.) left the Battalion to take command of the 8th Cheshire Regiment. Captain G. E. Whittall took over the duties of Second in Command of the Battalion, and retained the command of D Company.

Effective strength of the Battalion, 24 officers and 848 other ranks.

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ROLL OF OFFICERS.

1st March 1917.

Headquarters.

Lieut.-Colonel L. H. R. Pope-Hennessy, D.S.O., Commanding.
Captain G. W. Titherington, Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. B. F. Roberts, Machine-gun Officer.
2nd Lieut. E. B. Parkinson, Transport Officer.
2nd Lieut. H. W. Bleeze, Bombing Officer.
2nd Lieut. K. E. Anderson, Sniping Officer.
2nd Lieut. T. R. Milford, Signalling Officer.
Hon. Lieut. G. Dancy, Quartermaster.

A Company.

Captain C. Fitzgerald.
Lieut. D. Murphy.
2nd Lieut. F. M. Hardie.
2nd Lieut. P. G. Wells.

B Company.

2nd Lieut. H. T. C. Field.
2nd Lieut. H. E. F. Smyth.
2nd Lieut. D. A. T. Wilmot.
2nd Lieut. J. R. Brown.

C Company.

Captain W. E. C. Terry.
Lieut. W. W. Wooding.
Lieut. S. J. Griffin.
2nd Lieut. L. J. Rock

D Company.

Captain G. E. Whittall, M.C.[1]
Captain H. Bicknell.
Lieut. E. C. Kinghorn.
2nd Lieut. G. C. Huggard.

The Battalion was still in occupation of the Blockhouse Line, with H.Q. at Sinn.

March 6th.—Battalion H.Q. moved from Sinn to Imam-al-Mansur.

The Arabs now causing some trouble by grazing their herds nearer to the blockhouse line; machine-guns fired to frighten them off, and proclamations ordering them to give themselves up were dropped. A few came in under the white flag.

March 11th.—Heard that Baghdad had been entered by British troops at 11 a.m. to-day.

[1] Also second in command of the Battalion.

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March 13th.—A party of about 50 Arabs attempted to penetrate the blockhouse line near Blockhouse 75. One Arab was found dead on the wire.

March 14th.—Lieut.-Colonel Pope-Hennessy received orders to join the 3rd Division as G.S.O.I.; he handed over the command of the Battalion to Captain G. E. Whittall, M.C., and left at 2 p.m.

Lieut. Kinghorn took over command of D Company.

March 15th.—Intimation received that Captain G. E. Whittall, M.C., was appointed second in command (A/Major) from 1st March.

March 18th.—A draft of 21 (14 from India) joined the Battalion.

March 19th.—Lieut. A. E. S. Riddle rejoined from sick leave to India, and was posted to D Company.

March 20th.—Arabs penetrated wire and were fired on on their way out. They dropped much valuable material collected by them from old trenches in Abdul Hassan Bend

Major G. E. Whittall took over Post Commandant's duties at Imam.

March 21st.—Arabs removed donkeys from Labour Corps Wire was not cut, but the animals' feet were tied together and they were then dragged under the wire.

March 22nd.—Lieut.-Colonel F. Stapleton joined from India and took over command of the Battalion.

March 24th.—Lieut. H. E. F. Smyth broke his collar-bone at football.

March 27th.—Private A. V. Spencer, while on Imam Dump Guard, was shot by an Arab and died of his wounds.

B Company furnished a detachment (24 O.R.) to Megasis Pumping Station.

March 28th.—Lieuts. D. Murphy and G. C. Huggard with 43 N.C.O.'s and men left for Amara for formation of Stokes Mortar Battery. Lieut. H. D. Radford, on his way from Basra, joined this party at Sheikh Saad.

March 29th.—Captain H. K. Bicknell left for Magil to relieve, as A.P.M., 2nd Lieut. G. R. Grosvenor, who is under orders to proceed to Amara for the Stokes Mortar Battery.

March 30th.—2nd Lieut. L. R. Watts rejoined from hospital.

D Company H.Q. moved from Atab to Imam.

March 31st.—Railway dismantled as far as Imam. Blockhouses 81 to 69 dismantled and abandoned. D Company to Sinn.

Battalion strength, 22 officers and 821 other ranks.

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April 1st.—The dismantling of the Blockhouse Line now proceeding rapidly, and companies assembling at Sinn.

April 2nd.—Battalion H.Q. moved from Imam to Sinn. 2nd Lieut. L. R. Watts admitted to hospital.

A new outpost line was established by the 119th Infantry from Sinn to Megasis. No trouble from Arabs.



LIEUT.-COLONEL L. H. R. POPE-HENNESSY, D.S.O., AND CAPTAIN AND ADJUTANT G. W. TITHERINGTON.

April 3rd.—Dujailah Redoubt abandoned. The Battalion (less C Company) marched to Twin Canals, arriving at 10.30 a.m.

April 4th.—Marched to Sheikh Saad, the baggage going by train. Camp near the old site of December last.

Lieut. A. Price (Sussex Regiment) rejoined from B Convalescent Depôt, Amara, and was posted to A Company.

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April 12th.—The Battalion was all together at Sheikh Saad for the first time since December last. One month's leave to India granted to 6 officers and 250 other ranks (most of whom had been in Mesopotamia continuously since April 1st, 1916, and many for an even longer time).

April 24th.—Company and individual training, etc., going on daily.

April 26th.—Lieut. H E. F. Smyth rejoined from hospital 2nd Lieut. D. A. T. Wilmot and 4 N.C.O.'s proceeded to Amara for 3 weeks' Physical Training Course.

April 28th.—A and D Companies embarked for Azizieh, the animals marching with XV Echelon.

April 30th.—The remainder of Battalion embarked for Azizieh.

May 2nd-3rd.—On these days the two parties disembarked at Azizieh, and pitched camp.

May 3rd-12th.—Settling down, improving camp, taking over defences, training, etc.

May 13th.—2nd Lieut. B. E. Anderson proceeded to Kut for duty with the Military Light Railway; Lieut. A. Price took over command of D Company.

May 17th.—14 men rejoined from Amara (hospital, etc.).

May 18th.—Lieut. W. Rance and 57 other ranks joined from India, some of whom had been with the Regiment before, but others were almost untrained. Lieut. A. E. Riddle and 30 other ranks proceeded on escort to cable at Umm-el-Tubal.

May 19th.—Lieut. Rance appointed Staff Officer to the Azizieh Mobile Column.

Sergeant Robinson and 68 other ranks joined from India, viâ Amara.

May 21st.—2nd Lieut. P. G. Wells proceeded to Basra on transfer to the Royal Flying Corps in Eygpt.

May 24th.—2nd Lieut. Smyth and 30 men proceeded on escort to telegraph party half-way to Zeur. The Mobile Column marched out and bivouacked, returning next day.

May 26th.—2nd Lieut. L. J. Rock and 20 men returned from escort to railway party half-way to Zeur.

May 27th.—2nd Lieut. Watts and 30 men proceeded on escort duty half-way to Zeur with 600 camels and Labour Corps.

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May 28th.—2nd Lieut. D. A. Wilmot returned from P.T. Course at Amara.

May 30th.—Lieut. A. E. Riddle and 30 men proceed on escort half-way to Ali-Sherki.

May 31st.—Strength of the Battalion: Present, 17 officers and 732 other ranks; on leave in India, 6 officers and 250 other ranks.

June 9th.—D Company, reduced to 100 rifles, proceeded to garrison Azizieh Railway Station, and to construct perimeter and blockhouses.

June 14th.—2nd Lieuts. D. S. Northcote and A. L. Tompkins joined from England, and Lieut. T. P. Williams rejoined from India.

June 18th.—2nd Lieut. L. H. Watts and 25 men to Umm-el-Tubal, to meet and escort telegraph party; and on the 20th Lieut. T. P. Williams and 50 men went to the same place as escort to Railhead.

June 22nd.—Lieut. J. W. Meade, 2nd Lieut. A. L. Thompson, 90 other ranks from England, and 13 from hospital, joined the Battalion; 35 of these were from the Shropshire Light Infantry. Most had about twelve months' service, but a few from the A.S.C. were untrained.

June 23rd.—Further escort half-way to Zeur went out.

June 24th–25th.—Captain Kinghorn and 2nd Lieuts. B. F. Roberts and E. B. Parkinson rejoined from leave in India, and on the 26th Lieut. A. Price left for India on a month's leave.

June 26th.—2nd Lieut. J. S. Fenwick, 2nd Lieut. L. V. Steele (K.R.R.C.), and 213 other ranks joined from Bangalore. The party left Basra 254 strong, but the remainder went into hospital en route. Except a few men returning from hospital, etc., this draft averaged only a few months' service, and were practically untrained.

Lieut. S. J. Griffin returned from leave in India.

June 30th.—Strength of the Battalion: 27 officers and 1,026 other ranks, of whom 70 were sick (off duty).

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REPORT OF THE MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION.

In August 1916 a Commission was appointed to inquire into the operations in Mesopotamia up to the fall of Kut. The Commissioners were: Lord George Hamilton, G.C.S.I. (Chairman), Lord Donoughmore, Lord Hugh Cecil, M.P., Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, General Sir Neville Lyttelton, Sir Archibald Williamson, M.P., Mr. John Hodge, M.P., Commander Josiah Wedgwood, M.P.

After examining more than one hundred witnesses,[1] the Commission issued their Report in June 1917, Commander Wedgwood making a separate report. The following summary appeared in *The Times* of the 27th June:—

COUNTRY AND CLIMATE.

By way of introduction to their narrative of the campaign the Commission give an account of the physical and climatic peculiarities of Mesopotamia, and of the obstacles which they present to military operations.

Mesopotamia comprises the country between and adjacent to the lower reaches of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, and is a vast, roadless desert, intersected by swamps, and without timber or stone. The few towns are situated on the river banks. The sole access from the sea is by a channel called the Shatt-el-Arab, through which the Tigris and Euphrates flow into the Persian Gulf. Seventy miles up this channel is the primitive little port of Basra, which, in 1914, was without quays, storehouses, or any of the facilities necessary for the base of an expeditionary force.

Kurna, Amara, Kut, and Baghdad, towns to which the expedition successively advanced, are respectively 50, 140, 290, and 500 miles up river from Basra. Ctesiphon lies between Kut and Baghdad. The navigation of the Tigris is very difficult. Ocean-going

[1] The Commission, of course, had no opportunity of examining General Townshend, who was at the time a prisoner of war in Turkey. What his evidence would have been may be gathered from the book which he published subsequently, *My Campaign in Mesopotamia* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1920).—ED.

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steamers, drawing not more than 19 ft., can make their way to Basra, but for 50 miles above Basra, as far as Kurna, the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, there is only 7½ to 12 or more feet of water, according to the season and the floods. From Kurna to Baghdad the river is shallow, and in places very tortuous, so that only steamers of 3½ ft. draught and of special construction can safely make the journey. Floods frequently overflow the banks of the river, and not only increase the difficulty of navigation, but also absolutely prevent marching or wheeled traffic over large tracts of country.

From their consideration of all these difficulties the Commission draw the consclusion that the provision of adequate and suitable river transport above Basra, and of sufficient wharfage and unloading facilities at Basra, was a necessity, if effective military operations were to be carried out inland.

> "As an expeditionary army must be sea-borne, sea-supported, and sea-victualled, and well supplied with river transport, it was manifest from the outset that without these facilities the orderly dispatch and distribution of the reinforcements, ammunition, stores, and supplies necessary for the well-being and replenishment of an advancing force would be almost impossible. The treacherous climate and the alternation of sweltering heat and bitter cold in these regions made the continuous supply of such articles as warm clothing, double-fly tents, sun-helmets, spine-pads, goggles, ice, ventilating fans, mosquito-nets, quinine, and other tropical prophylactics indispensable, if the health and *moral* of the troops were to be maintained at their accustomed high standard. Full rations, varied from time to time to counteract the climatic diseases of the country were very requisite. Sickness, even with a full supply of such palliatives, was certain to be high, necessitating abnormal hospital accommodation in addition to the ordinary provision for military casualties."

CONDITION OF INDIAN ARMY.

Whilst the conditions of the campaign in Mesopotamia required a standard of preparation and equipment above the ordinary, the Indian Army was, on the outbreak of war, not even up to the ordinary standard in these matters. This was due to the campaign of military economy which, by agreement between the Home and

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Indian Governments, had been pursued in India for many years before the war. The gradual extinction of the opium revenue and the friendly understandings arrived at with Russia were both treated as reasons for a reduction of military establishments. The supply of artillery was cut down both in quantity and quality. The number of troops available for immediate mobilization was reduced, and the army generally was only equipped for frontier warfare against savage tribes. The Indian Army was, therefore, relatively, as regards mechanical equipment, guns, etc., in a less favourable position to confront modern troops than it was in the time of the South African War; whilst reserves, both of personnel and material, had been reduced to a very low ebb when the war broke out.

Moreover, before the expedition to Mesopotamia was dispatched, India had already equipped and sent out large expeditions to France and South Africa, and in considering the Indian Government's responsibilities in Mesopotamia, it is fair to remember that the Mesopotamia Expedition was only part of a larger effort which involved, not only the maintenance in India of a considerable army for interior and frontier defence, but also the dispatch overseas of troops approximating in number to the total army maintained in India before the war.

ORIGIN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The Mesopotamia Expedition originated in a minute by General Barrow, the Military Secretary at the India Office, to the Secretary of State for India, dated 26th September 1914, suggesting that a force should be sent from India to occupy Basra in the event of Turkey joining in the war. The advantages of such an expedition were stated by General Barrow to be that it would checkmate Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike, it would encourage the Arabs to rally to us, it would safeguard Egypt, for without Arab support a Turkish invasion of Egypt was impossible, and it would effectually protect the oil installation at Abadan, in which the Admiralty had a large interest. The Secretary of State consulted India on the proposal; it appeared that the Germans were sending secret emissaries and German officers to raise a *Jehad* in the countries lying between Mesopotamia and India, and ultimately the Secretary of State ordered the expedition to be dispatched. The proposal seemed sound and justifiable in itself, as it

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was likely to prove an effective counter to German and Turkish intrigues.

The Commission find that :—

> "The expedition to Mesopotamia was a justifiable military enterprise, but one of such a nature that it required, during its inception and development, the most careful watching and preparation."

OCCUPATION OF BASRA AND ITS VILAYET.

It must be explained that the Secretary of State, while retaining control of the policy of the expedition, expressly delegated its management to the Indian Government. Accordingly the Indian Government secretly dispatched from Bombay, early in October 1914, a Brigade of British and Indian troops under General Delamain, with orders to demonstrate at the head of the Persian Gulf, to occupy Abadan Island with the object of protecting the oil-works, and, if possible, to occupy the port of Basra. On 5th November war was declared against Turkey, and the expedition was brought up to the strength of a division (roughly some 15,000 men), and placed in command of Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Barrett, who arrived in Mesopotamia on 14th November. After a few successful skirmishes with the enemy Basra was occupied without much difficulty on 22nd November. "So far the expedition had been a complete success, and in three weeks Basra, the key to Mesopotamia, had been taken and occupied. The suddenness and secrecy of the move had not only ensured success, but it had done so at very small cost to the expedition."

On the suggestion of the Military Secretary at the India Office, Sir Edmund Barrow, permission was given by Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State for India, for the force to push forward to Kurna, which is 50 miles north of Basra, and was considered a position of commanding military value on account of its situation at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. Operations against Kurna were successfully concluded on 9th December, by the surrender of the town, together with the Wali, 1,200 prisoners, and nine guns.

Our authority was thus established over the whole of the river tract between Kurna and the sea. The interval between December 1914 and April 1915 was spent in preparation for defending the British position. The Turks concentrated for an attack on Basra from the north-west, and at the same time threatened the safety

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of the oil-pipe up the Karun river in the north-east. The situation became acute, and in March and April the expedition was reinforced by a second division, and the whole force placed under the command of General Sir John Nixon, who arrived in Basra on 9th April. On 14th April the Turkish threat against Basra was successfully thwarted by a brilliant victory of the British and Indian troops under General Mellis at Barjisyah, near Basra, and there had also been successful fighting near Shaiba two days previously. These victories and the increase of force enabled the expedition to consolidate its position. But though the force had been doubled it had only been provided with less than half its proper scale of medical equipment, and the river transport was not sufficient for its requirements. "These deficiencies," say the Commission, "do not appear to have had sufficient recognition by the Indian Government."

Sir John Nixon's orders from Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief in India, were :—

1. To retain complete control of the lower portion of Mesopotamia, comprising the Basra Vilayet;
2. So far as possible to secure the safety of the oilfields; and
3. To submit a plan (*a*) for the effective occupation of Basra Vilayet; (*b*) for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.

These orders were dated 24th March, but they were not communicated to the India Office by the Indian Government until 3rd May. The Secretary of State did not, therefore, for some time appreciate that Sir John Nixon's orders involved advances to Nasiriyeh, on the Euphrates, and Amara, on the Tigris, both of which places are included in the Turkish province or vilayet of Basra.

But after much correspondence between England and India, the Secretary of State sanctioned successively the advance of Sir John Nixon's forces to Amara, which was captured by General Townshend on 3rd June, to Nasiriyeh, which was taken by General Gorringe after a victory on 25th July, and to Kut-el-Amara, or Kut, which was occupied by General Townshend on 29th September, after defeating the Turks and taking 950 prisoners, 17 guns, and much booty.

The occupation of the Vilayet of Basra was thus completed, and at Kut General Nixon had secured a highly convenient halting-place, which completely covered the enemy's main approaches to the territory occupied by us.

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ORIGIN OF FIRST ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD.

From quite early in the history of the expedition the possibility of an ultimate advance on Baghdad was in the minds of the authorities in India, Mesopotamia, and England. The Viceroy frequently referred to such a possibility, the Staff at Simla drew up various "appreciations" on the subject, and the very day after the capture of Basra on 23rd November the Indian Government's political agent in Mesopotamia, Sir Percy Cox, forwarded to India, after consultation with General Barrett, a reasoned proposal for such an advance. This proposal was forwarded to Lord Crewe, who, however, was not prepared to sanction it "for the present."

Sir John Nixon had taken with him to Mesopotamia orders by the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit a plan for an advance on Baghdad. This plan was forwarded to Simla on 30th August 1915, but it was not communicated to the Viceroy or the Secretary of State, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, wrote on the plan: "Unless we can get back troops from France, Egypt, or elsewhere, I fear that Baghdad, invaluable as its capture would be, is out of the question."

However, on 3rd October when General Townshend was pursuing the Turks after his victory at Kut, and had almost reached Azizieh, 50 miles north of Kut, General Nixon suddenly wired to the Secretary of State: "I consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate at Azizieh." Apparently General Nixon's idea was that contained in the plan which he had forwarded to India, viz., that he would follow on the heels of the disorganized Turks into Baghdad. But, owing to unsuitable and insufficient transport, General Townshend was unable to overtake and again defeat the Turks before they had time to reorganize in a new position at Ctesiphon. When he realized this, General Townshend wished to retire to Kut, but General Nixon still pressed his proposal on the Government, and ordered the Sixth Division to concentrate at Azizieh.

But the Home Government were not prepared at the moment to sanction the adventure. As early as 24th April Lord Crewe had stated, "in Mesopotamia a safe game must be played." Mr. Chamberlain, who, on 27th May, had succeeded Lord Crewe as Secretary for India, adopted a similar policy, and on 4th October wired to the Viceroy that it was "imperative to stop the further advance of General Nixon's force." Orders in this sense were wired to General

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Nixon on 5th October, and the advance on Baghdad was, therefore, apparently abandoned.

But on 4th October, the very day on which Mr. Chamberlain had telegraphed to stop Nixon, the Cabinet met and considered that "if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place (Baghdad), political reasons were thought to make its occupation desirable." On 8th October Mr. Chamberlain wired to the Viceroy :—

> "The Cabinet are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of Baghdad that every effort will be made by us to supply the force that is necessary We do not wish to attempt it with insufficient forces."

Again on 21st October Mr. Chamberlain wired :—

> "At present moment it seems the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. Arabs are wavering and will probably join Turks unless we can offer them great inducement. We are, therefore, in great need of striking success in the East."

It is clear, therefore, that political considerations largely influenced the Government in reopening the proposal for the advance on Baghdad after it had been abandoned. The Commission observe :—

> "The military experts cannot be made solely responsible for the consequences of a decision into the consideration of which outside political factors have necessarily entered."

And the evidence of Sir Beauchamp Duff is cited to the effect that, when political arguments were adduced by those above him in authority, he was ready to incur greater risks than would be justifiable from a merely military point of view. In pursuance of the Cabinet's decision, Mr. Chamberlain wired to General Nixon on 8th October :—

> "To both occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present force are you confident will be necessary ?"

To which General Nixon replied :—

> "No additions are necessary to my present force to beat Nur-ed-din and occupy Baghdad ; of this I am confident."

But he added he would require an additional division and one cavalry regiment to enable him permanently to occupy Baghdad.

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CABINET SANCTION THE ADVANCE.

On 9th October the Viceroy wired to Mr. Chamberlain that he was glad of the Cabinet's decision, that he accepted Nixon's estimate of necessary reinforcements, and that these should reach Baghdad not later than one month after the capture of that city, which was the period he calculated must elapse before the Turks could concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.

Meanwhile, the Government at home referred the question of the advance on Baghdad to the General Staff at the War Office, to the joint Naval and Military Staffs, and to a Special Committee presided over by Sir T. Holderness, Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office. All these authorities agreed that the capture of Baghdad by Sir John Nixon's existing force presented no difficulties, but that, in order to ensure the retention of the city, a reinforcement of one or two divisions was necessary. It appears, however, that none of these expert authorities went into the question of the sufficiency of Sir J. Nixon's transport, or of the possibility of rapidly moving the proposed large reinforcements up river from Basra to Baghdad, a distance of 500 miles. This is the more surprising, as there were at the time, both in the India Office and the War Office, documents showing the great difficulties of Sir John Nixon's existing force through lack of river transport and the consequent trouble there would be in reinforcing it. The Government, however, acted on what proved to be the mistaken advice of the experts, and on 23rd October Mr. Chamberlain authorized the advance on Baghdad in the following terms :—

> "If Nixon is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for the operation, he may march on Baghdad. Two divisions will be sent to him as soon as possible, but owing to relief and transport arrangements reinforcements will take time to dispatch. Probable date will be wired later."

BATTLE OF CTESIPHON.

Although Sir John Nixon had proposed the advance on Baghdad on 3rd October, and received sanction to it on 23rd October, General Townshend's force did not actually move forward until the middle of November. This delay of six weeks was due to the insufficiency of the river transport for the movement of the supplies up river.

There were available for General Townshend's advance about 15,000 men, but there were practically no reserves to support him,

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the remainder of the troops in the country being required to guard the lines of communication, which were 290 miles from Kut to Basra, and would be prolonged to 500 miles if the expedition advanced to Baghdad. General Townshend's troops were physically debilitated by their previous strenuous fighting in the hot months, and his British battalions were 30 per cent. below strength. It was quite uncertain when the promised reinforcements of two divisions from Europe would arrive at Basra, and when they arrived at Basra their transport to the front must take weeks, if not months. These were the circumstances in General Townshend's mind when, early in October, he pointed out to General Kemball, General Nixon's Chief of the Staff, that "unless great risk is to be run," it was absolutely necessary that the advance should be carried out methodically and with greater forces than those then available. But General Townshend did not press his objections, and when he advanced, on 21st November, to attack the two strong lines of Turkish entrenchments at Ctesiphon, "a spirit of intense optimism animated the Headquarters and Administrative Staff." It is true that General Townshend had only some 11,000 effectives available for attacking an entrenched force of Turks estimated at 11,000 to 13,000. But the majority of the enemy were troops who had already been beaten several times in Mesopotamia. Moreover, General Townshend, before the battle, was not informed of the possible Turkish reinforcements, whose arrival on the scene changed his victory into defeat.

After severe fighting, General Townshend's troops, on 22nd November, captured the first line of Turkish entrenchments and took 1,300 prisoners; they also penetrated the second line of entrenchments, but were here counter-attacked by fresh Turkish reinforcements, and forced back into the first line, which they had previously captured. Our losses had been very heavy. General Townshend found himself not only numerically very inferior to the enemy, but in some danger of being surrounded and cut off. He was also short of supplies. He was, therefore, compelled to fall back fighting to Kut, which he reached with the exhausted remnant of his troops on 3rd December.[1] His total casualties at and since the battle of Ctesiphon had been more than 690 killed and 3,800 wounded—a loss of over 30 per cent.

[1] A detailed account of the retreat to Kut will be found in General Townshend's book.—Ed.

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADVANCE.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY MISCALCULATIONS.

The Commission's findings as to the first abortive advance on Baghdad are as follows :—

> The advance to Baghdad under the conditions existing in October 1915 was an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations and attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation. It resulted in the surrender of more than a division of our finest fighting troops, and the casualties incurred in the ineffective attempts to relieve Kut amounted to some 23,000 men. The loss of prestige associated with these military failures was less than might have been anticipated owing to the deep impression made throughout and beyond the localities where the combats occurred by the splendid fighting power of the British and Indian forces engaged.
>
> Various authorities and high officials are connected with the sanction given to this untoward advance. Each and all, in our judgment, according to their relative and respective positions, must be made responsible for the errors in judgment to which they were parties and which formed the basis of their advice or orders.
>
> The weightiest share of responsibility lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance. The other persons responsible were : In India, the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge) and the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Beauchamp Duff); in England, the Military Secretary of the India Office (Sir Edmund Barrow), the Secretary of State for India (Mr. Austen Chamberlain), and the War Committee of the Cabinet. We put these names in the order and sequence of responsibility. The expert advisers of the Government who were consulted also approved the advance and are responsible for their advice, but the papers submitted to us suggest that the approval of the naval and military experts was reluctant and was, perhaps, partly induced by a natural desire not to disappoint the hopes of advantage to the general situation which the Government entertained. It is, however, notable that the experts unanimously anticipated no difficulty in the advance on Baghdad, but only in holding it. We do

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not attach any share in the responsibility for the decision to advance to Baghdad to the Councils of the Secretary of State for India and of the Viceroy, as we have been unable to ascertain from the evidence laid before us that the advance to Baghdad was ever brought before them in such a manner as to allow them to give their personal advice and opinion upon it.

We have included the War Committee of the Cabinet and the Secretary of State for India amongst those upon whom responsibility for this misadventure rests. It is true that the War Committee and the Secretary of State acted upon the opinion of their expert military advisers, and that the Secretary of State only gave his assent to the advance after he had received an assurance from the General on the spot that he had an available force sufficient for his purpose. But so long as the system of responsible departmental administration exists in this country, those who are political heads of departments in time of war, whether they be civilian or military, cannot be entirely immune from the consequences of their own action. They have the option and power of accepting or rejecting the advice of their expert subordinates. The acceptance by a chief of wrong advice from expert subordinates may be an extenuation of, but cannot secure complete immunity from, the responsibility for the evils which may ensue.

The Cabinet from the first laid down the principle, from which they never departed, that questions jointly involving civil and military policy should, in existing circumstances, only be decided by the Cabinet. This authority they exercised throughout, though at times they largely delegated their powers to the War Committee of the Cabinet.

KUT RELIEF OPERATIONS.

After full consideration, Sir John Nixon and General Townshend agreed that Kut should be held by General Townshend, and that his relief should be effected as quickly as possible with the reinforcements on the way from France and elsewhere. This decision received the assent both of Simla and Whitehall. The sick, wounded, and prisoners were evacuated and sent down stream to Basra. On 6th December the Cavalry Brigade left Kut, and on the 7th the Turkish investment of that place was complete.

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In the words of the Commission, "the history of the attempts to relieve Kut is melancholy reading enough—a record of a prolonged struggle carried on with inadequate means under abnormal conditions of atrocious weather, and terminating in failure." Sir Fenton Aylmer, Adjutant-General of the Indian Army, was sent to take command of the relieving force.

The two divisions from France, the bulk of which were still on the high seas, were only gradually and in piecemeal fashion arriving at Basra. Owing to a misunderstanding, units and their equipment had been embarked on different ships; in consequence they often arrived the one before the other, and time was needed for their proper reorganization before advancing. The equipment, especially in heavy artillery and high-explosive shells, was far below what was required for storming modern entrenchments. The available transport in Mesopotamia was not sufficient even to carry the men and ammunition to the front. At two critical periods in the operations there were as many as 10,000 and 12,000 men and a quantity of guns at Basra, which were sorely needed, and might have meant victory at the front, but could not be moved there. All the conditions pointed to the necessity of waiting till the new army had been properly organized and its deficiencies made good. Unfortunately, an early advance was considered necessary before reorganization was possible. During December General Townshend sent from Kut a number of telegrams, in which he urged, as reasons for his immediate relief, the dangers of enemy reinforcements and of a determined onslaught by superior numbers, the impaired *moral* of his troops, heavy losses in British officers, anxiety as to ammunition, etc.

But it is noteworthy that throughout this month he never, except on 5th December, put forward deficiency of supplies as a reason for accelerating his relief. On 5th December he wired: "I hope we can be relieved by a month; my rations for British troops are only one month." But a few days later he wired that he had rations sufficient to last till the beginning of February. Ultimately it will be remembered, he found that with the utmost economy the food just lasted till the end of April! Neither General Nixon nor General Aylmer definitely asked General Townshend how long his supplies would permit him to hold out, and his failure to inform them as to this was one of the main factors in the hurried advance of the relieving force from Ali Gharbi on 4th January 1915.

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The Turks had prepared a series of entrenched positions astride of the Tigris. They were driven from the first of these at Sheikh Saad on 7–9th January, from the second at Wadi on 13–14th January; but the exhausted troops, who had been fighting through continuous mud and rain, failed in an attempt to oust the enemy from their third position at Umm-el-Hannah a few days later. The casualties during these operations amounted to over 8,000 officers and men. A pause was imperative, and it was not till the beginning of March that the relieving force again advanced. On 7th March a night attack in the Dujailah Redoubt at Es Sinn failed, chiefly through miscalculation of the time required for the preliminary night march.

General Aylmer was then replaced by General Sir George Gorringe, who, after some preliminary successes, also failed with heavy losses in two attacks on 9th and 22nd April to carry the position to which the Turks had retired at Sanna-i-yat. The heavy floods made all movements most difficult, and the men at times could not use their rifles, which were clogged with mud. After 16 days' continuous fighting, not only against the Turks, but against the floods, all hope of relieving Kut had to be given up. The losses had exceeded 33 per cent., and were even greater in British officers, and the fighting efficiency of the force was seriously affected.

On 29th April Kut surrendered.

CAUSES OF FAILURE.

The Commission find that the main causes of the failure to relieve Kut were premature attacks, inadequate transport, and insufficient numerical superiority over a strongly entrenched enemy.

It should be added that after the fall of Kut the Expeditionary Force adopted a defensive rôle, and occupied the remainder of the year in consolidating their position and in improving river and land communications and supplies until time was ripe for beginning the second and successful advance on Baghdad, which has recently been consummated.

THE SIEGE OF KUT.

The Commission do not deal at any length with the conditions in Kut during its siege, but they publish, as an appendix, an account of the siege by Colonel Hehir, Principal Medical Officer to the besieged force.

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The Turks closed in on General Townshend on 7th December, and at first their assaults were numerous and severe. But after three days' fighting about Christmas the enemy were repulsed with such heavy losses that no serious attempts to storm the town were made for the remainder of the siege. The real enemy was starvation, and this compelled the surrender of the place on 29th April 1916, after a most gallant and tenacious defence of 147 days.

The following extracts from Colonel Hehir's paper show the straits to which the garrison were reduced :—

> "During the last month of the siege men at fatigues, such as trench-digging, after 10 minutes' work had to rest awhile and go at it again; men on sentry-go would drop down, those carrying loads would rest every few hundred yards; men availed themselves of every opportunity of lolling about or lying down. There were instances of Indians returning from trench duty in the evening seemingly with nothing the matter who laid down and were found dead in the morning—death due to starvation asthenia. Men in such a low state of vitality can stand little in the shape of illness—an attack of diarrhœa that they would have got rid of in a day or so at the beginning of the siege often ended fatally—all recuperative power had gone. At the end of the siege I doubt whether there was a single person equal to a five-mile march carrying his equipment. Personally, up to the middle of March, I could make a complete inspection of the front-line trenches and fort (about five miles) in the morning; I had then to halve it, and at the end of April, while doing even half, I had to rest on the way. Practically all officers were in the same condition of physical incapacity.
>
> "The behaviour of the troops throughout the siege was splendid. The defaulter's sheet of the British soldier was a *carte blanche*, and there was no grumbling; there was almost a complete absence of suicide and insanity."

The difficulties in rationing the Indian troops were much enhanced by caste prejudices as to food. For a long time many of them refused to eat horse or mule flesh. Had it not been for this, these animals could not only have been used as food for the men, but the grain they consumed could have been devoted to the same purpose. It is doubtful, however, if this would have done more than prolong agony. The relieving force was not strong enough in

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artillery, high-explosive shells, and other appliances, without which attacks on modern entrenchments seem absolutely futile.

When the inevitable happened and the town surrendered a striking tribute was paid by the starving men to their commanders. Right up to the end of the siege General Townshend and his brigadiers retained the confidence and allegiance of their men. After the terms of surrender had been settled, and the Generals were departing in a steamboat as prisoners of war, their men formed up along the riverside and gave them a parting cheer as a proof of their unbroken loyalty.

EQUIPMENT AND COMMISSARIAT DEFICIENCIES.

Every General who appeared before the Commission agreed that the Mesopotamian Expedition was badly equipped. Sir Beauchamp Duff informed them that the Indian Army, which furnished the expedition, was organized only for semi-savage fighting, was not well found for an overseas expedition, to a large extent had second-rate equipment, and was "backward in every particular."

The unpreparedness of the Indian Army for its task in Mesopotamia was primarily due to a long-standing policy of economy and restriction of military preparation to the needs of frontier warfare, for which the Home and Indian Governments were, of course, responsible, and not Sir Beauchamp Duff and the General Staff at Simla. But the unpreparedness for overseas warfare was well known to the Indian military authorities, and when they undertook the management of an expedition which was to fight against Turkey, supported by Germany, they ought immediately to have striven energetically to bring the equipment of the expedition up to the standard of modern warfare. The Indian Government were guilty of omissions in nearly every branch of military provision, with the exception of the commissariat, though even here the standard was low and the distribution of food uneven. Serious defects in military equipment, resulting in unnecessary suffering and casualties amongst the troops, were allowed to persist month after month during the first fourteen months of the campaign, when the Indian Government were responsible for its management.

As regards heavy artillery, which India was not in a position to supply, the Indian military authorities did not, for at least a year, "appraise, anticipate, or represent to England" the needs of the expedition. Meanwhile the troops in Mesopotamia had, without

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adequate preparation by heavy artillery, to attack across the open, and at the cost of heavy casualties, strongly fortified trenches with inferior and insufficient artillery. The advance against Ctesiphon was undertaken with only 18 field guns and 6 horse-artillery guns; and the lack of proper artillery also contributed to the failure of the operations for the relief of Kut. There was also a deficiency in aeroplanes, which, however, the War Office could not supply owing to more urgent demands from other theatres of the war.

There is a long list of other items of equipment, such as wire-cutters, water-carts, tents, bombs, blankets, etc., deficiencies in which contributed largely to our heavy casualties and reverses. There was at one time a lack of summer clothing, even for the patients in hospital, and in the bitter winter months troops had been sent from India in "shorts" and tropical clothing. The Commander-in-Chief originally intended to leave the provision of warm clothing for the troops to private charity, and only consented to undertake its provision after a protest by the Viceroy.

The Commission's finding on this part of their inquiry is :—

> "During the period for which the Indian Government were responsible, the commissariat of the expedition cannot be said to have been up to the standard of our Army in France, but there was no general breakdown. Discomfort and want were at times experienced, mainly through lack of transport, and illness arose from serious deficiencies in diet. The whole system of supply was on too low a standard, and was badly organized. We have reason to believe that it has been materially improved since the War Office became responsible for the commissariat.
>
> "The ration originally supplied to the Indian troops was deficient in nutritive qualities, and a serious outbreak of scurvy ensued. Since then this ration has twice been improved, but it still requires careful attention as to the adequacy of its nutritive powers.
>
> "In other essentials the expedition was badly and insufficiently equipped, and little, if any, effort was made to remedy deficiencies until the War Office took over the expedition. It is difficult to arrive at any conclusion other than that the wants of the expedition received meagre attention and illiberal treatment at the hands of the Simla authorities during the years 1914–1915."

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DISPUTES WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT.

The history of the supply of reinforcements to the force is a melancholy tale of altercation between London and Simla. Although up to the time of the advance on Baghdad the expedition was always numerically strong enough to cope with the Turkish forces, yet this result was only attained after protracted wrangling between the Governments at home and in India, neither of whom appeared willing to accept the task of reinforcing an expedition for the success of which they were jointly responsible. The danger and friction created by such a situation is well exemplified by what happened in the early part of 1915. At that period the military authorities in England and India were agreed that the Mesopotamian Expedition was in danger of attack by superior Turkish forces, and that its reinforcement by a division was imperative; but the Secretary of State informed the Viceroy that no reinforcements could be dispatched from England, and the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that no further troops could be spared from India. The difficulty was only got over, after much delay and discussion, by the Home Government definitely ordering India to send reinforcements to Mesopotamia, and relieving the Viceroy of all responsibility for any consequent danger to India. The reinforcements were sent, though only at the last moment, and they enabled Sir John Nixon to defeat and drive the Turks before him in the spring and summer of 1915.

In fine, the arrangements for drafts and reinforcements were lacking in co-ordination as between the Indian and home authorities, and this want of co-ordination led to the failure to supply effective reinforcements in connexion with the advance on Baghdad and the operations for the relief of Kut.

TRANSPORT.

A shortage of river transport existed from the time of the occupation of Kurna in December 1914, and became serious from and after May 1915. Despite additions that were made, the shortage had become relatively even greater in April 1916 than at any earlier period of the campaign, owing to the increased numbers of the force. Practically at no time after the advance above Kurna was river transport adequate to requirements. It greatly delayed military operations, in which celerity was an important factor for

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success, it affected the comfort and feeding of the troops, and it was a direct cause of suffering to the sick and wounded. It took nearly two months to concentrate troops and supplies for the advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara, and the advance towards Baghdad was fatally delayed from the same cause. It seems almost certain that, but for the shortage of river transport, the Turkish Army would have been destroyed between Kut and Ctesiphon. But the want was most acutely felt during the strenuous days of the attempt to succour General Townshend, when time was of the utmost importance in view of the straits to which his garrison was reduced. Shortage of river transport was the chief cause of the failure to relieve Kut.

The reasons for this shortage were as follows :—

> " Steamers of low draught and peculiar type are necessary for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates. There were only a few such steamers plying in Mesopotamia when the expedition arrived in November 1914, unaccompanied by any river steamers. The forces in Mesopotamia were doubled in the spring of 1915, and again more than doubled early in 1916; but except for sending, early in 1915, a few craft which had been ordered for General Barrett's original small force, and were quite inadequate for the increased force, India sent no supply of ready-built steamers to Mesopotamia till the spring of 1916. On the other hand, new vessels, which were asked for by General Nixon in the summer of 1915, took twelve months to build in England and dispatch to Mesopotamia. Consequently they were not available till long after the retreat from Ctesiphon and the fall of Kut."

The Commission comment on the unbusinesslike procedure of the India Office in providing these vessels, but point out that in any case they could not have been built in time to affect the advance on Baghdad or the operations for the relief of Kut.

With regard to the advance on Baghdad, Sir John Nixon was informed on 28th October by his Inspector-General of Communications that he estimated that, in addition to the shipping already ordered, twelve more steamers and twenty-four barges would be required in view of the expected reinforcements. This estimate General Nixon did not pass on to India or London. If he had done so, in view of the insistence by both the Indian and Home Governments on the necessity for the prompt arrival at Baghdad of the

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reinforcing two divisions, it is at least open to doubt whether the sanction to the advance would not have been countermanded.

In the matter of the provision of river craft, the Indian Government was entirely out of touch with the situation in Mesopotamia, they made no effort to estimate beforehand what the requirements would be, and the officials criticized or misread the demands made from Mesopotamia for ready-made craft, with the result that a number of such craft, which were available in India, did not arrive in Mesopotamia till early in 1916. Had they been made available for General Nixon between October and November 1915 they would have materially lightened his transport problems, and might, perhaps, have even altered the history of the campaign.

COMMISSION'S FINDINGS.

The findings as to transport are :—

(*a*) From the first the paramount importance both of river and railway transport in Mesopotamia was insufficiently realized by the military authorities in India.

(*b*) A deficiency of river transport existed from the time the Army left tidal water and advanced up river from Kurna. This deficiency became very serious as the lines of communication lengthened and the numbers of the force increased.

(*c*) Up to the end of 1915 the efforts made to rectify the deficiency of river transport were wholly inadequate.

(*d*) For want of comprehensive grasp of the transport situation, and insufficiency of river steamers, we find the military authorities in India are responsible. The responsibility is a grave one.

(*e*) River hospital steamers were an urgent requirement for the proper equipment of the expedition, and were not ordered until much too late.

(*f*) With General Sir J. Nixon rests the responsibility for recommending the advances in 1915 with insufficient transport and equipment. The evidence did not disclose an imperative need to advance without due preparation. For what ensued from shortage of steamers, both as concerns suffering of the wounded and military losses, General Sir John Nixon must, in such circumstances, be held to blame.

(*g*) During the first four months of 1916 the shortage of transport was fatal to the operations undertaken for the relief of Kut. Large reinforcements could not be moved to the front in time to take

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part in critical battles. Based upon information received from General Townshend as to the urgent necessity for his immediate relief, operations were undertaken, notwithstanding the extreme transport difficulty, but in all the circumstances we do not attach blame for this to the General in Mesopotamia directing the operations.

(*h*) Facilities for the discharge and handling of cargo at Basra, also provision of works for the erection and repair of river craft, were hopelessly inadequate.

(*j*) Proceedings in connexion with the filling of orders for river craft by the Director of the Royal Indian Marine in India, and the India Office in London, were far from satisfactory.

(*k*) Looking at the facts, which from the first must have been apparent to any administrator, military or civilian, who gave a few minutes' consideration to the map, and to the conditions in Mesopotamia, the want of foresight and provision for the most fundamental needs of the Expedition reflects discredit upon the organizing aptitude of all the authorities concerned. General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the General Staff, Whitehall, in a document to which we have already referred, states : "In general the operations were allowed in 1915 to develop without proper regard to the vital questions of supply and maintenance." In which opinion our investigations lead us unreservedly to concur.

MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

The Commission were unable to make an interim report on the medical arrangements as directed by Parliament, but they have devoted to the subject a separate section (Part X.), which is practically a complete report in itself, dealing with provision for the sick and wounded.

The Commission adopt the principal conclusions of the Vincent-Bingley Commission, which were that from a very early stage in the campaign the sick and wounded underwent avoidable discomfort and at times great suffering, owing to deficiencies in medical arrangements, especially as regards river hospital steamers, land ambulance transport, hospitals, and medical personnel and equipment. The sufferings of the wounded from these defects became aggravated after the battle of Ctesiphon, and culminated during the Kut relief operations early in January 1915, when there was a complete breakdown of the medical arrangements. For these

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deficiencies the Vincent-Bingley Commission divide responsibility between the authorities in India and Mesopotamia. The Report of the Vincent-Bingley Commission is printed in full as an appendix to this Report.

The Commission supplement and support the conclusions of the Vincent-Bingley Report with special evidence which they have taken, especially as to the early phases of the campaign and as to the responsibilities of the higher authorities in India, two subjects with which the earlier Commission did not fully deal.

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR W. BABTIE.

The Commission severely criticize deficiencies in medical equipment in the early phases of the campaign. Sir W. Babtie was Director of Medical Services in India up to June 1915, and the Commission state that, knowing the Army Medical Service in India to be organized only for frontier warfare, knowing the provision of the field ambulances and hospitals to be deficient, and knowing the medical personnel to be insufficient, Sir William made no adequate efforts to improve these defects so as to equip the Mesopotamian Expedition in a manner suitable for campaigning in an unhealthy tropical climate against an enemy who was in alliance with and supported by the foremost exponents of modern warfare.

The expedition was dispatched to Mesopotamia, and reinforcements were dispatched to the expedition, with medical personnel and hospitals short even of the authorized scale—a scale which in itself was insufficient. Each division was only supplied with twelve sections of field ambulance instead of its proper complement of twenty. This was due to medical personnel being retained in India for forces which might be required to meet internal disturbances or frontier warfare. The Commission are not convinced that the policy of preparing for possible warfare in India at the expense of actual warfare in Mesopotamia was justifiable. But even if this be conceded as a justification for allowing Mesopotamia to be severely understaffed in medical personnel, it was clearly the duty of Surgeon General Babtie to impress on the authorities in India and at home the dangers of such a proceeding, and to have urged strongly upon the authorities in India that they should apply to England for assistance. This he did not do.

No river hospital steamers were provided for what it was known must be largely a riverine campaign. Consequently until 1916 the

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sick and wounded had to use ordinary river transport steamers. These were always overburdened with ordinary transport work, were not infrequently used for carrying animals, and it was not always possible properly to clear them of their accumulations of filth and dung before they were used for sick and wounded troops. No wheeled ambulance transport was provided. It follows that ordinary Army transport carts were the only vehicles available for the sick and wounded where land transport was necessary. There is an overwhelming mass of evidence as to the inhumanity of using these carts for the wounded. Padding for them was not always available. In some cases dead bodies were even used as cushions. Even when padded they were cruel and dangerous for certain classes of wounded. All this must have been well known to Surgeon-General Babtie, or might have been easily ascertained by inquiry or experiment. His only action in regard to developing a more suitable vehicle than the bullock-tonga was to ask the Maharaja of Benares to provide a special corps of pony tongas, none of which were, however, available in Mesopotamia till long after Sir W. Babtie had left India.

Surgeon-General Babtie's administration was marked by serious faults, for which he must be blamed, and the importance of which cannot be minimized. But the shortness of his experience as Director of Medical Services when the war broke out, and the fact that he had to work in an atmosphere very unfavourable to reforming innovation, must be regarded as diminishing the weight of the censure he deserves. He is undoubtedly a man of great ability, and having regard to all the circumstances the faults of his administration were not such as to prove him unfit for important responsible administrative posts.

OFFICIAL WANT OF FRANKNESS.

In matters affecting the sick and wounded the want of frankness has painfully impressed the Commission. A number of instances are given in which defects in medical arrangements were not reported. Perhaps the most striking of these is in connexion with the medical breakdown after Ctesiphon, when over 3,500 wounded had to be removed from the battlefield to the river bank, in some cases a distance of ten miles, without proper ambulance transport, and with an insufficiency of medical personnel, of food, and of comforts, so that a large proportion of the wounded had to make

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their way on foot in spite of their injured condition. When they arrived at the river the available steamer accommodation was gravely inadequate. The wounded and weary men had to be crowded into steamers and barges without sufficient medical attention, appliances, or conveniences. Some of the wounded were disembarked at Amara, but the majority went down to Basra, a journey from the battlefield which, in some cases, took as much as fourteen days, and the discomforts of which were aggravated for the wounded by the presence on board of many cases of dysentery and other sickness.

INDIAN ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE.

The Commission make a number of recommendations of a minor character with a view to improving the efficiency of the Indian Army Medical Service in war-time, and generally improving the standard of medical provision for the troops in India. There is urgent necessity for a thorough reform by the Indian Government of the whole system upon which their medical services are based. Sir Alfred Keogh, Director-General, Army Medical Services at the War Office, stated :—

> "I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the medical arrangements connected with the Army in India have been for years and years most disgraceful. I say that with a full sense of responsibility. I have served for many years in India. I have not been there for some time now, but in my opinion things are not better than they were. Anything more disgraceful than the carelessness and want of attention with regard to the sick soldier in India it is impossible to imagine."

The medical provision for the troops in Mesopotamia has, however, improved since April 1916. Sanitation and the prevention of disease are now properly organized, and appliances of all kinds are being continually improved, as better transport facilities on the Tigris distribute the necessary machinery and apparatus. Altogether the public may be assured that a new spirit exists in the medical command in Mesopotamia.

MEDICAL FINDINGS.

The medical provision for the Mesopotamia Campaign was from the beginning insufficient; by reason of the continuance of this insufficiency there was a lamentable breakdown, causing severe and

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unavoidable suffering to the sick and wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon and the battles in January 1916; there was amelioration in March and April 1916; but since then the improvement has been continual, until it is reasonable to hope that now the medical provision is satisfactory. The main deficiencies were in river hospital steamers, medical personnel, river transport, and ambulance land transport.

A grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway, who did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was responsible, and, in particular, failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. Sir John Nixon was throughout solicitous as to the condition of the wounded. His main mistake was to rely too absolutely on the statements made to him by Surgeon-General Hathaway; to that extent he may be blamed.

The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in Mesopotamia is, however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appointment was held by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie up to June 1915, and afterwards by Surgeon-General J. G. MacNeece. Sir William Babtie was an officer of ability and knowledge, but he did not bring these qualities sufficiently to bear upon the task before him. He accepted obviously insufficient medical provision without protest, and without any adequate effort to improve it. He cannot, therefore, be held blameless. Surgeon-General MacNeece was an officer thoroughly desirous of fulfilling the duties assigned to him; but he was a man of advancing years and diminishing strength, unequal to the position he was called upon to fill, and his administration showed no signs of the vigour and efficiency that were required.

The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting the general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of retrenchment, and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as that to Mesopotamia. The limitation of medical preparation and the low standard of medical treatment in the Indian Army at the outbreak of war were the natural outcome of this policy.

The Secretary of State showed an earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only comment that can

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be made upon his procedure is that he did not fully utilize the official powers at his disposal for the purpose of ordering at an earlier period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.

To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsibility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government. In regard to the actual medical administration he showed throughout the utmost good-will; but, considering the paramount authority of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.

A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, who failed closely to superintend the adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia. He declined for a considerable time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy, to give credence to rumours which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures which a subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering.

There has been misuse of official reticence as to medical defects and the sufferings of the sick and wounded.

Throughout the campaign (with insignificant exceptions) the executive and regimental medical officers and personnel have devoted themselves with unremitting kindness, zeal, and industry to the care of the sick and wounded with such means as were at their disposal.

DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAMPAIGN.

The Commission comment on the system of divided responsibility during the period up to February 1916, when the "policy" of the campaign was under the Secretary of State and its "management" under the Indian Government. Under this system a multiplicity of authorities had to be consulted. There were first the General Officer Commanding on the spot in Mesopotamia, then the Commander-in-Chief in India, then the Viceroy, then the Secretary of State for War with his Military Secretary, then the War Council with the Imperial Staff, and, finally, the Cabinet. Such a subdivision weakened the sense of responsibility of each authority consulted, and has made it very difficult accurately to apportion blame or credit. It was under this system that the administrative failures took place, and it was not until London took over the sole charge of the campaign in the spring of 1916 that there was any

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marked improvement in the management. The success since effected is a striking illustration of the all-importance of unity of control in time of war.

Moreover, under an arrangement entered into before the war, the War Office were responsible for the collection of intelligence with a view to possible military operations in Mesopotamia north of Basra, while India was responsible for collecting similar intelligence for Basra and the Persian Gulf. This delimitation of responsibility was not very logical, inasmuch as it was evident that Basra must become the base of any military operations in Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf. The result was, that when the war came, plans of operations for a campaign in Mesopotamia north of Basra had not been prepared at Whitehall nor at Simla. When the Secretary of State ordered the expedition to start, Mesopotamia was "no man's child." The War Office was occupied with its own gigantic task at home, and India was preoccupied with fears of attacks on her frontier and of disaffection within her borders.

The Indian Government was at first lukewarm on a proposition which it did not originate, and demurred to sending necessary reinforcements. During the first months of the campaign the India Office was stimulating the Indian Government to greater exertion by ordering them to send out additional troops. As soon as the troops sent out amounted to two divisions, then the rôle was reversed, and it was the Indian Government who were constantly pressing upon the Home authorities the necessity of advance. The advances to Kurna, to Amara, and to Kut, though put forward as necessary defensive operations, may have been partially prompted by ambition to capture Baghdad. At any rate, Simla and Whitehall were not pulling well together, and, up to the date of General Townshend's advance on Kut, no full and frank exchange of opinion seems to have taken place either as to the scope and aim of the expedition, or as to the preparation and expenditure necessary to ensure its success.

The Commission's findings as to the division of responsibility are :—

> "The division of responsibility between the India Office and the Indian Government, the former undertaking policy and the latter the management of the expedition, was, in the circumstances, unworkable. The Secretary of State, who controlled the policy, did not have cognizance of the capacity of the

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expedition to carry out the policy. The Indian Government, who managed the expedition, did not accompany developments of policy with the necessary preparations, even when they themselves proposed those developments. The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successful move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan."

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONTROL.

There is a Military Department at the India Office under the authority of the Secretary of State for India, and with whose advice he controls and decides the general military policy of India, but this department is not organized for the purpose of directly managing a campaign. It was, however, through the instrumentality of this Department that the Mesopotamian Campaign was started, and its policy controlled by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State is also criticized for exercising his control through "Private" telegrams, which do not come before the Councils of the Viceroy and Secretary of State, are not necessarily communicated to the officials, and have not the mandatory character of public telegrams. A large number—if not the larger proportion—of the telegrams quoted in the Report referring to the advance on Baghdad are marked "Private." One of the most important of these private telegrams, conveying new and serious information as to the possible concentration of 60,000 Turkish troops near Baghdad, was, in consequence of its being marked "Private," not filed in the Military Department in India, and was not transmitted to Sir John Nixon in Mesopotamia. The use by Mr. Chamberlain of "Private" telegrams and letters instead of official dispatches is considered to have delayed investigation and remedial measures in regard to the treatment of the sick and wounded. The great increase in the use of "Private" methods of communication by the Secretary of State and Viceroy tends to dispossess their Councils of their statutory powers.

The Commission conclude :—

"If the Councils of the Secretary of State and Viceroy are to be dispossessed of their old powers, such a change should be effected openly under an Act of Parliament, and not by a change in the internal procedure of the India Office."

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INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL.

The Viceroy's Council was not sufficiently consulted in regard to the campaign, which was, in fact, conducted solely by the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief in India. The control of the expedition was narrowed down to control by two high officials, both heavily charged with many other anxious and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities which had little, if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopotamia. Moreover, all criticism or suggestions for reform from subordinates was strongly resented. When General Cowper, A.Q.M.G. in Mesopotamia, energetically represented the need for more river transport in January 1916, the Commander-in-Chief, at the Viceroy's instigation, telegraphed :—

> "Please warn General Cowper that if anything of this sort occurs, or I receive any more querulous or petulant demands for shipping, I shall at once remove him from the force, and will refuse him any further employment of any kind."

When Major Carter represented to Sir John Nixon the condition of the wounded at Ctesiphon, General Cowper says :—

> "I threatened to put him under arrest, and I said that I would get his hospital ship taken away from him for a meddlesome, interfering faddist."

RETRENCHMENT IN INDIA.

As already explained, the policy of economy had prevailed in India during the years of peace before the war. When war broke out the Indian Government appear to have wished to continue this policy. Their net military expenditure for the year 1914–15 was actually nearly £50,000 less than the estimate which had been made for that year before war was declared, and on the assumption that expenditure would be on a peace basis. In introducing the Indian Financial Statement for 1915–16, Sir W. Meyer, the Finance Member, stated, "Our chief economy occurs under the Military Services," and, though the war had already been waging for more than eight months, he budgeted for a military expenditure half a million less than the corresponding expenditure for the previous year.

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It has been argued that India had no cause to be sparing in expenditure on her overseas expeditions, because the Imperial Government had agreed to bear all cost of the expeditions above the normal cost to India of the troops dispatched. But the Commission were informed that the Finance Department frequently demurred to proposed new war expenditure in the fear lest such expenditure should persist after the war and become a charge upon India, and it was a similar motive which influenced the financial officials in their dealing with Sir J. Nixon's demand for a railway.

The official atmosphere of economy had its effect on the officers engaged in the campaign.

> "It is not unnatural that military and medical officers thought they were best discharging their duty to the Government by keeping down demands, by 'carrying on' as best they could without incurring fresh expenditure, and by discouraging their subordinates from pressing new ideas or ideals which, though undoubtedly beneficial to the service for which they are responsible, would entail, at any rate at the outset, additional expenditure."

Thus the atmosphere and influence of economy continued at Simla long after the war broke out, and there are indications of a reluctance on the part of the Indian Government to recognize the indisputable fact that war meant extra expenditure. They seemed to have struggled hard to carry on war upon a peace budget, and it is hardly open to doubt that this tendency was one of the causes of the inadequate expenditure incurred, and the lack of provision made for the wants of the Mesopotamia Expedition during the first sixteen months of its operations.

FAULTY INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

The Indian Military Administration concentrates in one person the two offices of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. It follows that, especially in time of war, the Commander-in-Chief is unable to perform adequately his duties as Commander-in-Chief on account of the onerous claims of his duties as Military Member. Thus Sir Beauchamp Duff never visited Mesopotamia or Bombay, the port of embarkation to and disembarkation from Mesopotamia. In his exercise of control he relied

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exclusively on such official reports as reached him at Simla or Delhi. The effect of this aloofness is illustrated by the incredulity of Simla as to the medical breakdown in Mesopotamia. Lord Hardinge writes to the Secretary of State on 18th February 1916: "I may mention here that I have at last succeeded in convincing the military authorities that the medical arrangements up the Tigris are as bad as can be." A severer comment could not have been made upon the isolation and ignorance of those primarily responsible for the treatment of the wounded. Bombay, Calcutta, London, the Houses of Parliament, and private individuals, both in India and England, were all cognizant of what was going on. Simla and Delhi alone were unmoved.

But if there was over-centralization at the head of the military administration, there remained a cumbrous dualism below. The Departments of the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member, though under the same individual, are kept separate and distinct, and they are separately maintained in order to give substance to the fiction that one person is two persons. The Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, may think and order something in his department which, in his subsequent capacity as Military Member in another department, he may like to unthink and counter-order. The procedure under this unique form of military administration results in great delay in dealing with new proposals relating to the Army.

Official evidence of an amusing nature is quoted to show that important proposals may have to go through eighteen or twenty processes of examination and "minuting" before they are finally agreed to or rejected. Though this lengthy procedure was modified during the war, yet many witnesses bore testimony to the inordinate dimensions attained by minute-writing, check and counter-check, and the reference backward and forward of papers and proposals in the administrative departments of the Army. The present system urgently requires simplification and acceleration. It is difficult under it to ascertain where responsibility begins and ends, whilst the waste of time and energy involved must operate detrimentally to efficient administration.

The attempt in India to control and regulate the wants of the expedition from Simla was an administrative mistake, and representatives of the Headquarters Staff with wide powers should, from the first, have been stationed at Bombay, the port of embarkation and disembarkation to and from Mesopotamia.

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The Commander-in-Chief himself, or his representatives as *liaison* officers, should, from time to time, have visited Mesopotamia with a view to keeping the Headquarters Staff in touch with the needs of the expedition. In consequence of such want of touch, the Military Authorities at Simla did not appreciate or realize the difficulty of campaigning in Mesopotamia, and from such lack of knowledge failed to make sufficient provision for surmounting the difficulties and drawbacks.

MILITARY REFORM NEEDED.

The Commission were not specially directed to make recommendations, but under this heading are the following suggestions :—

1. The combination of the duties of the Commander-in-Chief in India and Military Member of Council cannot adequately be performed by any one man in time of war, and the existing organization s at once over-centralized at its head and cumbrous in its duality below.

2. The aim of administrative reform in India should be a devolution of responsibilities and duties from the over-centralized bureaucracy of the Supreme Government at Simla.

3. Changes should be made in the Indian Military Administration enabling the Commander-in-Chief adequately to perform his duties as such.

4. The Secretary of State should inquire into the system of promotion of British Officers in India, the system of reserves for native troops, and certain other questions which have been brought before the Commission.

CENSURE OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

The Commission differentiate between the error of judgment shown by the Indian Government in their advocacy of the advance to Baghdad, which might have happened in any campaign, and their failure adequately to minister to the wants of the forces employed in Mesopotamia.

> "This failure," they say, "was persistent and continuous, and practically covered the whole of the period during which the Indian Government were entrusted with the management

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of the expedition. With the knowledge of the facts which we now possess, and of the extent and scope of the preparations of the War Office since they undertook the management of the campaign, it is impossible to refrain from serious censure of the Indian Government for the lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the inadequacy of their preparations and for the lack of readiness to recognize and supply deficiencies. They ought to have known, and with proper touch with the expedition they could have known, what were its wants and requirements. It is true that their military system was cumbrous and inept. It was, however, within the power of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief to have established a more effective procedure and a closer touch with the expedition itself."

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION.

Except for a few months, during which there were serious set-backs, the success of the campaign, as a whole, has been remarkable.

"Up to the date of the advance on Baghdad continuous victory had been achieved. During the last few months the Force has resumed its career of victory. We are of opinion—reviewing the operations as a whole—that it may now be truly asserted that, in the many parts of the world in which the Allied forces have been engaged, no more substantial results or more solid victories have been achieved than those won by the gallantry of the British and Indian Armies on the stricken plains of Mesopotamia."

COMMANDER WEDGWOOD'S REPORT.

Commander Wedgwood's Report, a document of twelve pages, gives no account of the operations or deficiencies in Mesopotamia. It is almost entirely devoted to the attitude of the Indian Government to the war in general, and to the thesis that Lord Hardinge and General Sir Beauchamp Duff "showed little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war." Commander Wedgwood stigmatizes this attitude as unpatriotic, and declares that it has been a calamity to England. He entirely absolves everybody in Mesopotamia and England from blame for

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the failures in Mesopotamia, and places the whole of such blame on two Indian Officials, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff. As to this the Commission say :—

> "We do not think the evidence before us justifies attaching to Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff alone the blame for the mistakes and shortcomings connected with the Mesopotamia Expedition. We have given reasons for a wider, and, in our judgment, a more equitable apportionment of responsibility."

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AFTER KUT.

The following account was written, on his release, by Regimental Sergeant-Major Love. As will be remembered, the officers were separated from the men immediately after the surrender, and did not see them again. On passing into captivity, therefore, Sergeant-Major Love, as senior member of the Regiment, was held by his captors to be more or less responsible for his men :—

On the sad day of our surrender at Kut, 29th April 1916, we were marched from the Fort to the town, where we remained for a day in camp alongside the river. The total strength of the Battalion was 385, including men in Kut hospital, and 77 attached from other regiments.

From Kut we marched to Shumran, about seven miles, and remained there a week. On the morning of the 6th May, the Turks gave permission for provisions to come up from our force down river at Sanna-i-yat, but we ourselves were most unfortunate, as the gifts sent out for the Regiment had not arrived. The 1st Norfolk Regiment, however, had a large consignment, and they very kindly sent us a share, which was greatly appreciated by all. At noon orders were given for us to hold ourselves in readiness to leave for Azizieh at half an hour's notice, and at about 3 p.m. we moved off. Our marching out strength was as follows: on parade, 252; in hospital, 42; detained, 16.[1]

Our first march out from Shumran was about nine miles. On arrival in camp the adjutant of our escort (a German) sent for all seniors of units, and told us that we were to march to Baghdad by easy stages, as we had done that day, but as next day proved, we were doomed to disappointment. During the first night I was awakened several times by men coming to complain of the escort having stolen their things, and in the morning I found that two men had lost their boots. After this we seldom took off our boots, and, if we did, we took care to tie them to us. Our next day's march was one of our worst. We were on the move from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. in intense heat, and so weak were we all that it was a great struggle

[1] Those in hospital and detained afterwards went to Baghdad by boat.

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to get into camp at all, some men not arriving until quite late. Private Carter died within three miles of camp, and was buried where he died.

Next day the Commandant saw that it would be impossible for us to move, so he ordered a two days' halt. So far we had not received any rations, except a few black chupatis, which, we were told, were for the dying, not for men who were not sick, and the only food we had was what we had brought with us from Shamrun, given to us by the Norfolk Regiment. This was now exhausted. At this halting-place ten of our men were admitted to hospital, and of these Sergeant Barfoot and Lance-Corporal Williams (P Company) died.

Two more marches brought us to Azizieh. Our Arab escort tried hard during these marches to find fault with us, and made several false reports against the men, though up till now they had not ill-treated us. I was sent for by the Commandant and given strict orders that all knives and other sharp instruments were to be given in, as the escort had reported that they had been threatened by the prisoners. We were allowed to keep only one blunt table-knife for every 25 men. From this time the attitude of the escort towards us changed, and onwards, to the end of our long journey, the escort were continually flogging our men. One particularly bad case that I witnessed was that of the late Armour Q.-M.-S. Packer, who was suffering from dysentery and unable to keep his place in the ranks. The sergeant of the escort, an Arab named Shiaba, belaboured him severely because he did not keep up. On arrival in camp I reported the matter to the Turkish Commandant, but he merely told me that there was no cause for complaint; the Arab had done his duty; this was Turkish discipline, and, while we were prisoners, we would be subject to Turkish discipline.

Our march into Baghdad was very humiliating. The Red Crescent and German flags were flying; the whole of the town was out to jeer us in; and several cinematograph machines were at work making pictures to record our captivity throughout Turkey and Germany. Here we remained two or three days, encamped near the railway station, our only protection from the sun being a small quantity of straw matting, which covered barely a quarter of the men. No sanitary measures were taken, there were no latrines, and the stench was terrible. We had, however, here for the first time the luxury of bread, of which we received a daily ration of two small loaves.

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At Baghdad we entrained for Samara (about 80 kilometres), where we rested for a couple of days, and were told that we were bound for Mosul. For the march the prisoners were made up into two columns, the Regiment being with the first column. On account of the great heat, marching was carried out at night, and the first march, to Tekrit, was very long and over rough ground. Here we were joined by C.-S.-M. Butcher and some 70 N.C.O.'s and men of various units, mostly sick, and, after five or six more marches, we arrived at Mosul, where we halted for two days. Every one was now suffering from diarrhœa, and about 20 men were admitted to hospital, including C.-S.-M. Butcher and Sergeant Gibbs. We were now told that we would continue our march to Ras-el-Ain, where we would work on the Baghdad Railway. The prisoners were now divided into three parties, viz., English, Mohammedan, and Hindu, the intention evidently being to induce the Mohammedans to go over to the Turks. This could be easily seen from the different treatment they received, especially in the matter of rations, they being given nearly twice as much as we English.

Before leaving Mosul 25 men of the Bombay Volunteer Battery were attached to the Regiment, and our strength was now roughly 300. The marching was severe, and one march in particular was very trying, as we had to do 45 kilometres, and were at it from 4 p.m. one day until 11 a.m. the next. At the end of this march seven men were reported as having fallen out sick, and they never rejoined us. Two of them were Private Wilson and Private Taylor (7740), but the others I cannot remember, as my diary in which the names were entered was stolen.

It was about the 19th June 1916 that we arrived at Ras-el-Ain, where we came across the railway, which had been completed up to this point from Aleppo. Private Harding (Q Company) died on the last march, and our medical officer, who had been with him, told me that the escort refused to allow the body to be brought into camp to be buried. About 3 p.m. the same day we entrained, and, after travelling all night and the next day, reached Islahie, where we left some 20 men who were sick, including Orderly Room Q.-M.-S. White and C.-S.-M. Voller. We moved off again at about 8 p.m., marching across the Amanus mountains, and, after halting for three hours during the night, arrived in camp about 1 p.m. This was called by the men Mulberry Camp, but we left it next day and marched to Manouri, where we had two days' rest. While we were here General Melliss, V.C., arrived in a motor-

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car, and the men made a rush to see him. His kindness to us will never be forgotten. He was greatly touched by our wretched condition, and he offered the men a few words of advice, giving them at the same time all the money he possessed—I believe five Turkish pounds in gold. The Commandant of the escort, observing what was taking place, ordered the man away, and the General was not allowed to see us again.

We entrained again, and after five hours' journey arrived at Adana, where we received orders to return at once to Manouri. Next day, at 2 p.m., we were ordered to move camp, and were told that the length of the march would only be one hour, yet we had to go 20 kilometres, to a place called Bagtchi, and it took us about nine hours. On this march I witnessed a most brutal attack by the same Arab (Shiaba) on a young Australian of the Flying Corps. He was sick at the time, and Shiaba struck him across the head with a large stick and knocked him down. Several of our men rushed to the lad's assistance, but they were driven back by the escort, and were forced to leave him where he fell. During this same march I was suffering from dysentery, and was obliged to fall out for ten or fifteen minutes, but was able to keep up with the party for a time. Eventually, however, I lost sight of the party going round a bend in the road, when Shiaba struck me over the head with a big stick and knocked me senseless. When I came to myself I found my arms, back, and head bleeding, and the khaki coat which I was wearing had been stolen off my back. Next morning we were paraded and handed over to the German engineer, Herr Claus, for distribution for work on the railway line. This was on 26th June 1916, and I was then told that the Australian who had been attacked on the previous afternoon had died. I repeated the case and my own to Herr Claus, and he sent a report to the Turkish Commandant at Bagtchi (Arif Bey).

The Regiment, with N.C.O.'s and men attached to our party, were sent off to Airan for work. Our strength was 227, of whom 104 actually belonged to the Regiment, 32 attached, and the remaining 91 were men of various other units who had been attached to us at different times during the march from Baghdad. At Airan we were given five or six days' rest, for which we were very thankful; tents were issued to us, and we were given a bread ration of 1 kilo per man. We were now told off to different kinds of work, according to our trades before enlistment. We were all anxious to get to work so as to earn a few piastres to provide ourselves with extra food,

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but most of the men went sick after a few days' work. In spite of this, during the following two months every one was driven to work, and the number of men who died was terrible. Later on, the engineer became more humane in his treatment of us. The hospital arrangements were very bad. At first the sick were sent to hospital at Bagtchi by train (eight miles), but after six weeks Bagtchi hospital became full, and a large German tent was pitched in Airan as a hospital. A Swiss named Vogt was by way of being the doctor in charge, but before the war he had been nothing more than a masseur. He was most brutal on several occasions, and I have seen him strike men who were sick for very trivial things. Twice I reported him to the German Chief Engineer, who threatened him with instant dismissal if he did not change his ways, and this had the desired effect, as I never heard of his striking a man afterwards.

Between the 26th June and 7th September 1916 the following deaths occurred :—

At Airan : 43rd, 11; attached, 3; other units, 7. At Bagtchi : 43rd, 13; attached, 4; other units, 16.

Cholera, dysentery, enteritis, and beri-beri were the principal causes of the deaths. Medicines were always very scarce.

On the 7th September 1916 almost all our men were sick, and 186 were sent away to various Turkish rest camps. Of these 76 were 43rd, 26 attached, and 84 other units. Several were very bad cases, and they were sent away without doctor or medicines, with the result that many of them died in the railway trucks on the journey.

In February 1917 we received our first parcels of food from England, and from that time they came continuously at different times until our release in 1918.[1] Words cannot express our grateful thanks to the ladies who worked so hard for the Regiment in keeping us supplied with food and clothes. But for them very few would ever have reached home.

During our last ten months we had no reason to complain, as our parcels arrived each month, and we received money from the Consul.

I regret that I am unable to give fuller details, but on two occasions my kit was stolen, and with it such diaries as I had kept.

[1] Of the Regiment 74 were released and 213 died in captivity. Fuller statistics will be given in a later volume.—ED.

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THE 2ND BATTALION
OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY

IN

FRANCE AND FLANDERS

1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

LIEUT.-COL. R. B. CROSSE, D.S.O.

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RECORD OF THE 2nd BATTALION.

1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

THE first six months of the period included in this volume were very full. A summary of the general situation in France and Flanders will be found earlier in the volume, and the plain story of the doings of the 52nd (still with the 5th Brigade, 2nd Division) is now told by means of officers' private diaries, the more or less official War Diary of the Battalion, and such extracts from Operation Orders, etc., as have been considered to be of particular importance for a clear understanding of events. The reader may weary of reading these lengthy official documents, but, as was pointed out in previous volumes, in no other way is it possible to follow the changes in tactical methods constantly taking place. Again, the letters and figures dealing with map references may appear superfluous when the maps themselves are not reproduced; but, from the historical point of view, such extreme accuracy in the location of places is often essential, and access can always be had to the squared maps referred to. It is hoped that Maps 1 and 2 in this volume will be sufficient to enable the reader to follow the movements of the Battalion.

FROM THE DIARY OF LIEUT.-COLONEL R. B. CROSSE, COMMANDING THE BATTALION.

July 1st.—At Villers-au-Bois in Brigade Reserve. Lieut.-Colonel Eden, D.S.O., on temporary duty at H.Q. 4th Army.

The 51st reinforcement (1 Sergeant and 25 R. and F.) joined.

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July 2nd.—To trenches in 2nd Division Carency (2) sub-section, in relief of 17th R. Fusiliers.

July 3rd.—Quiet day.

July 4th.—Quiet day and wet. Visited by officers of the 2nd South Staffords desirous of taking over.

July 5th.—At 11.30 a.m. our trench mortars registered. At 1.15 p.m., in retaliation for our trench-mortar fire, the enemy fired a few rounds at Regimental H.Q., killing 1 man (the sentry) and wounding another man (belonging to the officers' mess).

July 6th.—At 11 a.m. our trench mortars began wire-cutting. At 12.35 p.m. enemy started retaliation on Regimental H.Q., and kept it going until 2.30 p.m.

At night, on relief by 17th R. Fusiliers, moved to the support battalion position. B Company at the disposal of the left battalion; C Company at the disposal of the right battalion; D Company at Cabaret Rouge; A Company at Carency.

July 7th.—Raid by 17th R. Fusiliers. Barrage on Regimental H.Q. and Zouave Valley in general.

July 8th.—Quiet day. Captain and Brevet-Major R. B. Crosse, D.S.O., to be temp. Lieut.-Colonel from this date.

July 9th.—At 8.30 p.m. the enemy blew a mine beneath Football Crater, thereby damaging our lip of the Crater. At 11 p.m. we relieved the 17th R. Fusiliers, and Regimental H.Q. were established in a new place, upon which we have been working for the last two days, our sapping platoon (under Captain Rawson) having done very good work. It had been considered advisable to vacate the old H.Q. (Holloway) altogether.

D and C Companies took up their former places in the right and centre respectively, B Company on the left, and A Company, in support, in the Quarry.

2nd Lieut. Bobby being required for temporary duty at Brigade H.Q., Lieut. Harrison was brought up to take his place as Grenade Officer.

July 10th.—Quiet day. We expected a mine to go up, but nothing happened.

July 11th.—At 5.30 a.m. the Brigadier-General went round the trenches occupied by the Regiment. The enemy fired from his trench mortars at about 6 a.m. and 11 a.m., but the day was otherwise quiet.

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July 12th.—At 11 p.m. a German patrol emerged from round the north side of Football Crater, and bombed our wiring party in front of the right picket. We retaliated vigorously with bombs (ours are now far superior to the German bombs); quiet was restored, and the wiring proceeded.

Information received that Lieut.-Colonel Eden, D.S.O., has been posted to the temporary command of the 24th Infantry Brigade, dated 8th July.

July 13th.—The Brigadier-General went round our trenches at 4 a.m., when the situation in Football Crater was explained to him.

July 14th.—At 1.30 a.m. the Regiment was relieved by the 13th Essex Regiment (6th Brigade), and marched to Estrée Cauchie.

July 15th.—To Camblain Châtelain. Captain R. M. Owen, from attachment to General Staff H.Q., IVth Corps, rejoined for duty as Second in Command, dated 8th July.

July 16th–19th.—At Camblain Châtelain.

TO THE SOMME.

(*Map* 1.)

FROM THE DIARY OF MAJOR R. M. OWEN.

July 20th.—The Regiment paraded at 9.20 a.m. and entrained at Pernes Station at 10.50 a.m.; arrived at Saleux, a little south of Amiens, at 4.35 p.m. Detrained, and had a long march (16 miles), not arriving at Corbie until after midnight. The men marched very well, only two falling out.

July 21st.—Got into billets at about 12.30 a.m. Officers given bad billets, but, after some trouble with the Town Major, things improved. Regiment resting all day. Very hot. C.O. and Adjutant reconnoitred country north-west of Bray-sur-Somme. The traffic through Corbie at present is just like that in Piccadilly—hundreds of lorries, etc., passing through all day and most of the night; most difficult to sleep.

July 22nd.—More or less standing by all day, expecting orders to move. Bathing parade before breakfast.

July 23rd.—The Regiment marched at 10.30 a.m. to Happy Valley, and arrived at 4.30 p.m. Enormous number of horses and vehicles here, all standing in the open. Bivouacked.

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July 24th.—The C.O. out reconnoitring the front line all day with the Brigadier.

July 25th.—The C.O. took O.C.'s A and D Companies on reconnaissance to reserve and support trenches. I walked up as far as Carnoy in the morning. At 8 p.m. the Regiment left bivouac, and moved up to Montauban area (to the south of Montauban), as battalion in 5th Brigade reserve. I got in about midnight, and H.Q. officers had to share a dug-out with B Company officers. The 5th Brigade relieved a brigade of the 3rd Division.

52ND SOLDIER IN FIGHTING-KIT.

July 26th. — With Crosse (C.O.) and others round the trenches at 3 a.m.; back about 5 a.m. On the go all day. The noise of the shelling from our guns is terrific.

July 27th.—I visited C and D Companies at about 4 a.m. The Germans had been firing heavy shells all night, and the companies had had a bad time. Fairly quiet day, except for some shelling of the vicinity of Regimental H.Q. Rawson has improved our H.Q., and made things more comfortable. Ordered to relieve 2nd H.L.I. to-morrow in front line trenches about Waterlot Farm.

July 28th.—In the early morning the C.O., Adjutant, Bobby (Grenade Officer), and Horley (Lewis-gun Officer) went round the trenches at Waterlot Farm.

At about 7 p.m. we moved up to the front line, to relieve the H.L.I., going viâ Bernafay Wood, Trones Wood, up Longueval

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Alley, to the edge of Delville Wood, and then past Waterlot Farm. It was a horrible walk, the ground being strewn with dead, in all positions and much decomposed. As soon as we arrived there was a scare, and our companies were blocked coming in. The H.L.I. did not get away until long after midnight.

July 29th.—A quiet day and very hot. Very busy all day making preparations and getting out orders for our attack to-morrow morning, orders for which were given verbally to C.O.'s yesterday. We moved our H.Q. in the evening to Divisional H.Q.

July 30th.—Zero was at 4.45 a.m., i.e., daylight, and much too late. The attack by B and C Companies on Guillemont Station failed after repeated attempts, and so the other attack (by A and D, towards Ginchy) failed also. We have 12 officer casualties, and more than 200 men. Poor Jack Hardcastle killed. This is just like the Givenchy show last year. We naturally had no rest for the remainder of the day, and a disturbed night.

July 31st.—Got orders about 2 a.m. that the H.L.I. were relieving us, with the exception of D Company, who had to be left behind. We were back in our old position, near Brigade H.Q., about 7 a.m. There was considerable shelling during the night, so we did not have a very good night's sleep, as we had hoped.[1]

ATTACK ON GUILLEMONT.

Lieut.-Colonel Crosse's Diary continued.

The events of the last days of July referred to by Major Owen in his diary given above, require some further explanation.

On the 29th July the 5th Infantry Brigade issued orders for the attack, of which the following is a summary :—

"Reference Guillemont Map 1/20,000.

"1. The 5th Infantry Brigade, in conjunction with troops of the 30th Division, will attack and capture the village of Guillemont, Guillemont Station, and the German trenches east of Waterlot Farm on the morning of the 30th July. The hour of zero will be communicated later.

[1] This was the last entry in Major R. M. Owen's diary. On the 2nd August he was severely wounded by a shell at 9 a.m., and died a few hours later in the Clearing Station at Divies Copse.—Ed.

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"2. The objectives for the 5th Infantry Brigade will be as follows :—

(*a*) The enemy's defences between Waterlot Farm and Guillemont (exclusive), including the trench which runs parallel to the Longueval-Guillemont Road through T.19.a, S.24.b, and S.18.d.

(*b*) The German trenches running from S.18.d.5.5, T.19.a.7½, T.19.c.4.9½.

When captured, the northern extremity of these trenches will be joined up with our present line in the south-east corner of Delville Wood.

(*c*) To gain touch with the 30th Division.

" After reaching the objectives the railway will be the southern boundary of the Brigade.

"3. The attack will be preceded by a bombardment of heavy and field artillery.

"4. The Infantry of the 30th Division will assault their first objective, so as to reach it just after 0.8, at which hour the barrage will lift to the second line.

" The Infantry of the 5th Brigade will reach their objectives at—

(*a*) Guillemont Station and trench immediately south of it

(*b*) The portion of German trench situated in S.18.d

at the same time as the Infantry of the 30th Division reach their first objective.

" Strong points will be constructed at the station at about T.19.a.4.2 and at S.18.d Central."

Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 mentioned the work that would be carried out by the artillery and machine-guns, the latter from the S.E. corner of Delville Wood sweeping the ground between Ginchy Village and the German trenches, and the former cutting the wire in front of the German trenches, and then barraging by lifts in accordance with times marked on an attached map.

"8. The attack, as detailed above, will be carried out by the 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the right, and the 24th Royal Fusiliers on the left.

" The right Battalion will be responsible for Guillemont Station and trench immediately south of it, and, in the final objective, for hostile trench from T.19.c.4.9½ (exclusive) to S.24.b.8.8.

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"The attack on Guillemont Station will be timed to commence at 0.8 (i.e., zero + 8 minutes).

"Prior to this time the attacking troops will crawl up as close to our barrage as possible.

"At 0.25 the attack on enemy's trench T.19.c.4.9½ to S.24.b.8.8 will be carried out; in this case also the one and a half companies detailed for this objective will approach as close as possible to our barrage.

"At 0.8 the left Battalion will attack and consolidate enemy's line from S.24.b.8.8 to S.18.d.5.5. They will also furnish a company for the purpose of joining up the captured line to the south-east corner of Delville Wood. The order for this latter work to commence will emanate from O.C. 24th Royal Fusiliers, who will decide when the situation admits of the digging being carried on. It is not intended that this trench should be dug continuously, but work will be concentrated on a chain of small posts which can be joined up later."

Para. 9 gave the disposition of units of the Brigade prior to zero hour, and para. 10 the forming-up places prior to the attack, the Regiment receiving instructions as follows :—

"2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry :—

"One and a half companies for attack of station will be formed up as directed by O.C. Battalion. The attack on the station will be made from the N.W.

"One and a half companies for attacking enemy's line will be formed up as detailed by O.C. Battalion.

"One company, as already detailed, holding our line.

"Battalion H.Q. in present front line."

Para. 11 dealt with communications—telephone and visual, and the following relating to the use of pigeons :—

"*Pigeons.*—There are 4 birds at Waterlot Farm, and 4 at Bernafay. Quick communication can be obtained at any time by this means. Birds fly to Corbie, and wires are sent back through 2nd Division. Total time taken, about 30 to 45 minutes to Brigade H.Q.

"It has been noticed that both pigeons and pigeon-flyers have been left, without a scrap of cover, sitting outside Battalion H.Q. Both should be given a corner of a dug-out."

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By para. 12 two Stokes mortar-guns were placed at the disposal of the O.C. 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry during the advance on Guillemont Station; and by para. 13 a section of the Brigade Machine-gun Company was detailed for garrisoning the station when captured.

The remaining paragraphs of the Orders gave short but detailed instructions for the employment of the R.E., the evacuation of the wounded, the disposal of prisoners, etc.

All troops taking part in the attack were ordered to carry 2 bandoliers and 3 grenades per man, in addition to the necessary picks and shovels, while "all companies going over the top" were to have water-bottles filled and one day's ration per man, in addition to iron ration.

The above Orders were accompanied by a note to Lieut.-Colonel Crosse from Brigadier-General Bullen-Smith, commanding the 5th Infantry Brigade :—

"Plan of action as discussed by us yesterday has been approved by the Divisional Commander. You will notice in the Orders sent herewith that the actual forming-up places for your battalion are left to your discretion, as you must be a better judge than I can be of what is most suitable.

"The Divisional Commander desired me to impress on you the importance of your right flank. It is possible that the 30th Division may meet with very stubborn resistance, and, naturally, your advance to the second objective cannot proceed with the right flank in the air.

"By holding the station you can very materially assist the main operation.

"In case I am not able to come and see you, I wish you and your fine battalion the best of luck."

On the 30th July zero hour was 4.45 a.m., and the attack commenced in accordance with the time-table. At 6 a.m. the Officer Commanding the Regiment sent the following message to Brigade H.Q. :—

"Attack on station at first held up by line of bombing posts is now getting forward, but I cannot yet tell whether it has reached objective. Heavy casualties."

The 30th Division on the right carried the village of Guillemont, but the 5th Brigade was checked at the outset, the Regiment meeting with strong resistance from the enemy's bombing-posts,

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which the Stokes mortars failed to silence as intended. Instead, therefore, of the attack sweeping over the bombing-posts, it became disorganized for a time, but then pushed through in two columns. Heavy machine-gun fire broke on the rear waves, and the Brigade was unable to carry its objectives, which necessitated the withdrawal also of the 30th Division from the village of Guillemont.

The farthest point reached by the 5th Brigade was Guillemont Station, which officers and men of B and C Companies of the Regiment are known to have entered, although none returned.

Amongst the casualties were the following officers :—

Killed.

Captain J. B. HARDCASTLE.
Lieut. N. S. HARRISON.
2nd Lieut. R. H. S. MAUL.
2nd Lieut. W. L. CHOWN.

Missing, believed killed.

2nd Lieut. B. C. C. WARDE.

Wounded.

Captain L. J. GOODWYN.
Lieut. F. W. CHIPPINDALE.
Lieut. P. L. C. WEBSTER.
2nd Lieut. M. G. FIELDING.
2nd Lieut R. G. PLUCKROSE.
2nd Lieut. T. G. C. CAULFIELD-STOKER.
2nd Lieut. J. E. V. RATHBONE.

August 1st.—At 5 p.m. the Regiment proceeded from Brigade Reserve to Waterlot Farm trenches, in relief of the 2nd H.L.I.

August 2nd.—At Waterlot Farm. Captain (temporary Major) R. M. OWEN, Second in Command, was mortally wounded.

August 3rd.—At 8 p.m. the Regiment was relieved by the 17th R. Fusiliers, and went into reserve, as before.

Casualties.—Sergeant P. Barlow (Scout Sergeant) wounded, 3 men killed, while on patrol duty.

August 5th.—The 52nd reinforcement (1 Sergeant and 65 R. and F.) joined at the Happy Valley (F.26.27.L.2.3).

The 5th Infantry Brigade were relieved by the 6th Infantry Brigade from Divisional Reserve. The Regiment stood fast, in order to save an exchange of positions with the 13th Essex Regiment.

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August 8th.—The vicinity of Brigade and Regimental H.Q. was unpleasantly shelled for 5 hours last night. To-day Guillemont was attacked by the 6th Brigade. The relief of the 5th Brigade (from Divisional Reserve) was cancelled, and the Regiment was lent to the 6th Brigade, and disposed in support positions between Trones and Bernafay Woods. Regimental H.Q. in the latter, sharing a dug-out with 2nd S. Staffordshire H.Q.

August 9th.—The 6th Brigade renewed the attack; two Companies (B and C) of the Regiment moved up, but were not required. Later the 6th Brigade was relieved by the 17th Brigade, and the Regiment returned to its old area in the vicinity of 5th Brigade H.Q.

August 10th.—The Brigade moved to the Sandpit area, and went into bivouac.

August 11th.—The Regiment marched to Ville-sur-Ancre (Ville-sous-Corbie), and found the 5th (Service) Battalion of the Regiment at Buire, less than two miles away.

August 12th.—Quiet day. Brigade conference. 53rd reinforcement (1 Sergeant, 38 other ranks) joined.

August 13th.—The Regiment marched to Mericourt L'Abbé, thence by rail to Saleux, and thence marched viâ Saveuse to Ailly-sur-Somme.

August 14th.—54th reinforcement (16 men) joined. By 6.20 p.m. to-day the move to Ailly-sur-Somme was completed. Very comfortable billets. Bathing parades.

August 15th.—Rest. Bathing. Divisional conferences.

August 16th.—Marched to Montonvillers.

August 17th.—To Candas.

August 18th.—To Bus-les-Artois.

August 19th.—The 5th Brigade relieved the 3rd Guards' Brigade in Beaumont section. The Regiment moved into Brigade Reserve, relieving the 1st Grenadiers Guards in new billets in Bus-les-Artois, with H.Q. under canvas just outside the village.

August 20th–21st.—Training and various classes of instruction in progress.

August 22nd.—The C.O., with the Adjutant and Company Commanders, reconnoitred the trenches of the left battalion.

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August 23*rd*.—2nd Lieut. K. Peploe rejoined from duty at the Base. The 55th reinforcement (28 men) joined. The Regiment relieved the 17th R. Fusiliers in the trenches.

August 24*th*–28*th*.—In the trenches.

On the 25th 2nd Lieut. A. S. Holiday (A Company) and 2nd Lieut. H. Davies (C Company) joined.

On the 26th 2nd Lieut. V. E. Fanning (B Company) joined.

On the 27th 2nd Lieut. E. H. Vigars rejoined and was reposted to D Company.

Casualties.—On the 26th 3 men of C Company were killed.

August 29*th*.—To Courcelles-au-Bois, on relief by the 17th R. Fusiliers. B Company was left at the disposal of the 17th R.F., and D Company went to Ellis Square Redoubt and Fort Horstead.

Major C. S. Baines, D.S.O., rejoined from the 2/6th R. Warwickshire Regiment, and assumed the duties of Senior Major.

August 30*th*.—The following joined : 2nd Lieut. F. S. Parsons, B Company; 2nd Lieut. C. W. Fitt, C Company.

August 31*st*.—2nd Lieut. M. G. Fielding rejoined and was reposted to A Company.

September 1*st*.—The Regiment, in position of Support Battalion of the 5th Brigade, was distributed as follows :—

Regimental H.Q. and one company in huts and tents at Courcelles-au-Bois.

One company in billets at Colincamps.

One company in Ellis Square (redoubt).

One company in the trenches, at the disposal of the left battalion holding the Beaumont sector (17th R.F.).

September 2*nd*.—Temp. 2nd Lieut. R. A. Creswell joined for duty, on being returned from the Royal Flying Corps, and was posted to D Company.

The 56th reinforcement (25 men) joined.

September 3*rd*.—At about 11.30 last night some five shells were fired into the area occupied by H.Q. and the company. A man and a horse of another unit sharing the ground were killed. Splinters fell on the tents and huts, but without doing any damage.

September 4*th*.—The Regiment relieved the 17th R. Fusiliers for a second tour of duty in Beaumont left sub-sector.

September 5*th*–9*th*.—On the whole a quiet and uneventful period. The weather improved.

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September 10th.—The Regiment, on relief by the 17th R. Fusiliers, moved to position of Battalion in Divisional Reserve, in huts at Coigneux Wood.

September 11th.—The 57th reinforcement (17 men) joined.

Major-General R. Fanshawe, C.B., D.S.O. (52nd Light Infantry, 1883–1911), visited the Regiment, speaking to men on parade, and afterwards addressing the officers.

September 12th.—The Regiment practised co-operation with aeroplanes just north of Couin.

September 12th–15th.—At Coigneux. During this period the Regiment was usefully employed in Company Training and Physical Training. All young officers attended Riding School regularly before breakfast, under the C.O. or Senior Major.

September 16th.—Relieved the 17th R. Fusiliers in the same trenches. Relief effected without incident.

September 16th–19th.—In trenches. On the 17th, 18th, and 19th Regimental H.Q. were shelled.

At 9.30 a.m. on the 19th we were suddenly relieved by the 12th (Service) Battalion R. Sussex Regiment (116th Brigade, 39th Division), and moved to huts north of Bus-les-Artois.

September 20th.—On the relief of the 5th Brigade the Regiment moved to Sarton into good billets.

The following officers joined for duty :—

Captain R. J. Brett, re-appointed Transport Officer, in which capacity he had served from 4th August 1914 to 3rd November 1914, when he was wounded.

Lieut. D. T. Barnes, reposted to D Company.

Lieut. J. B. Slade-Baker, posted to D Company.

2nd Lieuts. O. H. M. Sturges and L. W. Giles, posted to B Company.

2nd Lieut. P. Booth, posted to C Company.

2nd Lieuts. F. C. L. A. Lowndes and P. H. R. Whitehead, posted to A Company.

2nd Lieut. H. Vernon, posted to C Company.

The last seven came from the R.M. College, Sandhurst, and several have family connection with the 52nd.

September 23rd.—Still at Sarton. 2nd Lieut. G. S. La W. Lyle oined, and was posted to D Company.

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September 26th.—The 58th reinforcement (11 men) joined. It is worthy of note that 9 of these were Territorial soldiers, signallers from the Territorial Training Reserve Battalion.

The Regiment was placed at two hours' notice to move. The proposed night scheme was, therefore, abandoned.

September 27th.—Training in the vicinity of billets ordered to be proceeded with. Four hours' notice of move probable.

September 28th.—Normal training ordered to be resumed.

September 29th.—The night scheme (attack from trenches), deferred from 26th/27th, was very satisfactorily carried out.

September 30th.—The Rev. W. L. S. Dallas, C.F., who for 13 months had been attached to the Regiment as one of the Chaplains (C. of E.) to the Brigade, was placed under orders to proceed for duty to the 165th Infantry Brigade (56th Division).

October 1st.—Sarton. The clock was put back one hour, to winter time, at 1 a.m.

A fine, bright Sunday. The Rev. W. L. S. Dallas took the Church Parade Service (at which the Divisional Commander, Major-General W. G. Walker, V.C., C.B., and the Brigade-Commander, Brigadier-General G. M. Bullen-Smith, D.S.O., and part of their respective Staffs were present), followed by a celebration of Holy Communion, and then left to join the 165th Infantry Brigade.

The 59th reinforcement (11 men) joined.

During the period of rest and training at Sarton (since 20th September) some very useful work was carried out. Various forms of instruction, usually by lecture, for the newly joined officers, and physical training for everybody else, before breakfast, and close-order and skirmishing drills, attacks from trenches, wiring, bombing, and Lewis-gun classes after breakfast daily. Officers' Riding School daily, under the Transport Officer.

ROLL OF OFFICERS.

1st October 1916.

Headquarters.

[1]Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Crosse, D.S.O., Commanding.
[1]Major C. S. Baines, D.S.O., Senior Major.
Captain R. J. Brett, Transport Officer.

[1] Temporary rank.

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Captain H. W. H. RAWSON, Commanding Sapping Platoon.
Lieut. E. H. WHITFELD, M.C., Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. T. TYRWHITT-DRAKE, Grenade Officer
2nd Lieut. C. R. HORLEY, Lewis-gun Officer.
Lieut. A. E. WARNOCK, Quartermaster.
[Captain L. F. SCOTT.]

Captain K. W. MACKENZIE, M.C. (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer.[1]

A Company.

[2]Captain N. W. HILL.
[2]2nd Lieut. A. S. HOLIDAY.
[2nd Lieut. M. F. M. PARKES].
[2]2nd Lieut. M. G. FIELDING.
2nd Lieut. F. C. L. A. LOWNDES.
2nd Lieut. P. H. R. WHITEHEAD.

B Company.

[2]Captain G. FIELD, M.C.
[2]Lieut. R. M. BARNES.
Lieut. V. E. FANNING.
2nd Lieut. F. S. PARSONS.
2nd Lieut. O. H. M. STURGES.
2nd Lieut. L. W. GILES.

C Company.

[2]Captain W. J. LITTLEDALE.
[2]2nd Lieut. H. DAVIES.
[2]2nd Lieut. C. W. FITT.
2nd Lieut. P. BOOTH.
[2]2nd Lieut. R. E. A. WEBSTER.
2nd Lieut. H. VERNON.

D Company.

[2]Captain R. B. KITE, M.C.
[2]Lieut. D. T. BARNES.
Lieut. J. B. SLADE-BAKER.
Lieut. K. PEPLOE.
[2]2nd Lieut. R. A. CRESWELL
2nd Lieut. T. A. IONIDES.
2nd Lieut. E. H. VIGARS.
[2]2nd Lieut. J. D. C. HOLLAND.
2nd Lieut. G. S. La W. LYLE.

October 2nd.—The Regiment paraded, so as to pass the starting-point (H.18.a.30) at 10.33 a.m., and marched to Bus-lez-Artois. Went into huts, which had been left in a very dirty condition by the last occupants. A very wet march and a wet night.

October 3rd.—Found two fatigues parties (2 officers and 160 other ranks), who were ordered to be at the rendezvous at 9 a.m.

The Regiment moved viâ Bertrancourt and Beaussart to huts in Mailly Wood.

October 4th.—In Mailly Wood (P.18.a.b). Furnished fatigue (over 200) at several points.

2nd Lieut. R. Blackwell joined, and was posted to D Company. Lieut. Peploe transferred from D to B.

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[1] On leave ; replaced temporarily by Captain J. McTurk (R.A.M.C.)
[2] Temporary rank.

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October 5th.—C.O., with Company Commanders, visited trenches in Serre left sub-sector, with a view to taking over to-morrow from the 1st K.R.R.C. (99th Brigade).

October 6th.—Relieved the 1st K.R.R.C. in trenches extending from near Mathew Copse on the right to Russian Sap (just short of John Copse) on the left.

This is a place of considerable trench-mortar activity, a number of guns being established in our lines with a view to wire-cutting. Retaliation for these afternoon shoots cause a certain amount of damage to our line.

2nd Lieut. Fitt proceeded to England, on transfer to the Machine-gun Corps.

October 7th.—Quiet. Mainly remarkable for the great number of reconnoitring officers (Staff, and of all units and arms) who came up during the day.

October 8th.—The Regiment was relieved in the afternoon by the 4th Royal Fusiliers (Lieut.-Colonel E. B. North), now belonging to the 3rd Division, and with whom the Regiment was brigaded (5th Infantry Brigade) in 1911–1912 at Aldershot.

Marched to bivouac in Lealvillers. Wet.

Captain G. Field, M.C., admitted to hospital, having injured his foot by a fall in the trenches.

October 9th.—Reconnaissance by officers of practice trenches, taped out to the south of Arqueves.

October 10th.—At Lealvillers. Lieut. K. Peploe took over command of B Company (with temporary rank of Captain), in place of Captain Field, M.C.

The 60th reinforcement (7 men) joined. A Brigade conference in the morning, and in the afternoon a Brigade parade for exercise over the taped practice trenches.

October 11th.—The 61st reinforcement (11 men) joined. Another Brigade practice on the same ground took place this morning.

October 12th.—Brigade practice repeated.

October 13th.—Divisional practice of the same scheme as yesterday.

The 62nd reinforcement, conducted by 2nd Lieut. A. O. W. Webster-Jones (who returned to the Reserve Army School on handing over), arrived. The reinforcement consisted of 95 men,

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transferred from the 6th R. Berks, and many of them were of a group called up in June 1916, and originally enlisted for the R.F.A. Their knowledge of drill was unsatisfactory, especially the handling of arms.

October 14th.—Quiet day in camp. Inspection of draft. The 63rd reinforcement (10 signallers) arrived.

October 16th.—Divisional practice, as on the 13th.

October 17th.—The Regiment marched independently to billets in Arqueves.

October 19th.—At Arqueves. 2nd Lieut. A. O. W. Webster-Jones joined for duty, and was posted to A Company.

October 22nd.—The Regiment moved to billets in Mailly Maillet, in relief of the 17th R. Fusiliers, who went into the trenches.

October 25th.—To trenches in Redan Section, in relief of the 24th R. Fusiliers (left sub-sector) and 2nd H.L.I. (right sub-sector).

October 26th.—Wet and moderately quiet. Two parties, each of an officer and 14 others, went out in front of the Redan at 7.45 p.m., in order to try to get through two gaps in the enemy's wire, and to take prisoner a sentry so as to get an identification. Owing to the fact that they were only shown the ground last night and so had an imperfect knowledge of it, both parties failed to find gaps, and returned with several men slightly wounded.

Casualties during the day.—5 men killed.

October 27th.—Relieved by the 17th R.F., and moved to Mailly Maillet.

Captain K. W. Mackenzie, M.C. (R.A.M.C.), transferred to act as D.A.D.M.S. and Division, was relieved as Medical Officer by Captain D. S. Cassidy (R.A.M.C.).

October 28th.—In billets at Mailly Maillet. Bathing, inspections, etc.

October 29th.—Captain J. McTurk (R.A.M.C.) relieved Captain Cassidy as Medical Officer.

October 30th.—The 5th Brigade was relieved by the 99th Brigade, the Regiment remaining in the same billets. A very wet day.

November 1st–8th.—Still in billets at Mailly Maillet All ranks were kept fairly well employed in working parties, which took fro

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200 to 300 men daily, with proportion of officers. The weather was for the most part bad, and the trenches and overland tracks became very bad.

On the 7th the 64th reinforcement (43 men) arrived.

November 9th.—Relieved the 24th R.F. on the whole Redan Sector, normal frontage of two battalions, the disposition of companies being :—

Right Front.—C Company, Captain Littledale.

Left Front.—B Company, Captain Peploe.

Support (distributed along Chatham Line).—A Company, Captain Hill.

Reserve (Valade Line, Mountjoy and 6th Avenue).—D Company, Captain Kite, M.C.

Headquarters in the Advanced Brigade H.Q. at White City.

The relief began up 6th Avenue about 4 p.m., and was effected without incident. The day was very fine and sunny. The trenches were found to be, on account of the weather, in an appalling condition, in many places impassable, so that traffic was generally overland after dark.

About 9.20 p.m. Captain PEPLOE was very badly wounded by a sniper (said to be lying out in "No Man's Land") at quite short range, in the leg near the thigh. This occurred while he was on his way to visit the Bombing Post on the north face of the Redan. He died a few minutes after being wounded while being brought in.

Lieut. V. E. Fanning succeeded to the command of B Company.

November 10th.—Another fine day, the wet condition of the trenches changing to one of heavy sticky mud, which made progress even more difficult. Conference of C.O.'s at Brigade H.Q. at Beaussart at 3 p.m., when was made known the amended Scheme of Operations, now becoming probable.

November 11th.—"X" day (according to the Scheme), or the day next but one before "Z" day (the day of zero).

The Regiment was relieved in the evening by the 2nd H.L.I., and took over the Hôtel de Ville area of Mailly Maillet.

November 12th.—"Y" day. The G.O.C. 2nd Division met all C.O.'s at 5th Brigade H.Q. at 10 a.m. The remainder of the day, until the Regiment moved up to the trenches after dark, was spent in equipping, issuing stores, etc.

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The Regiment moved off by companies from billets, so as to clear Mailly Maillet by 10.15 p.m., taking up assembly positions as under :—

A Company, in Valade Trench, north of 6th Avenue; *D Company*, thence southwards. These two companies in column of half companies, forming the first two waves of the Regiment in the attack.

C Company, in the north end of Mountjoy Trench; *B Company*, thence southwards towards White City.

All these positions were occupied without incident, the night being singularly quiet, with a thick mist.

Regimental H.Q. moved to join Headquarters with the 24th R.F. in Buster Trench.

November 13th.—"Z" day. All the above preparations were made and dispositions taken up by 3.45 a.m.

The following is a summary of Operation Orders :—

Objective.—The 24th R.F. on the left of the 5th Infantry Brigade, having on their right the 2nd H.L.I., and on their left the right battalion of the 6th Infantry Brigade, were to take and consolidate that part of the German Front System opposite to them as far east as a trench referred to as the Green Line. This was to be attacked by the 24th R.F. in four waves, with the 52nd Light Infantry following in support, ultimately to pass through the 24th R.F. and capture that part, to its front, of a trench referred to as the Yellow Line, but to be prepared to afford all possible support, if and when required, to the 24th R.F.

BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

On at any rate the 5th Infantry Brigade front, the attack, which began at zero 5.45 a.m., by a short but very heavy bombardment of the German Front Line System, came as a complete surprise to the enemy, and within the Green Line very little (if any) resistance was encountered. Considerable inconvenience and some casualties were, however, caused by a party of about 40 Germans, who remained for nearly 48 hours "unmopped-up" in the German Front Line about the point to which it was intended to dig the Cat Street Tunnel—possibly because they happened to be just at a point of junction between two attacking brigades, for which the troops of neither felt directly responsible.

The thick mist made the keeping of direction very difficult.

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Watched from the Chatham Trench near its junction with Buster Trench, the attack appeared to go very well; but soon after dawn it became obvious that on our left it was going far from well.

According to the programme the joint H.Q. of the 24th R.F. and ourselves were to move across to approximately selected position in German lines as soon as definite information was received that the Green Line was taken; but, owing to the uncertainty of the situation on the left, and the ultimate necessity of forming a defensive flank facing northwards, orders were received to delay this move. H.Q. 24th R.F., therefore, remained stationary throughout, i.e., until relieved, and our H.Q. moved forward about midnight, 14th/15th November, to the position approximately selected. Brigade H.Q. had not then moved forward, and did not subsequently do so.

Presumably the failure of the 3rd Division, attacking on the left and north of the 2nd Division, in front of Serre, was responsible for the failure of the 6th Infantry Brigade (on our left) to get forward. Elements of this Brigade, with parts of the 24th R.F. and of the Regiment, combined to form this defensive flank until it was finally taken over on the night of 13th/14th November by the 22nd R. Fusiliers, of the 99th Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve.

The Regiment sustained a certain number of casualties in the advance, including Captain Kite, from our own artillery, due to an attempt to follow our barrage too closely; but otherwise the casualties west of the Green Line were inconsiderable.

There was a great deal of bombing of German dug-outs west of the Green Line and elsewhere. An officer saw one soldier throw 21 bombs in succession down the steps of a German "Regimental Command Post" in Munich Trench east of the Green Line.

In the advance forward from the Green Line the leading waves appear to have lost direction, and to have wheeled forward northwards in the mist into a communication trench known as Lager Alley, running east and west between the Green and Yellow Lines, and so parallel to the real and correct line of advance. This mistake was discovered, and the Yellow Line was penetrated by elements of all companies who had by now become thoroughly mixed up. In the Yellow Line no British troops could be found right or left, although on the right elements of the 17th R.F. had also entered it. These also, however, failed to get touch on either flank, and withdrew.

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Considerable fighting ensued in the Yellow Line, in Munich Trench, and in Lager Alley, our forward parties being at one time all but surrounded. After some difficulty and numerous casualties, a withdrawal, covered very well by bombers and Lewis-gunners, was effected to the Green Line, which was consolidated.

On the night of the 15/16th November the 2nd H.L.I. and the 24th R.F. were withdrawn to billets in Bertrancourt, while we and the 17th R.F. returned to the old British Line.

On the afternoon of the 17th November the 17th R.F. and ourselves were withdrawn to billets in Mailly Maillet.

CASUALTIES BETWEEN THE 13TH AND 17TH NOVEMBER.

November 13th.—Killed: 2nd Lieut. A. O. W. WEBSTER-JONES (A Company).

Wounded: Captain W. J. Littledale (C Company), Captain R. B. Kite, M.C.[1] (D Company).

Captain N. W. Hill (A Company), accidentally wounded and remaining at duty.

2nd Lieut. F. C. L. A. Lowndes (A Company), 2nd Lieut. O. H. M. Sturges (B Company), 2nd Lieut. H. Vernon (C Company).

2nd Lieut. T. A. IONIDES (died of wounds on the 16th).

Missing: 2nd Lieut. H. Davies (C Company), 2nd Lieut. R. A. Creswell (D Company), 2nd Lieut. J. D. C. Holland (D Company), known to be severely wounded.

November 14th.—Killed: Lieut. V. E. FANNING (B Company).

November 15th.—Killed: Captain H. W. H. RAWSON.

Total casualties during the period: 13 officers and 235 other ranks, of whom 10 were killed, 149 wounded, and 76 missing.

November 18th.—The Regiment now began a series of marches, with a view to ultimately reaching the place of "Rest and Training"; the moves as under were effected without incident. A few men fell out on several days, but rejoined. Considering the arduous nature of the recent operations the men marched excellently.

On the 18th marched to Bertrancourt; 19th to Amplier; 20th, Canaples; 21st, St. Ouen; 23rd, Le Menage (Cramont); 24th Maison-Ponthieu; 25th, Canchy; 27th, Fontaine-sur-Maye.

[1] Captain R. B. KITE died of his wounds at Le Treport on the 10th December 1916.

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This last place is evidently the permanent one for the Regiment, which is detached from the remainder of the Brigade. The billets are moderate, but could be much improved by us if material were available.

November 26th.—Lieut. J. B. Slade-Baker rejoined from attachment to H.Q. 2nd Division, and took over command of D Company from 2nd Lieut. R. Blackwell.

November 27th.—2nd Lieut. R. Blackwell took over command of C Company.

The following officers of the Territorial Force joined for duty: 2nd Lieut. H. E. Mann (D Company) and 2nd Lieut. J. J. G. Clarke (B), both of the Essex Regiment; 2nd Lieut. J. E. Ellis (B), 2nd Lieut. J. H. Piperno (C), A. O. W. Kindell (C), D. G. Rydings (A).

Brigadier-General A. J. F. Eden, D.S.O., 24th Infantry Brigade, visited the Regiment.

November 29th.—The following officers of the Territorial Force joined for duty: 2nd Lieuts. W. G. Bacon (A Company), T. A. Coffin (B), J. N. Chapple (D), E. S. Fold (C).

The 65th reinforcement (1 Sergeant and 58 men) joined for duty.

December 1st.—The Regiment, in billets at Fontaine-sur-Maye, carried out a special programme of training, including various classes of instruction, from this date until the end of the month.

December 3rd.—2nd Lieut. Lyle took over command of D Company from Lieut. Slade-Baker, who proceeded to H.Q. 6th Infantry Brigade, for attachment.

December 4th.—The 66th reinforcement (87 men) joined.

December 7th.—67th reinforcement (11 men) joined.

December 8th.—68th reinforcement (113 men) joined.

December 12th.—Lieut. C. T. Chevallier rejoined for duty. 69th reinforcement (1 Sergeant and 13 men) joined.

December 13th.—70th reinforcement (10 men) joined.

December 14th.—Captain R. J. Brett, Transport Officer, took over command of C Company from 2nd Lieut. Blackwell.

December 17th.—71st reinforcement (23 men) joined.

December 19th.—Lieut. R. M. Barnes took over command of B Company from 2nd Lieut. L. W. Giles.

2nd Lieut. D. G Rydings proceeded to England on transfer to Machine-gun Corps.

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2nd Lieuts. Mann and Clarke, Essex Regiment (T.F.), reposted to the 13th (Service) Battalion Essex Regiment, 6th Infantry Brigade.

December 21st.—Lieut. Slade-Baker rejoined from attachment to the 6th Infantry Brigade.

December 25th.—2nd Lieut. (temp.) C. E. Cope joined for duty (A Company).

2nd Lieut. P. Booth rejoined from hospital.

December 26th.—72nd reinforcement (26 men) joined.

December 27th.—The 5th Infantry Brigade Sports were held to-day on the Noyelle Ground. The Regiment won the *Boat Race* and the *Relay Race*, and was 2nd in the *Best Turn-out*, both for Heavy and Light Draught Pairs in Harness. In the former (H.D. in G.S. Wagon) Private Weaving tied with Private Lees, H.L.I., who, however, was awarded 1st Prize for his polished pole-chains. In the latter competition (L.D. in Limbered G.S. Wagon) Private Bunning lost to Private Thompson, H.L.I., by 2½ marks, which were taken off for his limber. Colonel Brooke, A.S.C., who judged the competition, reported: "Private Bunning's harness was in a class by itself, and superior to anything that I have seen in this Brigade Competition or in any other that I have judged in this month."

In the *Officers' Scurry* (4 furlongs), the horse ridden by Lieut. Slade-Baker was 2nd. Also ran: the Commanding Officer's horse (Owner), the Medical Officer's horse (Lieut. Tyrwhitt-Drake), and the Senior Major's horse (2nd Lieut. Fielding).

The Regiment won the 5th Brigade Football Tournament.

December 28th.—2nd Lieut. (temp.) J. D. Grover joined for duty and was posted to D Company.

2nd Lieut. R. Blackwell took over command of D Company from Lieut. Lyle.

December 31st.—2nd Division Sports, etc., on the Bois Grampus and Noyelle Grounds. The Regiment won the following: *Boxing (Light Weight)*, won by 7785 Private Smith (A Company); *Best Turn-out, Limbered G.S. Wagon and Pair L.D. Horses*, Silver Cup, Private Bunning; *Best Turn-out, G.S. Wagon and Pair H.D. Horses*, Private Weaving.

The Regiment was also 2nd in the *Championship Best Turn-out*, and in the *Relay Race.*

The Deputy Chaplain-General, the Rt. Rev. Bishop Gwynne, D.D., visited the Regiment, and took a voluntary Evening Service, which was attended by every one in the Regiment who could find room.

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ROLL OF OFFICERS ON THE STRENGTH.

31st December 1916.

Regimental Headquarters.

Lieut. Colonel R. B. Crosse, Commanding.
Major C. S. Baines, D.S.O., Senior Major.
Lieut. E. H. Whitfeld, M.C., Adjutant.
Lieut. C. T. Chevallier, Lewis-gun Officer.
Lieut. J. B. Slade-Baker, Transport Officer.
Lieut. T. Tyrwhitt-Drake, M.C., Grenade Officer.
Lieut. and Quartermaster A. E. Warnock.
Captain J. McTurk, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer.

A Company.

Captain N. W. Hill.
Lieut. F. S. Parsons.
2nd Lieut. M. G. Fielding.
2nd Lieut. P. H. R. Whitehead.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Warren.
2nd Lieut. C. E. Cope.
2nd Lieut. W. G. Bacon.

B Company.

Lieut. R. M. Barnes.
Lieut. H. W. Spurge.
2nd Lieut. L. W. Giles.
2nd Lieut. J. E. H. Neville.
2nd Lieut. J. E. Ellis.
2nd Lieut. T. A. Coffin.

C Company.

Captain R. J. Brett.
Lieut. M. S. Griffith-Williams.
2nd Lieut. L. S. Dowson.
2nd Lieut. P. Booth.
2nd Lieut. J. H. Piperno.
2nd Lieut. A. O. W. Kindell.
2nd Lieut. E. S. Fold.

D Company.

Lieut. D. T. Barnes.
2nd Lieut. R. Blackwell.
2nd Lieut. G. S. La W. Lyle.
2nd Lieut. J. N. Chapple.
2nd Lieut. J. D. Grover.

Extra-Regimentally Employed.

Captain L. F. Scott, Town Major, Couin.
Captain J. A. Southey, Cadet School, G.H.Q.

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1917.

January 1*st*, 1917.—At Fontaine-sur-Maye. The Regiment went for a route march.

The following officers joined, on reposting from the 6th (Service) Battalion :—

2nd Lieut. M. S. Griffith-Williams, posted to C Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Warren, posted to A Company.

Notification received of the following awards of the MILITARY MEDAL :—

8665 Lance-Corporal TILBURY.
11210 Private BYTHEWAY.
9104 Sergeant (now *C.S.M.*) E. J. SMITH.
10073 Sergeant J. W. WRIGHT.
13384 Private ROGERS.
16455 Lance-Corporal BURFORD.
18816 Private NORTON.
9684 Private E. DOULIN.
23309 Private CRAMP.
9300 Sergeant A. BODDINGTON.
7926 Private HAWKES.

January 3*rd*.—Notification received of the award of the MILITARY CROSS to Lieut. THOMAS TYRWHITT-DRAKE.

Captain R. J. Brett proceeded to England to attend the 2nd Senior Officers' Infantry Course at Aldershot, commencing on the 7th instant.

Lieut. F. S. Parsons proceeded to Bermicourt to join C Battalion Heavy Branch Machine-gun Corps.

Lieut. E. H. Whitfeld, M.C., proceeded to H.Q., 5th Infantry Brigade, for attachment.

Lieut. H. W. Spurge took over command of B Company, and Lieut. D. T. Barnes of D Company.

January 5*th*.—Notification received of the award of the MILITARY CROSS to :—

2nd Lieut. (temp. Captain) N. W. HILL.
2nd Lieut. M. G. FIELDING.

January 7*th*.—Notification received of the award of the DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL to :—

8238 Company-Sergeant-Major A. RICHARDSON.
9782 Sergeant C. BAILEY.

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January 8th.—The Regiment marched at 9.30 a.m. from Fontaine-sur-Maye to billets in Prouville.

January 9th.—Marched to Gezaincourt.

January 10th.—Remained in billets at Gezaincourt.

January 11th.—Marched viâ Beauval to Talmas.

January 12th.—At 1 p.m. marched to billets at Rubempré.

January 13th.—At 9 a.m. the Regiment was moved in 41 motor-busses viâ Albert to Wolf Huts, west of Pozières, on the Albert-Bapaume Road, being then in the position of the support battalion of the 5th Infantry Brigade, which had begun to relieve the 154th Infantry Brigade (51st Division) on the previous day.

January 15th.—The 73rd reinforcement (26 men) arrived.

January 16th.—At 5 p.m. the Regiment began to relieve the 24th R.F. in the position of the right battalion of the 5th Infantry Brigade in the 2nd Divisional Front. A Company on the right, B Company on the left, in each case holding a line of posts; Regimental H.Q. in Dyke Valley; C Company in Courcellette dug-outs; D Company at Brigade H.Q

January 17th.—During this relief Captain N. W. HILL, M.C., was killed by a shell.

The following 2nd Lieutenants of the Territorial Force joined for duty :—

J. D. M. Straith, E. H. Taylor, F. T. Gass, C. E. Barnes, and D. E. Haymen.

January 18th.—C Company relieved A, and D relieved B.

January 20th.—The Regiment was relieved by the 1st King's (Liverpool) Regiment (6th Infantry Brigade), and moved back to Bouzincourt on completion of the relief.

During this tour of the trenches 7 men were wounded.

January 28th.—Relieved the 1st R. Berks in Ovillers and Wolseley Huts, on the 5th Infantry Brigade moving into support, and became "Work Battalion" of the Brigade, finding large working parties daily for the next few days.

February 1st.—The following are the officers present with the Regiment :—

Headquarters.

Lieut.-Colonel R. B. CROSSE, D.S.O., Commanding.
Major C. S. BAINES, D.S.O., Second in Command.
Lieut. C. T. CHEVALLIER, Lewis-gun Officer.

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Lieut. J. B. SLADE-BAKER, Transport Officer.
Lieut. T. TYRWHITT-DRAKE, M.C., Grenade Officer (Acting Adjutant).
2nd Lieut. T. A. COFFIN, Sapping Platoon Officer.
Lieut. A. WARNOCK, Quartermaster.
Captain E. J. MCTURK (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer.

A Company.

2nd Lieut. M. G. FIELDING.
2nd Lieut. P. H. R. WHITEHEAD
2nd Lieut. R. C. WARREN.
2nd Lieut. C. E. COPE.
2nd Lieut. F. T. GASS.

B Company.

Lieut. H. W. SPURGE.
Lieut. R. M. BARNES.
2nd Lieut. L. W. GILES.
2nd Lieut. J. E. H. NEVILLE.
2nd Lieut. J. E. ELLIS.
2nd Lieut. J. D. M. STRAITH.

C Company.

Lieut. M. S. GRIFFITH-WILLIAMS.
2nd Lieut. P. BOOTH.
2nd Lieut. C. E. BARNES.

D Company.

Lieut. D. T. BARNES.
2nd Lieut. R. BLACKWELL.
2nd Lieut. G. S. LA W. LYLE.
2nd Lieut. E. H. TAYLOR.
2nd Lieut. D. E. HAYMEN.
2nd Lieut. J. D. GROVER.

The following are Extra-Regimentally employed :—

Captain J. A. SOUTHEY, Cadet School, G.H.Q.
Captain R. J. BRETT, Senior Officers' Course, Aldershot.
Lieut. E. H. WHITFELD, M.C. (Adjutant), attached H.Q. 5th Brigade.
Lieut. L. S. DOWSON, Central Training Establishment.
2nd Lieut. J. N. CHAPPLE, attached 5th T.M. Battery.

February 2nd.—The Regiment still at Ovillers and Wolseley Huts, furnishing working parties.

February 5th.—From 5 p.m. the new Reserve Brigade (99th) took the working parties. The 5th Infantry Brigade took over the front line of the 2nd Division, and the Regiment moved into the forward lines of Ovillers Huts, becoming Reserve Battalion of the Brigade in the Line. Weather very cold, with frost; ground very hard.

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February 7th.—The following officers joined for duty, and were posted to Companies: Lieut. T. W. C. Foreshew (C); 2nd Lieut. H. A. Beaver (D); 2nd Lieut. H. Miles (B); 2nd Lieut. G. C. Callaway (A).

The 74th reinforcement (17 N.C.O.'s and men) arrived.

February 9th.—Major C. S. Baines, D.S.O., was admitted to hospital, suffering from trench fever (29th Casualty Clearing Station, Gezaincourt).

The Regiment relieved the 24th R.F. in the Right Sub-section, held (with very slight alteration) as before. Relief completed at 11 p.m.

February 13th.—The 4-days' tour of duty was very free from trouble of any description, except that a Heavy Battery, which up to the time of handing over had not been located, insisted on shelling the ground all around four of our posts. Repeated attempts to get this stopped failed. The nights were very bright moonlight, which enabled movement and visiting of posts to be done very easily. On the whole, the attitude of the enemy was quiet. There was some sniping and firing at enemy's wire by our Lewis-gunners.

The Regiment was relieved by the 24th R.F. and, on relief, moved to Ovillers Huts.

February 14th.—"*W Day.*" The Regiment exchanged areas with the 99th Infantry Brigade (Regimental H.Q. moving to Aveluy), and took over the duties of Work Battalion of the Reserve Brigade.

February 15th.—"*X Day.*" Distribution of the Regiment effected as follows: H.Q. and B Company (less 2nd Lieut. Neville and 50 men, employed as permanent working party near Méaulte) at Aveluy.

C Company and 50 men of D Company permanent light railway working party at Donnets Post.

D Company (less the above 50 men) permanent working party for unloading ammunition.

A Company finding 3 platoons of 90 men for permanent working party under C.R.E. 2nd Division, at Wolseley Huts; and the remainder, with all available details of other companies (100 men), for making dug-outs near Pozières (174th Tunnelling Company, R.E.)

February 16th.—"*Y Day.*" As yesterday. Regimental H.Q. moved at 10.30 p.m. to Bruce Huts, Aveluy having been shelled at

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10 p.m., when one direct hit on the stables killed 5 horses, viz., the Commanding Officer's two (one being the black mare which had served with the 52nd continuously since September 1913), the Adjutant's two, and the Transport Officer's one.

February 17th.—"*Z Day.*" Attack by the 2nd Division, as Right Division of the IInd Corps, carried out by the 99th Infantry Brigade. Subsidiary attack made by the 6th Infantry Brigade (2nd S. Staffords). The operations are described in the IInd Corps Summary of Information, from which the following are extracts :—

"At 5.45 a.m., under cover of a heavy barrage, we attacked on both sides of the Ancre.

"North of the river the attack was entirely successful ; 2 officers and 142 men are reported to have been captured, and consolidation was easily effected.

"South of the river little opposition was encountered on the left, but on the right the enemy was found to be on the alert. The final objectives were not gained, and the position is still obscure.

"The opposition met with on the right must be attributed to a great extent to the fact that at about 2 a.m. a deserter crossed over in the vicinity of the East Miraumont Road, and, according to the statements of prisoners since captured, informed the enemy that a large attack was taking place between 4 and 6 a.m. All the enemy troops in this sector had apparently received instructions regarding our attack at 5.15 a.m. In addition the enemy artillery heavily barraged our front areas from 5 to 5.30 a.m. Rockets were continually put up along the line, and our assembly for attack was much impeded. In spite of this the first objective appears to have been gained with little difficulty. In the second phase, however, machine-gun fire from the north and north-east was much in evidence, and shortly afterwards a strong counter-attack developed.

"Up to 7 p.m. 7 officers and 300 other ranks have passed through the Corps Cages. However, it would appear that between 550 and 600 prisoners have been captured."

February 18th.—Regimental H.Q., with the portion of B Company still in hand, moved to Aveluy.

The following are extracts from IInd Corps Summary of Information issued to-day :—

"South of the Ancre our troops were engaged in consolidating and improving their position.

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"North of the Ancre at 11.25 a.m. to-day a hostile force, estimated at two battalions, in three waves, with supports in artillery formation, were seen advancing in a south-west direction from the Wonder-Work (L.32.b). Our barrage effectively dealt with this attack, and the enemy retired in disorder, suffering heavy losses. The attack was supported by a light barrage, but we had no casualties.

"Owing to the persistent fog, shooting with aeroplane observation has again been impossible.

"Heavy neutralizing fire was directed on to enemy batteries on several occasions, to stop reported shelling of our trenches, and on each occasion the hostile shelling immediately slackened.

"At 6.45 this morning our artillery opened fire on barrage lines, in response to an S.O.S. from the Left Division, and again at 11.20 a.m., to repel a strong counter-attack from the north-east; at 12 noon the latter was reported to have collapsed under our barrage fire, and the enemy appear to have suffered considerable losses.

"Hostile artillery showed considerable activity yesterday afternoon and evening, but little shelling has been reported since daylight this morning.

"Our front-line system north of the Ancre was bombarded intermittently from 1 p.m. (yesterday) onwards, the shelling being heaviest about 4 p.m. During the evening our line east of Grancourt received considerable attention, and from 4 to 5 a.m. this morning a bombardment of moderate intensity was distributed along the fronts of our Centre and Right Divisions.

"One officer and 160 other ranks passed through the Corps Cages in the past 24 hours.

"The total number of prisoners taken during the recent operations amounts to 10 officers and 609 other ranks.

"The total number taken by the IInd Corps during 1917 amounted to 16 officers, 934 other ranks."

February 19th.—The following officers joined the Battalion, and were posted to Companies: 2nd Lieut. H. S. Eagle (B); 2nd Lieut. L. Bartlett (C). The 75th reinforcement (45 N.C.O.'s and men) arrived.

February 21st.—The Regiment finally relieved of working parties, and closed to billets in Albert.

February 22nd.—Reconnaissance of the Line to be taken over, the Right Front Sub-section being now Nos. 1 to 11 posts inclusive.

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February 23rd.—The Regiment relieved the 1st King's (Liverpool) Regiment (6th Infantry Brigade) in the Right Front Sub-section. A troublesome relief, completed at 2 a.m. (24th). H.Q. in original position in the Dyke Valley.

February 24th.—Quiet day. After dark, information was received that a patrol of the 18th Division (on our left, i.e., on the left of 17th R.F., who were on our left) had penetrated to a point well within the German lines on our front, and had found no enemy. Orders received to send out patrols at once, and find out whether Guard Trench and Desire Support Trench were held. Patrol going out at 9 p.m. from A Company (on right) reported Guard Trench and that part of Desire Support Trench to its front believed to be held, although posts could not be located. At 10.30 p.m. a patrol going out from B Company (on left) reported that part of Desire Support Trench to its front held by at least one post. This was duly reported. Further information, not then available, disclosed that the Germans were definitely not holding their front system except by one or more rearguard posts or "pockets," and the Support Battalion (2nd H.L.I.) was passed through the front line in the dark, and at dawn (25th), under cover of a mist, established a line of outposts beyond and to the south of Pys.

The following officers joined for duty to-day: 2nd Lieut. H. A. Smith (posted to A Company); 2nd Lieuts. S. A. E. Miles (A), M. A. Simon (B), H. O. M. Herbert (C), A. E. Henley (C), H. W. D. Palmer (D), the last five on attachment from the R. Berkshire Regiment.

February 25th.—The Regiment continued to occupy the original British Line, except that there were posts forward on the flanks, in order to be in touch with the Australians on the right, and the 17th R.F. on the left.

February 27th.—The Regiment relieved the 2nd H.L.I. in the forward position. A and B Companies were established in the new front line, consisting of Gallwitz Switch Trench on our right, and a line of posts on the left extending to the outskirts of Pys, including the cemetery.

D Company (Support) in Grundy Trench.

C Company (Reserve) in shelters about Regimental H.Q. in Aqueduct Road.

The relief was effected with difficulty, owing to darkness, and completed by 3.20 a.m. (28th).

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February 28th.—A quiet and misty day. The front line was for a time shelled by the enemy's artillery as well as by our own (in their attempt to cut the wire in front of Grevillers Trench). Policy of very active patrolling maintained.

Casualties during February.—7 killed and 14 wounded.

ALBERT CHURCH, AFTER THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT,
The figure of the Virgin remaining suspended.

March 1st.—Relieved after dark by the 24th R.F. quickly and without incident. The night was quiet, cold, and misty. The Regiment was now distributed as follows :—

H.Q., posts in Old British Line Nos. 8 and 19.
A and B Companies in Coulee Trench; C and D in Below Trench.
The next 48 hours were devoted to salvage, burial of corpses, etc.
Casualty.—1 man killed.

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March 3rd.—The Regiment was relieved by the 1st K.R.R.C. (99th Infantry Brigade), and, on relief, marched to billets in and about the Rue Carnot, Albert.

March 4th.—At Albert. The whole Regiment bathed during the morning at the baths in the Rue Corbie.

March 5th.—2nd Lieut. Horley rejoined from England, and took over the duties of Lewis-gun Officer from Lieut. Chevallier.

The 76th reinforcement (18 N.C.O.'s and men) arrived.

March 5th–10th.—Such training and drill as the weather and ground permitted was carried out.

March 11th.—The Brigade moved into the Support Area, and the Regiment relieved a battalion of the 6th Brigade in Ovillers Huts.

March 12th.—Bathing, drill, etc. Reconnaissance of the Forward Area by about 10 officers.

The 77th Reinforcement (10 other ranks) joined from the base.

March 13th.—The Regiment moved at 1 hour's notice to the following: H.Q., Dyke Valley; A Company, Chalk Mound; B and C, Courcellette Dug-outs; D, old Brigade H.Q. (R.29 Central).

March 13th–18th.—Employed on road-making (Pys to Le Sars, and Warlencourt to Le Sars).

March 18th.—During the afternoon the Regiment moved to a leg-shaped ravine in G.33 Central, bivouacking, and being placed under the orders of the 6th Brigade (Forward Area).

On the 17th Captain (temp. Major) D. M. Rose, 4th Battalion (T.F.), joined for duty.

March 19th.—The Regiment marched at 8 a.m. to the Bidacourt Line, and there dug a defensive line, 650 yards in length, using the German wire as obstacle in front. At 4 p.m. orders were received to withdraw to Wolf Huts at once.

March 21st.—To Bruce Huts, on the Aveluy-Bouzincourt Road.

March 23rd.—No. 5019 Sergeant A. McAlister left the Regiment on discharge, having completed (on the 6th instant) 22 years' service, and being 43 years of age. He had served with the 52nd throughout the whole of the present war, as N.C.O. in charge of water-cart during the retreat from Mons, and up to the time of his appointment as Pioneer Sergeant in November 1914.

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March 24th.—To Herissart. At 11 p.m. time was advanced 1 hour.

March 26th.—To Gezaincourt.

March 27th.—To Ligny-sur-Cauche.

March 28th.—To Hericourt; less C and D Companies, at Guinecourt, 1½ mile away.

March 30th.—The Regiment marched to Floringhem, just north of Pernes, and took over very good billets. The march was 15 miles, and was very well done; march discipline very good; nobody fell out.

Captain R. J. Brett was appointed Senior Major of the 17th R.F.

The following officers joined for duty and were posted to Companies: Captain F. W. Chippendale (D Company), 2nd Lieut. R. G. Wilsdon (B), 2nd Lieut. F. Southam (C), 2nd Lieut. L. E. W. O. Fulbrook-Leggatt (A).

March 31st.—The day was spent in clearing up and resting.

April 1st.—At Floringhem. The following officers joined for duty and were posted to Companies: 2nd Lieut. R. W. G. Creswell (B Company), 2nd Lieut. G. H. Fuller (C), 2nd Lieut. A. E. Walter (D).

April 2nd.—"Summer Hours" began at Rouse. There was a heavy and unexpected fall of snow during the night and throughout the day, which resulted in some of the billets having to be evacuated by reason of their non-weatherproof roofs. Training was abandoned in favour of making the roads through the area and to the Refilling Points passable.

April 3rd.—2nd Lieut. B. J. Crewe joined for duty on first appointment, and was posted to C Company.

April 4th–7th.—The weather improved considerably, and made a great amount of training possible. Particular attention was paid to the old Regimental method of waterproof-sheet bivouacking, and the old equipment, i.e., string, pegs, and sticks (carried on the cookers), was completed, 2 pegs per man carried in the haversack, as before.

This method was approved by the Major-General, and was adopted for the Division.

On the 5th the 78th reinforcement (13 men) joined, and on the 7th Lieut. J. E. Ellis was struck off the strength (to England, sick).

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April 8th.—Captain (temp. Major) D. M. Rose (T.F.), who has been attached to the Regiment since the 17th March, proceeded to rejoin the 1/4th Battalion (T.F.).

The Regiment marched, as part of the 5th Brigade, to the area Hermin-Frevillers viâ Dieval and Bajus. One hour halt for tea east of Dieval.

April 10th.—To Maroeuil.

April 11th.—On the 2nd Division relieving the 51st (Highland) (T.F.), in the area in front of Roclincourt, captured by the latter Division on the two preceding days, the Regiment went into support in the old German Second Line (Kleeman Stellung), relieving the 6th Black Watch. The relief was effected during the afternoon and in a snowstorm, which made conditions throughout extremely unpleasant. Two companies (A in particular) were very badly provided with dug-outs, which in this line were most disappointing. Shelters had to be improvised, in some instances with S.A A. boxes.

2nd Lieut. F. T. Gass was struck off the strength, pending transfer to the Indian Army.

April 12th.—In the same position. All officers reconnoitred the forward area.

Captain J. A. Southey was posted to the 5th (Service) Battalion of the Regiment.

April 13th.—In the early morning Brigade orders were received to make preparations to carry out an attack on the railway line crossing the Divisional front, about 700 yards in front of the then British Front Line (Farbus—Point-de-Jour Line), and establish a line of posts in front of it in the direction of the line Bailleul-Willerval. Reconnaissances of forming-up places were made by officers. During the afternoon, however, the line was found to have been vacated by the enemy, and occupied by the front battalion (24th R.F.) on the Brigade front.

About 10 p.m. the Regiment moved forward, still as support battalion, having A and D Companies in the Farbus—Point-du-Jour Line, and H.Q., B and C Companies, and the Regimental Aid Post in Tommy Trench.

2nd Lieut. J. D. M. Straith was struck off the strength, on transfer to England (sick).

April 14th.—Major Baines, D.S.O., took over temporary command of the Regiment from Lieut.-Colonel Crosse, D.S.O. (sick).

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At night the Regiment relieved the 24th R.F. in the front line, H.Q. moving to a dug-out on the railway embankment. There was considerable delay, due chiefly to the non-arrival of ration and water pack-transport at the proper places, the convoy having been misled by its guides. The line which the Regiment was to hold ran parallel to and about 1,000 yards from the Oppy-Arleux and Arleux Switch Trenches, which were held by the enemy. Disposition of the Regiment : A, B, and D Companies, each with 2 platoons in the front line posts, and C Company in posts round the Sugar Factory. Owing to the difficulty of finding the posts in the intense darkness, the relief was not complete until after daylight (15th April).

Casualties.—2 men killed and 3 wounded.

April 15th.—The enemy bombarded all the posts throughout the day with H.E. and shrapnel. During the night (15th/16th) B and D Companies were relieved by the 17th R.F., and were brought back to dug-outs in Sunken Road, between the railway embankment and the Sugar Factory. The enemy bombardment was particularly heavy this night.

Casualties.—2 men wounded.

No. 4335 Sergeant-Major Warnock was transferred to the home establishment.

April 16th.—2nd Lieut. R. W. G. Creswell was struck off the strength, on transfer to England (sick).

Casualties.—1 killed, 10 wounded, 1 missing.

April 16th/17th.—At 6.40 p.m. orders were received for the Regiment and the 17th R.F., in conjunction with the 63rd (R.N.) Division on the right, and Canadians on the left, to "endeavour to capture" the Oppy Line and Arleux Switch by means of bombing parties. According to all reports of observers and patrols, the wire was thick and without gaps on our front. At about 10.30 p.m. the attack was postponed, in order that further patrols should be sent out.

At about 3.30 a.m. the attack was cancelled. It rained all night, and there was heavy hostile shelling.

After 3.30 a.m. D Company relieved A Company, which, with B, was moved to Ouse Trench and cellars and dug-outs in the northern outskirts of Bailleul.

April 17th.—2nd Lieut. J. N. Chapple was struck off the strength on transfer to the 5th Trench Mortar Battery.

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C.-S.-M. Clare was appointed Acting-Sergeant-Major of the Regiment in place of Sergeant-Major Warnock.

During the afternoon several cellars occupied by A Company were blown in by shell-fire, and the Company was moved to a dug-out in the Sunken Road.

Casualties.—5 killed, 4 wounded, 1 missing.

At night B and C Companies exchanged places.

April 18th/19th.—The Regiment was relieved by the 2nd South Staffordshire Regiment (6th Infantry Brigade), and withdrew to the old British and German front-line dug-outs. All ranks were in a very exhausted condition, and badly in need of a few days' rest. Lieut.-Colonel Crosse resumed command on the 19th.

Casualties.—On the 18th, 1 man wounded; on the 19th, 5 men wounded.

April 20th and 21st.—Excellent arrangements were made by Lieut. T. A. Coffin and No. 6973 Corporal Jones for the comfort of the Regiment by the erection of a bath-house, barber's shop, and shaving saloon at the Transport Lines, to which the men were marched by platoons during these two days.

Reliefs among officers and N.C.O.'s were carried out with the Reserves left out of the line.

April 21st.—2nd Lieut. E. H. Taylor was struck off the strength on transfer to England (sick).

The Regiment exchanged lines with the 2nd H.L.I., being then posted: H.Q. and C Company in Tommy Trench; A, B, and D Companies in the Kleeman Stellung.

April 22nd.—B and D Companies moved to the Farbus—Point-du-Jour Line, in relief of two companies 17th Middlesex Regiment.

2nd Lieuts. F. Southam and D. E. Haymen, wounded (shock), were invalided to England.

April 23rd.—The 63rd (R.N.) Division, on the right of the 2nd Division, attacked and captured Gavrelle about dawn, thereby somewhat advancing the British line to the south. From near our Regimental H.Q. an excellent view was obtainable, both of the attack and of the several counter-attacks. Officers and Regimental Observers were employed all day in watching and writing reports.

April 24th.—Comparatively quiet day, but the enemy made several more fruitless counter-attacks on Gavrelle.

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April 25th.—Orders received at 1.30 p.m. that the Regiment would be relieved by the 17th R.F., and would then proceed to Bray, near Ecoivres and Mont St. Eloi.

April 26th.—Move completed about 3 a.m. Day spent in explanation of the schemes, etc.

ATTACK ON THE ARLEUX-OPPY LINE.

Secret Orders for the attack had already been issued by the 2nd Division and by the 5th Infantry Brigade. The Officer Commanding the Regiment embodied such of these as applied to the Regiment in his Confidential Orders, given further on. There were, however, certain orders and instructions, issued by the Division and the Brigade, which are of considerable interest, as showing to what extent matters of detail were worked out beforehand; and some of these orders are worthy of being quoted in full. After giving the plan of the attack, the boundaries of the Divisional front, the dividing lines between Brigades, and the exact location of the three objectives, the method of carrying out the attack by the battalions was entered into fully, while separate instructions were given (in appendices) for the employment of Trench Mortar Batteries, Machine-gun Companies, R.E., Signallers, Bombers, etc.

Extracts from 5th Infantry Brigade Orders.

"Dress.—Fighting order without great-coats. Waterproof sheets will be carried, as well as the following :—

(*a*) Two No. 5 Mills bombs per man.

(*b*) 120 rounds A.S.A. per man, except signallers, bombers, rifle-bombers, scouts, runners, Vickers and Lewis-gunners, who will carry 50 rounds.

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(*c*) One day's ration per man.
(*d*) By every other man one flare.
(*e*) Two sandbags per man.
(*f*) Wire-cutters and breakers as available.

(Wire-cutters should be attached to the man by a cord.)

"Officers will be dressed exactly the same as their men. They will carry Véry pistols and a packet of S.O.S. coloured lights.

"Field Message Cards will be carried by all officers and Platoon Commanders.

"Distinguishing marks will be worn as laid down.

REGIMENTAL SCOUTS, 2ND BATTALION.
May 1917.

"Not more than 16 officers (including Medical Officers) will go in with a battalion. The complement of N.C.O.'s and men laid down in para. 30 S.S. 135 must be left behind.

"All ranks are forbidden to carry any document, maps, or sketches which may give information to the enemy.

"Watches will be synchronized at 10 a.m., 2 p.m., and 10 p.m. on 'Y' day, and 3 hours before zero."

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Appendix III to Brigade Orders dealt with INTER-COMMUNICATIONS as follows :—

1. *Telephone.*—Lines will be laid to the Sugar Factory and forward to the two Battalion H.Q. on road in D.10.b.

There will be an exchange at the Sugar Factory.

Battalion Signal Officers of the two attacking battalions will arrange for lines to be laid to companies on the night Y/Z.

Each attacking company will carry on their line immediately after zero. Cable for this purpose will be provided.

Earth circuits will be employed until time and opportunity admit of improvement.

The two lines thus taken over on each battalion front should be laddered, if possible, by small parties detailed for the purpose, having prepared lengths of cable with them.

2. *Runners.*—A Brigade Runner Post will be established at the Sugar Factory consisting of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men. This will work both backwards and forwards.

The two attacking battalions will establish Relay Posts in the Arleux Loop as soon as it is captured.

They will consist each of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men. These will be called No. 1 Relay Posts.

No. 2 Relay Posts (consisting of the same number) will be ready to advance as soon as the final objective is captured. They will be instructed to report to Company Commanders as soon as they arrive, and will be used for sending back to the No. 1 Posts.

Telephone lines mentioned in para. 1 should be led into the Runner Posts, and linesmen posted there.

3. *Power Buzzers.*—One Power Buzzer will be established at the Forward Battalion H.Q. This will be manned by brigade signals.

The listening set will be at Brigade H.Q.

One Power Buzzer will be kept in reserve at Sugar Factory, and will be sent up on word being received by brigade signals that a suitable place had been found.

There will be one Power Buzzer in Company H.Q. in the present line.

4. *Wireless.*—A Wireless Station will be established at the Sugar Factory, and will be moved forward as soon as opportunity offers.

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5. *Pigeons.*—Probably only two birds per forward battalion will be available. These should not, therefore, be brought beyond Battalion H.Q.

6. *Visual.*—A Divisional Reading Station will be established at B.19.d.2.8, which will watch for signals from the whole Division front. In the event of the day being misty, a Brigade Station will be established at the Sugar Factory, if a suitable view can be obtained from there.

NOTE.—From the above scheme it will be seen that from the forward battalions there will be 4 ways, and from the Sugar Factory 5 ways of sending back information without runners.

Battalions should, therefore, never have to send farther than the Sugar Factory in the event of other means failing.

DIVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

I. *Provost Arrangements :—*

(1) Battle Straggler Posts will be established at—

(*a*) G.6.c.8.0.

(*b*) Cross Roads in Roclincourt, A.29.c.4.4.

This post will have a sub-post at the beginning of the duck-boards, A.29.a, which will also deal with walking wounded cases, *vide* below.

The 99th Infantry Brigade will detail an officer and 3 men for each of these posts. These officers will get into communication with the A.P.M. as soon as possible, and will be instructed by him (A.P.M.'s address, Divisional H.Q.). They will report to the A.P.M. on the evening of " Y " day.

Officers in charge of posts will take down full particulars of all stragglers before sending them on to the Collecting Station, with a view to evidence being forthcoming for disciplinary action to be taken subsequently, if desirable. They will pay special attention to noting if stragglers have discarded their arms and equipment, and will record the fact.

They will observe all walking wounded passing their posts, and will note if they are in possession of arms and equipment. If they are not, the Officer in charge of the post will, if he considers the man could have brought out his arms and equipment, record the fact for future inquiry.

In the case of walking wounded who have properly brought down their arms and equipment, but who appear too exhausted to carry

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them farther, the officer in charge of the post will take them over, giving a certificate that he has done so.

The A.P.M. will issue *pro formas* to the posts.

Nothing in the above paragraphs is to be interpreted to mean that all walking wounded (many of them are severely injured) are to bring down arms and equipment. It is, however, intended that all who can should do so.

(2) Prisoners-of-War Cage is situated in Roclincourt off the Barrier (Cross Road A.28.a) Roclincourt Road. Notice-boards are up.

Responsibility for prisoners rests with Brigades until they reach the Cage. Prisoners (except officers) will *not* be searched until they reach the Cage, but escorts are responsible that they do not destroy papers. Officers are to be searched at once, and all papers sent as quickly as possible to the Divisional H.Q.

(3) The 5th Brigade will detail one officer and 10 men to report to the A.P.M. at 4 p.m. on "Y" day, to act as Guard on the Prisoners-of-War Cage.

(4) The A.P.M. will arrange for the necessary rations for posts, and for any escorts supplied by the Corps or Division for the Cage. He will arrange for shelter in consultation with "Q."

(5) The A.P.M.'s H.Q. will be at the Prisoners-of-War Cage.

(6) All prisoners captured by the Division should be sent to the 2nd Division Cage, unless circumstances forbid, and *not* to other Divisional Cages. Escorts on handing over to a Cage should always demand a receipt.

(7) Escorts should not exceed 10 per cent. of prisoners.

(8) All personnel detailed from Brigades for duty under the A.P.M. will be taken from the men who will be left out of the fight in accordance with the amended para. 2, Sect. XXX of S.S. 135, "Instructions for the Training of a Division for Offensive Action."

II. *Ammunition Supply (Small Arms)* :—

(1) An Advanced Divisional Dump has been formed in the Tunnel at B.15.c.6.3, and will be known as "Tunnel Dump."

The main Divisional Dump is at B.26.c.0.5, and is called "Weston's Dump." This Dump is on the telephone.

Brigades will indent on "Tunnel Dump" and "Weston's Dump" direct.

(2) In building up Brigade, etc., Dumps, the establishments ssued from this office (dated 19/2/17) will be followed generally

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(Flares and Véry Lights probably cannot be got in the numbers laid down), but Brigadiers will use their discretion regarding the number of forward dumps to be formed. Positions of forward dumps to be notified to D.H.Q. as soon as selected

(3) Grenades in dumps will be kept *in boxes.*

(4) On reaching the enemy's trenches dumps of grenades and S.A.A. will immediately be formed, partly from supplies carried by each man of the attacking waves, partly by special parties detailed to carry them, and later from supplies sent up from the rear.

Notice-cloths, marked "S.A.A." and "Grenades," will be carried by all attacking companies, and will be set up in objectives, supplies of ammunition being collected near them. Cloths will be supplied. by D.H.Q.

(5) The principle of all ammunition supply must be adhered to strictly, i.e., troops in front are supplied from the rear, and do not have to send back except to give information to the next dump in rear.

III. *Food Supply :—*

(1) A dump of reserve rations will be formed at "Weston's Dump." Brigades will indent on it in case normal rations do not get through.

(2) 2,500 cheese sandwiches will be delivered to the 5th and 6th Brigades on Refilling Point on "Y" day.

(3) Rations on the normal scale will continue to be sent up daily. Special carrying parties, distinct from dump carrying parties, will be detailed to meet rations.

All rations are to be taken up by pack transport, and not in limbers.

Brigades will arrange suitable rendezvous for pack transport, where guides *from the front* will meet the animals, to ensure their being taken as far forward as possible.

IV. *Water :—*

Brigades in the line will complete water-dumps in forward dumps. A reserve of 800 tins will be held at "Weston's Dump." The officer in charge of the dump will issue sparingly.

It is hoped that a water-point about Area B.19.a.0.0 will be ready by "Z" day.

An advanced reserve dump of water is being formed at B.15.a.7.2, in which there will be 800 tins of water.

(There is also a reserve of 20,000 sandbags at "Tunnel Dump.")

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V. *Carrying Parties :—*

(1) Battalion Commanders and Company Officers must know where the forward dumps are situated, and officers must make themselves personally acquainted with the actual positions. In addition, two N.C.O.'s per section *must* visit their Battalion and Company Dumps.

(2) At "Weston's Dump" there will be a carrying party of 3 officers and 150 men, found by the 99th Brigade, to carry to Brigade dumps. The party to report to the officer in charge "Weston's Dump" on the evening of "Y" day.

(3) At each Brigade dump there will be carrying parties of at least one officer and 25 O.R., and 2 men to act as runners, to supply the Battalion dumps of attacking battalions. Parties to be found by Brigades concerned.

(4) Not less than 1 officer and 20 O.R. will be detailed as carrying party for each Battalion dump.

(5) Each Company will detail not less than 2 sections as carrying parties from Company dumps onwards. These parties must be commanded by a determined N.C.O.

(6) Carrying parties will wear a yellow band on the left arm.

(7) Company dumps will be refilled from Battalion dumps, and so on.

(8) The stores for the first journey must be taken forward immediately in rear of the last attacking waves.

Officers and N.C.O.'s in charge of parties will move in rear of their parties, to ensure that the stores arrive.

(9) A guard of 2 N.C.O.'s and 6 O.R. will be found by the 99th Brigade on "Weston's Dump," and will report on the morning of "Y" day. The party will report to the officer in charge of the dump.

Guards of 1 N.C.O. and 3 O.R. will be mounted on Brigade dumps.

VI. *Tools :—*

As many tools as possible are being sent up to "Weston's Dump."

VII. *Side Shows :—*

A Soup Kitchen and Coffee Bar will be running at the beginning of the duck-boards at Roclincourt.

Free issues of coffee, tea, biscuits, and cigarettes to the 2nd Division.

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SUMMARY OF CONFIDENTIAL ORDERS, ISSUED BY LIEUT.-COL. CROSSE, D.S.O., ON THE 26th APRIL 1917.

Reference Maps.—Biache, 1/20,000.
Oppy, 1/10,000.
Sheet 51 B.N.W., 1/20,000.

On a date to be decided later and known as "Z" day, at zero hour (which will be about dawn), the 2nd Division will co-operate with the 63rd (R.N.) Division on its right, and the 1st Canadian Division on its left, in an attack on the Arleux Loop and Oppy Line, with the 5th Infantry Brigade on the left, and the 6th Infantry Brigade on the right, of the Divisional front.

The 5th Infantry Brigade will have the 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the left, and the 2nd Highland Light Infantry on the right, as assaulting battalions. The other two battalions of the Brigade, viz., 17th R. Fusiliers and 24th R. Fusiliers, will act, the former as "mopping-up" and carrying parties, and the latter as Brigade Reserve.

[Here follows a clear description of the boundaries between battalions as laid down on the map.]

The dispositions and formations of the Left Battalion (2nd Oxford and Bucks) at zero hour will be as follows :—

1st Wave, on parapet of our own front-line trench.—2 Platoons D Company on left; 2 Platoons B Company on right.

2nd Wave, inside our own front-line trench.—2 Platoons and H.Q. D Company; 2 Platoons and H.Q. B Company.

Immediately behind our own front-line trench.—2 Platoons of attached Company 17th R.F., to mop up the Blue Line.

Immediately behind them.—Remainder of attached Company 17th R.F., to mop up Arleux Loop.

On a taped line 50 yards behind our own front-line trench.—2 Platoons A Company on the left; 2 Platoons C Company on the right.

On another taped line 50 yards behind the above.—Remainder of A and C Companies.

25 yards in rear of the above.—Carrying party of 2 Platoons of the attached Company 17th R.F.

Regimental H.Q. (sharing dug-out with H.Q. 2nd H.L.I.).—Near road B.10.b.82.

Regimental Aid Post will be notified later.

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Each company will be prepared to hand over its reserve stretcher-bearers to the Medical Officer.

Artillery Time-table as it affects the Regimental front :—

0 to 0 + 8 minutes.—Artillery barrage on enemy's front line. Infantry gets forward under the barrage.

0 + 8.—Artillery lifts off enemy's front-line trench, and Infantry assaults enemy's front line.

0 + 12.—Artillery lifts forward at the rate of 100 yards per 4 minutes, until it becomes protective beyond the Blue Line. Infantry moves forward behind the barrage, and attacks any enemy met with until the Blue Line is reached.

0 + 32.—The last of the Infantry reaches the Blue Line, and halts for 23 minutes. From 0 + 50 to 0 + 55 all the Divisional Artillery ceases fire.

0 + 55.—Divisional Artillery opens intensive fire for 5 minutes. Infantry gets forward under the barrage.

0 + 1 hour.—Artillery begins to lift forward at 100 yards in 4 minutes, and Infantry moves forward behind the barrage (clearing the village, etc.).

0 + 1 hour 24 minutes.—The last of the Infantry reaches the Green Line. Artillery barrage becomes protective beyond it.

The occupation of the Brown Line does not constitute the attainment of the third objective in full. What is required is the establishment of a line of posts (B.6.d.85—C.1.c.64—C.7.a.77), which will be done under cover of a protective barrage.

The successive phases which lead up to the above are as follows :—

First Wave, followed by 2nd Wave and moppers-up, will advance close to the barrage during the intensive bombardment ready to rush the Arleux Loop when the barrage lifts off it. The advance will continue to the Blue Line (1st Objective) as the barrage creeps forward.

The 2 Platoons of moppers-up next following the 2nd Wave will remain in and consolidate Arleux Loop.

During the pause in the advance of the barrage after the capture of the Blue Line (by the 1st and 2nd Waves), the 3rd and 4th Waves will close upon the 1st and 2nd Waves, *but will not enter the Blue Line.*

The Regiment will advance in four Waves to the Green Line, and, after the necessary halt on the barrage, will continue the advance

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on the Brown Line. *It is the actual pace of the Artillery barrage which decides the Infantry advance.*

Once more it must be impressed on every one that it is absolutely necessary, and far more safe, to advance close up to the barrage, and that any portion of the enemy's trench or position opposite, even to as small a body as a section, must be assaulted immediately the barrage lifts off it, as this is the only sure means of preventing any enemy, whom the trench or position may hold, from manning his parapet and stopping the advance.

The principle to be observed throughout is to avoid committing troops to enfilade machine-gun fire on the open ground between Oppy and Arleux, until the attacks through those villages have progressed sufficiently to protect the flanks of the advance over the open ground.

All ground gained must be at once consolidated.

Strong points are being constructed by platoons of the 17th R.F.

A Regimental Compass Party will march on the right of the Regiment. The O.C. C Company will detail an officer for this duty.

After zero hour hourly reports (as nearly as possible) will be rendered.

Contact aeroplanes signalling ground sheet and panel will be at Regimental H.Q.

Vigilant periscopes, 20 per company, will be issued to-morrow, and their use for flashing to aeroplanes will be explained to all ranks. Contact aeroplanes will fly over the line about 7 a.m., when flares will be lit and mirrors flashed. This will be done also when the contact aeroplane sounds its Klaxon horn or drops lights.

O.C. C Company will have 1 N.C.O. and 6 men detailed to form a relay runner-post, to be known as "No. 1 Relay Post," in the Arleux Loop, as soon as it is captured. These must be selected men, whose duty will be to receive messages and get them back to Regimental H.Q.

On the 27th April the order was received that "Z" day would be the 28th and zero hour 4.25 a.m.

The 2nd Divisional Artillery Operation Orders were issued in fullest detail, and the following was the Barrage Table, showing how the movements of the Infantry were to conform to the fire of the Artillery

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BARRAGE TIME-TABLE.

Actual Time, unless Zero changed.	Zero Time.	Artillery and Infantry.
4.25—4.33	0+8 min.	Artillery barrage enemy's front line. Infantry get forward under barrage.
4.33—4.36	+8 to +11	Infantry assault front-line trench. Artillery lifts forward gradually on to 1st objective (Blue Line). Front-line trench is left to moppers up, and Infantry get forward under barrage.
4.36—4.41	+11 to +16	Artillery barrage *on* Blue Line. Infantry get forward under barrage.
4.41—4.45	+16 to +20	Infantry assault the Blue Line. Artillery lifts off Blue Line.
4.45—5.25	+20 to +60	Artillery forms protective barrage in front of Blue Line. Infantry reorganize on Blue Line.
5.25—5.30	+60 to +65	All fire ceases for 5 minutes.
5.30—5.35	+65 to +70	Artillery opens with intense fire for 5 minutes. Infantry get forward under barrage.
5.35—5.39	+70 to +74	Artillery lifts forward gradually on to 2nd objective (Green Line). Infantry get forward under barrage.
5.39—5.43	+74 to +78	Artillery barrage on Green Line. Infantry get forward under barrage.
5.43—5.47	+78 to +82	Infantry assault Green Line. Artillery lifts off Green Line.
5.47—6.7	+82 to +102	Artillery forms protective barrage in front of Green Line.
6.7—6.12	+102 to +107	Artillery ceases fire for five minutes.
6.12—6.17	+107 to +112	Artillery reopens with intensive fire for five minutes. Infantry get forward under barrage.
6.17	+112	Artillery lifts forward gradually on to 3rd objective (Brown Line). Infantry get forward under barrage.
6.17—6.21	+112 to +116	Artillery barrage on Brown Line. Infantry get forward under barrage.
6.21—6.29	+116 to +124	Infantry occupy Brown Line. Artillery lifts off Brown Line.
6.29—6.39	+124 to +134	Artillery forms protective barrage 300 yards beyond Brown Line.
6.39—6.59	+134 to +154	Artillery lifts forward gradually from 300 to 500 yards beyond Brown Line. Infantry will push out line of protective posts under this.

NOTE:—(1) The Field Artillery barrage will be preceded by a Heavy Artillery barrage through Oppy Wood and Village.

(2) After Zero + 154 minutes, the Divisional Artillery will reopen fire only on receipt of S.O.S. or Mass Signals.

(3) In order to co-ordinate our attack with the 1st Canadian Division on our left, there will be a gap in the barrage on the left of the 5th Infantry Brigade from Zero - 16 minutes to Zero + 82 minutes. The left troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade must, therefore, advance "by the right."

(4) During the advance through Oppy Wood it will be necessary to burst the shrapnel high, in order to clear the trees. The Infantry must, therefore, be warned that though the shells may be bursting over their heads, or even a little behind them, they must watch the strike of the bullets on the ground, and get as close to this as possible.

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LIEUT.-COLONEL CROSSE'S DIARY CONTINUED.

April 27th.—At 11 a.m. the Regiment moved to the transport bivouac, there to equip and move direct to the Assembly Trenches after dark.

On going into the Assembly Trenches on the night of the 27th/28th, A Company was shelled near Brigade H.Q., 2nd Lieut. E. C. CALLOWAY and 6 men were killed, and a number of others wounded. Two Lewis-guns were destroyed, and the teams practically all casualties. There were several others wounded going in, for the most part belonging to Regimental H.Q.

April 28th.—4.25 a.m. was fixed for "zero hour," when the Regiment attacked in four Waves, B and D Companies (Captain Giles and Captain Barnes) on the right and left front respectively, C and A Companies (Lieut. Dowson and 2nd Lieut. Whitehead) forming the 3rd and 4th Waves in rear.

The 8th Battalion Canadian Infantry attacked on the left and the 2nd H.L.I. on the right, the 6th Infantry Brigade being again beyond them on the right.

The whole attack was more successful on the left than on the right, the Canadian Corps taking and holding, apparently without difficulty, all their objectives.

On the right the 6th Infantry Brigade experienced considerable trouble in the vicinity of Oppy Wood and Village, partly due, it is believed, to an uncertain situation still farther to the right or southwards.

This affected the Regiment and the 2nd H.L.I. on our right in that our right flank had to be swung back and in a measure made "defensive."

The feature of the operations (which continued, as far as the Regiment was concerned, up to the night of the 1st/2nd May, when it was finally relieved) was the initiative, resource, and good leading of the Company and Platoon Commanders, more especially Captain D. T. Barnes and Captain Giles, to whom very great credit is due for the immediate control of the forward situation. All their subordinate commanders seemed to realize the necessity for at once collecting together adjacent men—no matter to whom they belonged—and retelling-off and reorganizing them for immediate further action. Particularly good work in this latter respect was done by 2nd Lieut. B. J. Crewe.

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The casualties included 2nd Lieut. G. S. La W. Lyle, wounded (subsequently died of his wounds at Aubigny); also wounded: Lieut. L. S. Dowson, 2nd Lieut. P. H. R. Whitehead, 2nd Lieut. A. E. Walter, 2nd Lieut. H. A. Smith, 2nd Lieut. H. S. Eagle (who rejoined after 3 days), about 200 other ranks, of whom 130 were wounded, and the remainder either killed or missing.

The Regiment, in touch on either flank with the adjacent troops, continued to hold its front, approximately on the line of the "Blue Line" (2nd Objective), where extremely good work was done by the Lewis-gunners.

The trenches were very much shelled and badly provided with dug-outs; a number of men were buried, and a certain number of casualties occurred, the exact figures it has not yet been possible to arrive at as regards separating them from those which occurred in the actual attack.

After the attack the Captains of the two leading Companies of the Regiment reported :—

Right Company.—"On my Company front there was only one proper gap in the wire, and that was on the right. The remainder of the wire had not been cut very much."

Left Company.—"There was one gap in the wire on my Company frontage, and that was a very bad gap."

Both these officers described our barrage at zero as "weak."

Rations, water, and stores for consolidation purposes were brought up by the 10th (Pioneer) Battalion D.C.L.I.

As far as I could ascertain, arrangements in accordance with Field Service Regulations, Part II, Ch. XI (12) for clearing our part of the area of operations of the wounded had not been made sufficiently early, as might have been done.

April 29th.—The situation did not change; all the ground was maintained, and no infantry counter-attacks matured, although the shelling was considerable. Rations and water came up in the same way as yesterday, and the remaining wounded were evacuated—17 cases in all. Reserve officers and N.C.O.'s were brought up from the transport.

A reinforcement of 1 Sergeant and 73 other ranks arrived near Ecurie.

April 30th.—Situation unchanged. The Regiment was relieved (on the night of 30th April/1st May) by two composite companies,

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No. 1 (Lieut. Blackwell) and No. 2 (2nd Lieut. Walker, 2nd H.L.I.), each of 3 platoons, made up of reserve officers, N.C.O.'s, and men, and reinforcements of the two Regiments, so as to enable the two Regiments to be withdrawn.

May 1st/2nd.—This composite battalion (commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Crosse) was finally relieved by a battalion of the Composite Brigade, and the Regiment, on relief, proceeded to the dug-outs in the old German and British front lines (i.e., as they were up to the 9th April last) near Roclincourt.

WINNERS OF THE LIGHT-DRAUGHT TURN-OUT.
5th Infantry Brigade Horse Show, 1917.

[Lieut. J. B. Slade-Baker (Transport Officer), No. 9300 Sergt. A. Boddington (Transport Sergeant), No. 6528 Pte. Bunning.]

May 2nd.—About midday orders were received to move, as part of the 5th Brigade, to Ecoivres. The move was carried out during the afternoon, and the Regiment was billeted in "Y" Hutments.

May 3rd.—Cleaning up and bathing.

2nd Lieut. L. E. W. O. Fullbrook-Leggatt rejoined for duty after having been wounded, and was reposted to A Company.

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May 4th.—The Regiment marched viâ the main Arras-St. Pol Road, to Villers Brulin, being there very comfortably billeted in the village. About 10 p.m. received orders to march at 8 a.m. to-morrow.

May 5th.—Marched to Camblain-Châtelain; comfortable billets in the area round the Mairie. [This was the area occupied by the Regiment in July 1916, immediately prior to entraining (from Pernes) to join 4th Army on the Somme.]

May 6th.—2nd Lieut. H. A. Vernon joined for duty, and was posted to A Company.

May 7th–12th.—At Camblain-Châtelain. During this week some very useful training was carried out, also reorganization, and promotion of N.C.O.'s to complete establishment. Specialists' classes of instruction under their respective officers.

May 13th.—Sunday. In the unavoidable absence of the Rt. Rev. Bishop Gwynn, C.M.G., D.D., Deputy Chaplain-General, the morning Parade Service was taken by the Rev. H. W. Blackburn, M.C., M.A., Assistant Chaplain-General, 1st Army, who remained to spend the day with the Regiment.

May 14th–16th.—During these days training was continued as last week. The following were trained as instructors in bombing at a Brigade bombing-class: Lieut. Booth, 2nd Lieuts. Atkins, Fuller, Crewe, and 8 N.C.O.'s.

A series of Regimental photographs was taken by permission of the Brigadier-General, and on the afternoon of the 16th some very successful sports were held, in spite of the inclement weather.

May 17th.—The Regiment marched by the Chausses Brunhaut to Bray, and were accommodated in huts and bivouacs, in not quite the same area as we occupied in April.

May 18th.—Marched to a camp about Les Quatre Vents, between Arras and Roclincourt, and relieved the 2nd S. Staffords (6th Brigade).

May 18th–23rd.—The Regiment found working and road-mending parties—about 200 men per 24 hours.

2nd Lieut. W. H. Seale, on appointment to a permanent commission, joined for duty.

May 24th.—The 5th Infantry Brigade relieved the 15th in the Left Brigade Section of the 2nd Divisional Front.

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The Regiment took over from the 16th (Service) Battalion R. Warwicks the position of Support Battalion in the Red (or Corps) Line, in front (east) of Willerval.

May 28th.—Relieved the 2nd H.L.I. in L. 3 Sub-section (Right Battalion of Left Brigade). Two companies (D on right and C on left) in the front line, in front of Arleux; A and B, with Regimental H.Q., in Arleux Loop.

May 31st.—After three quiet and uneventful days the Regiment was relieved by the 2nd H.L.I. after dark, and returned to the position of support (Willerval).

June 1st.—Completed the move at about 1 a.m.
Casualties.—2 men wounded.

June 3rd/4th.—The Regiment was relieved by the 1st King's Liverpools, and took over the camp at Roclincourt, vacated by that Regiment.
Casualties.—1 man wounded on the 2nd; 4 men killed on the 3rd.

June 4th/5th.—A working party of 200 men found for the forward area from C and D Companies. Several bombs dropped near the camp.

June 5th/6th.—The Regiment moved to the Support Position of the Right Brigade (99th). H.Q. at the Railway Tunnel, and the companies disposed from right to left: A in the Railway Embankment just south of Tunnel; B astride the Arleux—Sugar Factory—Tunnel Road (H.Q. in old Brigade Battle H.Q. in Sunken Road); C and D thence to south end of Long Wood. Working parties (200 men per night) were furnished.

June 7th.—The 82nd reinforcement (36 R. and F.) arrived.
Casualty.—1 man wounded.

June 8th/9th.—The Regiment was relieved by the 2nd H.L.I. and moved to Ecurie Wood Camp.

June 9th.—2nd Lieut. F. C. L. A. Lowndes, M.C., rejoined for duty and was posted to A Company.

June 10th.—Two companies on various working parties within the Corps area. 2nd Lieut. W. A. R. Ames joined for duty and was posted to B Company.

June 11th.—At Ecurie Wood Camp. Lewis-gun and Bombing Classes, under Lieut. Horley and 2nd Lieut. Vernon, began.

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June 12th.—The 2nd Division Horse Show took place to-day.

In a cross-country race (3–4 miles) the Regimental team (representing the 5th Brigade) ran second to the R.E. Sergeant Constable (52nd) was first man home.

June 13th.—Working parties, and training yesterday and to-day.

June 14th.—Training, but no working parties. A and C Companies held their Company Sports.

At 8.30 p.m. the Regiment moved to camp east of Roclincourt, vacated by the 1st East Surrey (5th Division), as one of the 6 battalions detailed for work in the forward area, found by the Division out of the line. A great deal of work was necessary in the camp, and this was very ably executed by the Regimental Sapping Platoon.

June 15th–19th.—Roclincourt Camp. During this period the Regiment was employed on working parties, chiefly round Willerval North Strong Point and in Tommy Trench, at the rate of 200 men per night, except on the night of the 19th/20th, when 400 men were taken. On that night the Regiment was relieved by the 10th R. Dublin Fusiliers, and moved to huts and billets in Mt. St. Eloi.

June 20th.—XIIIth Corps Horse Show.

June 21st.—By motor-bus and lorry to Bethune, where the Regiment was billeted in the École de Jeunes Filles.

June 22nd.—The Regiment relieved the 2/4th E. Lancashire (T.F.), of the 198th Brigade, 66th Division, in the "Canal Right" Sub-sector of the Divisional front. The 23rd R.F. (99th Brigade) was on the right (i.e., in Cambrin Left Sub-sector), and the 2nd H.L.I. was on the left (i.e., in the Canal Centre Sub-sector). The Regimental Front extended from the Vermelles—La Bassée road (Boyau 15, or Burbure Alley) on the right to the Bethune—La Bassée road, exclusive, on the left. This front was taken over by two companies—B on the right, C on the left, while D was in immediate support on the line Kingsway (late Kinsbury) Trench to Tower Reserve Trench, and A Company in support in the Village Line, between its junctions with Maison Rouge Alley and Wilson's Way. The feature of the area was the existence of four long tunnels, viz., Wilson's, Robertson's, Lane (not taken over or held), and Mill Tunnel, which went under the Mill (erroneously described as "Tower"), just south of the Bethune—La Bassée road.

A regular system of reliefs and interchange of companies was instituted, by which each company spent 2 out of every 8 days in

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support in the Village Line, being able to get baths in Annequin. In this way every man had a bath and was re-underclothed once in 8 days.

June 25th.—Captain G. Field, M.C., rejoined for duty and was posted to the command of B Company.

Casualties.—5 men wounded on the 24th; 1 man wounded on the 27th; 1 man wounded (died of his wounds) on the 28th.

IN THE FIELD FROM AUGUST 1914 to MAY 1917.
Pair of H.-D. horses—"Fanny" and "Polly"—with their driver, 8267 Pte. Weaving.

June 30th.—The Regiment still in the same position.

During the month of June the following officers were struck off the strength: 2nd Lieut. H. A. Beaver; 2nd Lieut. (temp. Captain) M. G. Fielding, M.C., "unfit for any duty for one month" (Medical Board in England, 11th June).

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OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE 2ND BATTALION BETWEEN THE 1ST JULY 1916 AND THE 30TH JUNE 1917.

I.

ON THE STRENGTH OF THE BATTALION, 1ST JULY 1916.

[1]Lieut.-Colonel A. J. F. EDEN, D.S.O., at H.Q. 4th Army, in temp. command of the 24th Infantry Brigade, from 8th August 1916.

[1]Major R. B. CROSSE, D.S.O., Second in Command; appointed to command the Battalion (temp. Lieut.-Colonel), 8th July 1916; awarded Croix de Chevalier, Légion d'Honneur (France), February 1917.

[1]Captain R. M. OWEN, attached G.S. IVth Corps H.Q.; rejoined the Battalion, 18th July 1916; Second in Command (temp. Major); *died of wounds* received on the 2nd August 1916.

[1]Captain G. FIELD, awarded Military Cross; B Company Commander; to hospital, injured, 8th October 1916; rejoined, 25th June 1917; B Company Commander (acting Captain).

Captain J. H. BOARDMAN, C Company Commander; to hospital, 28th July 1916.

Captain K. W. MACKENZIE, M.C. (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer; to 2nd Divisional H.Q., as D.A.D.M.S., 27th October 1916.

Captain L. J. GOODWIN (3rd Battalion), *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. N. W. HILL, joined the Battalion, 5th June 1916; A Company; A Company Commander; *wounded*, 13th November 1916, but remained at duty; awarded the Military Cross, 1st January 1917; *killed*, 17th January 1917.

Lieut. R. B. KITE, awarded Military Cross; D Company Commander; *wounded*, 13th November, and *died of his wounds*, 10th December 1916.

[1] Went to France with the original Expeditionary Force, 1914.

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Lieut. W. J. LITTLEDALE, C Company Commander (temp. Captain); *wounded*, 13th November 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. K. PEPLOE, duty at the Base; rejoined Battalion, 23rd August 1916, D Company; transferred to B Company, 4th October 1916; promoted Lieutenant, 30th July 1916; B Company Commander (temp. Captain), 10th October 1916; *killed*, 9th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. C. R. HORLEY, Lewis-gun Officer; invalided to England, 9th November 1916; rejoined, 5th March 1917.

Captain H. W. H. RAWSON (3rd Battalion), commanding Sapping Platoon; *killed*, 15th November 1916.

[1]Lieut. A. E. WARNOCK, Quartermaster.

2nd Lieut. C. H. B. SLOCOCK (3rd Battalion); in command of B Company; *wounded*, September 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. C. G. STEPHENS, Machine-gun Officer.

2nd Lieut. T. G. C. CAULFIELD-STOKER, joined the Battalion, 12th June 1916; C Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. T. TYRWHITT-DRAKE, awarded Military Cross, 1st January 1917; Grenade Officer.

Captain J. B. HARDCASTLE, temporary Captain since March 1916; *killed*, 30th July 1916.

Lieut. E. H. WHITFELD, M.C., Adjutant; promoted Captain, 1st January 1917.

Lieut. J. W. G. WYLD, awarded Military Cross, 1st January 1917; G.S.O. 3, 4th November 1916; Captain, 1st January 1917; Dispatches, May 1917.

2nd Lieut. P. A. BOBBY, Grenade Officer, *accidentally wounded*, 28th July 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. R. M. BARNES (9th Battalion), B Company; to General List, New Armies, 22nd June 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. J. ELLAM, *wounded*, August 1916; to England.

[1] Went to France with the original Expeditionary Force, 1914.

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2nd Lieut. T. A. IONIDES (3rd Battalion), D Company; *died* on the 16th *of wounds* received on the 13th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. J. B. MURRAY, to England sick (shell-shock), 29th September 1916.

2nd Lieut. W. L. CHOWN (attached from 3rd Dorsets), *killed*, 30th July 1916.

2nd Lieut. R. H. L. MAUL, *killed*, 30th July 1916.

2nd Lieut. N. S. HARRISON (9th Battalion), acting Grenade Officer, July 1916; *killed*, 30th July 1916.

2nd Lieut. W. I. B. WARE, D Company; *wounded*, 1st August 1916; subsequently 4th Class Agent, Intelligence Corps.

2nd Lieut. B. C. C. WARDE (3rd Battalion), A Company; *missing believed killed*, 30th July 1916.

2nd Lieut. M. F. M. PARKES, awarded Military Cross; to Army Signal Service.

2nd Lieut. J. D. C. HOLLAND, D Company; *wounded and missing, presumed killed*, 13th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. R. G. PLUCKROSE, B Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England; to 6th Battalion.

2nd Lieut. J. E. V. RATHBONE (attached from 3rd Dorsets); *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England.

Lieut. F. W. C. CHIPPINDALE (Spec. Res.), B Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England; rejoined, 30th March 1917; D Company.

Lieut. P. L. C. WEBSTER (3rd Battalion), C Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916; to England.

Lieut. J. D. BELGRAVE, to Royal Flying Corps.

2nd Lieut. W. R. GOFFE, D Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916.

2nd Lieut. R. E. A. WEBSTER, C Company; *wounded*, 29th November 1916.

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II.

JOINED OR REJOINED BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

2nd Lieut. A. S. HOLIDAY, joined, 25th August 1916; A Company.

2nd Lieut. H. DAVIES, joined, 25th August 1916; C Company; *missing, believed killed*, 13th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. V. E. FANNING, joined, 26th August 1916; B Company; in command of it, 9th November; *killed*, 14th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. E. H. VIGARS, D.C.M., rejoined on 27th August 1916; D Company; to duty at the Base.

[1]Major C. S. BAINES, D.S.O., rejoined from 2/6th Warwickshire, 29th August 1916; and became Senior Major (Second in Command) of the 52nd.

2nd Lieut. F. S. PARSONS, joined on 30th August 1916; A Company; to Machine-gun Corps, 3rd January 1917.

2nd Lieut. C. W. FITT, joined, 30th August 1916; C Company; transferred to Machine-gun Corps, 6th October 1916; *killed*, May 1917.

2nd Lieut. M. G. FIELDING, A Company; *wounded*, 30th July 1916; rejoined, 31st August 1916; awarded the Military Cross, 1st January 1917; temp. Captain; invalided, 11th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. R. A. CRESWELL (9th Battalion), joined from R.F.C., 2nd September 1916; D Company; *missing*, 13th November 1916.

[1]Captain R. J. BRETT, rejoined and appointed Transport Officer, 20th September 1916; C Company Commander, 14th December 1916; to Senior Officers' Course, Aldershot, January 1917; Second in Command 17th R. Fusiliers, 30th March 1917.

Lieut. D. T. BARNES, rejoined, 20th September 1916; D Company; D Company Commander (acting Captain), 27th January 1917; awarded D.S.O.

[1] Went to France with the original Expeditionary Force, 1914.

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Lieut. J. B. SLADE-BAKER, joined, 20th September 1916; D Company; attached to H.Q. 2nd Division; rejoined, 26th November 1916; to command of D Company same date; attached 6th Infantry Brigade H.Q., 3rd to 21st December 1916; appointed Regimental Transport Officer, 14th December 1916.

2nd Lieut. O. H. M. STURGES, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; B Company; *wounded*, 13th November 1916; to England.

2nd Lieut. P. BOOTH, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; C Company; attached to H.Q. 5th Infantry Brigade, 1917.

2nd Lieut. L. W. GILES, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; B Company; B Company Commander (acting Captain), April 1917.

2nd Lieut. F. C. L. A. LOWNDES, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; A Company; *wounded*, 13th November 1916; to England; awarded the Military Cross, 1st January 1917; rejoined, 9th June 1917.

2nd Lieut. P. H. R. WHITEHEAD, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; A Company; *wounded*, 28th April 1917; to England.

2nd Lieut. H. A. VERNON, joined (from the R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 20th September 1916; C Company; *wounded*, 13th November 1916; to England; rejoined, 6th May 1917; A Company.

2nd Lieut. G. S. LA W. LYLE, joined, 23rd September 1916; D Company; in temporary command of it, 3rd December 1916; *died of wounds* received on 28th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. R. BLACKWELL, joined, 4th October 1916; D Company; to temporary command of C Company, 26th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. A. O. W. WEBSTER-JONES (3rd Battalion), joined, 19th October 1916; A Company; *killed*, 13th November 1916.

Captain D. S. CASSIDY (R.A.M.C.), relieved Captain K. W. Mackenzie, M.C., as Medical Officer, 27th October 1916.

Captain J. MCTURK (R.A.M.C.), relieved Captain Cassidy, as Medical Officer, 29th October 1916.

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2nd Lieuts. H. E. MANN, J. J. G. CLARKE, J. H. PIPERNO, A. G. W. KINDELL, G. D. RYDINGS, W. G. BACON, E. S. FOLD were attached to the Battalion from the T.F. for a few weeks from November 1916.

2nd Lieut. J. E. ELLIS (attached from T.F.), joined, 27th November 1916; B Company; invalided to England and struck off strength, 7th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. T. A. COFFIN (attached from T.F.), joined, 29th November 1916; B Company; Sapping Platoon Officer, January 1917; and afterwards Gas Officer.

2nd Lieut J. N. CHAPPLE (attached from T.F.), joined, 29th November 1916; D Company; attached to 5th T.M. Battery, January 1917; struck off strength on transfer to 5th T.M. Battery, 17th April 1917; *wounded*, May 1917.

Lieut. C. T. CHEVALLIER (3rd Battalion), rejoined, 12th December 1916; Lewis-gun Officer until 5th March 1917; then Intelligence Officer.

2nd Lieut. C. E. COPE, joined, 25th December 1916; A Company.

2nd Lieut. J. D. GROVER, joined, 28th December 1916; D Company; Signalling Officer; to 2nd Signal Company R.E.

2nd Lieut. R. C. WARREN (reposted from 6th Battalion), joined, 1st January 1917; A Company.

2nd Lieut. L. S. DOWSON, C Company; to Central Training Establishment, January 1917; *wounded*, 28th April 1917; to England.

Lieut. H. W. SPURGE (3rd Battalion), B Company; B Company Commander, 3rd January 1917; to 5th Battalion, 11th May 1917. *See* that Battalion.

2nd Lieut. J. E. NEVILLE, B Company; joined, January 1917.

Lieut. M. S. GRIFFITH-WILLIAMS (3rd Battalion), joined from 6th Battalion, 1st January 1917; C Company; C Company Commander (acting Captain), 17th January 1917.

2nd Lieuts. J. D. M. STRAITH, E. H. TAYLOR, D. E. HAYMEN were attached to the Battalion from the T.F. from the 18th January 1917 until April 1917, when they were invalided to England, 2nd Lieut. Haymen suffering from shock.

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2nd Lieut. F. T. GASS (T.F.), who was attached for the same period as the above, was transferred to the Indian Army.

2nd Lieut. C. E. BARNES (T.F.), joined, 18th January 1917; C Company.

Lieut. T. W. C. FORESHEW (3rd Battalion), joined, 7th February 1917; C Company; acting Captain.

2nd Lieut. H. A. BEAVER, joined, 7th February 1917; D Company; invalided to England and struck off the strength, June 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. MILES, joined, 7th February 1917; B Company.

2nd Lieut. G. C. CALLOWAY, joined, 7th February 1917; A Company; *killed*, 27th/28th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. S. EAGLE, joined, 19th February 1917; B Company; *wounded*, 28th April 1917, but rejoined three days later; acting Transport Officer; subsequently D Company.

2nd Lieut. L. BARTLETT, joined, 19th February 1917; C Company.

2nd Lieut. H. A. SMITH, joined, 24th February 1917; A Company; *wounded*, 28th April 1917; to England.

2nd Lieuts. S. A. E. MILES, M. A. SIMON, H. O. M. HERBERT, A. E. HENLEY, H. W. D. PALMER, all of the R. Berkshire, were attached to the Battalion for a period from the 24th February 1917.

2nd Lieut. R. G. WILSDON, rejoined, 30th March 1917; B Company

Lieut. F. SOUTHAM, rejoined, 30th March 1917; C Company; *wounded* (shock) and invalided to England, 22nd April 1917.

2nd Lieut. L. E. W. O. FULLBROOK-LEGGATT (3rd Battalion), rejoined, 30th March 1917; A Company; *wounded*, April 1917; to England; rejoined, 3rd May 1917; A Company Commander (acting Captain).

2nd Lieut. R. W. G. CRESWELL, joined, 1st April 1917; B Company; invalided to England, 16th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. G. H. FULLER, joined, 1st April 1917; C Company.

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2nd Lieut. A. E. WALTER, joined, 1st April 1917; D Company; *wounded*, 28th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. B. J. CREWE, joined (on first appointment), 3rd April 1917; C Company.

2nd Lieut. W. H. SEALE, joined (on first appointment to a permanent commission), 20th May 1917; C Company.

2nd Lieut. W. A. R. AMES, joined (from R.M.C., Sandhurst, through 3rd Battalion), 10th June 1917; B Company.

QUARTERMASTER'S STAFF, 2ND BATTALION.
MAY 1917.

Hon. Lt. and Qr.-Mr. A. Warnock; 5016 Q.-M.-S. F. Barnes, M.C.; 3760 Sergeant W. G. Ward; 5056 Pte. Walker; 5072 Pte. Jones. Each in possession of Indian Frontier and Long Service and Good Conduct Medals.

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CAPTAIN GODSAL'S ESCAPE FROM GERMANY.

It will be remembered that mention was made in an earlier volume of the CHRONICLE of the capture of Captain Godsal and Lieut. Button, when in a French hospital, during the retreat from Mons. After upwards of two and a half years in captivity, Captain Godsal succeeded in effecting his escape. He gives the following account of his experiences:—

I was taken prisoner on the 26th August 1914 in a French hospital at Avesnes, having been hurt in the leg by a bit of Berlaimont railway bridge when it was blown up by the French early that morning. I spent a week at Avesnes, and was taken from there to a hospital at a Catholic Home at Kaiserwerte, close to Düsseldorf, where I was for three weeks. I was very lucky to get into this place, as I was pretty well done there—a great contrast to some of the places that other officers got into. From there, after spending one night in Düsseldorf Military Hospital, I was sent to Halle, where I spent two nights. It was an abominable place, and always one of the worst camps in Germany. Like most prison camps, it was run on a very "intensive" system. There I found some 32 other British officers and several hundred French and Russians. I am glad I only had two days of the place.

Sixteen of us were now sent to Torgau-on-the-Elbe, which was the camp for all (or nearly all) the English at that time, and these numbered about 230, of whom some 30 belonged to the R.A.M.C. Here I remained for nearly two months, from 1st or 2nd October to 25th November 1914, when I was sent, with half the English, to Burg, the rest following a day or two later. This was another abominable camp, very restricted as regards accommodation in every respect, and most insanitary. We spent six months there, and then it was closed for alterations, and we were sent to Mainz, which we thought a great improvement, as no doubt it was; but one does not get any fonder of a prison camp as the time increases. We were there for almost exactly a year, when we were moved to Friedberg, in Hesse, not any great distance away—close to Bad Nauheim.

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I was at Friedberg for nine months—up to 20th March 1917—and it is from there that this story begins. I must, however, go back a day or two in order to explain how it came about that we got our chance of escape.

Friday, 16th March, 1917.—We received orders suddenly, at about 11.30 a.m., to the effect that all British officers were to be ready to move to another camp at once. No other details were given. The orders appeared to be a complete surprise, even to the German officers in the camp.

There were about 130 British officers at Friedberg, and a day or two later we got instructions that we would go in two parties, about 80 in the one party, and 40 in the other. The smaller party was composed of Irish officers and officers of Irish regiments, whether Irish or not (no exchanging allowed), also all the merchant skippers, and two or three other officers specially named, as well as several of the very youngest officers. These went to Augustabad. Later, a third batch of seven were picked out of this lot to go elsewhere. Tuesday was given as the day of departure of the 80 party, and Thursday for the others.

A large number of officers started making preparations for escape should opportunity offer, maps were copied, and suitable kits packed. Our party (the 80 lot) eventually paraded on Tuesday evening, 20th March, and marched to the station. We were very pleased and surprised to find a guard of only 15 men provided for us, under a very young officer, who could not speak a word of English. It seemed rather hard to give him the job of looking after 80 of us, all strange to him, on a night journey, with such a small guard. I don't think that the officers from the camp would have liked to take it on.

The Germans do not give out the destination before the move, as they evidently think it would be giving a chance of making preparations for escape. However, the guard had brought a party of Belgian officers, and had waited in the town with them all day so that we should not meet them. They had, therefore, been on duty for a very long time, and it was from them and from the labels on one of the Belgian boxes, which had been brought up to the camp, that we found out that our destination was to be Clausthal.

At the station we were very much amused to find that the Germans were quite alive to a possible chance of escape, as they called out the names of all reputed escapers and suspects, and put

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them in a special coach under a special guard. The rest of us were put in the ordinary third-class coaches, which had four compartments to the half coach, with a lavatory in the centre of the coach. The four compartments opened direct into the corridor, and did not have doors, as ours do. Also the backs between the compartments were not right up to the roof, as in ours, but a man could see over into the next compartment if he just raised himself from his seat.

I was in the second compartment from the front of the coach, and there were five British officers and one German soldier in each compartment, except in the one in front of mine, which had no soldier, as the guard appeared to be one short, so the man in my compartment had to look over and see that all was right in the other compartment. This he did several times (counting the prisoners) while he was awake. We soon got on good terms with him, which was always a sound thing to do. He was an Alpine Jäger, and he said he had been nearly 30 hours on his feet. His history consisted in a short time on or just behind the West Front, after which he had been sent to the Red Tower Pass in Rumania, where he had been for about six weeks, having had a pretty rough time, and eventually invalided home. He was quite a young man.

The train left Friedberg at about 9 p.m. After we had gone some way the man got very drowsy, and went sound asleep. He was in the seat next the window facing the engine on the left of the train, and I was in the seat opposite to him, with my kit in the rack over his head. The train stopped at every station, as all trains do in Germany now, I believe, and we had several stations with only one platform and but little light.

Between 11.30 p.m. and midnight Campbell (of the Suffolks) came to me, and, in a whisper, asked if I would make an attempt with him from the window of the next compartment. His original plan had been to try with another officer, but he now was among the suspected and in the special coach. I, too, had been going to try with another officer, so I said that he must come with us.

I got down my kit (packed in a rucksack, a potato sack, and in coat-straps) from over the soldier's head, and, sitting in front of him, I packed all I wanted in the rucksack. I next changed my best coat for an old one, on which I had prepared the badges of rank so that they would pull off at once, and handed it round into the next compartment. I then went along to the lavatory to see if my absence was noticed, and came back to the *front* compartment, another officer from there moving in and taking my place, so that

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the number should be all right. The third man did the same. All the guards in the three compartments were asleep.

We then arranged ourselves near the window, and each had another man to hand out his kit. After we were ready, the first one or two stations were unsuitable, but the third was ideal—only one bright light on the right, and no platform on the left. Campbell got out through the window, and his helper handed him out his kit; he then walked back along the line close to the train for about five yards, where he laid down close up to the train, so as not to go out into the light coming from the windows. I then got out as well, had my kit handed to me, and also laid down. Unfortunately, as I was getting off the footboard, the train began to move, and the third man did not get a chance.

I very nearly had trouble, as, in my hurry to get off, I did not notice a small iron fence between the two tracks, and nearly got astride it. Luckily I got back all right, or might have been hurt.

We laid still, watching the train passing out of sight, and then, seeing no one on the station, got up together, ran up the bank opposite, and laid down behind a bush to arrange our things. Unfortunately, we found that we had lost something. I had dropped my service water-bottle, and Campbell his blanket. He walked back a bit to look for them, but could not see anything of them, and did not like to go back on to the line again. (I heard afterwards that the water-bottle fell in the compartment, and the third man, who picked it up, afterwards gave it to another officer, who escaped into Bulgaria after she had given in. It was very badly dented by the explosion of 26th August 1914.) Probably the blanket dropped in the carriage, as otherwise it would have shown where we left the train.

My kit was as follows: *Clothes.*—An old uniform jacket and a pair of new and thin trousers. A pair of long and very thin drawers, a service-dress shirt and two woollies, my service-cap, a pair of boots, three pairs of socks, and a very thick pair of woollen gloves. Also, wrapped round a long loaf of German bread, a very good brown blanket, which, after the first night, I wore like a cape. I also had a housewife, with needles and thread, and black buttons to sew on my jacket. *Food.*—I had, besides the loaf (about 3½ lb., and a normal ration for one officer for a week), a one-pound tin of spiced beef, and a fine piece of very fat bacon of about four or possibly five pounds weight, a small tin of Osborne biscuits, a ½-lb. tin of cocoa, some three or four dozen Oxo tablets, a tin plate for

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use as a frying-pan, and some almonds and raisins (only a small packet), four boxes of matches, and a small compass, which I managed to hold on to when I was captured, but which was not luminous.

Campbell carried : A rubber hot-water bottle for keeping water in during the day, a tin pot (about a quart) for drinking from and for cooking purposes, some four dozen Oxo tablets, a quantity of the large square "Campaign" biscuits (about sixty I think), several slabs of chocolate, and some Horlick's Malted Milk tablets, two tins of spiritine, and several boxes of matches, some of which were done up in waterproof material. For clothes he was much better off than I was. He had over his uniform a mufti coat and trousers, also a cap (which, however, he lost in the hay the first night), a Balaclava cap, a vest and woolly, with spare vest, drawers, shirt, etc., in his rucksack. He had a very good French compass with a splendid luminous point, by which he laid our course all the time.

As regards maps : As we did not know in which direction we were going before we started, I had made tracings of a very small-scale railway map, roughly 150 miles into Germany from the Dutch as well as from the Swiss frontier. Luckily I had marked Cassel on it, but it was about the limit in that direction. Also only the last night I had managed to get a small piece of map, about 4 miles to the inch, showing from Münster to the frontier near Wynterswyck, which had been sent out by one of the three men who had escaped that way before us. I also had a bit of map of the only piece of Switzerland north of the Rhine, in case we went south.

Campbell had nothing starting earlier than about half-way from the Ham-Paderborn district. This was an enlargement from a small-scale map, giving a route up to the frontier, and a short space each side of it. This was what we used chiefly till we got into the bit near the frontier. As we came up on to this bit from the south, we did not get on to it till we were close to the frontier.

First night (*March* 20–21).—After getting on our rucksacks, etc., we started off at right angles to the railway line. We do not know what the name of the station was for certain, but we know that we were near Cassel, and the distance to the frontier would be about 140 miles as the crow flies. The time was as near as possible midnight.

We soon got on to a road which we followed for some time, going roughly north-west (probably too much north), and uphill all the time. Eventually, coming over the top of a hill, we found the

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lights of a large town in front of us. I think that it possibly may have been Cassel, in which case we must have been going pretty well due north. We turned off to our left through the woods, and for the rest of the night we walked across country and through woods. Deep snow lay everywhere, rather soft and damp, and most of the country was hilly and wild On one occasion we passed a light railway (single) running up to some quarries; otherwise we saw very little till we came out to a village. It was then about 4 a.m., so we were looking out for somewhere to sleep. We were pretty wet about the feet, though warm enough from walking, but rather anxious about our tracks in the snow.

In the village we could not find any place where we could spend the day, so we started out again on the other side, and a very few hundred yards out we found a very suitable small barn. We managed to break open the door, and, after filling the water-bottle, got in. One end was full of hay, and the other had two traps in it. We climbed up on to the hay with the light of matches, and, after hanging up our boots and socks to dry and starting on the tin of spiced beef, we buried ourselves down as comfortably as possible.

Soon after we had got in, our anxiety as to our tracks was a good deal relieved, as a regular blizzard got up and continued all the morning, after which it started to freeze very hard. During the day quite a number of people passed our barn, and several children on their way from school, but no one came in or near it. Through a chink we could watch the people going along the road, but could not see anything of the country. The contents of our water-bottle froze hard, so that we could not drink anything at all. Our socks and boots, too, were as hard as boards, and took a lot of blowing on before we could get into them again in the evening, but we managed it. Then we had a meal off the spiced beef, and put the rest of it, also frozen hard, in our pockets.

March 21–22.—It was a very nice night for walking at first. The whole country was frozen hard, and the roads covered with white frost, and very slippery in consequence. We started at about 8 p.m., and for some three hours got along very well, keeping on roads all the time, except for having to walk round one village which we came to very soon, perhaps inside two miles after we started. After this we got into large woods, very deep in snow, which had drifted in the rides and was soft. Very hard walking, and very wet. Woods are a great trouble when you have no map to

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show how large they may be. You do not know whether you are walking down a long strip or going the shortest way to get out of them. The only thing is to go straight on by the compass and hope for the best.

Some hours later we tried to make a fire so as to get something hot to drink. It was useless trying to get sticks, so used one of the spiritine blocks, and made a pot full of Oxo. This was the only time we used Oxo, as it was too salt, and afterwards we always used cocoa, which was splendid, and just lasted us out to the end of our journey.

After finishing our drink we walked back again to the ride from which we had turned off, when I found that I had forgotten my gloves. I went back to get them, and when I returned to Campbell I found him just picking himself up off the ground. He told me that he must have fainted. We waited a bit, and then went on again, but he was feeling very unwell, and we had to keep stopping for rest. The wood seemed interminable, and we thought that we should have to spend the day in it. We very nearly did so, but, luckily, when we had almost given up hope of getting out during the night, we found ourselves on the edge of a clearing, and came upon some cart-tracks. We followed them a short distance and found some buildings. In the poor light I kept seeing buildings in all directions, and in a good many places where there were none. However, we went up to a group, round a farmhouse, and tried everywhere to get in, but without success. A bit farther on, however, we found that there were more buildings, and that we were on the outskirts of a village.

The village consisted of a group of farmhouses, having the farm buildings all mixed up with them, as in most of the villages about that part. We walked through, looking for a place to spend the day, and at the very far side we found a large barn—the last building in the village—the door of which did not fit very well at the bottom, and, by lying flat, we managed to crawl under it.

This barn, like so many others we saw, was a magnificent old building, much bigger than anything I have ever seen in England, and one end of it was full to the top with rye-straw. Campbell, who was feeling very cold and very unwell, fell down off the first story, some twelve feet or more, but very luckily did not hurt himself, and got up again all right. We had two other stories at least to go up, which I explored with the help of matches, and at last we both reached the top.

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Campbell was still very unwell and cold, but when he had got well into the straw and taken his wet boots and things off his feet he began to feel a bit better. It had been a very trying night, much the worst that we had all through, but we were not disturbed in any way during the day, and had a good rest. We said to ourselves that the second day was sure to be the hardest. After being shut up for so long we were bound to feel a bit tired at the end of the first day.

March 22–23.—We both felt much refreshed by the day's rest. Campbell made a wonderful recovery, and walked as if he had had nothing the matter with him the day before. We had a large détour to make a start with, as there was a deep valley in our way. In fact, on the previous night we had gone almost completely in the wrong direction in order to get free from the wood and down to our shelter for the day.

After going out of our way for some three or more miles we got across, or, rather, round the valley, over a boggy moor; then we hit off a decent track and were soon on roads again going in the right direction. We did a really good night's work. We found a very handy modern barn alongside a stream, and, after picking the lock with a tin-opener, cooked our bacon and cocoa over a fire of straw in a large pig-tub in the middle of it. We had a splendid meal. After this we had to leave the road and go through some very rough woods for a short distance, when we reached a small river which we crossed at a mill. We then kept along the river for some way till we eventually came on to a main road. Having eaten some chocolate and biscuits and had a drink, we went on along the road, which led in about the right direction. Within ten minutes we found a signpost—the first we had seen—and it told us that we were going in the direction of Arolsen. This was splendid news, as Arolsen was the only town marked on my map for about sixty miles, and so it was a tremendous help being told that it was only some four or six kilomètres in front of us.

Signposts were very scarce at all times, and I don't think those we saw on the whole journey would come to double figures, and some of them were of no use to us. They were always rather a job to read by the light of a match, and many a time we longed for a flash-lamp.

We walked nearly into Arolsen before we decided to go right round it. We did not know what its size was, but it had lights which proclaimed it to be a fair-sized town. We kept round the

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west side of it, over very heavy ground covered in snow. We passed some gasworks with a very bright light, and eventually came out into a large double avenue which we followed. The road passed a large, probably private house, and then, getting into a somewhat unused state, it brought us to the railway. After crossing this we went over a bit of waste ground and then reached a wood, which had many paths and a summer-house, etc., in it, evidently a kind of pleasure-park for the people of Arolsen.

Keeping along the bottom of the wood, to the left as we walked, and finally into it, we reached what was apparently the continuation of the road that had brought us to Arolsen. The time was now getting on, and we hoped to be able to find a place to sleep in before long, especially as Campbell had been bad the previous day; but though we passed several villages, we could not find any suitable shelter. In one or two villages in particular we examined a lot of buildings in the hope of finding a good sleeping-place.

As we were unable to find what we wanted, we went on walking till daylight. Just before dawn we walked a long way across the frozen plough to where we thought we saw a farm, only to find that it was a small wood. However, as soon as it got light enough to see, we found a large modern barn close to the road. For a long time we could not get into it. One end was empty, but we could not get through the large doors, nor could we make any impression on the pitch-holes at the back, and the place was built of new brick and iron. At last we found that if one of us pulled the bottom of the door the other one could just squeeze through; but it proved a most uncomfortable lodging. The barn had been filled with rye-straw from the other side, and the butts of the sheaves had been laid nearly flush up against the door by which we had entered. There was a small buttress on each side of the door, and the straw was packed so tight that we could not get past the buttresses at all; while above our heads the sheaves also came close to the door, so that we could not stand upright. Still, we were grateful for any cover at all.

We spent a very uncomfortable day, having to lie one on the top of the other, or very nearly so, I with my head at the chink between the door and its hangings, and Campbell with his opposite the chink between the two doors. An absolutely icy draught came in through both, as it never thawed all day. We each tried to keep the other's feet warm under our arms and tried to sleep. We certainly deserved rather a better sleeping-place after such a long walk. We must

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have done nearly thirty miles—a very fine performance on Campbell's part after being bad the night before. We were not disturbed, which was a bit of luck, as we were within fifty yards of the road, and a dog would have found us very quickly if one had come along. We saw several people going to and from their work, including some very rough-looking women working on the land, evidently having done so all their lives, also several prisoners.

Towards the evening a German with a Russian prisoner brought a traction-engine and threshing-box, and put the latter in the other (i.e., the empty) end of the barn, and left the engine outside. We saw a chance of hot water for making cocoa when we started, but the German let all the water out before he left. That was about the end of a very uncomfortable day.

March 23–24.—This night we walked through what must have been very pretty country. We struck a village very soon after starting and walked round it, through the gardens, and eventually down what passed as a street at the bottom end of it. After that we followed the road for a long time, which wound about in the deep valleys, first one way and then another, till at last we came to a signboard which showed that we had a town called Marsburg in front of us. We did not follow the road direct to this place, but a side road to Ober-Marsburg. This was rightly called Ober-Marsburg, for it is a village built on the top of a very steep hill right above Marsburg itself. We went through the top half of the village, only passing one man in it, and turned down to our left along a footpath which brought us out on to the top of Marsburg.

We then found that Marsburg was a long, straggling town, with a river running the whole length of it. We first went to our right and then struck what was evidently the main road that we had left, and which had led round the hill that we had come over. It would almost certainly cross the river in the middle of the town. That was not good enough, so we turned back to out left to see if we could cross the river farther in that direction. We walked along the river-bank for a bit, and then along the railway which ran roughly parallel with the river. One train passed us. We came eventually to a level crossing, and, guessing that there must be a bridge to our right, we turned off the line just before we got to the crossing, which had a house on it. We found a light bridge, which we crossed, and, passing through some brickworks, went up into the wooded hills on the other side of the valley. The whole of the country now seemed to be very wooded and thick. We

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went well up the hill and then collected sticks, made ourselves a fire, and cooked our nightly ration of bacon and cocoa, which we ate very comfortably.

After this we walked in woods for most of the rest of the night. For a long time we kept rising till we got into a lot of snow. It was rough walking, as the rides did not work in at all kindly for us till some time after we had passed the top, when we struck a timbering road and came down into a very nice valley. This side of the hill seemed to have caught the weather a good bit worse than the other, as there was snow for some way down, and the tracks were covered with ice and quite hard. The timbering track soon brought us to a fine main road, with woods again on our right, but a stream running through meadows on our left. We inspected several small cattle-sheds in these fields, but did not find anything to suit us. The time was getting on, and we were becoming anxious about our lodging, when we came to a straggling village, through which we walked without finding anything, until we reached almost the last house. Near this we found a cattle-feeding shed alongside the road, and into it we had to go, whether we liked it or not, as it was now pretty well broad daylight. The shed was quite a low place, with a rough loft above and a little hay scattered more or less evenly over it, perhaps about two feet in the deepest part. It had been evidently used for keeping cattle in during the winter, and the cattle doubtless had been sold off. The floor of the shed was rather below the level of the road, which must have been nearly flush with the loft, and there were two houses within a hundred yards, one by the side of the road, and the other behind the shed. It was a very nice comfortable place and we could see people walking along the road, close to us, during the day, but we very nearly had trouble. Somewhere about midday a dog, coming along the road, winded us and started barking savagely, evidently trying to draw attention to us. This went on for five or ten minutes while we lay quiet. However, he had no luck, and went off. People were too busy or too intent on minding their own business to bother about the cur. We put on our boots and mobilized our things in case of trouble. We hoped that this was the end of the brute, but again, about 2 or 3 p.m., and yet again in the evening between 6 and 7, he came back and had another good bark at us, but still no one paid him any attention.

We found in this loft a five-pronged fork, probably used as a hay-fork, and as Campbell wanted a stick, we cut the prongs off, and it

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made a beauty. It must have been nearly an inch and a half thick and very strong. After this he used to put it under the pot when we were boiling water for the cocoa, with the result that it got shortened down to about two and a half feet.

March 24–25.—We started off as soon as we dared, as we always were rather afraid that our friend the cur-dog might come back again, but we did not see any more of him. We found a signpost close to the end of the village, but it did not give us any useful information, so we went on along the main road, with the railway on our left. We passed through a large village, which seemed to have two or three parallel streets running the whole length of it. We took the right hand and not-much-used one, and soon afterwards crossed the valley at the end, when we followed the road which rose pretty sharply the other side.

We now found ourselves on a sort of high plateau, more or less bare, which we crossed for a long way till we came to a steep dingle which ran across our path. We went down one side and up the other, then sat down on the far side, outside the edge of a young Scotch fir plantation, to cook our grub. After this we went on again over rather more cultivated land until we came to a cross-road, soon afterwards getting into some sort of down-land, with woods all along the higher ground. Not knowing at all where I was, I said to Campbell that the country bore an extraordinary resemblance to the country round Paderborn, which I had noticed when I was moved from Düsseldorf to Halle in the train in 1914, and it actually turned out that we were very near Paderborn, which must have been a very few miles to our north-east.

The going for a long time was quite nice, short down-grass, till we found the lights of a town or station in front of us. Coming down near to the lights we found that we had a largish river before us, and a road to our left front that evidently crossed it by a bridge. However, as usual, we did not like to trust to a bridge so near a village, and thus, after reaching the river, we followed it along towards the bridge for a few hundred yards, and were delighted to find a small footbridge which crossed over to some works on the other side. This was a bit of luck, as the river must have been 40 or 50 yards across at that point.

We crossed the river,[1] and just beyond found the railway, under which we went by a culvert. The lines branched about here, the

[1] This river would appear to be the Alme, and the town Buren.—P. G.

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main line running straight across our path, while a branch line, coming out of the station in a more or less easterly direction, turned away northwards.

After we had crossed the line we discovered that the lights we had seen came from a factory which was busy working, and appeared to have a guard outside it, so we avoided it by crossing over some slag-heaps close to it, and then hit off the main road again on the other side. This road seemed to lead just right for us, and we got on well. We passed one signpost, by which we more or less located our position, though not with any certainty.

Perhaps some five or six miles beyond this we had rather a funny experience. We were, we believed, some miles from any town or village, and, with the exception of a few large farms, the country seemed very empty. At about 2 or 2.30 a.m. we met an old Landsturm man walking along, with a rifle and fixed bayonet slung on his shoulder. He said ,"Guten Abend," so we said the same. He then said something which I could not follow, but which sounded like something to do with beer, to which Campbell luckily used his only two words of German, "Ja wohl," which produced the reply, "Sehr wenige." As we did not stop we were by this time beginning to get away from him, and he said no more. We went on till well out of reach, and then turned quickly to the left at right angles to the road and put a good distance between us and it. The country was frozen very hard, so there was not much fear of being tracked. We kept on walking till daylight. First of all over frozen plough for a long way, and then we found a good number of woods which we kept pretty close to till daylight, when we lay down in a plantation of thick young spruce, close to the main road, which ran roughly at right angles to our direction. Though it was cold when we first settled down, this was much the pleasantest day we spent. The sun came out very bright and warm, and there was no wind.

After we had had our usual breakfast of some of Campbell's biscuits and chocolate, we decided that we must have something better in the way of hats. Campbell had lost his civilian cap the first day, and had only a Balaclava, and I only my service-cap, knocked out of shape as much as possible.

Campbell's rucksack was lined with shiny American cloth in order to keep it waterproof, so he decided to take this out and make use of it to cover caps. Then I took my cap and cut the band all the way round in the centre, keeping the peak and half the band for myself, and giving Campbell the top and the other half of the

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band. He covered the top with American cloth and added a peak, while I made a new top for my part, and covered the peak and band. We also went through our kit, and actually decided to leave a few of Campbell's biscuits behind here, as we thought we should not want them.

After this I lay down and had a real good sleep, the best that I had had at all, but I was aroused by Campbell shaking me and saying, "Get up and put on your boots," meaning, of course, that there was some danger. Almost at the same moment a shot was fired quite close to us, perhaps about 30 yards away, doubtless by one of the ubiquitous sportsmen looking for hares and roe-deer. However, he must have missed, as he went off whistling hard for a long time. It was just as well for us that his dog (like most German sporting dogs, and some others, too, for that matter) evidently could not resist a hare, and so luckily led him well from us again. We gathered up our goods and chattels and moved on into the next little thick plantation, but we never saw any more of the sportsman.

March 25–26.—Before we started off we noticed that there was a signpost two or three hundred yards to our left, so we went off to have a look at that before we went on. It told us the direction of a place marked on our map, which was useful information, but the place was not on our line.

We next did a long walk over very nice ploughs, which had quite thawed during the warm day, and had thawed dry. After that we got into a much lower and wetter grass country full of wet ditches. Through much of it it was very hard to find the way because of the water, but Campbell had the most extraordinary sight in the dark, and seemed to be always able to see anything, and I tried to keep my eye on the top of his head against the sky.

We crossed one very large and important line of railway, and then reached Lippstadt. This seemed to be quite a large town, with the River Lippe running through its centre and at right angles to our line of march. A railway crossed the river to the east or north-east side of the town, but we did not like the look of the very large bridge, fearing that it migh tbe guarded. We therefore determined to go through the town. We came to it from the right-hand side as we were going, entering at probably the north-east end, and following a large main road which ran parallel to the river, or nearly so.

When we got pretty well into the town we met quite a number of people hurrying home. A train arrived just before. The time

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was about midnight, and, of course, they were only thinking of how soon they could reach home. This was just as well, as we twice took the wrong turn to the right, thinking that it must lead to the bridge, but in each case found that it ended in nothing. If we had been the only people in the street we should have appeared very suspicious to any policeman (if there was such a being) on his beat, as we must have been two rather strange-looking objects, both with rucksacks on our backs, and I with a brown blanket round my shoulders like a cape, with my very ragged best Sunday uniform trousers underneath. Campbell looked more like a German tramp, if there are such things, as he had something which passed as plain clothes. I was rather too tall, so walked very much bent and with a limp.

However, we found ourselves at the bridge at last. A very large place, as it appeared to be combined with some mills which came almost under it in places, and which seemed to split the river up into channels, and so make the bridge all the longer. It looked like an old brick or stone bridge. We met no one on it except two loiterers, who stared hard and seemed to talk about us, but we passed on. Once over the other side the town soon ended, and we were out in the open country again, and on a very good high road. We followed it for a long way till we came to a canal. A light railway ran along the side of the road all the way. When we reached the canal, which was at four cross-roads, we turned half-left and across country, for the road we had been following had been taking us in a too northerly direction, and our proper line was rather west of north-west. For some distance we kept across country, mostly arable, with a few grass fields and some fences. We were to find a good many fences after this.

We cooked our bacon and cocoa under a hedge, as we thought we were some way from anywhere, and would not be disturbed; but, after starting on, we found a house not 200 yards from where we had made our fire. There were three houses in a row, about a hundred yards apart, evidently not built very long, as, besides their new appearance, their gardens were newly and roughly fenced in. We went through the bottom of these gardens, disturbing nothing but a small cur-dog in the first, who barked for some time, and then we managed with a bit of rough climbing through the fence to get into a lane.

We now came into quite a different kind of country. It was much too wet for arable, and had grass fields surrounded by dykes, with

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a great many poplars or willows alongside the road. The road developed into a very wet and rough track, with a deep ditch on each side, as I found out by trying it. Campbell seemed to be able to see everything, and I almost nothing. We were walking along the side of the road, and I was just behind his heels, when I took a pace too much to my right, not even being able to see that there was a ditch there, with the result that I found that I was in water up to just below my waist. My right arm was wet nearly to my shoulder, and the part of the blanket on that side was also wet through. This was rather a bad look-out. The time must have been about 2 a.m., and perhaps later, so that I should not have time to walk myself dry again. The only thing was to walk as long as we could in order to get my things dried as far as possible. The country was not good for drying, as it was wet all the time. There were a very few and scattered farmhouses and fir woods, otherwise nothing but wet meadows.

We had no other trouble, though we got hung up in barbed wire fences round farm buildings once or twice, but we were not able to find a barn for the day, and eventually had to lie up in a very unpleasant wood. It was a mere spinney on the side of a farm road. There was no bottom to it, and it was wet. Besides this, it started to rain and snow alternately, and continued pretty well all day. Very luckily for me Campbell was able to fit me out with his spare underclothing, and I spent the day in very little else. We moved during the day from one side of the wood to the other, where we found a slightly thicker cover overhead, but it did not make much difference, as the wet came through all day long. The country seemed very empty. I don't think that we heard more than one or two farm-carts pass all day, no other sign of life except one cock pheasant.

We must have made a great deal of ground during the preceding night, which was entirely due to Campbell's extraordinary eyesight. He could always see the road, however rough and dark it was, and I don't think I know anyone else who could have led at the pace that we went all the time. With another pilot we might have been two or three days longer over the whole journey.

March 26–27.—It was still raining when we started off in the evening, and so we were very pleased to be on the move again, as we could always keep warm when we were moving. We walked, too, over very heavy plough pretty well all night, terribly sticky, especially soon after we started.

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During the night the weather cleared up, and we got drier, but we did not succeed in making a fire. We had no spiritine left, so we had to dine off cold raw bacon. However, there are many worse things than that, and it was very fat and easy to eat. We were now rather uncertain of our whereabouts, as we had not seen a sign-post for a very long time, and had not passed any town that we could identify. There were several large towns at some distance from us, especially to the west, as we could see their lights in the sky. We had been keeping to the north of the River Lippe ever since we crossed it at Lippstadt, and must have seen the lights of Ham and other towns on the river.[1]

We were very lucky in our lodging for the day on this occasion, though it was late when we found it, about 5.30 a.m., and quite light. It was a most magnificent barn, standing right out in the middle of the fields by itself, and not a house in sight. We walked all round it and then found a small hole in the wall at one end. The barn was an immense height, and both of the end bays were more or less empty, except for some implements in the farther one, while the centre was filled to the roof with rye-straw, into which we climbed up and made ourselves very comfortable after our ten hours' walking.

March 27–28.—We cooked a hot meal in the barn, to make up for the one we had missed the night before. It made a good deal of difference, and we started off very much refreshed. Of course, as a rule, it would be quite impossible to cook so early, as there might be people about.

We had a really splendid night's walking, as, though we kept pretty well off the roads, we hit upon grass-tracks over a very rough sort of half-moor country which was nearly all grass, and rough at that, and very little plough. The night was quite without incident. We cooked our grub in a ditch by a gateway, because there happened to be water close to the spot. We were not at all particular about water. When we wanted a drink we rattled a stick in the ditch to see if there was water there, and if so, we drank it, without asking any questions, and we were never any the worse for it, unless, indeed, this was the cause of Campbell's trouble on the second night.

We again walked on till daylight, over ten hours in all, and then laid down in a small plantation of Scotch firs, close to what looked

[1] We think that we passed to the south of Beckum and Ahlen.—P. G.

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like some abandoned canal works. Apparently they were only temporarily abandoned, as there were huts and rails, etc., about. There was a sharp frost again this night, and my blanket and trousers, which were not yet dry, were frozen stiff. Our bivouac was not a very comfortable one, and there was little or no sun during the day. No one came close to us, though there was a party after roe-deer a short distance off. There were a great many roe-deer about here. We saw some as we reached the place, and quite a number came out to feed just before we started off in the evening.

The country now was quite different from that through which we had come during the earlier part of our journey. In place of villages we found only scattered farms, all of which had barking dogs, which made the finding of a hiding-place difficult. There were quite a number of fences, and grass took the place of the arable.

March 28–29.—We left this place early, about 7.15 p.m., as it was a nasty cold spot, and there did not seem to be many people about. We walked across country till we got to a largish village having a good-sized church with a spire, which we left on our right, and got on to a good road. We did not follow this, however, for long, but walked parallel with it, at some three or four hundred yards distance for some way, not wishing to take any risk. The country hereabouts was more cultivated and in better order and not bad walking.

This night we had an important question to settle. Where should we cross the Ems-Dortmund Canal ? This very large canal ran right across our path, also a river (the Stever) ran parallel with it at about the point that we were making for, and a light railway ran more or less parallel to both. We decided that we would not take the risk of crossing at Olfen, where the main road crossed it, but would try to the north. We thought that the chances were that the railway would cross the river, which was not likely to keep straight for long, and presently we hit off a lucky signpost showing us where Ludinghausen lay to the north of us.

As soon as we reached the river we kept along it northwards until we struck the railway, which we had already passed once, but without knowing what railway it was, and after a bit the railway crossed the river. We then cut across country and got on to a farm-track, which we followed till we came to a large farm and found a straight road, with youngish trees on each side of it, leading straight in the direction in which we wanted to go. Following it we found a

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magnificent bridge straight across the canal, quite a light one, and probably only used for farm purposes or for timbering. But it was certainly a most splendid bit of good fortune hitting it off, almost directly on our road, without any trouble at all.

The bridge led into large woods, and the road went on through them. We followed it for some way till we came to a place where the country on the right opened out slightly. Here we sat down and cooked our hot meal.

After this we kept on through much rougher country again, till we got on to a large moor, very deep in heather for the most part, apparently, as we discovered afterwards, marked on the map as the Borken Birge. At the time, of course, we did not know where we were, and did not know when this moor would end, and so kept right on till daylight. We had found ourselves too high up on the hill for comfort, but by daylight found a patch of very thick self-sown Scotch firs on fairly low ground, so here we made a very nice little bivouac-place in the heather. During the night it had been freezing pretty hard, but had been quite fine, and the ground was dry, so that we could lie on it and put the blanket over us, instead of both trying to wrap ourselves at once in the same blanket, which always meant a gap somewhere. Towards eight or nine o'clock a.m. it began to rain and snow at intervals, making the trees round us thoroughly wet, but our blanket kept it all out, and we were very comfortable. We slept well and had a real good rest, being only once disturbed during the day when some German soldiers came rather close to us. They were having a sham fight on the moor all round our lair, but luckily it was so wet by this time that we thought they were not likely to try to come into it, and they did not do so, though they made a great noise with their blank ammunition.

We had no idea what was the size of the moor, and thought that we should probably have some way to go to get to the end of it. It was not, of course, marked on our map-tracings, but we thought that we must be somewhere near Haltern. Where we were meant a good deal to us, as we wanted to get to a point near Velen for the last day, so that we might lie up within an easy march of the frontier and yet be outside any possible patrols. If we were not near Haltern we should have great difficulty in doing the distance in the time.

March 29–30.—We started off from our bivouac about 7.30 p.m., and found that we were only some 200 yards from the edge of the

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moor. This, again, was an extraordinary bit of good fortune, as we knew that we had another small river in front of us, and we wanted to get on and have a look at it before the night got too dark. Almost as soon as we got off the moor we found a river with one crossing, but this would have taken us to Haltern, which was much too large a place to attempt at that early hour of the evening. This river seems to have been the Stever, which had been running parallel to our course and parallel to the Lippe (flowing farther south). The small river that we knew we had to cross seems to have been a tributary of the Stever called the Muhlen Beck.

We did not know of a crossing over this Muhlen Beck, but, as before, struck rather to our right in the hope of finding one, much in the same way that we did at the Ems Canal. We crossed some very rough peaty country which the Germans had been clearing and ploughing. On much of it there had evidently been timber which had recently been cleared off. There were probably a number of soldiers in Haltern who would be used for this job, and as we passed close to the town an hour or so later we heard tattoo sounded several times, undoubtedly by many different units.

We soon struck the Muhlen Beck, which was quite a fast-running stream with very steep banks, and we followed it up-stream for a bit till we came to a bridge, which took us over by a sort of large restaurant place which was all a blaze of light, and we could see the waitresses walking about in the dining-room as we passed by the windows. There did not seem to be any diners, and we concluded that it was after dinner-time. The whole place seemed to be a sort of pleasure-garden, and close by there was also a mill or electric-light works. A railway running into Haltern from the north-east passed within a hundred yards or so of this place. This we crossed and kept rather to our left till we were close to the outskirts of Haltern. We then cut across the ploughed fields till we hit off the right road again on the other side of the town. I think we probably really went too much to our left, but we made sure of the road.

We joined the road close to the last few houses of the town, and followed it pretty well all night. It was now raining hard, and continued to rain for hours, and I don't think that we met anyone anywhere. We followed the road through a fine wooded valley beyond Locktrup and Kleine Beken. Here, after passing through the village, and just after the road leads away from the railway, we went into a cart-shed, and, sitting down on a trap, ate our grub.

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Raw bacon, of course, we had to have, as it was much too wet to look for a place to make a fire. In the trap we found a horse rug, which Campbell made use of, and took along with us, only regretting that we had not found it earlier.

After this we went on again through Gross Beken till we finally left the road and went on to what seemed by the map to be the Weisses Venn. Except for the little bit before we passed Haltern we had left the road only once, when we made a short cut which did not pay, I think, looking at it from the map. This was from near Locktrup to Kleine Beken. Here we went up into the woods to our right, and got fairly entangled in them. They were very steep and thick, and the rides never seemed to help us, till at last we struck a bigger ride with a signpost, showing the way to Beken. After that it was all right.

When we reached Weisses Venn (the place which, quite early in our journey, we had settled we must pass on our last night) we pushed on through it, looking for a sanctuary for the day, if possible, somewhere close to Velen. Unfortunately the woods were very thin underneath and gave no cover, and they were evidently timbering in them in several places, so that it would not be a very safe place to lie up. It was nearly daybreak when we got outside the greater mass of the woods and saw only small spinneys about us. There were also several farms scattered about. Before we were able to find a hiding-place we were pretty well surprised by daylight, and had to lie down in a very open little spinney, because we did not dare to walk about any longer.

We had just taken off our boots and lain down when a small cur-dog, spotting us, came and barked at us, so we had to put on our boots again and shift somewhere. It was now broad daylight, and we walked to the edge of the little plantation, where we came across a footpath, along which an old woman was walking. She saw us, but, without speaking, passed on to a farm which we noticed about a hundred yards away. We discovered that there was another farm in the direction from which she had come, also, perhaps, not more than 100 or 150 yards from where we had been lying. As soon as she was out of sight we turned up towards the farm from which she seemed to have come. By some extraordinary luck the cur-dog, evidently thinking that he had done his duty, did not follow us, but disappeared for good.

As we got close up to the buildings of the farm we saw that the house lay up to our right with some buildings between us and it,

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while just opposite us was an old barn, to which we started straight away. Just as we were leaving the bit of cover we were in to go across to it we saw a man, going from the farm, turn the corner away to our left, and we heard voices of two or three people talking on the other side of the buildings between us and the house. However, we reached the old barn safely, and found that it was one which we could get into without any difficulty at all. The bottom half was used more as a cart-shed than as a barn, and the upper part consisted of a loft at each end, with nothing in the middle. We found hay on the end, on to which we climbed, and made a snug place in the corner, as far as possible from the ladder.

This loft was a wonderfully good find, and we spent one of the best days here that we had anywhere. We had to keep pretty quiet during the morning, as there were people moving about outside, and at about 11 a.m. or 12 noon a woman came and took away some of our hay. Of course, we were well covered up, besides being well to the opposite side from where she took the hay, and she did not notice us.

We went through all our kit here during the day, and left a lot of things that we were not likely to want again, such as the earlier maps, etc. We made our last remaining grub up into equal portions for the night, after eating what we wanted for the day. The last of the bread and bacon, which had gone on all the time like the widow's cruse, we made up into quite useful sandwiches for the night, and put all the food into our pockets, with everything else we did not want to lose. We did this because we thought that it was possible, though not very probable, that we might find wire fences on the frontier, or, at any rate, might have to run for it, in which case we could throw away things that did not matter. There was a small piece of bacon fat left over.

I did not think that it was very probable that we should find wire, either barbed or live, on the frontier, because, before I started, I had seen a letter from the last man who had escaped. It was owing to having seen this letter that we made for the point on the frontier that we eventually reached. It pointed out the advantages of making for Wynterswyck. It is in a salient which sticks out very considerably into Germany. The writer had crossed there, and had not found anything to stop him. Lastly, the spot was fairly easy to recognize, as a road and a railway run from Stadtlohn to Sudlohn more or less parallel to the frontier, and about three miles from it, the road and railway being quite close to each other. We should

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know for certain if we met these two close together that if we kept on at right angles to them we should be over the frontier in a little over three miles at the outside.

The place that we chose for lying up near Velen was also close to a railway, the position of which and direction of which we could ascertain during the day by the noise and whistles of the trains.

March 30–31.—Leaving behind a lot of odds and ends which we did not want, including the rug that Campbell had borrowed at Gross Beken, we started off on our last stage at about 7.30 p.m. Although we were pretty certain of our position from the sounds of the trains heard during the day, we had a look round the farmers' carts before leaving the old building, and found on them the owner's name (which I forget) with the address "Velen" after it, and so started off pretty well satisfied with the idea of coming round the village from the north side and making straight for the frontier, passing to the north of Sudlohn.

We worked well clear of the rather straggling village, crossed over the railway, and came round through the woods on to the road leading to Nord Velen. We came out into this road down a rough track in the wood, and stood where the latter joined the road to look at the map. The time must have been rather before 9 p.m., and it was dark, but not too dark to see some 60 or 80 yards. I suppose that we had been standing there for a minute or two when I heard someone walking along the road towards us from the direction of the village, which could not have been more than some 400 yards away. I called Campbell's attention to it, and we turned back up along the track that we had come down, just catching sight of the people I had heard as we did so.

We walked pretty quickly, hoping that we had not been seen, but, looking back, after we had gone some twenty yards into the wood, I saw that we were being followed, and that a man was walking as fast as he could with the evident intention of catching us up. We started to run into the wood to our left; however, he ran a good bit better than we did, and soon caught us up. He was one of the regular forest guards, a sort of official gamekeeper and woodman, in a kind of green uniform with a Tyrolese hat. I am afraid that my knowledge of German is so small that I cannot do justice to what he said, but it started with "Mitkommen," repeated several times at the top of his voice. We did not answer, but merely looked stupid, as if we did not understand. When it was evident that we

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were not coming with him, he put his hand in his trouser pocket, doubtless in order to pretend that he had a pistol there, and said that he would shoot if we would not "Mitkommen." He began to count "Ein, zwei . . ." He repeated "Ein, zwei . . ." until it began to be obvious that he had no pistol in his pocket. If he had, why should he not show it? Why did he not get on with "Drei"? Instead he shouted "Verstehen Sie?" We clearly did not. Campbell then said "Hollander," pretending that we were Dutch smugglers or poachers, of which it is said that there are a good many along the frontier. To this he replied by asking for our "Papieren." Campbell was ready for this, as he had put in a front pocket, where he could easily find it, the only official German document that we possessed. This was a vaccination certificate, showing that he had had the necessary number of inoculations required by the German authorities, namely, once for smallpox, twice for cholera, and three times for typhoid. It turned out a much more useful document than the German who issued it had ever imagined it would be.

The forest guard took it, but owing to the dim light in the wood had considerable difficulty in reading it, and so bent his head well over it. This was Campbell's chance, and he gave him a good one over the side of the head with the stick that he had carried all the way from the barn where the dog had barked at us, and which was now shortened down to a very handy length.

The German dropped the paper and fell backwards, finally falling on to the ground some eight or ten yards from where he had been standing, uttering the words "Unmenschlich Kerl," which has always seemed to me such a fine expression for a gamekeeper to utter as he fell.

Campbell picked up his certificate and we turned and ran, but as we turned we noticed that he looked as if he were going to come after us, so we went towards him again, whereupon he ran back to the track through the woods that we had left, where the woman, who had been his companion on the road, was standing watching the whole proceeding without saying a word, although the village was so near.

He did not quite reach the woman, but fell again within about eight or ten yards from her, so we did not touch him, but turned again and ran for all we were worth. How badly he was hurt I don't know. I am inclined to think that he thought two were too many to tackle.

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We reckoned that we were now eight miles from the frontier at the very nearest point, or a good bit farther as we would have to go, because we could not go straight for it, as that would have been asking to be caught, so we travelled pretty well due north. For some three miles or so we must have done really good time. We threw away everything, as already arranged, and after more or less running for about the first three miles we kept up a fast walk.

One little bit of excitement we had. We heard a cantering horse coming up a track and a man's voice. It seemed too much as if we were being pursued, and we lay down just in time behind a patch of gorse. But it was only a cart driven, I think, by a soldier, evidently going home. Still, it was a great relief to see the last of him.

For the first two or three miles we went, first of all, through woods, and then generally along the side of the wood on the arable land. After that we got into what was for us ideal country, viz., heather and Scotch firs, few roads being more than tracks, and what there were being suitable only for timbering or purely local work. There were a few scattered houses, but the country was generally fairly empty.

After keeping up towards the north for a considerable distance we at last turned westwards again, and in due course hit off the railway and road that we were searching for. We had a good look round (for the country now was open and cultivated again), then we crossed the road and railway and went straight on at right angles to them for perhaps half a mile or more, till we reached a thick fence, where we sat down, got out our sandwiches, and ate our last meal in Germany.

It was now about midnight, and the moon was very bright. It had not troubled us on previous nights, as there had been few occasions when the sky was clear. But this night it was clear, and it was out of the question to try to cross the frontier till the moon went down, which we reckoned would be about 2 a.m., or rather after.

Our food finished, we went on again for a bit, and then found good cover in a small Scotch fir plantation. Here we lay till nearly two o'clock. The moon was then still well above the horizon, but was beginning to sink into mists which lay heavy in the distance. We waited till it was well obscured, and then started off again, walking as quickly and quietly as we could.

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We never knew when we passed the frontier. We found no wire fence such as was likely to be a boundary between the countries, though there was no shortage of fences. It is just possible that on the Dutch side of what we imagined to be the frontier wire-fenced land was more in evidence than on the German side. Certainly after a bit the country seemed to us to be better farmed, and I think that the Dutch probably farm much better and closer up to the frontier than the Germans.

There was only one possible indication of the position of the frontier that I saw. As we passed quite close to what appeared to be a farmhouse, I saw a large post with a heavy top to it. I did not mention this to Campbell at the time, as we were hurrying, and it was always dangerous to talk or do anything near a farm that might start the dogs barking, but I always thought that it was more than likely that the post marked the boundary.

As we were unable to locate the boundary, we had, of course, to be just as careful as we had been all along, until we should see the lights of Wynterswyck, or get some good evidence as to our whereabouts; and we had quite an unpleasant experience before we relaxed our precautions, which may have occurred before or after we were safe. There were a great number of small and deep ditches, both dividing the fields, and running through the woods which covered most of the country, as well as much barbed wire on which we tore our clothes and hands a great deal.

As we were going through a dark bit of wood, Campbell, who was, as usual, leading, came to a ditch, the far edge of which he could not see, but he was able to see an oak-tree growing out from the opposite bank and slightly over the stream, which made the ditch look narrower than it really was. Campbell said: "I am going to jump," and I, hearing a slight splash, thought that he had perhaps got one foot in; but the next thing that I heard was his voice from almost below me saying, "Pull me out." Then I saw his hand, which was just below the level of the bank, so that the ditch must have been nearly seven feet deep. I knelt down to get hold of it, when he changed his mind and said that he would carry me across on his shoulders; so I slipped my legs down over the bank and on to his shoulders, and he started off. He had not gone far, however, before he slipped and fell over on to his back, and I was upset into the ditch and under water till my head reached the bottom, which must have been at least four feet below the surface. I got up spluttering, and, being the taller, was able to get out first on

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to the oak-tree which had deceived us, and pull Campbell up after me.

We were now properly wet, and sincerely hoped that we were on the right side of the frontier, as to be caught soaked through and probably not be allowed to change till we got back to the prison camp would be far from pleasant. The ditch was like many others we had passed, but it happened to be in a very dark place. It was about at right angles to the frontier, and could not, therefore, have been the frontier itself.

After we had recovered ourselves we found a rough road running in the right direction, and followed it for some way. We had one more alarm—a whistle repeated three or four times on the road straight in front of us. It seemed to be a man's whistle, and certainly not like any bird's whistle that I have ever heard. This caused us to make a very considerable détour, although it was more than probable that we were on the right side of the frontier line.

We had no further trouble after this, and walking onwards we noticed a glow in the sky slightly to our left front, and just about where we hoped to find Wynterswyck. We gradually got into rather more open country, till at last, following a more beaten track than anything we had been on for some time, we came into full view of bright lights which we hoped were those of Wynterswyck railway station. For a moment we thought of the one possible danger, that we might have missed our direction and landed up at the wrong place—perhaps on the wrong side of the frontier. But the next moment that doubt was laid at rest.

We soon found ourselves in a cobble-paved street, with houses of a style quite different from what we had been accustomed to lately. We examined the shop windows and found different names and different advertisements, until we were quite sure we were right at last.

The next job was to find some one to help us. We were very wet and cold, and not a little tired. For ten days and four hours (it was now 4 a.m.) we had been avoiding every one, keeping away from towns as far as possible, and looking on every man as our enemy. Now we wanted to find a friendly light somewhere, and there was not one to be seen. The station lights had disappeared—either put out, or else invisible from where we were.

We walked right up the cobbled street without finding a sign of life. We turned, and finally retraced our steps till we got back again right into the centre of the town, and there we saw a little

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chink of light round the blind of a shop window. Rattling the door and the window, we were overjoyed at last to see a face appear. We signalled to it to let us in, and a man came to the door. We had fallen on our feet all right, as the place was a bakery, and five men were getting ready for the morning baking. We managed to make them understand, with a mixture of languages and by feeling our wet clothes, who we were, where we had come from, and what we wanted. They brought us a large plate of bread and butter and some coffee. It did not seem very large, and it did not last long, but it filled the gaps.

They then took us to the police station, some distance away, where we sat in front of a good fire while our particulars were taken down, and after that we were sent off with a policeman to wake up a little hotel.

This meant another long walk through the cobbled streets, but at last we got there and woke up the owner. He was quite a young man, who had been in Paris and spoke English and rather more French. No one seemed to know any German, although so close to the frontier. He got out drinks. I had some brandy, which did me no harm, and the policeman and the hotel-keeper, of course, could not go without; but what we wanted most was to get to bed and have our things dried. A bath also seemed an absolute necessity, as we had had no wash at all for ten days—in fact, we were in a filthy mess, with hands torn and bleeding, and inclined to fester.

We were given quite a decent room in what was a very small hotel, with one large bed for the two of us. Then came the question of a bath. The proprietor proposed to bring us a small kettle of hot water, and pointed to the basin as something to put it in, but that was nothing like enough for us. We simply could not get into bed without a good bit more of a wash than was possible under these conditions. The hotel possessed no bath; but, after hunting about, our host produced a large galvanized tub, such as might be used for washing plates or, perhaps, clothes. We did our best with that, and got into bed at a little after 6 a.m., having ordered our breakfast for eight o'clock—six poached eggs and bread and butter for each of us.

I cannot say that I slept very well before breakfast came. To start with, the bed had a spring wire mattress which sagged with our weight, so that we slipped down into a heap in the middle. This did not help, as if either moved the other woke—if, indeed, he

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was ever asleep. Perhaps, too, we had a good deal to think over, and one cannot think and sleep at the same time.

Sharp at eight came breakfast. The six eggs apiece were there all right, and three large slabs of bread and butter—very soft, white bread, the best part of an inch thick. It was a good breakfast, the best I had had for some time. I was quite ready for it, and could have eaten more.

Our next problem was how to get on to the British Consul. To start with, we could not get out of bed because we had no clothes. Even if it had been possible to dry our things inside twenty-four hours, they were in such a state that we could not very well go about in a civilized country in them. They were a bit strange when we started off, and they were a great deal stranger now.

This problem of the Consul was soon settled. The hotel proprietor was apparently accustomed to similar cases, as a few men and one officer had come through the same way before us, so he telephoned to the Consulate at Rotterdam, and was authorized to feed us and fit us out with clothes complete.

It was some time before the tradesmen of Wynterswyck came up to see us. Apparently it was a bit of a plot on the part of our friend the hotel proprietor. It was Saturday, and he thought that it would be a grand bit of business for him if we stopped till Monday, so it was two o'clock before we had enough clothes in which to come down and have some lunch.

Before we could leave Wynterswyck the Dutch Military Commandant, too, had to come and have his say, and he told us that it was necessary for an officer to accompany and look after us. This was meant very well and a politeness, but, unfortunately, being Saturday, all the Dutch officers, except the most junior, had gone away for week-end leave, and there would not be one available till Monday. Our friend the hotel-keeper made this worse by assuring him that we did not want to go till Monday, and he very nearly got his way. It was only by talking direct to Rotterdam, and getting the Consul to talk to the Commandant direct, and asking him to send a N.C.O. instead of an officer, that we were able to work it eventually.

After lunch we started out into the town to see the place, get shaved and cleaned up, call on our good friends the bakers, and, if possible, send a wire home.

Our appearance must have been rather a wonderful sight, even for the Dutchman of Wynterswyck. Since our arrival our feet and

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joints swelled up a good deal, and it was useless trying to get boots on, so we had bought large, broad slippers with square toes. I had a smart suit: coat very broad and double-breasted, with large buttons; trousers reaching down to about the middle of my calves; socks a sort of imitation Jaeger and nearly white; and, topping all, a soft felt hat. Campbell wore much the same, as there was no great selection.

And so we sallied out to spend our money. I possessed 40 marks German, in four notes, which I had bought off an old French Colonel at Mainz a year and half before, and these I changed. We went to the barber's first, and then proceeded up the street, walking rather badly with our sticks. Our next call was the telegraph office, where we found that the man talked English well, and on my giving him a wire, he read it, and when he saw the address "Redbrook-Maelor," asked if there was an office there. Although I told him that there was, he went back into his room and looked it up in the Postal Guide, just the same as every post-office man or woman in England does after you have assured them that it is a telegraph office. I also sent off a postcard to Davenport at Clausthal with the message: "Am stopping the Tiptree jam for six weeks, staying here with a friend.—Father." [The wire reached Chester the same night, and was at home with the post in the morning, and Davenport got the postcard in about two months.]

Then we called on our friends the bakers and bought a lot of sweets at their shop to try to make up for all they gave us the night before, and for which they would take nothing. After this we went into a large place to get some tea, and while we were there a soldier came in and asked us if we would come over and see the Commandant. Every one in the place seemed to know who we were, and no doubt he had been kept informed of our whereabouts.

So when we had finished tea we went across and found him at his headquarters in another hotel. He was a very young fellow, possibly not more than twenty, but he was very friendly, and, standing on the opposite side of his table, he tried to make us a sort of speech of welcome. He said that his country was not a Paradise (we assured him that we thought it was), but he hoped we should be comfortable while we were in it, etc., etc. We then proceeded to business. He talked a little English, quite enough to get on with, and, after some telephoning, we arranged that we were to leave by a train soon after 7 p.m. for Rotterdam, due to arrive there at midnight. He said he would send a N.C.O. with us, and introduced

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him to us. The N.C.O. was very keen to come, as we discovered that his best girl lived in Rotterdam.

Returning to the hotel we collected our wet belongings, which we had great trouble in finding, as I think that there is no doubt that the hotel-keeper did not want us to find them. He let us find some, but it was only after a long hunt that we got the lot. Our boots we forgot until we were half-way to the station, but secured them by sending back one of the small boys who followed us.

Our N.C.O., who was a very decent fellow, took and paid for our tickets, and after making certain, with our compass, that we were going in the right direction, we started out of Wynterswyck in a very comfortable first-class carriage.

We travelled by Utrecht, and had to change once, possibly there, but I am not sure. Our escort collected a crowd round the carriage windows at the few important stations by explaining who we were. One rich-looking individual, probably an actor, who talked some English, insisted on taking us out at the station where we changed and feeding us. In fact, every one did all he could for us.

Rotterdam was reached soon after midnight, and we were met by one of the interned officers (of the Antwerp Force) who was working at the Consulate. He took us to the floating offices of the river police, the people who seem to rule Rotterdam, and they kept us for a very long time, but did not ask us much. We filled up a form (I quite forget what was in it), and we were then taken off to the Harwich Hotel, a little place not far from the Consulate and the river. Here we had a good deal of trouble to wake up the proprietress, who thought that, as the midnight train must have been in some time, we could not possibly be coming, it being already after two o'clock. Still, at last we succeeded in getting her up, and she let us in and showed us our rooms. This time we got a bed apiece in a very good room, and were very soon asleep, thus bringing to an end a very long and eventful day.

April 1st.—Now we can begin to reckon by days again instead of by nights. We spent a good part of this morning, Sunday, 1st April, in bed. We were in no hurry to get up, and I should not like to say now at what time we had breakfast, but it must have been well after 11 a.m., and a real good breakfast it was, after which we simply lazed it, looked at the last batch of English papers that had been sent round to us from the Consulate, and then, when its turn came, had lunch. Campbell was not well—I doubt if he had really recovered from his attack the second day out—so we spent the afternoon in

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the same exciting manner. In fact, we did nothing at all till late in the afternoon, when we went for a very short walk. We had not gone very far when, as we were passing along the river front, a dog suddenly barked at us from the area of a house on our left. Simultaneously we both jumped, and thought that now we were in for it; but we recovered ourselves, and the feeling passed off as we went on.

After tea I went off to the English Church, but Campbell could not manage it, as he was feeling bad. I took a taxi there, and very dear it was, so I came back in the tram, getting a man who spoke English to help me, and he came all the way back to the Harwich Hotel with me.

Our little hotel was frequented chiefly by English seafaring people, and the proprietress was the wife (or widow) of a sailor. Our fellow lodgers were mostly Americans who had been in a Belgian relief ship that had been submarined a few days before off the Dutch coast—a most foul piece of work on the part of the Germans.

April 2nd.—Next morning we were not much earlier than the day before. Campbell was still seedy and stopped in, whilst I, after breakfast, went round to the Consulate to find out what was going to happen to us. They could not tell us when we should get a ship, but advised us to go up to the Hague, as we should be more comfortable there. They fitted us out with cash, and told us that we could go and get what clothes we required in Rotterdam that afternoon. The Consul (Maxse) asked us to lunch at the Yacht Club that day, and it was settled that we should go up to the Hague by the 6.30 train or thereabouts.

I returned for Campbell, and we went off to lunch at the Yacht Club, where the Consulate people all lunched as a rule. Afterwards we went into the town shopping, with the same officer who had met us at the station on Saturday night. We bought great coats, underclothes, a paper suit-case, and some odds and ends which we were not able to get at Wynterswyck, and then we travelled by the electric railway to the Hague—about half an hour's run. After a good deal of trouble in getting a conveyance, we eventually reached the Hotel Bellevue, which was quite a decent place, with good accommodation, baths, etc.—in fact, every luxury.

Here we made the acquaintance of an interned British naval officer, whose submarine had been wrecked off the coast. We talked to him for some time, but spent the greater part of the evening in writing up our diaries. During our travels I had kept a

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diary, which I had written up every morning in shorthand in a little pocket-book that Nicolai had given me at Mainz at Christmas 1916. It is quite an interesting thing to have, as, besides the record of our escape, it contains the addresses of all the Russians at Friedberg and Mainz who had chosen to write them in it, as well as various notes on all sorts of matters. The other souvenirs which I managed to bring away were my clothes and the beautiful hat I had made, a few coins (or, rather, tokens) from the camps, and my belt with 26 or 28 buttons on it, the buttons of every foreign and Allied regiment, members of which I had met in Germany, as well as several other buttons that I had collected from various foreigners.

April 3rd.—After breakfast, at which we met two or three other interned English, we visited the Embassy, where, after seeing one or two people, we went in to see Lady Susan Townshend, who invited us to lunch. At about three o'clock Lady Susan sent us back to the hotel in her car, and we waited in for the doctor who was to examine us, in order to give us a certificate of health for our passports. He came eventually, looked at us, and lectured us solemnly on the dangers of eating too much! After going short for so many days I am afraid his advice fell on deaf ears; at any rate, it was a bit late, as I had been doing all I could to make up for lost time, and thought that I never should be able to eat enough again. I was always ready for another meal as soon as I had finished one, and never felt any the worse for it. This went on for about a week, after which I found my level.

We returned to the Embassy for dinner, when we learned that we should leave the Hook for England next day. This was a great bit of luck, as we had been led to expect that we might be in Holland for the best part of another week. After dinner we were sent back again to the hotel in the car, which took the Chargé d'Affaires and his wife back as well. The next day we were to lunch with them and dine with the Consul, who had a house at the Hague; but, of course, the latter appointment had to fall through.

April 4th.—Our only business in the morning was to get our photographs taken for our passports, so after breakfast we went first to the Embassy and then off to a photographer who made a speciality of this. It was rather amusing getting photographed. They wanted us to be taken in a special way of their own, one picture, but which, on being squeezed at the sides, changed its expression. We saw some, evidently done from three pictures. For instance, it might be a man asleep in the normal position, and as you squeezed it he

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awoke and finally began to laugh. I should like to have had one, but we were afraid that it would take too long, while the passport photos took only about an hour. While they were being printed we went off to the Maartens Huis to look at the pictures. Both the place and the pictures were well worth going to see, and everything was beautifully kept and arranged.

After lunch we took our belongings and returned to Rotterdam to get our passports completed at the Consulate, had tea there, and then took a walk round Rotterdam until it was time to start for the dock. The Consulate provided us with a Naval Petty Officer as a guide, and, after collecting some clothes we had left at the Harwich Hotel, we drove off to the dock, where we found our little ship, the "Lapwing," very busy taking on board a great many tons of onions.

Just before we left the Consulate we met a private of the Gordons, who had been taken a day or two earlier than we had, and who had just arrived, having crossed the frontier the previous night. He was full of stories, as well he might be, having been all through the worst of it. How he found his way I don't know. He was not a man of any education, a private soldier in the old regular army. I don't think he had either maps or compasses, and he must have just set out and walked, until one day he found that he was no longer in Germany.

On the ship we had a fellow traveller who had also escaped a day after us. He was a private in the Canadian Army, and quite a different sort of man from the last, being well educated. He had managed to get a map and a small compass from a Frenchman somewhere, and it was a better map than any we possessed. He had made a good escape, having tried once before, but he was on a working-party somewhere on the Rhine, and so had not any great difficulty in getting away for a start.

Between 9.30 p.m. and 10 p.m. we started to slip down the river. There were two or three other little ships, rather like ours (all about 1,000 or 1,200 tons), moving down about the same time, all part of the same convoy.

Every one was given a life-belt and shown how to put it on, and although each of us had a cabin to himself, the captain would not let us bed down, but insisted on our stopping up, so we made ourselves quite comfortable in his cabin, which was a very smart little place with an open fire.

I spent a good deal of time on the "Lapwing's" bridge as we went down the river, and then, as soon as we were outside, which was

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somewhere about midnight, I curled up like the others and went to sleep.

April 5th.—Just as it began to get light I went up on the bridge again. A lot of destroyers had passed just before, but there was only one very large one then in sight, rushing about, round and across us, at what was, compared to ours, a very considerable speed.

We had been somewhat anxious about our crossing, as we had seen in the German papers that ships had been taken into Zeebrugge, and that on one occasion several escaped Russian prisoners had been recaptured and taken back to their prison camps. Anything almost would have been better than that. However, we had been reassured at Rotterdam we should not be taken back to Zeebrugge. We might be sunk and we might be drowned, but there would be always an escort handy, and we should not be taken back to Germany.

It was late in the morning when we first met the mine-sweepers coming out from the English coast. The first two had been fast passengers vessels, and they were followed by several pairs of other mine-sweepers, each pair towing a long wire rope between them. Behind came scores of ships passing out from the mouth of the Thames through the swept channel.

We were now safe inside the channel and could go to sleep in our cabins, so after lunch I did so, and slept like a top till after 4 p.m., when I got up for tea. We had hoped that we should be at our destination by this time, but we had come slower than we had expected, due, no doubt, to the length of the journey being increased by the wobbly course we were forced to follow under the instructions of our escort. Still, we were just getting into the wide mouth of the Thames, and we could see the coast of England, which we had not seen for well over two and a half years.

About 7 p.m. we arrived off Gravesend, and were told that we could either go ashore there and find our own way up to town that night, or we could stop on board, go on up the river, and clear off when we liked in the morning. But to-morrow was Good Friday, and we thought that it might be difficult to get about or to wire, so we decided to go ashore at once.

The Aliens Officer came off to have a look as us, and seemed satisfied, so we packed our small amount of luggage into a boat which had been hanging on to us for some distance in expectation of a job, and we were soon ashore and off to the station, looking regular foreigners in our Dutch hats, which alone might easily have got us into trouble.

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As we walked up to the station we passed a great number of soldiers, and found one wearing the badge of Campbell's regiment, the Suffolks. Of course he must talk to him, but he was of another generation, and probably, when the war began, did not know that there was a Suffolk Regiment, so he got no news from him. Later on he saw a sergeant and tried again, but with the same result. Then a policeman came up to us and asked us what we were doing in Gravesend, and were we thinking of stopping there? We told him that we wanted to go to the station and go on to town, and he said no more. It would have been rather a nuisance if we had been detained on suspicion of being foreigners trying to get information from soldiers.

However, we caught the 7.45 train for London Bridge, where we separated, Campbell going to a brother's; the Canadian, who had come off with us, going to some friends; and I took the tube across to Paddington, and turned up at 75 St. Mary's Mansions at somewhere about 9 30 p.m.—very glad, indeed, to be with relations again.[1]

And that's that!

[1] Captain Godsal subsequently did duty with the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion at home, went through a course at the Senior Officers' School, and was then posted for duty with the 23rd London Regiment in Palestine. When that regiment was ordered to France in the summer of 1918, he was appointed second in Command (acting Major) of the 19th London Regiment in Palestine, and remained with it until September, when he was admitted to hospital, and afterwards invalided home. He was awarded the Military Cross "in recognition of gallant conduct and determination displayed in escaping from captivity."—ED.

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THE TERRITORIAL FORCE BATTALIONS.

RECORD OF THE 1/4TH BATTALION.

1st JULY 1916 to 30th JUNE 1917.

(*Map No.* 1.)

SUMMARY OF BATTALION DIARY.

July 1st.—Marched in Brigade to Mailly-Maillet, starting at 10 a.m. Men in marching order, and all carrying two grenades and two sandbags apiece, while one platoon per company carried picks and shovel up to 50 p.c., and N.C.O.'s aeroplane flares, Véry lights, etc. Many checks and delays on the march, owing to convoys of ammunition cutting through the column. The Brigade bivouacked at about 1 p.m. in a field behind a wood outside the village. Heavy shelling audible all day and into the night. Many contradictory rumours circulated as to the progress of the fighting, but no official news. Sleep rather disturbed by a 15-inch howitzer (about 400 yards away), which fired every half-hour throughout the night.

The following officers were attached to the Battalion and joined for duty: Lieut. King (6th Middlesex), 2nd Lieuts. Meyrick, Fenwick, Plowman, Hutchins, and Thompson (all 5th Middlesex). The first two were posted to B Company, next two to A, remaining two to C and D respectively.

The Brigade and the 144th Brigade were placed in Corps Reserve for the attack.

July 2nd.—At 7 a.m. a bulletin was received, from which it appears that while the French on the Somme and the southern corps of the 4th Army have made good progress, the northern corps of the 4th Army, including the VIIIth Corps, have made no progress.

At 9.30 a.m. the C.O. and Adjutant attended at Brigade H.Q., and were informed that the Brigade will attack to-morrow and capture the first three lines of German trenches north of the Ancre at dawn. The C.O. and the Intelligence Officer (2nd Lieut. E. E. Smith) went off to Mesnil to reconnoitre the trenches from which the Brigade will attack.

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During the afternoon Captain Pickford returned from hospital, and 2nd Lieut. A. W. Carter (attached from 5th Middlesex) joined for duty.

At 5.30 p.m. orders for the attack were issued, and at 7 p.m. the Battalion moved off, followed by the Berks and Glosters. Five per cent. of the men and all surplus officers (over 22 in number) were left behind in Mailly, where packs were also stacked. The Battalion marched viâ Englebelmer and Martinsaart to Mesnil, which was reached at dusk. A bombing party, under 2nd Lieut. Wrong, went with the R. Berks up to Hamel. Heavy shrapnel burst over Mesnil,[1] one man wounded.

At 11.30 p.m. Operation Orders were cancelled, and the Battalion moved back to bivouacs, arriving at about dawn (3rd).

July 3rd.—Resting at Mailly in morning. At 6 p.m. the Battalion marched with the two Brigades back to bivouacs at Couin, arriving at about 9 p.m.

July 4th.—The Battalion relieved the 1/7th Warwicks in G Sector of the Hebuterne trenches. Relief complete by midnight. 1/5th Glosters on our left, 1/6th Glosters (144th Brigade, who relieved the 31st Division) on our right. 1 man wounded.

July 5th.—There was a good deal of shelling and machine-gun fire on our part during the night, with the object of keeping open the gaps cut in the enemy's wire. The state of the trenches is incredibly bad, especially on the right; they are quite as bad as in the depth of winter, except that they are now full of mud instead of water. Orders received that the two companies in the front line are to be relieved daily by the two companies in Battalion Reserve, and that they are to take up all their rations overnight, and act as if on outpost duty.

Casualties.—5 men wounded in the trenches, and 1 man killed and 2 men wounded while bringing up rations.

The whole Battalion hard at work pumping and cleaning up.

July 6th.—The 144th Brigade took over Trossachs Trench, so A Company was withdrawn to bivouacs south-west of Sailly. Weather bad, and trenches filling up with water.

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[1] Mesnil lies opposite Thiepval, the attack on which on the 1st July failed. It was decided not to repeat the attack here for the present, but to gradually work round to the east of Thiepval, with the object of cutting it off.—Ed.

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July 7th.—At 7.30 a.m. a smoke-cloud was discharged from the line of the battalions on our flanks with the object of drawing the enemy. Unfortunately the wind changed and the cloud blew back over our own lines. The enemy, however, started shelling vigorously, especially on the battalion on our right and on our right company. Two of our men (Lewis-gunners) were wounded in Oxford Street.

July 8th.—The Battalion was relieved by the 1st Bucks Battalion of the Regiment. During the relief the 56th Division, on our left, carried out a smoke demonstration. Moved by Jena Track and Valley Road to bivouac between the Dell and Coigneux.

During the night (8th/9th) we supplied 430 men for carrying back gas cylinders from G Sector to Hebuterne.

July 9th.—Voluntary Church Service. At night working parties for repair of trench bridges on the Plain.

July 10–11th.—On this night the Brigade dug a new trench in advance of H Sector, just north of G Sector. The Battalion dug the southern half of the fire-trench and the southern two communicators (Begeaud and Roualt). The working party consisted of 12 officers and 549 men, under Captain Pickford, and carried out the work successfully in a little under two hours, despite a good deal of enemy fire.

Casualties.—2 men killed and 7 wounded.

July 11th–12th.—C and D Companies employed at night in carrying up wire and pickets for the new trench and "dog-legging" in Vergingetorix.

Casualties.—1 man wounded.

July 12th.—At 4 a.m. the Battalion started for the trenches (G Sector, Hebuterne) to relieve the Bucks Battalion.

Relief complete by 7.30 a.m. Our artillery still fairly active, but enemy reply on the whole feeble. The state of the trenches much improved since we were last in. A and B Companies in fire-trench, D in reserve, C in the Dell. At night C Company employed in carrying up smoke-candles and bombs to front trenches, preparatory to our making a smoke demonstration.

July 13th.—Not much enemy shelling. A programme of "considerable activity" was arranged for the night of 13th–14th. About 10 p.m. the 4th Divisional Artillery on our right was active. The 1/5th Glosters (on our right) attempted a raid.

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July 14*th*.—At 3.10 a.m. smoke was discharged for half an hour all along the Divisional front. At 3.15 a.m. our artillery opened on the front-line trenches, which provoked a very severe reply from the enemy, who opened with intense M.G. fire, and put up a terrific barrage with 15-cm. shells and trench-mortars along Jones and Caber trenches. The derelict front line in front of Jones trench was also shelled with shrapnel, and there was some shelling on our left. Our Lewis and machine guns were active throughout the day, and the men were ordered to show fixed bayonets over the top of the parapet.[1] Active patrolling ordered. We had one man wounded during the day.

July 15*th*.—Just before midnight (14th–15th) 2nd Lieut. Rawlinson took a patrol of 4 men out from Caber. At 12.10 a.m. bombs were heard. Shortly afterwards Captain Edmunds, who was going round his posts, had reported to him that whistling and cries for help had been heard. He immediately returned to Company H.Q. and collected a big party (including 2nd Lieut. Hutchins), which he took out to the spot from which the sounds seemed to come. The party found 2nd Lieut. Rawlinson terribly wounded in the stomach and Private W. A. Cox (dead) practically on the German wire near Hook, and succeeded in bringing them in in spite of enemy lights falling all around and shrapnel being fired on the party as they got back into the old front trench. 2nd Lieut. Rawlinson was able to give the following account : He noticed a yellow light in the German trench, and lay down to listen (the party was in single file, and he was leading). On getting up again he received a bomb in the middle of the stomach, and was knocked over. Germans seemed to jump up from all around. He believes that two of his men were hustled away, whether wounded or not he could not say. One German cut off Private Cox's shoulder-straps, while another cut off his own revolver and started to search his pockets. The enemy were in a great hurry to get away. During this, 2nd Lieut. Rawlinson pretended to be dead, and when the enemy had gone he blew his whistle.

Though extremely seriously wounded 2nd Lieut. Rawlinson was evacuated to the Field Ambulance successfully.

In the evening the C.O. and Adjutant of the 10th Welsh Regiment visited us, with a view to relieving us to-morrow. The 144th Brigade

[1] This demonstration on the left was made in conjunction with the main assault being delivered to the south-east on this day.—Ed.

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(which was on our right) has already been relieved and gone south, together with the 143rd Brigade and the Bucks and Berks.

One of our aeroplanes came down just behind the Papin Ridge and drew a lot of enemy shelling.

July 16th.—The Battalion was relieved by the 10th Welsh Regiment, the first company arriving at 4.30 p.m., and the relief (except for Lewis-gunners) being complete by 7 p.m. The Battalion moved into bivouacs between Couin and St. Leger, every one heartily glad to see the last of G Sector. A Company had been sent up from Dell, to be attached for the night to the 10th Welsh, one of our sections going to each platoon of the Welsh.

July 17th.—A Company rejoined at 9 a.m. At 2 p.m. (having sent off the transport independently) the Battalion was conveyed in 36 lorries viâ Authie, Bus, Bertrancourt, Forceville, and Redauville, to Bouzincourt, which was reached about 4.45 p.m. Much congestion of traffic on the road. We occupied huts in orchards on the west side of the village, with the transport at Senlis. Hear that the 143rd and 144th Brigades are holding Ovillers and the line in front of Pozières.

July 18th.—At 7.10 p.m. received orders to attack between Ovillers and Pozières at 1.30 a.m. to-morrow. At 8.15 p.m. the first company moved off through Albert to the dump on the Albert-Bapaume Road (Usna Hill), where R.E. stores, extra ammunition, etc., were issued. Companies then moved off up the Albert-Bapaume Road to get into position. B Company on the left, C on the right in the front line, A in support, D in reserve.

July 19th.—At 1.30 a.m. the attack was launched, but was held up. At 3 a.m. a second attack was ordered, but was not practicable owing to the congestion in the trench rendering reorganization impossible. At about 4.15 a.m. the Battalion was ordered to withdraw, which the state of the trench made a difficult operation. By 8 a.m. the Battalion was clear of the trenches, re-formed at the dump outside Albert, and moved to huts at Bouzincourt, where the surplus officers and 5 p.c. of the men had remained.

Casualties in the Battalion.—2nd Lieuts. Jefferson and Fenwick (attached from 5th Middlesex) wounded; other ranks, 99.

July 20th.—Resting. Received orders that the attack would be resumed to-night, the Battalion in reserve. At 11.45 p.m. the Battalion moved off, companies at 5 minutes interval, through Albert.

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July 21*st*.—At 1.10 a.m. bivouacked in a field and in old gun-emplacements about a quarter of a mile outside Albert, just on the south-east side of the Albert-Bapaume Road.

At 6.30 a.m. received information that the attack had been unsuccessful. The Bucks Battalion withdrew to bivouacs adjoining those occupied by us.

At night we furnished working parties.

July 22*nd*.—Informed that the attack would be resumed, and ordered to send an officer to reconnoitre the new trenches being dug by the Sussex. At 2.30 p.m. orders for attack were issued to C.O.'s at a conference at Brigade H.Q. (Usna Redoubt).

At 9 p.m. the Battalion moved up to get into position. The Australian Division, on our right, were attacking at about 10 p.m., and very heavy fighting appeared to be in progress.

July 23*rd*.—At 12.30 a.m. the Battalion attacked just east of Pozières. A Company on the left, D on the right, B in support, C in reserve.

The objective on the left was reached almost at once; that on the right after a hard struggle. At least two counter-attacks had to be repulsed.

At 4 a.m. we were reinforced by two companies of the 4th Berks. Heavy shelling all day, but no further attacks were delivered. In the afternoon it became evident that the Battalion had suffered heavily, and at night we were relieved by the 1/5th Warwicks. Relief complete by half an hour after midnight (23rd–24th).

July 24*th*.—On relief, the Battalion moved to bivouacs in a field outside Albert.

Casualties.—Captain B. B. B. Brooks, missing, believed killed; Captain J. E. Blake, killed; Captain Edmunds, 2nd Lieuts. T. N. Hall, G. M. Frieake, E. E. Smith, F. E. Jones, F. C. Lay, S. Smith, M. Hutchins (5th Middlesex), wounded. Other ranks: 73 killed, many wounded.

The Battalion remained in bivouacs until after dinners, and then returned to huts at Bouzincourt viâ the track crossing the Ancre between Albert and Aveluy.

July 25*th*–*August* 11*th*.—This period was spent by the Battalion in rest and in moving about from place to place in rear of the fighting area (*see* Regimental Diary), and on the 12th orders were received at Bouzincourt to go into the line to the east of Ovillers.

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The following drafts joined: 15 men on the 27th July, 10 on the 29th, 160 on the 1st August, 5 on the 7th, and 58 on the 10th.

August 12th.—The Battalion received orders to move into the line to the east of Ovillers, in relief of two battalions of the 12th Division, to-morrow. The C.O. and Adjutant made a reconnaissance of the line.

August 13th.—At 3 a.m. the Battalion moved off from bivouacs by companies, and marched to the neighbourhood of Usna Redoubt, where it breakfasted. At 7 a.m. moved on, and took over trenches from the 7th Norfolks on the right and 7th Essex on the left. The front line (Skyline Trench) had been taken over by these two battalions last night (13th–14th) with very little opposition. Dispositions: C Company, right front; D, left front; B, support; A, reserve (with 2 platoons in Ovillers).

Very heavy shelling over the whole area all day, more especially on Skyline and Ration Trenches. By the evening Skyline Trench had been obliterated, and C and D Companies had suffered heavy casualties, some, no doubt, caused by our own Heavies firing short.

Lieut. Wayman was reported missing, having been last seen going to the left of the line, presumably to make a reconnaissance.

About 9 p.m. enemy shelling became intense around Battalion H.Q., and all the telephone lines were cut. 2nd Lieut. Sherrington (in charge of D Company fire-trench) at this time detected signs of enemy movement, and sent back five messages, none of which, however, got through.

Shortly before 10 p.m. the enemy attacked our front and left flank with apparently two battalions. Our centre, which was weakly held, was pierced. On the left 2nd Lieut. Sherrington was in imminent danger of being cut off and captured, but he succeeded in extricating himself by good use of his Lewis-gun, when he took up a position in Ration Trench, and thereby secured our left flank. On the right survivors of two platoons of C Company (under Sergeant Crowe) were cut off from all communication with the rest of the Battalion, but succeeded in holding out in Skyline Trench near Point 81. From this point bombing attacks were organized down the trench, with the assistance of the Anzacs, and this portion of the trench was held until two platoons of the 1/5th Glosters relieved the party next evening (14th).

A bombing attack was also organized from Ration Trench up the communication trench, and was led by 2nd Lieut. L. W. HUNTER,

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who was unfortunately killed when close to Skyline Trench, where the attack was beaten back.

August 14*th*.—Owing to the length of line occupied and the casualties already sustained, no further counter-attack by the Battalion was practicable. Three companies of the 4th Berks were sent up and counter-attacked without success about 5 a.m. The line of Ration Trench was then held as the front line.

At 2 p.m. the Battalion was relieved by the 1/1st Bucks Battalion. The companies had tea near Usna Redoubt, and then moved to trenches in the Albert-Bouzincourt line, where the Battalion bivouacked.

The *Casualties* in the Battalion during the 13th and 14th August were: Lieut. W. A. WAYMAN, missing; 2nd Lieut. L. W. HUNTER, killed; Lieut. C. Lakin, 2nd Lieut. G. Pearson, 2nd Lieut. A. W. Carter (5th Middlesex), 2nd Lieut. J. King (6th Middlesex), wounded; and 147 N.C.O.'s and men killed, wounded, and missing.

August 15*th*.—Resting. Bad weather, and very little shelter for the men.

August 16*th*.—The Battalion relieved the 1/1st Bucks Battalion in the same sector of the line. Relief completed by 1 p.m.

Shelling not as severe as last time the Battalion was in, but fairly heavy all day.

During the night we sent out several patrols to discover which trenches were being held by the enemy, and also to gain touch with the Anzacs, on our right.

August 17*th*.—The enemy's shelling moderated considerably early this morning, but at 9 p.m. it increased in intensity on Skyline and Ration Trenches, as well as on Third Avenue.

Between 9.45 p.m. and 10 p.m. enemy movement on our left front was suspected, and at 10.15 p.m. suspicion of an actual attack increased. A barrage was asked for and immediately given. A patrol (under 2nd Lieut. Thompson) sent out subsequently found that the suspicious trench had been badly knocked about by the barrage, and had been abandoned by the enemy. Prisoners also stated that the enemy had intended to attack, but that our barrage had broken them up.

August 18*th*.—The Battalion was relieved by the 1/4th Berks at 7 a.m., and moved to Usna Redoubt and gun-pits in rear and beside the River Ancre. Relief completed by 12 noon.

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Casualties during the period 16th–18th August.—Captain H. H. Greenwell wounded (remained at duty); other ranks, 45 killed and wounded.

August 19th.—At 6.30 p.m. the Battalion moved to Bouzincourt, and got into billets by 9 p.m., two companies in huts on the Martinsaart Road, the remainder in the village.

August 21st.—Company training in the morning. At 3.30 p.m. ordered to be ready to move, in event of being required to support an attack by the 144th Brigade. At 7.15 p.m. the Battalion moved to Ovillers Post, and reported to H.Q. 144th Brigade. But the Battalion was not required, and so spent the night, two companies in Usna Redoubt, and the remainder in gun-pits in rear.

August 22nd.—In the morning the two companies in Usna Redoubt moved into gun-pits nearer the Ancre River.

August 23rd.—At 9 a.m. the Battalion moved up to the trenches north of Ovillers, and relieved the 1/7th Worcesters. Relief completed by 12 noon, 143rd Brigade on our right, the Bucks Battalion on our left. In front line A Company on the left; B on the right; C in support; D in reserve.

We had a bombing stop between 76 and 79. At this point bombing was almost continuous, except when we were ordered to withdraw to enable our heavy artillery to bombard point 79. About 30 yards of ground was gained, and our bomb-stop was pushed up to within 20 yards of point 79, but the actual trench junction could not be forced by direct bombing attack alone.

At 3 p.m. the Bucks Battalion delivered an attack, while we were responsible for making close communication. The first objective was trench 33–79; the second, 91. The attack was only partially successful.

From 9 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery was active, otherwise the shelling during the day was not very accurate.

At night our working parties were busy repairing trenches and digging a new trench from 48 towards 79.

August 24th.—We were in constant touch with the enemy near 79, but the general situation remained unaltered. Our companies relieved one another during the morning.

At 4 p.m. our artillery opened a bombardment preparatory to an attack by the 25th Division on Leipzig Salient on our left. The assault was delivered at 4.10 p.m. Plans had been made to take

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advantage of this to make an attack on point 79, with the assistance of five Stokes mortars. This, however, had to be abandoned, as we were ordered by the Corps to withdraw our bombing-post, in order that the heavies might fire on 79.

At 5.10 p.m. there was considerable hostile shelling on our trenches, and during the night a good deal of shrapnel was fired over our front trenches, impeding our work of consolidation.

We arranged with the Bucks for a combined attack on 79 about midnight, but it had to be abandoned owing to enemy activity. Patrols reported that the enemy front-line trench is held in great strength.

August 25th.—At 5 a.m. a German prisoner (5th Grenadier Guards) was taken opposite our right company. His battalion had relieved during the night.

Some shelling, but otherwise a quiet day. Company reliefs carried out.

The 1/5th Glosters relieved the 1/1st Bucks on our left. Orders received that consolidation only was required, so no further attack was made on point 79.

From 10 to 11 p.m. hostile artillery was very active on our right front company, doing much damage to trenches round 48.

During the night our patrols got well up to trench 79–91, and reported enemy digging energetically, and the enemy apparently more in shell-holes in rear than in the actual trench.

August 26th.—The 1/4th Berks relieved the Battalion in the morning, and we moved into dug-outs in Ribble Street, near Ovillers Post.

Casualties during the period 23rd–26th August.—2nd Lieut. A. C. Thompson wounded; other ranks killed or wounded, 57.

August 27th–September 30th.—Out of the line until the 5th September, when the Battalion took over trenches east of Auchonvillers, and remained there until the 8th. The remainder of the month was spent at various places, all spare time being devoted to training. Drafts received in September amounted to 174 men. The following officers joined or rejoined the Battalion: 2nd Lieuts. C. H. Powell and R. Affleck, Lieut.-Colonel A. J. N. Bartlett; also from the 7th and 8th Scottish Rifles 2nd Lieuts. A. M. Kirkwood, J. A. S. Maclean, R. G. Ramsay, A. Allan, A. S. Wotherspoon, D. W. Dinwoodie, and Paxton.

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October.—Throughout this month the Battalion was training and constantly moving quarters. Drafts to the number of 100 men joined, and the following officers: Lieut. W. D. Scott, 2nd Lieuts. Hill, Dye, Dadley, Garlick, Fawcett, and Etty.

November 1st.—C.O. and other officers reconnoitred support trenches between Martinpuich and Le Sars, preparatory to the Battalion moving in.

The Battalion marched at 12.30 p.m. viâ Albert and Fricourt to bivouacs in X.27.a. (Map 57.c., S.W. 10,000). Arrived at 4.30 p.m. Very wet and muddy.

November 2nd.—At 5 p.m. moved off by platoons to relieve the 6/7th R. Scots Fusiliers (45th Brigade, 15th Division) in the support trenches. The men carried next day's rations, and moved viâ Contalmaison (where tools were picked up), thence viâ tramway and corduroy track. Relief completed by 10.45 p.m. Fine moonlight night.

1/5th Glosters in front line; ourselves in support; 1/4th Berks in reserve, round Martinpuich.

November 3rd.—Fine day. Comparatively little shelling of Battalion area (support trenches between Le Sars and Martinpuich). Considerable work to be done in clearing up trenches, which are mostly quite impassable. Accommodation also to be improved, as there are no dug-outs, only a few incomplete shafts hollowed out at the bottom.

The whole area is on the forward slope, and, consequently, parties are in full view when walking on the top, which is the only way of getting about. Fortunately, so far the enemy has taken no advantage of this.

Rations were brought up by pack ponies to the junction of 26th Avenue with Mill Road. At night we furnished a party to carry up rations to the 5th Glosters.

November 4th.—Morning much as yesterday, but Destremont Farm was shelled a good deal.

At 1.15 p.m. our artillery put up an intense bombardment on the enemy front on our left for about ten minutes.

During the evening the command of the line was taken over by the 144th Infantry Brigade, to whom the Battalion was attached for all tactical purposes.

Between 9 p.m. 4th and 2 a.m. 5th November the Battalion relieved the 1/5th Gloucesters in the front line. Inexperienced guides made the relief take longer than it should have done.

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November 5th.—The Battalion in the front line in front of Le Sars, as left front battalion. The 144th Brigade is on our right, and the 44th Canadians (of the 4th Canadian Division) on our left.

The 50th Division (on the right of the 144th Brigade) attacked Butte de Warlencourt. The attack appeared to be successful. The enemy retaliated with 77 mm. and 15 cm. on the front and support lines and on Le Sars.

The Battalion had 6 men killed and 9 wounded. During the day there was considerable intermittent hostile artillery activity, and enemy snipers were busy, on our left flank, enfilading Aqueduct Road. This is troublesome, owing to the terrible state of the trenches. Our support companies relieved the companies in the fire trenches. Some useful patrol work was carried out at night.

November 6th.—Enemy artillery unusually active. Le Sars, Destremont Farm, Aqueduct Road, and intervening ground well searched, especially during the afternoon, Company H.Q. in the front line receiving special attention.

Three German prisoners (64th R.I.R. Guards Division, Guards Reserve Corps) were captured opposite our left company, and sent to Brigade H.Q.

Casualty.—1 man wounded.

At night we were relieved by the 1/1st Bucks Battalion, the relief not being completed until after midnight. Companies moved back into trenches in the support area, previously occupied.

November 7th.—Quiet day. Weather bad. One platoon of each company engaged in carrying up rations to the Bucks after dark.

Casualties.—1 man killed, 5 men wounded.

The Battalion was relieved by the 4th Berks by 8 p.m., when it moved into the Reserve Area round Martinpuich, occupying merely a disused water-logged trench.

November 8th.—The Battalion found large working parties, as well as ration-carrying and water parties.

November 9th.—As yesterday.

Casualties.—6 men wounded.

November 10th.—Working party of 50 men by day.

All available details and 5 p.c. were brought up to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, and a detachment (under an officer) from each company at Martinpuich was sent up. This party worked hard all day,

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with the result that bivouacs for three companies were put up in the Wood (S.7.b. and d.), and small shelters for the fourth company (A) were erected in the trench running north-west from the north-west corner of the Wood. This company (the Battalion Outpost Company) had a post on the ridge to watch the Divisional front.

Casualty.—1 man wounded.

The Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th R. Warwicks, and on completion of the relief (7.45 p.m.) moved to the bivouacs and shelters mentioned above, Battalion H.Q. being at S.8.a.76, taken over from the 1/8th Worcesters.

Sergeant J. H. Abraham appointed 2nd Lieutenant.

November 11th–30th.—Behind the line furnishing working and carrying parties until the 15th, on which day became support battalion, and on the 17th took over front-line trenches in front of Le Sars, holding them for three days. Lieut. R. St. G. Lake was killed on the 17th by a shell; Lieut. W. D. Scott was wounded on the 20th; and during these days 9 men were killed and some 25 wounded. The Battalion was out of the line until the 25th, and then returned to the trenches until the 29th, losing 1 man killed and 7 men wounded. The following officers joined: 2nd Lieuts. W. H. Enoch (rejoined), W. H. Fleeming, W. J. B. Bowler, J. E. Ellis, A. O. W. Kindell (the two latter being reposted to the 2nd Battalion on the 23rd), Major R. R. S. Rowell also rejoined on the 24th November.

December 1st–10th.—In camps, furnishing working parties, etc.

December 11th.—The Battalion relieved the 1/4th R. Berks in the front line in front of Le Sars (left sector). The first company moved off at 3.45 p.m. Guides were at the corner of Gilbert Alley and Albert-Bapaume Road. Rations for 24 hours, as well as gum-boots, were dumped at the same place. The relief went well, and all companies were in position by 9.30 p.m. The Bapaume Road was shelled during the relief, and 2nd Lieut. Kirkwood and his servant were badly wounded.

At 8.40 p.m. an enemy patrol of 6 or 8 men approached the Chalk Pit from the N.N.W., and crawled to within 10 yards of our post before being seen. They were driven off with bombs and rifles; but, unfortunately, the remainder of the post rushed out of their shelter and received bombs in their midst. One man was killed. 5 men were wounded, and 2 were missing. Our patrols were busy at night.

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December 12*th*.—The rain of last night turned to snow and sleet and made trenches and tracks in a hopeless condition. Companies at work all day clearing the trenches and shelters. Enemy shelling not more active than usual.

2nd Lieut. Paxton spotted an enemy post about 150 yards from Scotland Trench, opposite the junction of that trench and Gilbert Alley. Unfortunately, while doing so he was sniped, and wounded on the side of the head, but he carried on until the arrival of Major Rowell in the evening.

Patrols active at night; one patrol was fired on by a machine-gun, had two men wounded, and had to withdraw.

December 13*th*.—Rained all day. Enemy shelling not particularly heavy. A few gas-shells fell near Destremont Farm during the morning.

The Battalion was relieved by the 1/5th Glosters. Complete by 9 p.m. Returned to Scotts Redoubt South. All in by midnight.

December 14*th*.—The Battalion moved to D Camp at Bécourt between 11.15 a.m. and 12 noon, and took over from the 7/8th K.O.S.B. Camp consists of Nissen Huts, and is very comfortable, except for the mud.

December 15*th*–31*st*.—The Battalion remained in camp at Bécourt until the 28th, when it moved to camp at Bresle. The weather was cold, with snow and rain, but a good deal of training was carried out and working-parties kept busy. During the month 243 men arrived in five drafts, and 2nd Lieuts. Millard and W. P. Powell rejoined the Battalion.

1917.

January.—From Bresle the Battalion moved by rail, on the 9th, through Amiens to Oisement, thence marching to Cerisy-Buleux, where training was continued until the 29th, when a move was made by rail to Hamel. A draft of 22 men arrived on the 29th, and on the 30th 2nd Lieut. G. G. Smith joined and was posted to C Company.

February.—Training continued for the first few days, box respirators were issued, and the new French treatment for preventing trench-feet was carried out. On the 7th the Battalion went into the trenches near Herbicourt and remained in the front line until the 13th, having 6 men wounded. From the 13th to 17th in support

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position furnishing working parties, carrying parties, and patrols; 2nd Lieut. B. VOKES and one man were killed, and 8 men wounded. From the 18th to 23rd the Battalion was training at Cappy, on the 24th returned to the support area, and next day into the front line opposite La Maisonette, where the Battalion remained three days, losing 2nd Lieut. W. H. Fleeming and 5 men wounded

March.—The Battalion went into the front line again on the 1st, and continued in and out of the trenches until the 20th. During this period B and C Companies rehearsed a raid on dummy trenches, and carried it out successfully at La Maisonette on the 17th. On the 20th the Battalion marched from Cappy to Peronne, and thence moved gradually forward in pursuit of the Germans to Tincourt and Marquaix. During this month 3 men were killed, and Captain and Adjutant E. E. Bridges, 2nd Lieut. H. F. Pearson, and 13 other ranks wounded. Captain M. Edmunds and Lieut. H. H. Jefferson rejoined, and 2nd Lieuts. F. E. Jones, E. C. H. Wincer, C. H. Bowman, W. S. Tetley, V. S. Wilkins, and G. A. Pitts joined the Battalion in March.

April 3rd.—The Battalion moved to Villers Faucon in relief of the 1/8th Worcesters, leaving Marquaix at 8.15 p.m. C and D Companies took over positions in outpost line in front of Ronssoy. H.Q. and 2 platoons of D Company at St. Emilie.

April 4th.—A patrol from D Company (outpost on left) went out at 3.30 a.m. and did not return until after midday. It had been compelled to shelter in a shell-hole owing to the light becoming too strong, and on making a dash for the outpost line one man was killed and another mortally wounded.

Other patrols from the outpost companies were fired on, and the outpost positions were shelled. B Company suffered casualties.

At 7 p.m. our artillery put a barrage on the enemy positions. Patrols went out to ascertain whereabouts of enemy, but were very soon fired on. C Company had 5 men hit and 1 man accidentally killed.

April 5th.—A and B Companies moved from Villers Faucon at 2.30 a.m. to take up a position for an attack on Ronssoy, in conjunction with the 1/4th Berks on our right and the 1/5th Glosters on our left.

At 4.45 the attack was launched and proved successful, with comparatively slight casualties. We took a number of prisoners and two machine-guns.

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At 7 a.m. Ronssoy was in our hands, and a position was taken up to the east of the village. The enemy then shelled the place very heavily, but without causing casualties to the Battalion, as the men were clear of all buildings. The work of consolidation of positions continued all day, and at night the Battalion was relieved, but not without mishap, for the enemy shelled with 5.9's, which caused some casualties, including 2nd Lieut. F. C. Lay and C.-S.-M. F. C. Wicks wounded. Relief complete about midnight. The Battalion at Villers Faucon.

Total casualties during the day.—9 other ranks killed; one officer and 23 other ranks wounded.

2nd Lieuts. J. E. Boyle and A. E. Crew joined the Battalion.

2nd Lieut. R. H. WHITE awarded the MILITARY CROSS.

April 7th–17th.—Still moving forward after the Germans, the Battalion went into the outpost line in front of Ronssoy on the 15th. Captain P. Pickford rejoined on the 7th, and on the 8th intimation was received that Captain G. H. GREENWELL had been awarded the MILITARY CROSS.

April 18th.—A patrol of A Company worked towards Guillemont Farm and found it to be strongly held. D Company was ordered to attack the farm this night, but the order was afterwards cancelled and the attack postponed.

April 19th.—A patrol of A Company again found Guillemont Farm strongly held, and enemy machine-guns on the ridge in front D Company ordered to make the attack at 7.30 p.m.; C Company in support; detachments of R.E. and 1/5th R. Sussex to assist to consolidate the position when captured. In the afternoon there was artillery preparation.

At 7.30 p.m. D Company was in position in two lines with 5 paces interval. When the ridge was reached heavy machine-gun fire was opened. The lines moved on, the support platoons having reinforced so as to make one line. The enemy was observed running out of rifle-pits north-west of the farm. In spite of the enemy's heavy fire the advance continued. When about 150 yards west of the farm the three left platoons reached slight cover, but the right platoon had lost touch. It, however, reached a trench where it established itself, and eventually it obtained touch with the rest of the company. The two centre platoons continued to suffer casualties from rifle and machine-gun fire, and the flank platoons were

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heavily shelled, so that it became impossible to maintain the advance. It was now evident that the farm was strongly held, and as orders were received that not more than one company was to be engaged, there was no alternative but to withdraw, and this was ordered at 9.30 p.m. A Company rendered considerable assistance by sending men to help the stretcher-bearers to bring in the wounded, and all were successfully evacuated.

The total *Casualties* in D Company were heavy.—2nd Lieut. D. W. DINWOODIE and 9 other ranks were killed; 3 men missing, and 46 wounded.

As soon as the survivors of D Company had withdrawn, the Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th Worcesters, and then proceeded to Hamel, viâ St. Emilie.

April 20th.—The last company reached Hamel at 7.15 a.m.

2nd Lieut. F. O. Townsend rejoined the Battalion; a reinforcement of 17 N.C.O.'s and men also arrived.

2nd Lieut. A. ALLAN awarded the MILITARY CROSS.

April 21st–30th.—At Hamel and in the vicinity, doing one tour of outpost duty. On the 27th Major Schomberg left the Battalion to take up the command of the 1/6th Glosters.

May 1st–18th.—The Battalion moved gradually forward until it reached the outpost line at Hermies, whence Cambrai was visible in the distance.

FROM MAJOR P. PICKFORD'S ACCOUNT.[1]

Our lines here consisted of a series of disconnected fire-trenches, each capable of holding a post of a platoon in the front line, and a half-platoon in the support line. No Man's Land varied greatly in width, and the enemy's position west of the Hindenburg Line differed from day to day. The Canal du Nord ran through our lines on the right near Hermies, and at one time we held one end of a demolished bridge, while the enemy held the other some 20 yards away; the main Bapaume-Cambrai road ran through the left of our front north of Demicourt, and here patrols wandered nearly a mile before encountering the enemy.

[1] Extracted from *War Record of the 1/4th Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry*, compiled by Major P. Pickford, M.C., D.S.O. This little book contains a mass of valuable information, with very complete statistical matter, and should be in the possession of every individual who served with the Battalion.—ED.

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Events in the line here were on the whole pleasant, but not very noteworthy.

The visor attachment to the steel helmet for protecting the eyes was issued and withdrawn within a week. Gas projectors were experimented with, and vast quantities of noxious vapours poured over enemy country without doing him much damage, as he nowhere held strongly a line which was so heavily protected by a canal and by three colossal belts of wire.

BATTALION DIARY CONTINUED.

May 19th–24th.—During this period patrols were active. On the 21st a fighting patrol of 28, under Lieut. Townsend, went out from C Company to establish a post astride the east bridgehead. They proceeded in two waves, but, owing to the darkness, they experienced great difficulty in keeping touch, and, in addition, the enemy had laid "booby-traps," into which several of our men fell. They re-formed, however, and eventually located an enemy trench, from which they were met by very heavy rifle-fire. This position they charged and carried with the bayonet, killing many of the enemy. The retirement of the patrol was then effected under cover of the Lewis-gun Section, and the wounded were brought in. During this Corporal Bannard distinguished himself in attempting to disperse two enemy patrols seen to be approaching from different directions.

Total *Casualties* during 20th and 21st.—3 killed, 2 wounded, 1 missing.

May 25th–31st.—Moved to Demicourt and Beaumetz, and on the 29th went into the trenches.

Casualties during May.—4 men killed, 6 men wounded, and 1 man missing. 2nd Lieuts. W. J. L. Wallace and J. E. Mackay joined the Battalion early in the month.

June.—Nothing of note occurred in this month. The Battalion had two tours of duty in the left sector of the Hermies section (outpost line E. of Demicourt), but suffered only 3 casualties. On the 6th Lieut.-Colonel R. Stephens (1st Battalion) arrived and took over the command from Major P. Pickford, who had been in temporary command during the absence, on sick leave, of Lieut.-Colonel A. J. N. Bartlett. On the 20th 2nd Lieut. C. N. Gribble (Lancashire Hussars) joined the Battalion.

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CASUALTIES, 1/4TH BATTALION.

1ST JULY 1916 TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

Killed or Died of Wounds.

2nd Lieut. G. M. RAWLINSON.
Captain J. E. BLAKE.
Captain B. B. B. BROOKS.
2nd Lieut. C. M. FRIEAKE.
2nd Lieut. T. N. HALL.
2nd Lieut. D. M. HUTCHINS (5th Middlesex).
Captain W. A. WAYMAN.
Lieut. C. LAKIN.
2nd Lieut. L. W. HUNTER.
Lieut. R. ST. G. LAKE.
2nd Lieut. B. VOKES.
2nd Lieut. D. W. DINWOODIE (8th Scottish Rifles).

And 255 Other Ranks.

Wounded.

Captain E. E. BRIDGES.
2nd Lieut. A. W. CARTER (5th Middlesex).
2nd Lieut. C. J. FENWICK (5th Middlesex).
2nd Lieut. W. H. FLEEMING.
2nd Lieut. H. H. JEFFERSON.
Lieut. J. V. KING (6th Middlesex).
Lieut. A. M. KIRKWOOD (7th Scottish Rifles).
2nd Lieut. F. C. LAY.
2nd Lieut. H. R. PAXTON (8th Scottish Rifles).
2nd Lieut. G. E. PEARSON.
Lieut. H. F. PEARSON.
2nd Lieut. A. C. THOMPSON (5th Middlesex).

Missing (Prisoners of War).

11 Other Ranks, 5 of whom were wounded.

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HONOURS AND AWARDS.[1]

1/4TH BATTALION, 1ST JULY 1916 TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER.

Major J. O. SUMMERHAYES (R.A.M.C.).

MILITARY CROSS.

2nd Lieut. F. E. JONES.
The Rev. K. JACKSON (C.F.).
2nd Lieut. C. E. R. SHERRINGTON.
Captain F. B. JONES.
Captain E. E. BRIDGES.
Captain J. C. COOMBES (attd. T.M.B.).
2nd Lieut. R. H. WHITE (25th London Regt.).
Captain G. H. GREENWELL.
2nd Lieut. A. ALLAN.
Lieut. T. R. FORTESCUE.

BREVET-MAJOR.

Captain (acting Lieut.-Colonel) A. J. N. BARTLETT

MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES.

Lieut.-Colonel A. J. N. BARTLETT.
Major and Quartermaster A. A. BRIDGEWATER.
Major B. LONG, M.C. (attd. M.G.C.).
Lieut. A. K. GIBSON.
1744 Sergeant B. W. FAIRMAN.
2488 Sergeant F. NEWMAN.
200069 C.-S.-M. J. L. GARROTT.
2000624 Sergeant C. H. ALLSWORTH.
2000728 Lance-Corporal A. C. CAIGER.

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.

1440 Sergeant H. A. CLARK.
1362 Sergeant L. CROWE.
2249 Corporal E. A. MAZEY.

[1] Official statements of Acts of Gallantry for which these awards were made are given in full in Major Pickford's *War Record of the 1/4 Battalion.*

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MILITARY MEDAL.

1752 Sergeant H. COLLIER (attd. M.G.C.).
1794 Sergeant B. W. FAIRMAN.
2488 Sergeant F. NEWMAN.
2292 Sergeant J. WOOLNOUGH.
1671 Sergeant A. H. WOOTON.
2346 Corporal G. W. ADKINS (attd. T.M.B.).
1579 Lance-Corporal A. ADMANS.
1938 Lance-Corporal G. ASHPLANT.
201089 Lance-Corporal A. T. TURNER.
1427 Bandsman T. CARTER.
2674 Private J. H. ABRAHAM.
1654 C.-S.-M. J. T. PEET.
1776 Sergeant T. P. BARLOW.
201233 Lance-Corporal T. WARD.
3530 Sergeant A. ENSTONE.
1700 Corporal R. W. STEVENS.
1585 Lance-Corporal B. HARBOD.
2315 Lance-Corporal T. W. HERMON.
3057 Private L. W. HAWKINS.
4262 Private A. MARGETTS.
3616 Private F. G. MILLIN.
3584 Private E. W. THOMAS.
2000335 Private T. H. SMITH.
203615 Private J. E. GODWIN.
2000735 Sergeant W. H. MUDGE.
201049 Lance-Sergeant A. C. H. WIGGINS.
200793 Lance-Corporal B. BATTS.
201785 Lance-Corporal W. N. HOBBS.
200899 Lance-Corporal J. UPSTONE.
200462 Lance-Corporal F. G. WILSON.
200482 Private J. T. WHITE.
200631 Sergeant H. A. HARRIS.
201116 Corporal R. J. COLLIER.
200602 Corporal G. KIMBERLEY.
200774 Lance-Corporal G. J. LEEDS.
201472 Private E. AYRES.
201129 Private R. G. CHAMINGS
203383 Private A. W. MAY

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RECORD OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION.

1st JULY 1916 TO 30th JUNE 1917.

(*Maps* 1, 2, *and* 3.)

Although the 184th Infantry Brigade, to which belonged both the 2/4th Battalion and the 2/1st Bucks Battalion of the Regiment, took no part in the actual battle of the Somme, its task of making demonstrations to assist the Somme operations was arduous in the extreme, and its casualties heavy. At the commencement of the Somme offensive the 2/4th Battalion was at Laventie, holding the trenches and front posts.

FROM COLONEL W. H. AMES'S NARRATIVE.

The Battalion was relieved on the 4th July by the 2/4th Gloster Regiment, and went into billets at Riez Bailleul for rest. On the 6th July Captain Scott was instructing some men of D Company in bombing, when a bomb burst prematurely, killing Private Lord, severely wounding Captain Scott and Corporal North, and slightly wounding Lieut. Loewe and Private Williams. At 3 p.m. that afternoon the Battalion was suddenly ordered to march to Croix Barbée, where they relieved the 1st Battalion of the Hertfordshire Regiment and remained in reserve. On 12th July they relieved the 2/4th Royal Berks Regiment in the Richebourg trenches, and on 13th July the Berkshire Battalion carried out a raid. During the raid a 5.9 shell went into the hospital dug-out, but luckily did not cause any casualties. Lieut. Brown distinguished himself by his work in recovering the wounded on this occasion.

On the night of 12th July an unfortunate accident happened to D Company. They were occupying a part of the trench peculiarly liable to retaliation by trench-mortars, which was always cleared if our trench-mortars contemplated firing. A trench-mortar was fired without any warning to the officer commanding the Company, and a trench-mortar bomb fired by the enemy caught a whole platoon

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of D Company and made casualties of the lot.[1] On the 15th July the Battalion was relieved by the 16th K.R.R., and spent the night of the 15th/16th at Lestrem. On the evening of the 16th the Battalion marched to the Rue de Lys just short of Sailly, where they were billeted in a brickyard. A big attack was in preparation, and for the next three days the men of the Battalion were busily engaged in fatigue work, carrying ammunition and stores to the various points. Owing to misty weather, which prevented the guns registering, the attack was put off till the 19th. The 61st Division were to attack on the line from Bedford Row to Bond Street, the 184th Brigade on the front from Sutherland Avenue exclusive to Bond Street inclusive, the 183rd Brigade were on the right, and the Australian Division on the left. The 2/1st Bucks and the 2/4th Berks were in the trenches and were to make the attack, one Company (C) of the Battalion was in immediate reserve just north of the Rue Tilleloy, and the remainder of the Battalion remained in reserve at their billets. Owing to a misunderstanding of orders, a platoon of C Company, which was destined to carry trench-mortar ammunition across No Man's Land after the attack had been established in the enemy's trenches, was kept in the front line and suffered very heavily in the bombardment. An intense bombardment was kept up from 11 a.m. till 6 p.m., when the assault was delivered, but owing to the machine-gun fire of the enemy the assaulting Battalion could not get across No Man's Land, and suffered very heavy losses. About 7 p.m. the Battalion was loaded on to motor-buses and moved up towards the firing-line, and was sent up to take over the line held by the Berks and the Bucks. The relief was completed by 11, and at 11.30 the C.O., who had been ordered to remain at the Battle Headquarters, received orders to organize an attack with two companies on the Sugar Loaf, being told that he would find a party of Engineers with consolidating material at a certain point for which he was to provide a carrying company. A and D Companies were selected for the attack, and at 2.15 a.m. the Engineer party had not been discovered. The companies were filing out to take up their positions ten minutes later, when the Engineer officer reported, and stated that he had no material at all. The C.O. just at that moment received an order from the Brigade

[1] Notification was received on the 14th July that the Military Medal was awarded (for conspicuous gallantry on the 28th–29th June) to No. 3174 Sergeant A. H. Prentice, No. 1333 Private H. V. Gardner, and No. 3125 Corporal A. E. Brereton.

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Headquarters that unless everything was ready by 2.30 he was not to start, so the attack was cancelled.

The next few days were occupied in cleaning up and repairing the trenches. 2nd Lieut. Thorne, of the 6th Middlesex, who was attached to the Battalion, made two journeys into No Man's Land during the day, and succeeded in bringing in wounded men on each occasion. On 23rd July the Battalion was relieved by the 7th Worcesters, and the same day took over the Winchester House Section of the Moated Grange sector from the 11th East Yorks. They remained in this trench till 27th July, when they returned to Riez Bailleul, and on 1st August went to Robermetz for divisional rest. That day Colonel Ames gave up the command of the Battalion, and Major G. P. R. Beaman assumed temporary command.[1]

From the Battalion Diary.[2]

August.—The first week of this month was spent at Robermetz, whence the Battalion moved to Laventie, and went into the trenches at Fanquissart on the 9th, remaining there until the 15th, and losing Lieut. Tiddy and 2nd Lieut. Dalton killed. From the 15th to the 21st at Laventie training, and furnishing working parties and patrols. Then back to the trenches until the end of the month.

Casualties.—2 officers and 1 man killed, 3 officers (2nd Lieuts. Benson, Wood, and Roche) and 25 men wounded.

Joined during the month.—Major R. Bellamy, D.S.O. (R. Sussex Regiment), took over the command on the 6th; Captain G. K. Rose, M.C., 2nd Lieuts. Callender, Fowler, Harrington, Benson, and Lyons.

September.—Until the 10th the Battalion was at Robermetz training, and on the 11th took over trenches in the left sub-section of the Moated Grange sector, coming out on the 19th, and going in again on the 29th.

The tours in the line were without incident; 2nd Lieut. Bulmer was wounded on the 13th, and between the 12th and the 30th two men were killed and six were wounded. On the 16th Lieut. K. E. Brown was awarded the Military Cross for good work on the

[1] In July the casualties were 24 men killed, and Captain W. D. Scott, Lieut. Loewe, 2nd Lieut. M. Thorne, and 96 men wounded. The following joined the Battalion: On the 9th, 2nd Lieuts. F. F. Moorat, M. Thorne, E. H. Wood, G. H. Dalton, M. Eden; and on the 12th, 2nd Lieut. Robinson.

[2] A more graphic account of events will be found in *The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry*, by Captain G. K. Rose, M.C. Oxford: Blackwell, 1920.—Ed.

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13th July, and on the 29th 2nd Lieuts. C. B. Hunt and T. W. P. Hawkes joined for duty, and were posted to D and C Companies respectively.

October 1st–31st.—The whole of this month was passed in a similar manner to the month of September, the Battalion being in the Moated Grange trenches and posts from the 1st to the 3rd; in billets at Riez Bailleul from 4th to 9th; trenches again from 10th to 15th; Riez Bailleul, 16th to 20th; trenches, 21st to 27th; and the remainder of the month at Riez Bailleul and Robecq. During the month the casualties amounted to 2 men killed and 11 wounded, and on the 21st 2nd Lieut. Benson was wounded while attached to the Trench-mortar Battery.

November.—From the 1st to the 25th the Battalion constantly moved camp (*see* Regimental Diary at the beginning of this volume), and from the 26th to the 30th was in the trenches, Mouquet left sector, losing 2 men killed and 3 wounded during the month.

December was spent at Hedauville, with one tour in the trenches (Mouquet Farm), when 1 man was killed and 7 men were wounded. On the last day of the year the Battalion received a draft of 102 men.

1917.

January 1st–31st.—This month was uneventful. The Battalion was in reserve billets at Hedauville until the 8th, and then moved to support hutments at Martinsaart. Marched to Puchevillers on the 15th, to Longvillette on the 17th, Domqueur on the 18th, Maison Ponthieu on the 19th, there remaining in rest billets until the 3rd February.

February 4th.—Marched to rest billets at Brucamps, and remained there, undergoing training, until the 12th.

February 13th.—Marched to Longpré, and there entrained at 11 a.m. Detrained at 3 p.m. at Marcelcare, and marched to hutments at Wiencourt, taking over the huts from French troops.

February 15th.—Marched from Wiencourt to reserve billets at Rainecourt, there remained until the 21st, then marched to billets at Herleville.

February 23rd.—The Battalion relieved the 2/4th R. Berks in the left sub-section of the Ablaincourt sector. Dispositions: A Company on the left, C centre, D right, B in support.

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February 24th.—Most of the trenches being deep in mud or water, parties were engaged day and night in clearing up. All companies in the line sent out patrols at night.

February 25th.—1 man killed and 1 wounded.

February 26th.—Our guns shelled the enemy line, but there was no retaliation.

February 27th.—The enemy bombarded our trenches for four hours.

Casualties.—2nd Lieut. A. C. FRY mortally wounded (died next day) and 2 men wounded.

February 28th.—Enemy bombardment of our lines very severe for 3½ hours, and at 6.15 p.m. they raided our trenches, penetrating the centre company front. A counter-attack was organized, and the enemy driven out, but not before he had inflicted heavy casualties, as follows: Officers, wounded, 2nd Lieut. Constable; missing, 2nd Lieuts. Guildford and Hunt.[1] Other ranks, killed 6, wounded 18, missing 19.

Captain G. K. Rose, M.C., commanding D Company, gives in his diary the following account of the German raid on his portion of the line:—

February 28th, 1917.—A fine enough day, somewhat misty. Like others, the dug-out was ominously quiet to start with; a few 5.9's and 4.2's fell in A Company, as far as I could judge. In the afternoon Hunt remarked how quiet it was, and I replied that the worst days were when they started shelling in the afternoon, and, instead of stopping, carried on over dusk. As if to prove the truth of my words, shelling started at about 4.15 p.m.

I went up at once and stood for a minute or two on what I used to term my hat-and-stick stand, an enormous tin, which, I believe, had been a food-container. I was glad I did so afterwards. I saw salvoes of rifle-grenades and small trench-mortars beating tattoos on my front, while much heavier ones were coming down on C Company, though I cannot say definitely that they were on their wire, which was in dead ground from me.

[1] 2nd Lieut. Guildford was captured, together with some 20 men of C Company, in a dug-out in a front-line trench less than 100 yards from the enemy's lines. 2nd Lieut. Hunt was with Captain Rose and D Company when their dug-out was raided. He was wounded by a bomb, losing a finger, but escaped from the dug-out, only, however, to walk into a German listening-post and be taken prisoner.—ED.

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I decided almost at once that an attack was likely, so attended to all requirements. First, to stand-to on the stairs with picked sentries; all men to change their gum-boots. My revolver was, I think, loaded, but I got out the appropriate Véry lights for S.O.S., with the latest directions in front of me. We had some food—biscuits, I think—but no alcohol, though I put my flask of rum in my pocket. I destroyed all maps and documents, except the B.A.B. code and a map or two, which I put in my left pocket, deciding to push them into the mud outside if an attack developed.

We then fell to joking, with intervals on the telephone, which held well. After my report about the trench-mortars, I continued to describe the extremely heavy barrage on us, combined with the fact that the situation was unchanged. I stated that my front was intact, and that I should not, therefore, on that send up any S.O.S.

During the last $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours I had Coles and Timms covering the entrance to the deep dug-out from both doorways, with bayonets unfixed, and a round in, catch up. I did not intend to be caught, and I did not believe that I should be. I was fair game, if the Hun could pierce my precautions and trick my experience.

Hunt was remarkably supine throughout the affair, and I could see that he did not appreciate my precautions. He was plainly bored by the bombardment, which he regarded as certain to lift and stop in good time. I remember extending my hand holding a knife to see if it shook at all; it did not, and I handed the knife to Hunt, who held it equally steadily, remarking that it was easy enough while we were in comparative security. Little, indeed, did he appreciate the hair's breadth that divided us from his "comparative safety"—the few strokes in the Hun gunners' programme that marked their zero!

After dusk began to fall I repeatedly asked Corporal Coles whether the bombardment was lifting at all, and whether he could hear any machine-gun or Lewis-gun fire. He replied "No" on every occasion except one, when he said he thought that it had lifted a little. I went half up the stairs, when a heavy crash convinced me that the barrage was steady and unflinching.

About 6.25 p.m. I decided to risk two men in reconnoitring to my front. Corporal Coles and Timms accordingly dived away, and returned after about 8 minutes. They had been up past No. 15 Platoon, nearly to the front post, and brought back the information (which I telephoned) that the front was intact and that, apparently,

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the wire was intact in front of my posts. A very fine piece of work on their part, performed through heavy barrage.

I will describe first of all what I saw and did during the next few hours, and afterwards supplement it by facts that I subsequently learned from other sources.

At a time which I suppose was 6.45 p.m., I heard shouting and clatter from outside the dug-out, and a voice say, "There are foreigners in the trench."[1] There was already a rush up the stairs being made by those not outside, when I felt a sharp concussion in the dug-out. It blew out the light and knocked me sideways. Things and men were falling, and groans told me that somebody had been hit. I knew at once what had happened, and Death seemed very close, and was then far away again, even as the next bomb came, the brain triumphing over the cowardice of acceptance. I paid no attention to Longford, who shouted out, "Oh, my arm!" or to any of the others who fell and groaned in what was fast becoming a shambles; but I bade all maintain silence to the utmost—for two reasons: I thought the Huns might deem us finished and either go away or come down into the dug-out, and because every outbreak of noise called down more bombs.

I heard Rowbotham say, "Send the S.O.S.," or "Shall I send the S.O.S. ?" to which I replied, "Yes," and Roberts, who was at the instrument, buzzed it through to H.Q. During these most appalling eight minutes (as I estimated it) in reeking darkness, surrounded and implored by wounded, and cumbered by dead, I experienced none of those reputed sensations of drowning men or the like; my mind was more filled with curiosity that I did not get hit, and a continual conviction that I must surely be about the last alive. Meanwhile I took off my wrist-watch: a pity that it should get smashed, and a possible indication of my movements in the darkness. I had drawn my revolver, and meant to fire it at some sort of somebody before I was finished. About 6 or 8 bombs, mostly percussion, but at least one time-fused, were thrown by the Germans.[2] A sulphuric sort of smell then began to fill the dug-out. This I knew to be gas, and, God helping me, I contracted my breathing. I shouted out to Hunt (who had survived the bombs, as I inquired of him after each exploded) that I would try to get out and shoot.

[1] Almost certainly a German pass-word, as such a strange phrase would never be used by our people.—G. K. R.

[2] I waited patiently for a mobile charge to be thrown down. Possibly their avidity for prisoners proved the Germans' undoing.—G. K. R.

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What became of Hunt I don't know, but I pushed past and scrambled over bodies, and seemed literally to swim out of the dug-out as if lighter than air. I came out just right for me, praise be, and just wrong for the Huns. I switched round right-handed at once and fired, at three yards' range, arm extended, at a black outlined group kneeling or crouching over the dug-out. It was a good moment; the finest of my life! A socking thud, heard once, and again when I sorted my impressions afterwards, proved to me that my first shot had hit, while my weapon was still giving its noiseless flashes at where a silhouette had dropped.

I turned again and was gone; a stream of something, running and burning, seemed to pour round my legs for an instant, and a shower of bombs, with pale green flashes, sped my going.

Convinced in my mind that I was the only survivor from my dug-out, I turned down B.C. 4 into the barrage, in order to win through to the platoons in Romains, and bring them up, viâ B.C. 5, to my front, which I made certain was lost. B.C. 4 was an inferno, the trench itself almost impassable, owing to mud and its having been blown in badly, and I alternatively tried going on the top. Not far down, when my first feelings of resurrection and exultation were becoming somewhat cured by the 5.9's, I encountered two figures with fixed bayonets. They were Short [1] and Lovell, and together we went on farther until, in some small dug-outs, I found some machine-gunners who had bolted from their emplacement after having their gun smashed up by a 5.9. They had lost their shrapnel helmets and equipment, and were in a state of bewilderment.

The other entrance to their wretched dug-out, which faced the shells of at least one battery of 5.9's, had already been blown in, and I think one of the men had been killed. I left them at once and climbed on top, when the next minute a 5.9, bursting on the parapet a yard or two in front of me, blew me headlong back again into the dug-out, a man screaming that he was hit. For some moments I wondered if I was smashed or not, my face having received a shower of earth and small fragments.[2]

[1] I learned long afterwards, on Short's return from hospital, that they had left the dug-out before the Germans commenced to bomb it, and had fired at Germans whom they had seen advancing in considerable force over the top from C Company's front. Their musketry had been bad. Short assured me that his finger was on the trigger to shoot as I came upon him, only a fanciful neglect to do so preserving me.—G. K. R.

[2] My face, as it turned out, had only a few minute scratches.—G. K. R.

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Had the refuge been worth a damn I might have been tempted to stay, as I was feeling pretty well knocked up and exhausted with the gas and the shelling; but the place was so obviously useless that the temptation died unborn, and I ordered the machine-gunners (even hatless as they were) to lead the way to Romains. Trenches had become unrecognizable, and we twice went wrong. During this time I learned something about that last plunging rush of a 5.9, when all whistling turns to a roar, that I had not known before, and I knew the feeling of being hit by one from the blasting proximity of these things, when all sight is light, and the earth splashes and foams upon one and around.

Arrived at Romains I found myself clear of the barrage. Ten minutes later a motley handful followed me once more towards the barrage. Sergeant Monby showed devotion and courage, acting as guide and assistant through the mud and confusion—not, it is true, to where I intended to go, but back to B.C. 4.

Throughout all this our artillery [1] had not put over a shell, nor our machine-gun a shot; the only opposition to the Germans being offered by the Sergeant-Major, Uzzell, and myself. Their behaviour I will describe.

At Romains I sent back my first message to H.Q. to the effect that the Germans were in our front trenches, and that I was counter-attacking from Romains. It was received at 8.8 p.m.

When I reached my H.Q. again (about 8.15 p.m.) I found the S.M. and Uzzell outside the dug-out, firing and throwing bombs at some Germans, who appeared to be hanging about in shell-holes somewhere in front. Smith was lying outside the dug-out half-dead already from gas, but the other casualties, Coles (dead), Timms, and Bugler Wright, all of whom had been hit at the top of the dug-out, had been treated to some extent, and were in the dug-out, together with Longford and Thompson, who were wounded when inside. Short and a man named Williams had also been wounded, as I learned afterwards, on the way over from Romains, and a man named Eno had been killed (by a shell, but no mark was found on his body).

With some men from No. 15 Platoon and some of those whom I had brought across I now cleared my left front, with bombers and parapet men, in the approved style. I place the withdrawal of the

[1] It is fair to say that batteries had a very small ration of ammunition that night, and this was further reduced by a very lucky hit on an ammunition dump by the Germans at the outset.—G. K. R.

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Huns at about 8.30, at which time a Véry light fell just beyond my dug-out, and must have been fired up by them to see that they were not being pursued.

My line and wire were intact, and no other casualties had occurred. The posts had been fairly heavily shelled, but the trench was not much blown in. While I was going round the Germans started putting over a lot of gas shells not far away, and helmets had to be worn. I had written a report to H.Q. stating all that I knew—the first knowledge of the facts which they obtained. I found, on my return once more to my Company H.Q., that my dug-out was much the worse for the affair; the table was knocked over, and all kinds of things were splintered, especially the stairs, which were badly knocked about and streaming with blood. The Huns had cut the telephone wires just outside when they picketed the dug-out, so that Roberts's S.O.S. had been in vain.

I learned a few more facts from Uzzell, the Sergeant-Major, Manning, and others. It appears that the Huns rushed several of C Company's posts, leaving out the one on my immediate left. They gassed and bombed the dug-outs, and captured 3 Lewis-guns and about 20 prisoners, besides leaving some ten of C Company killed or wounded. Robinson's dug-out was barraged, but not raided. The Huns, instead, after overrunning all C Company's front, came across and also down a small communication trench, following the southern edge of Peasant Copse, and at once picketed my dug-out and its approaches in force. Some jumped into the trench between me and B.C.4, and threw gas-bombs into the small (servants') dug-out, saying, "Come along out." Uzzell and Manning put on their masks and came into the trench, where Manning was burnt by liquid fire thrown by the Germans. Smith had no mask, and, after reaching my dug-out, must have collapsed under the effects of the gas. Uzzell was knocked out in a bout outside the dug-out, where he was lying in a stunned condition when I emerged, and my firing seems to have helped to bring him to. He said that the German kneeling over the entrance to the dug-out must have been an officer, from the orders he kept giving to the other Germans, some of whom were in the trench, and others on top all round. The Sergeant-Major, at the time when I went out, was putting on his gas-mask, and did not emerge for some minutes later. Rowbotham and the signallers also put on their gas-masks, and Rowbotham put their masks on the casualties. The Sergeant-Major and Uzzell in effect kept the Huns from coming back, and may, with me, have

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prevented them from pushing their success, shall we suppose, as far as Battalion H.Q.

I looked about first for my dead German and then for Hunt, but was astonished to find neither. I feel convinced that the Germans brought a large stretcher and escort party over with them, and disappeared with Hunt and their own wounded (and even dead, perhaps) down the small trench, which provided such an unwanted link between me and C Company.

BATTALION DIARY CONTINUED.

March.—The Battalion came out of the trenches on the 2nd, had one more tour in the line from the 9th to the 15th, and then moved quarters several times until, on the 31st, Caulaincourt was reached. Two men were killed and 6 wounded during the month.

April 1st.—C and D Companies moved to Sailor's Wood, in close support to the 2/1st Bucks.

April 3rd.—Moved up to the line and relieved the 2/1st Bucks in the sector east of Soyécourt; D Company in front-line posts; C in close support; B at railway embankment at Montolu Wood; A and Battalion H.Q. at Soyécourt.

April 4th.—Snowing all day. The front posts were heavily shelled during the morning; 1 killed, 2 wounded.

April 5th.—Enemy's artillery less active; 1 man wounded.

April 6th.—The 184th Brigade attacked the enemy's trenches, 2/5th Glosters on the right, 2/4th Oxford and Bucks on the left. "Zero" hour, midnight. A Company was the attacking company. The enemy wire was found to be uncut; two attempts were made to break through, but without success, and the attacking companies were consequently forced to withdraw.

Casualties.—Lieut. C. J. BARTON and 8 men killed; 2nd Lieuts. J. P. Wayte, R. Aitken, A. H. Tilley and 21 men wounded (2nd Lieut. A. H. TILLEY afterwards died of his wounds).

April 7th–8th.—On relief by the 2/1st Bucks, the Battalion moved to Caulaincourt, except B Company, who went into close support at Sailor's Wood.

April 8th.—Captain H. J. Bennett posted to the Battalion as second in command in place of Major W. L. Ruthven.

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April 9th.—Moved up into the 182nd Brigade area (Marteville) to consolidate and hold a line of trenches west of Holnon Wood.

April 10th.—Marched to reserve billets at Monchy-Lagache.

April 11th.—To Hombleux, where remained in rest billets, undergoing training until 19th, on which date the Battalion marched to reserve billets at Germaine.

April 20th.—The Battalion moved up to Holnon, and relieved the 16th Northumberland Fusiliers (32nd Division) in the support line —left sub-section; A Company in close support to the 2/5th Glosters.

April 21st.—Working on the line of resistance. Holnon was shelled during the night, and Battalion H.Q. were driven out during the early hours of the morning.

April 22nd–25th.—Remained at Holnon in support, working on the line of resistance. Two men wounded.

April 26th.—The Battalion relieved the 2/1st Bucks in the front line during the night; H.Q. at Fayet; 4 men wounded.

April 27th.—Enemy's artillery active; 4 men wounded.

April 28th.—D Company and 2 platoons of C raided the enemy trenches at 4.20 a.m., and reached the second objective, capturing two machine-guns and one German. Our casualties were heavy, viz.: 2nd Lieut. T. H. ALLDEN and 16 other ranks killed, 2nd Lieut. H. S. Taylor wounded and missing, 42 other ranks wounded, 9 missing.

April 29th.—Relieved by the 2/4th R. Berks, and marched to reserve billets. Cepy Farm was entered by a strong patrol of our B Company, and had one or two encounters with the enemy, leaving some killed, and obtaining an identification. Two men wounded.

May 2nd.—Marched into divisional reserve, and billeted at Vaux and Etreillers; H.Q. and A Company at Vaux.

May 3rd–13th.—This period was spent at the above-mentioned places in training and furnishing working-parties. On the 4th the MILITARY MEDAL was awarded to 200084 Sergeant G. W. BUTCHER and 201069 Corporal A. E. SLOPER; on the 5th 2nd Lieut. K. E. BROWN, M.C., was awarded the BAR TO THE MILITARY CROSS; and on the 9th the Divisional Commander presented Parchment Certificates for good service on a Brigade parade held between Vaux and Germaine.

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May 13*th*.—The Battalion marched to billets at Mesnil St. Nicaise.

May 15*th*.—Marched to Nestle and entrained. Detrained at Longueau and marched to Rivery.

May 16*th*.—Captain H. Y. Bennett appointed acting Major while acting second in command.

May 17*th*.—To La Vicogne.

May 18*th*.—Captain G. K. Rose, M.C., awarded the Bar to the Military Cross.

May 19*th*.—The Divisional Commander presented Ribbons on a Brigade parade.

May 21*st*.—Marched from La Vicogne to Neuvillette.

May 23*rd*.—To billets at Barly, and next day to huts at Duisans.

May 25*th*.—Lieut.-Colonel Bellamy relinquished the command of the Battalion, to take command of the Divisional Training School, and on the 26th Lieut.-Colonel H. E. de R. Wetherall, M.C. (Gloucestershire Regiment), joined the Battalion on appointment to command.

May 31*st*.—After a week's training at Duisans the Battalion marched to Tilloy and went into bivouac.

June 1*st*.—Relieved the 13th K.R.R.C. in reserve line trenches, Monchy sector.

June 2*nd*–5*th*.—The Battalion was employed on working and carrying parties, and had the following casualties: 2nd Lieut. Lindsey killed, and 2nd Lieut. Herbert wounded (both on the 2nd); other ranks, 5 killed and 20 wounded.

June 6*th*.—Relieved 2/4th R. Berks in the front-line trenches (Monchy); A Company, left front; C, right front; B and D, in support; 3 men wounded.

June 7*th*.—A Company, pushing forward about 100 yards, under cover of darkness, occupied a line of shell-holes unobserved by the enemy; consolidated them; and dug communication trenches. Two men wounded.

June 8*th*.—A patrol of 5 Germans, unaware of A Company's advanced position, walked into it, and were captured. Two men wounded.

June 9*th*.—The Battalion, less C Company, was relieved, and returned to reserve-line trenches.

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June 10th.—On relief, the Battalion marched to bivouacs at Tilloy. One man killed, 2 men wounded.

June 11th.—Marched to billets at Berneville and remained there, resting and training, until the 23rd.

June 23rd.—Marched to Gouy-en-Artois and entrained. Detrained at Auxi-le-Château, and marched to billets at Noeux, where the remainder of the month was spent. On the 29th the announcement was made that the VICTORIA CROSS had been awarded to Company-Sergeant-Major E. BROOKS, D Company, for gallantry in action at Fayet.

CASUALTIES IN THE 2/4TH BATTALION.

1ST JULY 1916 TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

Killed or Died of Wounds.

Lieut. R J. E. TIDDY.
2nd Lieut. G. H. DALTON.
2nd Lieut. A. C. FRY.
Lieut. C. J. BARTON.
2nd Lieut. A. H. TILLEY.
2nd Lieut. J. H. ALLDEN.
2nd Lieut. P. LINDSEY.
And about 60 Other Ranks.

Wounded.

Captain W. D. SCOTT.
Lieut. L. L LOEWE.
2nd Lieut. M. THORNE.
2nd Lieut. BENSON.
2nd Lieut. E. H. WOOD.
2nd Lieut. J. M. CONSTABLE.
2nd Lieut. J. P. WAYTE.
2nd Lieut. R. AITKEN.
2nd Lieut. S. E. HERBERT.
And about 280 Other Ranks.

Missing.

2nd Lieut. T. W. F. GUILDFORD.
2nd Lieut. C. B. HUNT.
2nd Lieut. H. S. TAYLOR (wounded).
And 29 Other Ranks, some of whom were undoubtedly killed.[1]

[1] According to the Report on Prisoners of War, the Germans captured alive only 22, of whom 6 were wounded (3 dying in captivity).

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HONOURS AND AWARDS.

1st July 1916 to 30th June 1917.

Victoria Cross.

Company-Sergeant-Major Edward Brooks.[1]

For most conspicuous gallantry. This Warrant Officer, while taking part in a raid on the enemy's trenches, saw that the front wave was checked by an enemy machine-gun at close quarters. On his own initiative, and regardless of personal danger, he rushed forward from the second wave with the object of capturing the gun, killing one of the gunners with his revolver, and bayoneting another. The remainder of the gun's crew then made off, leaving the gun in his possession. Company-Sergeant-Major Brooks then turned the machine-gun on to the retreating enemy, after which he carried it back into our lines. By his courage and initiative he undoubtedly prevented many casualties, and greatly added to the success of the operations.

Bar to Military Cross.

Captain G. K. Rose, M.C.
Lieut. K. E. Brown, M.C.

Military Cross.

Lieut. K. E. Brown.

For conspicuous gallantry. Hearing, after a raid, that two officers and some men were lying wounded in "No Man's Land," he at once led a rescue party of about four men, and, under heavy machine-gun fire, brought in an officer and other wounded men. He went out over the parapet at least three times.—(*Gazette*, 20th October 1916.)

Military Medal.

3174 Sergeant A. Prentice.	1758 L-Corpl. T. A. Rowbotham.
1333 Private H. V. Gardner.	200084 Sergeant G. W. Butcher.
3125 Corporal A. E. Brereton.	201069 Corporal A. E. Sloper.

[1] Before the war Sergeant-Major Brooks, who had formerly served in the Grenadier Guards, was employed by an Oxford building firm, and lived at Highfield. He enlisted in the 4th Battalion of the Regiment in October 1914; was promoted Sergeant in May 1915; went to France, and was promoted Company-Sergeant-Major in November 1916.—Ed.

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RECORD OF THE 1/1ST BUCKS BATTALION.
1st JULY 1916 TO 30th JUNE 1917.

(*Maps* 1 *and* 2.)

On the 1st July the Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds (who had succeeded Lieut.-Colonel L. C. Hawkins), moved to Mailly-Maillet for the opening phase of the battle of the Somme. The actual movements of the Battalion during the following year will be found recorded in the Regimental Diary at the beginning of this volume, so it is unnecessary to repeat them here. How the Battalion acquitted itself in the severe fighting of the year will be discovered from the extracts from Lieut.-Colonel Reynolds's narrative which follow:—

LT.-COL. L. C. HAWKINS.
Commanding Jan. to June 1916.

July 17*th*–18*th*.—On this night the Battalion was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance of certain points in the enemy's line between Ovillers and Pozières. The enemy's positions were not known, and the orders received were to find out whether the enemy was holding four points in the area. If these were not held by him, they were to be occupied and made into strong points; heavy fighting was not to be undertaken.

The tasks were allotted to A and D Companies, each company detailing one platoon for each of the points in its sector. Each platoon advanced in two lines of sections in file with a point patrol immediately in front, led by the officer in command, with ten yards' distance between sections. All points were found to be strongly held, and only one point was occupied by us, viz., the

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most easterly point, which was rushed by a platoon of A Company, under 2nd Lieut. B. C. Rigden. After daybreak this platoon was ordered to withdraw. This was done with only slight casualties, although across about 400 yards of open ground. For this 2nd Lieut. RIGDEN was awarded the MILITARY CROSS.

The *casualties* were as follows.—2nd Lieut. C. HALL (A Company), died of wounds; 2nd Lieut. R. C. Norwood (D Company), missing, afterwards reported killed. Other Ranks, 2 killed, 29 wounded, and 27 missing.

July 20th/21st.—On this night the Battalion was ordered to carry out an attack, in conjunction with the 1/5th Glosters and the 1/4th Oxfords, against the enemy positions between Ovillers and Pozières. A, B, and C Companies were detailed for the attack, with D Company in reserve. The enemy trench was about 325 yards distant from our front line. Forming up was done on a taped line 100 yards in front of a trench due east of Ovillers (Sickle Trench). The formation consisted of two companies in front line as follows : each in line of platoons in column of sections, two sections in first line, one in second line, and one in third line. The third company was in immediate support in one line. The attack was, therefore, in four lines, with ten yards distance between lines.

At 2.15 a.m. our troops left our trench to form up. The attack was to be delivered at 2.45 a.m. At 2.35 a.m. very heavy machine-gun fire was opened, and this, coupled with the fact that our barrage opened two minutes too soon and without any apparent effect on the enemy machine-gun fire, resulted in the attack failing. There seems little doubt that the enemy, possibly owing to the bright moonlight, was aware of our intentions.

A few officers and men reached the objective, but of these hardly any returned. The failure of the attack was a great blow to the Battalion, as it was its first serious attack. This, however, was amply compensated for in the next venture.

Casualties :—

Killed.

Captain L. W. CROUCH.
2nd Lieut. J. P. CHAPMAN.
2nd Lieut. C. G. ABREY.
2nd Lieut. C. W. TRIMMER.
And 8 Other Ranks.

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Wounded.

2nd Lieut. H. C. E. MASON.
2nd Lieut. B. C. RIGDEN.
2nd Lieut. H. V. SHEPHERD.
2nd Lieut. A. P. GODFREY.
And 96 Other Ranks.

Wounded and a Prisoner.

Captain G. G. JACKSON.

Missing.

41 Other Ranks.

Total casualties.—9 officers and 145 other ranks.

The following officers took part in the attack :—*Battalion H.Q. :* Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, Lieut. P. L. Wright, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Hales, Captain L. E. Hughes (M.O.). *A Company* (attacking) : Captain N. S. Reid, M.C., 2nd Lieut. B. C. Rigden, C. G. Abrey, 2nd Lieut. H. E. Molloy. *B Company* (attacking) : Captain L. W. Crouch, Lieut. R. Gregson-Ellis, Lieut. R. E. M. Young, 2nd Lieut. H. C. E. Mason. *C Company* (attacking) : Captain G. G. Jackson, 2nd Lieuts. H. V. Shepherd, J. P. Chapman, C. W. Trimmer. *D Company* (in reserve) : Captain E. V. D. Birchall, 2nd Lieuts. F. D. Earle, J. F. Arnott, F. H. Rover.

July 22nd/23rd.—A general attack was delivered this night by the greater part of the 4th Army, and during the attack the Australians captured Pozières. The 145th Infantry Brigade attacked on the immediate left of the Australians in the following order from left to right : 1/4th Oxfords, 1/4th R. Berks, 1/5th Glosters, the Bucks Battalion being in reserve in the Mash Valley, behind Ovillers. The Oxfords and the Berks gained a footing in their objectives, but had very heavy casualties, and were cut off from the Australians by a large stretch of trench which remained in the enemy's hands. On their right the attack by the 5th Glosters was unsuccessful, and they were left, without any communication to the rear, in a very perilous position.

At about 4 a.m. the Bucks Battalion received orders to attack and seize at all costs that portion of the trench previously attacked by the Glosters. Zero hour had been fixed for 6.30 a.m., and there being two miles of strange trenches to cover before reaching the

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jumping-off trench, no time could be lost, and orders were necessarily scanty, much being left to the initiative of the Company Commanders concerned. The attack was one of very great difficulty, owing to the way the trenches ran. The enemy position was a stretch of trench approached by two communication trenches about 400 yards long. The right-hand one was in good condition, and met the enemy's trench at right angles, the enemy having a bomb-stop about 50 yards from the end. The left-hand communicator was badly damaged, and ran at an obtuse angle into the enemy's line.

B and D Companies were detailed for the attack, B on the left, and D on the right. Both companies had to form inwards on the intervening space (about 200 yards). A Company were to be in support in the right-hand communicator.

While getting into position B Company came under a barrage of our own heavy guns, which caused many casualties and resulted in their not being in position in time. D Company, however, under the splendid leading of Captain E. V. D. Birchall, carried out their orders to the letter, and, by dint of advancing practically in the barrage, captured the whole position single-handed. The support company at once moved up to assist. The result of the action was that touch was immediately established with the isolated troops on our right, enabling bombing operations to be carried out by the 143rd Infantry Brigade, and a junction with the Australians was effected.

The following officers were engaged in this attack :—*Battalion H.Q.:* Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, Lieut. P. L. Wright, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Hales, Captain L. E. Hughes (M.O.). *A Company* (in support) : Captain N. S. Reid, M.C., 2nd Lieut. H. E. Molloy. *B Company* (attacking) : Captain O. V. Viney, Lieut. E. N. C. Woolerton, 2nd Lieut. R. E. M. Young, 2nd Lieuts. E. R. Hillman, F. Niall. *C Company* (reserve) : Captain P. A. Hall, 2nd Lieut. E. G. H. Bates. *D Company* (attacking) : Captain E. V. D. Birchall, 2nd Lieuts. F. D. Earle, F. N. Rover, J. F. Arnott.

Casualties :—

Died of Wounds.

Captain E. V. D. BIRCHALL.

Killed.

7 Other Ranks.

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Wounded.

Captain O. V. VINEY.
Lieut. E. N. C. WOOLERTON.
2nd Lieut. R. E. M. YOUNG.
2nd Lieut. F. NIALL.
And 68 Other Ranks.

Missing.

8 Other Ranks.

On account of this operation the following awards were received:—

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER.

Captain E. V. D. BIRCHALL.[1]
Captain N. S. REID, M.C.[2]

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.

Sergeant P. JENNINGS (B Company).
Corporal W. J. BARNWELL.
Bugler J. H. SCRAGG.

RUSSIAN ORDER OF ST. GEORGE, 2ND CLASS.

Corporal W. J. BARNWELL.

The following letter was received by Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds from the Brigade Commander (Brigadier-General H. R. Done) :—

"Please give my heartiest congratulations to all ranks of the Regiment under your command on their gallant and entirely

[1] From the *London Gazette* of 25th August 1916 :—

Capt. EDWARD VIVIAN DEARMAN BIRCHALL, Oxford and Bucks L.I.

For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in action. He led forward his company with great dash under heavy fire, entered the enemy's trenches, and, though dangerously wounded, refused any assistance till assured that the position won was firmly held.

[2] Lt. (temp. Capt.) NOEL SPENCE REID, Oxford and Bucks L.I.

For conspicuous gallantry in action. By promptly bringing up his company he ensured the success of the leading troops, and, after assuming command when his senior officer became a casualty, did fine work in making good the position, in establishing connexion with isolated troops on his right, and in repelling counter-attacks.

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successful attack on July 23rd. By this success, which was obtained in spite of heavy loss, you enabled the Brigade to carry out the whole of the task allotted, and also made secure the position of the troops who had already gained a footing in the enemy's position on your right."

August 13*th*/14*th*.—The Brigade on this night was holding a line immediately west of Pozières and on the extreme crest of the ridge. This trench was known as Sixth Avenue or Skyline Trench. The Australians were on the right, round Pozières Windmill. A heavy

LIEUT.-COLONEL. L. L. C. REYNOLDS.

enemy counter-attack drove back the battalion holding this trench, and at dawn a counter-attack was delivered by the 1/4th R. Berks. The forming-up was observed by the enemy, and the attack failed, with heavy casualties. The Battalion was then ordered to retake this trench, and in the afternoon moved up and relieved the 1/4th Oxfords in Fifth Avenue. The position to be attacked consisted of a trench, about 800 yards long, approached from Fifth Avenue (front line) by two badly damaged communicators about 200 yards long. It was decided to carry out a bombing-attack, for which C Company was detailed.

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The attacking troops worked up the right communicator, and worked outwards, while a bombing section of A Company was to establish a T-head at the top of the left-hand communicator.

The operation was entirely successful, and only slight opposition was met with, the enemy, after throwing a few bombs, running away down the north slope of the hill. Contact was regained with the Australians on the right, and the whole trench, except about 100 yards, was recaptured. Casualties from shell-fire were rather heavy, and, owing to the length of the trench, there were not enough men available to attack this portion, which was very strongly held. This was the situation on the morning of *15th August*. At midday the enemy opened an intense enfilade bombardment on the trench, mostly with heavy guns, up to 12-inch. This continued for nine consecutive hours. At this time Skyline Trench and Fifth Avenue were held by C and D Companies.

The bombardment started on the right and worked along the trench, systematically destroying everything. By 3 p.m. the Battalion was holding only the tops of the two communicators and a few posts in between, casualties being very heavy. These points, however, were held by C Company until 9.30 p.m., when they were relieved by B Company. During the whole nine hours the shelling was terrific, the whole ridge being a mass of smoke and flying earth. No attack ensued, and, shortly after B Company relieved C, the situation became quieter. After dark, in conjunction with the 5th Glosters, a bombing attack was delivered by A Company against the portion of the trench still in the enemy's hands. The attack was pressed with great determination, and casualties were heavy, but success could not be attained owing to the giving out of the supply of bombs, which could not be maintained by the efforts of the exhausted remnants of C and D Companies.

The shelling in Skyline Trench and Fifth Avenue was undoubtedly the heaviest and most prolonged that the Battalion has ever undergone. The endurance of all ranks throughout this was of the very finest.

The officers who took part in the attack of 14th and 15th August were :—*Battalion H.Q. :* Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, Lieut. P. L. Wright, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Hales, Captain L. E. Hughes (M.O.). *A Company :* Captain N. S. Reid, M.C., D.S.O., Captain V. C. Heathcote-Hacker, 2nd Lieut. W. R. Heath. *B Company :* Captain G. R. Crouch, Lieut. R. Gregson-Ellis, 2nd Lieut. E. R. Hillman. *C Company :* Captain P. A. Hall, 2nd Lieuts. E. G. H. Bates, D. Fallon,

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H. M. Breton. *D Company:* Lieut. F. D. Earle, 2nd Lieuts. J. F. Arnott, F. C. Dixon.

Casualties:—

Killed.

8 Other Ranks.

Wounded.

Lieut. F. D. Earle. 2nd Lieut. F. C. Dixon.
Captain V. C. Heathcote-Hacker. 2nd Lieut. D. Fallon.

And 165 Other Ranks.

Missing.

20 Other Ranks.

The following awards were made for these operations:—

Military Cross.

2nd Lieut. J. F. Arnott.

Distinguished Conduct Medal.

2405 Sergeant H. C. Baker. 1247 Sergeant S. G. Bishop.

French Croix de Guerre.

1247 Sergeant S. G. Bishop.

August 23rd.—The Battalion relieved the 6th Glosters in the trenches between Ovillers and Thiepval, with orders to carry out an attack on the enemy's forward positions. A and C Companies were detailed for this attack, which was timed for 3.5 p.m.

From 1 p.m. to 2.45 p.m. the heavy artillery carried out a bombardment which not only had no effect on the enemy trenches, but in fact served to define the precise limits of the objective. At 3 p.m. an intense bombardment was put down for five minutes by the Field Artillery, under cover of which the assault was launched. The barrage was good, but evidently short, as, when it lifted, the attacking troops had still some way to go, and the enemy was manning his trenches thickly, apparently very little affected by it, and firing hard on our men. In addition, the enemy barrage came down immediately after our own.

The result of this was that casualties were very heavy, and progress impossible. 2nd Lieut. Bates, who was commanding C Company, ran forward to try to rush the position, but was instantly

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killed. Company-Sergeant-Major Smith then endeavoured to get forward, but was at once severely wounded. The only other officer in this company was also wounded. On the left A Company's fate was much the same, 2nd Lieut. HEATH being killed and Lieut. M. Bowen wounded. A few N.C.O.'s and men of C Company reached their objective on the extreme right, but were all immediately killed or wounded, Sergeant Bishop alone getting back. The result was that the remnants of the two companies had to lie where they were until dark. Many were killed or wounded by shell-fire and snipers.

Very great gallantry was displayed by the officers and N.C.O.'s, and for this operation and for previous acts of gallantry C.-S.-M. SMITH was awarded the MILITARY CROSS, though, unfortunately, his wounds proved mortal. The losses in the two companies—following so rapidly on the casualties of the previous fighting—were irreparable, and in 2nd Lieuts. Bates and Heath the Battalion lost two very able and gallant officers.

No real gain resulted, except that we captured almost the whole of a diagonal trench running from our centre to the enemy's right, and on the left advanced our bomb-stop some fifty yards. A measure of revenge fell to the Battalion on the following morning, when they caught an enemy relief coming over the open, and inflicted very heavy casualties with Lewis-gun fire.

Officers who took part in the above attack :—*Battalion H.Q.* : Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, Lieut. P. L. Wright, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Hales, Captain L. E. Hughes (M.O.). *A Company* (attacking) : Captain N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C., Lieut. M. Bowen, 2nd Lieut. W. R. Heath. *B Company* : Captain G. R. Crouch, Lieut. R. E. M. Young. *C Company* (attacking) : Captain P. A. Hall, 2nd Lieuts. E. G. H. Bates, H. M. Breton. *D Company* : Captain R. Gregson-Ellis, 2nd Lieuts. J. F. Arnott and F. H. Rover.

Casualties :—

Killed.

2nd Lieut. E. G. H. BATES. 2nd Lieut. W. R. HEATH.

And 24 Other Ranks.

Wounded.

Lieut. M. BOWEN. 2nd Lieut. H. M. BRETON.

And 71 Other Ranks.

Missing.

13 Other Ranks.

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Reviewing the work of the Battalion during the period 14th July to 28th August 1916,[1] its Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, says:—

This period, which covers the whole of the active operations carried out by the 48th Division during the Somme offensive, was the test of the training and work of the Division during the previous 15 months. From this test the Division undoubtedly emerged with the greatest credit, and both in endurance and dash the Bucks Battalion proved to be all that could be desired.

The Battalion's losses during the period were extremely heavy, and many of the finest officers and N.C.O.'s in the Battalion were killed in the severe fighting. Amongst the officers killed were Captain L. W. CROUCH (commanding B Company), who had rendered invaluable service to the Battalion both before the war and on active service, and Captain E. V. D. BIRCHALL (commanding D Company), one of the finest officers the Battalion ever possessed.

The total *casualties* for the period under review were:—Killed or Died of Wounds, 8 officers and 52 other ranks; Wounded, 15 officers and 433 other ranks; Missing, 2 officers[2] and 102 other ranks.

The following congratulatory telegrams in connexion with the operations in which the 48th Division was engaged during July and August 1916 were received:—

From the Reserve Army, 31st July 1916.

"The Army Commander wishes to thank all ranks of the 48th Division for their excellent work during the past ten days.

"By their exertions they have greatly extended our hold on Ovillers, and have directly contributed towards the ultimate capture of Pozières."

From IInd Corps, 28th August 1916.

"The report on the operations carried out by the 48th Division up to the 25th August is an eloquent testimony to the excellent work carried out by all ranks.

[1] For these operations the following awards were eventually made: the D.S.O. to Lt.-Colonel L. L. C. REYNOLDS, and the Military Cross to Captain P. A. HALL, Captain and Adjutant P. L. WRIGHT, and Company-Sergeant-Major A. G. SIRET.

[2] The two officers missing were Captain G. G. Jackson, afterwards reported wounded and a prisoner of war, and 2nd Lieut. R. C. Norwood, presumed to have been killed. Of the fate of the 102 missing other ranks, no official information has been received, and it must be presumed that all were killed.

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"Will you please express my gratitude and thanks to all units under your command for their devotion to duty and for the way they have fought and worked to make these operations so successful. All ranks of the Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry have carried out their tasks with such spirit and co-operation that the results have exceeded expectations. You have all done nobly, and I congratulate you and your officers on the way the Division has worked.

"Your record in the recent operations is first rate.

"C. W. JACOB, Lieut.-General."

From the Reserve Army, 29th August 1916.

"The Army Commander wishes you to convey to the 48th Division his high appreciation of their work during the past fortnight. This Division has fought with only very short periods of rest since the 1st July. Since then it has met and defeated many different units of the German army, and has fully maintained the best traditions of British infantry. This record shows a high sense of discipline and honour in all ranks of the Division.

" N. MALCOLM, Major-General, General Staff."

LIEUT.-COLONEL REYNOLDS'S NARRATIVE CONTINUED.

From this time until the end of the year the Battalion had a considerable period of rest, marked only by spasmodic visits to the line at Beaumont Hamel and Hebuterne. A great deal of marching was done, and new drafts received a considerable amount of training before the Battalion moved into the Le Sars Sector in November.[1] This was undoubtedly the most miserable sector the Battalion was ever in, being under the most complete observation of the enemy, from Loupart Wood, Irles, and several other places, and this observation extended back several miles behind the line. The trenches were full of water, and everywhere falling in; accommodation was most meagre, Battalion H.Q. having to content itself with eight steps of a shaft of an incomplete mined dug-out. Shelling was considerable, particularly at night, and all rations had to be man-

[1] The following statement with regard to the award of the D.S.O. appeared in the *London Gazette* of 14th November: "Major (temp. Lt.-Colonel) LEWIS LESLIE CLAYTON REYNOLDS. He handled his Battalion with great skill and determination. On two separate occasions his good handling has achieved important success."—ED.

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handled at least two miles over ground ploughed up with shell-holes. As far as casualties went the Battalion was unusually lucky ;[1] but the strain and exhaustion was extreme, as even in rest-billets the Battalion was frequently shelled. At this time, too, there was no leave for some four months, so that the survivors of the Somme fighting became pretty well worn out.

After six weeks in the Le Sars Sector the Battalion was relieved on the 15th December and moved to Bécourt, whence, during the last week of the year, it went into billets at Bresle.

1917.

On the *1st January* the Battalion, under the command of Lieut -Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., was in billets at Bresle.

The following officers were serving with the Battalion :—

Battalion Headquarters.

Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., Commanding.
Captain P. A. Hall, M.C., Acting Second in Command.
Captain P. L. Wright, M.C., Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. W. Maggs, Transport Officer.
Lieut. J. B. Hales, Asst. Adjt. and Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. J. E. Firminger, Signal Officer.
Captain L. E. Hughes (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer.
Lieut. and Quartermaster E. Nichol.

A Company.

Captain J. D. B. Warwick.
2nd Lieut. R. B. Cooper-Smith.
2nd Lieut. S. Wiseman.
2nd Lieut. P. A. Coates.

B Company.

Captain G. R. Crouch.
Lieut. M. Bowen.
2nd Lieut. E. R. Hillman.
2nd Lieut. F. G. Vaughan.
2nd Lieut. R. F. Chatham.

C Company.

Lieut. G. V. Neave.
Lieut. G. R. F. Knight.
2nd Lieut. J. M. Tucker.
2nd Lieut. A. P. Darby.

D Company.

Captain R. Gregson-Ellis.
Lieut. H. J. Pullman.
2nd Lieut. J. Jack.
2nd Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier.

[1] 2nd. Lieut. D. Fallon was wounded on the 15th November.—L. L. C. R.

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On the 9th *January* the Battalion marched to Heilly and entrained, detraining at Oisemont, and then marching to billets at Neuville and Forceville. The movements of the Battalion into and out of the trenches during the next two months will be found recorded in the Regimental Diary at the commencement of this volume.

On the 10th *March*, when in the right front line between Barleux and La Maisonette, a gas-shell from a trench-mortar landed in A Company H.Q., resulting in the following heavy casualties :—

Killed.

Captain J. D. B. WARWICK.
2nd Lieut. S. WISEMAN.
2nd Lieut. R. B. COOPER-SMITH.
C.-S.-M. WATTS.
And 14 Other Ranks.

In addition, some half-dozen other ranks had to go to hospital suffering from gas poisoning, due to efforts to rescue the occupants of the dug-out.

The trenches in the La Maisonette Sector (which the Battalion had taken over from the French) were excellent during the long frost, but when the thaw set in their condition became very bad.

Reviewing the events of the eight months ending 19th March 1917, the casualties were abnormally heavy for ordinary trench holding, but the Battalion successfully dealt with the "Trenchfoot" problem, and had only two cases during the whole winter.

The *Casualties* were as follows :—

OFFICERS.

Killed, 3 (Captain WARWICK, 2nd Lieuts. WISEMAN and COOPER-SMITH) ; *Wounded*, 2 (Captain G. R. Crouch and 2nd Lieut. Fallon).

OTHER RANKS.

Killed, 30 ; *Wounded*, 67 ; *Missing*, 2.

2ND LIEUT. S. WISEMAN.

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The following Honours were awarded during the period :—

MILITARY CROSS.

2nd Lieut. D. FALLON.
265939 C.-S.-M. H. WATTS.

MILITARY MEDAL.

266045 Corporal WEST.
265279 Private TWITCHEN.

19TH MARCH TO 30TH JUNE 1917.

From the beginning of the German retirement from the Somme until the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres.

This period is principally important for several minor operations against the enemy posts forward of the Hindenburg Line. In these operations the Battalion was extremely successful in almost every case. The first and largest of these engagements took place on the night of 16th–17th April against enemy lines at Petit Priel and Tombois Farms. Smaller operations were also carried out on the night of 4th–5th June and the night of 7th–8th June.

Operations of 16th/17th April.

The Battalion's objectives were Tombois Farm and the ridge due east of the farm. The 4th Royal Berks were to co-operate with Guillemont Farm as objective, and the 143rd Infantry Brigade were to capture Le Petit Priel Farm and Catalet Copse.

The Battalion's attack was to be carried out by three companies : C (Lieut. J. B. Hales) on the right, B (Lieut. Bowen) on the left, and D (Captain Gregson-Ellis) in echelon behind.

It was a very dark night, with heavy driving rain, and wind blowing directly towards the enemy. Zero hour was fixed for 11.30 p.m. At 11.50 p.m. the enemy opened with machine-gun and rifle fire, putting up numerous Véry lights from the farm and the trenches on either side of it.

At 1 a.m. an orderly arrived from the right company, stating that both they and D Company were held up by wire too thick to get through in the face of the heavy machine-gun and rifle fire; the O.C. C Company was re-forming the two companies at Sart Farm; all D Company's officers had become casualties.

In the meanwhile the left company had got through, and was holding the farm.

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The other two companies were then sent up to consolidate the trenches on either side. An enemy counter-attack was easily held up. At 4 a.m. the Orchard was also cleared of the enemy, and new trenches were dug north and east of the farm. At daylight patrols were pushed out and our line was extended to cover the whole of the objectives, including Catalet Copse and Petit Priel Farm.

The following message was received from the Army Commander (General Sir H. Rawlinson) :—

"Please convey to 48th Division my admiration of their success last night. To have carried out a successful attack on a wide front in the midst of such a storm reflects the highest credit on all ranks, and especially on the leadership of subordinate commanders. My best congratulations and thanks to all troops engaged, including the artillery."

The following officers of the Battalion took part in the above attack on Tombois Farm :—*Battalion H.Q. :* Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., Major A. B. Lloyd-Baker, Captain P. L. Wright, Lieut. H. J. Pullman, Captain L. E. Hughes (R.A.M.C.). *A Company :* Captain N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C., 2nd Lieut. P. A. Coates. *B Company :* Lieut. M. Bowen, 2nd Lieuts. G. H. Johnston, R. F. Chatham, E. H. Fawcitt. *C Company :* Lieuts. J. B. Hales, G. R. F. Knight, F. D. Ollard. *D Company :* Captain R. Gregson-Ellis, 2nd Lieuts. J. Jack, N. S. Flint, B. C. C. Olivier.

All the officers of D Company were wounded, and Captain R. Gregson-Ellis died of his wounds.

Minor Operations of 4th/5th June.

The enemy had established a night post on the west bank of the canal about 250 yards north of the demolished bridge on the Hermies-Havrincourt road and railway which had been causing considerable annoyance.

On the night of the 4th/5th June a platoon, under 2nd Lieut. W. O'B. Rigden, made a reconnaissance, with a view to discovering the exact location of the enemy post, and, if possible, occupying it, and capturing or destroying the garrison.

The Lewis-gun Section took up a position north of the old Prisoners' Cage, situated north-west of the bridge, to give covering fire with two magazines, the stopping of the second magazine to be the signal to assault. Another section moved up the canal bank from the bridge, with the object of drawing the enemy fire, while the other two sections took up a position in the open opposite the

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supposed position of the post. The enemy opened with rifle-fire and rifle-grenades on the section moving up the canal bank. The two sections in the open crawled forward to within 40 yards, and came under heavy fire, which inflicted two casualties. The Lewis-gun fired one magazine, but failed through a misunderstanding to fire the second to give the signal to assault. The enemy fire being heavy, and the enemy 20 to 30 strong and well posted behind the bank over a distance of 100 yards, the officer in charge decided to withdraw, which he did without further casualties, and was able to give the exact location of the post.

Minor Operations of the 7th/8th June.

On the night of the 7th–8th June B Company (Captain M. Bowen) attacked the post with two platoons, having another platoon out covering their left flank opposite the Slag Heap, and the fourth platoon in support.

The attack started at 12.5 a.m. after a five minutes' barrage by one section of 18-prs. in enfilade, a box barrage being also placed around the area concerned.

The enemy opened rifle-fire before the assault took place, but was silenced by Lewis-gun fire from north of the Prisoners' Cage. This was confirmed by an *Unter Offizier* taken prisoner, who stated that the "machine-gun" fire forced them behind the bank, and that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top of them. There was concertina barbed wire in front of the canal bank, but little difficulty was experienced in dragging it out of the way. After the assaulting platoons got in there was a bombing-fight for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in when our men closed with them on the towpath below the bank.

Of the enemy 4 were killed, 4 wounded, and 11 taken prisoners. Our casualties were 3 killed and 10 wounded.

The result of this operation was the permanent occupation of the post, and much valuable information obtained from the prisoners taken.

Copies of the full report on this operation were afterwards forwarded to the units of the IVth Corps, with the following remarks :—

"The Corps Commander considers this report should be circulated down to Company and Battery Commanders, as it is a good example of the co-operation of all arms and of covering fire.

"The action of the Lewis-guns in driving the enemy to take cover and thus enabling our troops to get in is especially good."

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ROLL OF OFFICERS SERVING WITH THE 1/1ST BUCKS BATTALION, 1ST JUNE 1917.

Battalion H.Q.

Lieut.-Colonel L. L. C. REYNOLDS, D.S.O., Commanding.
Major A. B. LLOYD-BAKER, Second in Command.
Captain P. L. WRIGHT, M.C., Adjutant.
Lieut. J. E. FIRMINGER, Signal Officer.
2nd Lieut. W. MAGGS, Transport Officer.
2nd Lieut. G. A. JOHNSTON, Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. and Quartermaster E. NICHOL.
Captain L. E. HUGHES (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer.

A Company.

Lieut. G. F. R. KNIGHT.
2nd Lieut. P. A. COATES.
2nd Lieut. F. M. PASSMORE.
2nd Lieut. F. C. MARSHALL.

B Company.

Captain M. BOWEN, M.C.
2nd Lieut. E. H. FAWCITT.
2nd Lieut. R. E. NORMAN.
2nd Lieut. T. D. DIPPLE.

C Company.

Captain G. V. NEAVE.
Lieut. F. D. OLLARD.
2nd Lieut. A. P. DARBY.
2nd Lieut. W. O'B. RIGDEN.

D Company.

Captain J. B. HALES.
Lieut. H. J. PULLMAN.
2nd Lieut. H. C. E. MASON.
2nd Lieut. C. G. REEVES.

After the raids of the first week of June related above the Battalion continued in the line at Hermies, with rest intervals at Beaumetz and Velu.

The following *Casualties*[1] occurred during the period 19th March to 30th June :—

Killed.

22 Other Ranks.

Died of Wounds.

Captain R. GREGSON-ELLIS.

[1] In Volume XVIII it is intended to give fuller statistics of all kinds, as well as a complete record of services of officers of the Battalion in the field.

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Wounded.

Lieut. N. S. Flint. 2nd Lieut. R. F. Chatham.
2nd Lieut. J. Jack. 2nd Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier.

And 82 Other Ranks.

The following awards were made for the above operations :—

Military Cross.

Captain M. Bowen.

Distinguished Conduct Medal.

265610 Sergeant T. P. Hopcroft.
265146 Sergeant W. G. Saunders.

Military Medal.

265405 Sergeant S. T. H. Woodham,
265296 Private H. E. Cross.
266461 Private A. Herbert.
267533 Private F. G. Seward.

Mentioned in Dispatches.

Captain R. Gregson-Ellis.
265615 Sergeant H. A. Canvin.
265046 Sergeant G. A. Richardson.
265974 Sergeant F. G. Sinclair

COLONEL F. O. WETHERED, V.D.
Commanding Bucks Battalion, 1914–15

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RECORD OF THE 2/1ST BUCKS BATTALION.

1st JULY 1916 TO 30th JUNE 1917.

(*Maps* 1, 2, *and* 3.)

On the 1st July the Battalion was in rest billets at Laventie; on the 3rd went into Divisional Reserve at Fosse, in relief of the 2/8th Worcestershire; and on the 6th moved up into the line, taking over the right sub-section of the Ferme du Bois Sector from a battalion of the 91st Infantry Brigade. Battalion H.Q. were established in a building near Windy Corner, on the road from Richebourg St. Vaast to Richebourg l'Avoué.

FROM THE BATTALION DIARY.

July 9th.—The Battalion has three companies in the front line and one in reserve.

July 10th.—The following 2nd Lieutenants joined the Battalion from the 3rd Wiltshire Regiment: Charles Rich Clutsom, Samuel Archibald Currie Gibson, Harold Rowland Nelson Brewin, Harold Grosvenor Baddeley, Arthur Jospeh Smee, George D'Arcy Wallace Oliver, Frederick Richard Parker, Norman Victor Kent.

July 11th.—2nd Lieut. J. Ward was wounded, but not seriously.

July 12th.—Relieved by 2/5th Glosters, and went into billets at Richebourg St. Vaast, with garrisons for 18 posts; next day, on relief by 17th Sherwood Foresters, moved to Croix Barbée, and on the 15th to billets one mile N.N.E. of Laventie.

July 16th.—The Battalion took up a position in the front-line trenches opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient. The 184th Infantry Brigade issued orders for an attack on the enemy's trenches, with the object of preventing German reinforcements being sent to oppose our offensive in progress on the Somme.

July 17th.—Owing to bad light interfering with the artillery bombardment the attack was postponed, and the Battalion, after

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leaving one company in the line, withdrew to its former billets, but on the following day resumed its position in the trenches, holding a front with three companies.

THE ATTACK.[1]

July 19th.—"Zero" was at 11 a.m., and at that hour the bombardment started.

By 5.30 p.m. we had lost nearly 100 men killed and wounded by shell-fire. This was serious, as on 18th July A Company (which was holding the Battalion front) had lost 78 men gassed, owing to one of our own shells having hit and burst a gas cylinder in our trenches.

The Battalion went into action with 20 officers and 622 other ranks, and these numbers were reduced by casualties suffered during the action to 6 officers and 300 other ranks.

At 5.40 p.m. what was left of A and D Companies (the assaulting companies), viz, about 120 men, filed out into No Man's Land by way of Rhonnda Sap, and lay down in four waves.

At 6 p.m., with a cheer, the four waves leaped up and assaulted the enemy's trenches. Even before 5.40 p.m. the enemy's machine-guns had become busy, and at 6 p.m. they mowed down our advancing waves, so that only a few men actually reached the German parapet, and none of these ever returned.

Quite early (about 1 p.m.) telephone communication between Battalion H.Q. and the front line was cut. After many gallant attempts to mend the wire, success was attained at exactly 5.45 p.m., and from then until 9.30 p.m. the telephone was in constant use, thus saving many lives, in that runners were spared.

Reports that flowed in over the telephone were sent on, as they came in, straight to Brigade H.Q., and were very contradictory. Owing to the distance between the trenches, and to the continuous bombardment and smoke, the officers who were observing found their task almost impossible to fulfil with any degree of accuracy. Our men having been seen actually on the German parapet, it was concluded that a certain number must have got in. But it is certain that very few survived the enemy's machine-gun fire, and whether they got in or not they never returned.

At 6.10 p.m. C Company (carrying our R.E. material for consolidating purposes) went out into No Man's Land, but again the

[1] Written by Lt.-Colonel H. M. Williams and Captain and Adjutant G. E. W. Bowyer.

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enemy's machine-gun fire prevented any advance without extermination.

By 6.30 p.m. it was clear that :—

(1) The attack could not succeed without more men.

(2) Given more men (say two companies) the attack must have succeeded.

No reserves, however, were available, and the C.O. was ordered to reorganize and to attack again at 8.30 p.m. This order was received at a time when every man (save a few telephone operators, orderlies, and wounded) was in No Man's Land; but gradually about 80 men were reorganized, and 40 men of B Company (Reserve) were added.

An order then came postponing the attack until 9 p.m.; but at 8 p.m. this was cancelled, and the order said that no further attack would take place that night.

Every officer who went out with the assaulting companies was either killed or wounded, and Captain H. S. G. Buckmaster was the only officer who went out into No Man's Land and who came back physically unhurt. The casualties during the 18th–19th July amounted to 322 of all ranks.

Killed.

Captain H. CHURCH.
Lieut. C. P. PHIPPS.
2nd Lieut. H. R. N. BREWIN.
2nd Lieut. F. R. PARKER.

And 62 Other Ranks.

Died of Wounds.

Lieut. D. G. CHADWICK.

Wounded.

Captain I. STEWART-LIBERTY.
Captain V. W. G. RANGER.
2nd Lieut. H. G. BADDELEY.
2nd Lieut. A. T. PITCHER.
2nd Lieut. B. H. DRAKES.
2nd Lieut. G. D. W. OLIVER.
2nd Lieut. T. J. RELF.
2nd Lieut. J. S. RUTHERFORD

And 180 Other Ranks.

Missing.

Lieut. G. W. ATKINSON (*believed killed*).
2nd Lieut. R. B. HUDSON (*believed killed*).
And 65 Other Ranks (*all believed killed*).

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The whole attack was unsuccessful in that the enemy's trenches, though penetrated, were not consolidated and held. But, on the other hand, a very great measure of success may be claimed, in that :

(1) The enemy suffered severe casualties.

(2) He was, and will be, prevented from withdrawing either infantry or guns for the support of his forces farther south—on the Somme.

One of the most striking lessons to be learnt from the attack is that the greatly superior method of holding trenches adopted by the Germans should at once be followed by the British and French Armies.

Whereas on our Battalion front the Regiment had not one bomb-proof shelter and lost 100 casualties from shelling alone, the Germans appeared to have some 6 teams of machine-gunners and very few infantry. Even after seven hours' bombardment by our guns these 6 teams of machine-gunners appeared intact, firing over the parapet at our assaulting infantry. By crowding three companies into three hundred yards of front our casualties from shell-fire were the more heavy.

July 20th.—At 1 a.m. the Battalion returned to its billets near Laventie, on relief by two companies of the 2/4th Oxfordshire, and at 10 a.m. was conveyed by motor-bus to billets at Estaires.

July 22nd.—The Battalion was inspected by Major-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., 61st Divisional Commander.

Major L. L. C. Barrett and Captain H. S. G. Buckmaster were invalided to England, the Battalion thus losing the services of the last of its four company commanders.

The strength of the Battalion is now 19 officers and 545 other ranks (on paper).

July 24th.—The Battalion moved to Riez Bailleul.

July 27th.—Two companies went into the line in the Moated Grange sub-section, and the other two companies occupied 10 posts.

July 31st.—Brigadier-General C. H. P. Carter, C.B., C.M.G., handed over the command of the 184th Infantry Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Dugan, D.S.O.

Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Williams gave up the command of the Battalion and handed over to Major G. Christie-Miller.

The Battalion moved into billets at Le Grand Pacaut (one mile south of Merville).

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August 2nd.—The following 2nd Lieutenants of the 9th or 10th Manchester Regiment joined the Battalion for duty: Stanley Mylius, James Kirk, Clifford Foy, Gordon Thorley, and Fred Allen.

August 5th.—Major J. B. Muir (4th Black Watch) took over the command of the Battalion.

A draft of 62 men joined the Battalion from England; 184th Infantry Brigade Sports were held at La Gorgue.

August 7th.—Brigade Horse Show.

A draft of 12 men (some from the 1/1st Bucks and lately fighting on the Somme) joined the Battalion.

August 8th.—Moved into billets just west of La Gorgue.

August 9th.—The Battalion relieved the 2/8th Worcesters in the right sub-section (Fauquissart).

August 10th.—A draft of 35 men arrived.

August 13th.—2nd Lieut. Streat (10th Manchesters) was wounded, having been in the trenches only 6 hours, he having joined the Battalion for duty yesterday.

August 15th.—To billets at Laventie, on relief by the 2/5th Glosters.

August 20th.—One man killed.

August 21st.—The Battalion relieved the 2/5th Glosters in the trenches.

August 22nd.—Enemy active with guns and light trench-mortars, but not doing much patrol work.

August 25th.—At 4 a.m. the enemy suddenly bombarded our right centre company with all forms of hostile weapons. This lasted about half an hour, but was not followed by a raid, as was expected. Our dug-outs and floor-boards were much damaged.

Casualties.—3 men wounded.

August 27th.—Returned to billets at Laventie.

August 31st.—The following Honours have been awarded to the Battalion :—

MILITARY CROSS.

2nd Lieut. (temp. Captain) I. STEWART-LIBERTY.
Lieut. J. E. S. WILSON.
2nd Lieut. A. H. PHILLIPS.
2nd Lieut. B. H. DRAKES.

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DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.

1694 Corporal F. GURNEY.

MILITARY MEDAL.

2129 Sergeant J. PETTY.
3321 Corporal T. OLDROYD.
3395 Corporal S. R. HAYERS.
1636 Lance-Corporal R. FRANKLOVE.
3418 Private W. SANDERS.

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF ACTS OF GALLANTRY.

Captain I. STEWART-LIBERTY.

He displayed complete disregard of personal danger, and, by his fine example under heavy fire, gave great encouragement to his men. He kept them together in the assault under heavy machine-gun fire, and led them to the enemy's trenches. He was severely wounded.

Captain J. E. S. WILSON (R.A.M.C.).

He went up to the front line from his aid-post through a very heavy barrage in order to assist the wounded. By his pluck and skill he undoubtedly saved many lives. He afterwards controlled the evacuation of the casualties under heavy fire.

2nd Lieut. A. H. PHILLIPS.

He went out into No Man's Land to reconnoitre and rally men under very heavy shrapnel and machine-gun fire. He showed great coolness and brought back valuable information.

2nd Lieut. B. H. DRAKES (E. Yorks R.).

He commanded the leading platoon of the assault with great dash, and, though his thumb was blown off early in the advance, he stuck to his command till again wounded in the leg after he had reached the enemy's lines.

Corporal F. GURNEY.

For conspicuous gallantry during operations. He showed the greatest courage and promptness in repairing some apparatus which had been hit by an enemy shell. He also led a bombing party in the assault with great courage.

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September 3rd.—The 184th Brigade was relieved, and went into Divisional Reserve. The Battalion, on relief, marched to billets at Le Grand Pacaut.

September 8th.—A bombing accident occurred, owing to the premature explosion of a bomb. The Battalion Quartermaster, Lieut. D. Waller, the Bombing Officer, 2nd Lieut. A. J. Smee (attached from 3rd Wilts), and 4 other ranks were wounded, while 3 other ranks were killed.

September 11th.—The Battalion relieved the 2/7th Worcesters in the right sub-section of the Moated Grange Section, with Battalion H.Q. at Ebenezer Farm.

September 19th.—On relief, went into billets at Riez Bailleul.

September 25th/26th.—A raid on the enemy trenches was undertaken, but was not successful, and 2nd Lieut. E. H. WALTERS (attached from the Manchester Regiment) was killed. An interesting experiment was, however, tried with the greatest success. A stationary Reconnaissance Patrol was sent out into No Man's Land some hours before "zero" with a telephone. By this means the most accurate information was obtained concerning all enemy movements in No Man's Land, which was of the greatest possible assistance to the party of R.E. who went out and laid the torpedo.

September 27th.—The Battalion returned to the Moated Grange Section, in relief of the 2/5th Glosters. Enemy active with machine-guns and trench-mortars.

September 30th.—Brigadier-General the Hon. R. White, C.M.G., now commands the 184th Brigade, having relieved Brigadier-General Dugan, D.S.O., who was accidentally wounded during Stokes-gun practice at Meurillon.

October 1st–28th.—During this period the Battalion continued to relieve and be relieved by the 2/5th Glosters every 6 days, going into billets at Riez Bailleul when out of the trenches. The only incident of interest was the capture on the 21st October of a German officer, of the 10th Bavarians, who had in his possession some valuable maps.

October 29th.—The Battalion marched to billets near Robecq, where the next few days were spent in training for open warfare. The march was resumed on the 2nd November, and Barly (about 45 miles) was reached on the 6th.

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November 7th.—A draft of 23 men joined the Battalion. Training was resumed. During the recent 5 days' march the Battalion established a record in being the only battalion of the Division who had not a single man fall out.

November 8th–15th.—The week at Barly was spent in training, the officers, when off duty, having the opportunity of enjoying two or three days' hunting with a pack of foxhounds, found in the possession of a farmer in Barly, and said to have been left there by one of our cavalry regiments. The experience, if not unique, was certainly extraordinary, as the guns on the Somme front could be plainly heard while hounds were running.

November 16th.—To billets at Montrelet, and next day to Harponville and Vadencourt.

November 19th.—Marched to billets at Albert (11 miles), arriving with record of marching still unbroken, no man of the Battalion having fallen out during the 90-mile march from Moated Grange to Albert, and the weight carried by each man at the time was between 70 lb. and 80 lb.

Here for the first time the two Bucks battalions met, the 1/1st being in the line near the Butte de Warlencourt.

November 21st.—The 61st Division relieved the 18th Division, the 184th Brigade relieving the 55th Brigade. The Battalion marched to huts at Ovillers, in Brigade Reserve, and remained there until the 26th.

November 26th.—The Battalion relieved the 2/5th Glosters in the Mouquet Farm right sub-section. Intermittent enemy shelling.

November 30th.—On relief, the 184th Brigade went into Divisional Reserve, the Battalion marching to huts in Martinsaart Wood. During the four days in the trenches the Battalion had 2 men killed and 4 men wounded.

December 2nd.—Marched to huts at Hedauville, where the Battalion spent a week training.

December 11th.—Captain and Adjutant G. E. W. Bowyer left the Battalion, for attachment to H.Q. 61st Division, 2nd Lieut. T. S. Markham being appointed Acting Adjutant in his place.

December 12th.—The 184th Brigade moved up into support, the Battalion marching to huts at Martinsaart, where it was employed on various fatigues until the 19th.

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December 20th.—Moved to Wellington Huts, viâ Aveluy, in support (with A Company in Fabeck Trench), and on the 24th went into the line—Desire Trench.

December 25th.—By way of Christmas greeting at 8 a.m. every gun on the Fifth Army front suddenly opened on the enemy with one round per gun. This was repeated at 12 noon and at 5 p.m.

The Battalion, though very wet and muddy, was quite cheerful, and sent a Christmas message to the 1/1st.

December 28th/29th.—Relieved by the 7th Worcesters, and moved to huts at Aveluy.

December 30th.—The 184th Brigade moved back into reserve, and the Battalion marched to billets at Hedauville.

1917.

January 1st–7th.—The Battalion remained at Hedauville training. On the 2nd 31 men joined from the "3rd Line" in England.

January 8th.—Moved into support and occupied huts in Martinsaart Wood, where the whole Battalion was employed on working parties until the 14th.

January 15th.—Marched to Puchevillers for rest and training. The marching-out strength of the Battalion was 678. On the 17th to Gézaincourt, in heavy snow; on the 18th to Mesnil-Domqueur; and on the 19th to Gappennes, our final destination, where the Battalion was accommodated in huts and barns, and underwent training in very cold and frosty weather until the 3rd February.

February 4th.—Marched to Villers (about 12 miles), and spent 8 days there, resting and training.

February 13th.—Marched to Longpré and entrained for Marcel-eave viâ Amiens. Detrained, and marched to Wiencourt Camp, on the 15th moving to Framerville.

February 16th.—The Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 124th French Regiment in Deniécourt northern sub-section.

February 19th.—Relieved by 2/5th Glosters and R. Berks, and moved into reserve.

February 23rd/24th.—Relieved 2/5th Glosters in Spuds sub-section; 4 men wounded.

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February 28th.—The enemy artillery suddenly developed immense activity and bombarded our front for three hours, and then raided the centre company of the Battalion on our left.

March 1st.—Received particulars of yesterday's raid. After heavy bombardment the enemy broke through to our line of resistance, bombing dug-outs, causing over 20 casualties, and taking an equal number of prisoners, including two officers. The raid was on the centre of the front held by the 2/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.[1]

March 2nd.—On relief, marched to billets at Rainecourt, where we carried out a week's training.

March 9th/10th.—Returned to Spuds sub-section, in relief of the 2/5th Glosters.

March 15th.—We attempted a small raid on an enemy post in Sebastopol Trench, but found it strongly held, and we had a corporal killed. At night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/8th Warwicks, and moved to Vauvillers, the 184th Brigade coming out of the line for 12 days' rest.

March 18th.—The withdrawal of the Germans having become known, the 61st Division commenced to move forward, the Battalion marching to Lihons.

March 19th–22nd.—The Battalion continued to advance, halting at Vermandovillers, Bersaucourt, Marchélepot, and Flez and Douvieux. During this period the Battalion was engaged in repairing roads and filling in mine craters. The villages passed through were found in the most deplorable state, the Hun having done every manner of deliberate damage imaginable. Buildings were burnt to the ground, trees cut down, wells contaminated with filth, etc., etc.

March 30th.—The Battalion moved to Montecourt, and next day to Tertry.

April 1st.—The Battalion received orders to move to Soyecourt and relieve the 2/8th Warwicks in the line. Soyecourt was found to be in ruins, but there was a sufficiency of timber and corrugated iron to enable the men to erect shelters for themselves. The Battalion was warned that it would make an attack early the following morning, and in the short time available it was impossible to reconnoitre the enemy position. A reconnoitring patrol, under Lieut.

[1] Captain G. K. Rose's account of the raid will be found in the 2/4th Battalion Record, page 235.—ED.

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Petrie, however, went out at dusk, with the object of discovering if the Montolu Woods were occupied by the enemy, or if he was guarding the approaches to the railway embankment, as the Battalion was to advance over this ground before deploying. A small sentry group was seen in the woods, but disappeared on the approach of our patrol. No other Germans were discovered.

April 1st/2nd.—Brigade orders for an attack arrived late at night, and as zero hour was at 5 a.m. there was little time for the Battalion to complete its preparations. The enemy was holding a line through Binecourt, and thence northwards along a ridge north-east of Soyecourt, with the Binecourt-Vendelles road and the railway embankment in front of the enemy's position. This ridge was to be attacked by the 2/1st Bucks Battalion, the 59th Division co-operating by attacking on the left, while the 2/4th R. Berks and the 183rd Brigade attacked on the right. The dispositions of the Battalion were as follows: C and D Companies were detailed to make the attack, D on the left of C; two platoons of A to cover the left flank; and B Company to remain to hold the original line. The attacking companies were to deploy, at zero hour, from the embankment, while our artillery opened fire on the enemy positions, and the 184th Machine-gun Company supported the advancing infantry with overhead fire.

The attacking companies marched out on to the road just in front of Soyecourt, with Captain Beck (C Company) in command. With C Company there were also 2nd Lieuts. Hughes and Thomas; and D Company had Captain Taylor (in command) and 2nd Lieuts. Gibson and Gill.

During the night Lieut. Wells (Signalling Officer) had laid down a wire line to the embankment as a guide to the direction to be taken. A second line, 900 yards long, was also fixed, and each man held this in his left hand and kept it taut as he advanced. Moving in file the companies reached the point on the embankment, and then, turning right-handed, deployed along it. When this was completed each company had a frontage of some 450 yards, and the deployment was effected with only a few minutes to spare. So far nothing untoward had happened, and everything was quiet, except for a few stray bullets, one of which, unfortunately, killed a man of D Company.

April 2nd.—At 5 a.m. the guns suddenly opened fire, and the men went ahead towards their objective. D Company met with no

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opposition, and as they topped the ridge they were able to see the Germans completely surprised, making off in every direction. C Company was less fortunate, and suffered from two mishaps. First, the men in their eagerness ran into our own artillery barrage before it had lifted forward. Captain BECK was among the casualties. He was wounded in the hand, but continued to lead his men forward with great gallantry until he received a second and mortal wound. The other misfortune which fell upon C Company was caused by another battalion who had attacked and captured Binecourt. Issuing from that village, and following the Vendelles road, a part of the battalion caught sight in the half light of dawn of what they imagined to be fleeing Germans, and immediately opened intense fire with Lewis-guns. As they discovered three or four minutes later, they had been firing into our C Company attacking the ridge, and had enfiladed the line of its advance, high shots also reaching D Company beyond, and causing casualties in both companies. However, in spite of these regrettable incidents, the ridge was carried without any great opposition on the part of the enemy, several of whom were captured, and the positions were consolidated.

Casualties.—1 officer and 8 other ranks killed; 1 officer and 29 other ranks wounded.

April 3rd/4th.—A further advance was made, and after a careful reconnaissance, under 2nd Lieut. Wilkins, Caubrières Wood was occupied. Later in the night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and moved to Caulaincourt.

April 6th.—A congratulatory message was received by the Divisional Commander from the F.M. Commanding-in-Chief, expressing his satisfaction at the recent operations of the Division. The Brigadier, 184th Brigade, also thanked the Battalion for the work performed.

April 7th.—The Battalion moved from Caulaincourt to Soyecourt, and relieved the 2/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry in the line. The latter, with the 2/5th Glosters, had made an attack the previous evening on the ridge along which the Germans had dug their new position, but, owing to the darkness and wire not having been cut, the attack was unsuccessful. It was understood that our Battalion would now be ordered to repeat the attack.

April 8th/9th.—At 11 p.m. a patrol, under Lieut. Foster, went out to examine the German wire, which they found about 10 feet broad, but not insurmountable, except, perhaps, on a dark night.

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Then, finding no enemy about, they went on and clambered into the trench, which was discovered to have been evacuated. After exploring the trench in all directions Lieut. Foster returned with his report, and two platoons of B Company immediately went forward and occupied the trench. The Berkshire on the right and the 59th Division on the left were informed of the new situation, and both moved up to the vacated German positions. At daybreak a party of some seventy of the enemy were seen retiring about a mile away.

April 10th.—The Battalion was relieved in the line by the 18th Highland Light Infantry (of the 106th Infantry Brigade, 35th Division), and moved to billets at Tertry.

2nd Lieut. Pitcher rejoined the Battalion for duty.

April 12th.—Marched to Offoy, on the banks of the Somme. The village had escaped destruction at the hands of the retreating enemy, and the men were able to make themselves fairly comfortable.

April 13th–18th.—This period was spent in cleaning up and training, and on the 19th a move was made to Germaine.

April 20th.—Sergeant O. BALDWIN (B Company) has been awarded the MILITARY MEDAL for daring patrolling and bringing back valuable information.

The Battalion moved into support at Holnon, the left section of the Divisional front. One battalion of the 184th Brigade holds an outpost line about 1,000 yards to the east of the village of Fayet. This line, as well as Fayet itself and the main line of resistance 800 yards in front of Holnon, was all under observation of the enemy at St. Quentin.

April 21st–23rd.—The Battalion was employed each night in digging and wiring the resistance line.

April 23rd/24th.—The Battalion moved up to Fayet, and took over the outpost line from the 2/5th Glosters. The posts occupied by us were eleven in number, the first three in a continuous trench, the others consisting of small isolated traversed trenches. The wire was thin and not continuous.

April 24th.—During the day the enemy artillery was active, concentrating principally on the village of Fayet.

At night 2nd Lieut. Hill took out a reconnaissance patrol, but finding his way barred by a party of the enemy in a small wood had to return.

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April 25th.—The Brigadier now expressed very strongly that an effort should be made to disturb the equanimity of the Germans opposite, and, accordingly, Lieut. Hill was sent out with a strong patrol of 15 men with the object of trying to ambush the Germans whom he had seen on the previous night; but his mission met with no success, although he surprised a party of the enemy in another part of the ground, and got some shots into them as they ran off.

During the night the Battalion took over a fresh line of posts, thus extending the line about 1,000 yards to the south-west, so that Cepy Farm lay just in front of its right flank. This farm had previously been captured by the 32nd Division, who were, however, shelled out of it, and it was not known if the enemy occupied it. As soon, therefore, as we had taken over the new line of posts, Captain Tubbs sent out a raiding party, under Lieut. Pitcher, to clear the farm, but it was found to be deserted.

April 26th.—At 7 p.m. an attack on our posts by a picked German force of stormers, probably about 50 strong, developed. The attack was not wholly unexpected, as the amount of dead ground in front of some of our posts certainly favoured an attack from the direction of Cepy Farm. From the farm a road, running north-west and sunken, passed through almost the centre of our line of posts, but was closed by a barrier which had been constructed between a front held by part of A Company and one held by part of B. From the farm also there was an old German trench, which practically ran the whole way to the barrier. Making use of this trench and the sunken road, one party of the enemy, issuing from the farm, made for the barrier, while another party attempted to surround the adjacent post.

The attack on the post failed, as Corporal Hopcroft got his Lewis-gun at work at once and mowed down the attackers until they desisted, but, unfortunately, being himself killed. Equally good work was done by Sergeant Clark (A Company), who, with two bombers, drove the enemy from the barrier, and inflicted several casualties.

A third enemy party of about 20 men attacked a post a little farther north, but were promptly met by Lewis-gun fire, losing seven of their number before they could get away. The remainder fled to an old German trench close by, but were followed by a party of bombers (under Corporal Brawn), who succeeded in killing five of them and capturing another six. The German attack was thus completely broken up, twenty or more of the enemy having been

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killed, and very few escaping unwounded. The casualties in the Battalion were 1 man killed and 2 men wounded.

We were assisted in repelling the attack by the 184th M.G.C., and by a very good artillery barrage which came down half a minute after our S.O.S. went up.

The same night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and proceeded to Atilly, where the men bivouacked on a railway embankment.

April 29th.—Moved into support (about half a mile forward), but bivouacked outside Holnon, as that place was being subjected to excessive shelling.

April 29th–30th.—At work on the resistance line.

May 1st.—The distribution of the Battalion was as follows: A and B Companies, with Battalion H.Q., in bivouacs on the edge of Bois d'Holnon; C Company, Support Company in Outpost Line; D Company in bivouacs and cellars in Holnon; A, B, and D furnished working parties.

May 2nd.—On relief by the 2/6th Glosters, marched to billets at Germaine.

May 3rd.—Captain G. Stevens rejoined for duty, and was appointed C Company Commander; Lieut. Green joined from England as Quartermaster; and Lieut. Molloy and 2nd Lieut. Rolfe also joined for duty.

Corporal E. WINDSOR was awarded the MILITARY MEDAL for the gallant manner in which he led his rifle-grenadiers in action on the 26th April.

May 4th–8th.—At Germaine, training and finding working parties.

May 9th.—Major-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., 61st Divisional Commander, inspected the 184th Brigade, and handed Presentation Parchments to Private Narinsky, Abrahams, and Kingham, A and B Company runners, for the gallant way in which they carried out their duties during the attack on the 26th April.

May 13th.—Marched from Germaine to the Nestle area, and billeted in Rouy-le-Grand.

May 15th.—The Battalion entrained at Nestle Station for Longueau, and thence marched to billets at Camon (just outside Amiens).

May 17th.—Marched from Camon to Talmas.

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May 19*th*.—The Divisional Commander presented the ribbon of the D.C.M. to C.-S.-M. HEARN and Corporal BRAWN, and that of the M.M. to Corporal WINDSOR for gallant conduct :—

Company-Sergeant-Major T. HEARN.

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He rendered invaluable assistance to his officer in reorganizing the company and superintending the consolidation of the position." (DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.)

Corporal A. BRAWN.

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. A party of the enemy had advanced and occupied a position close to his post. He at once left his post with his bombers, and with great gallantry attacked and dispersed a superior force." (DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.)

May 21*st*–30*th*.—Marched from Talmas to billets at Barly, the Battalion occupying the same billets as in last November, and being warmly welcomed by the inhabitants. On the 23rd to Sombrin, and on the 24th to Duisans, where the Battalion remained six days and was reinoculated.

May 31*st*.—The Battalion moved into dug-out shelters in the old German line just west of Tilloy, near Arras.

June 1*st*.—Relieved the 10th Royal Fusiliers in the vicinity of Marliere and Wancourt (support position).

June 5*th*.—2nd Lieut. A. T. Pitcher and one man were wounded while on working party, and two men of C Company were killed by shell-fire.

June 6*th*.—The Battalion relieved the 2/5th Glosters in the front trenches east of Guemappe, the strength of companies being as follows : A, 110; B, 90; C, 70; D, 90. Sergeant Cross, C Company, was mortally wounded during the relief.

June 7*th*–9*th*.—Weather perfect. Enemy's aircraft active.
Casualties.—1 man killed, 2 men wounded.

June 10*th*.—To Tilloy, on relief by the 2nd London Regiment.

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June 11*th*.—Marched to Berneville. Captain R. F. Symonds was appointed Adjutant of the Battalion. C.-S.-M. ROLFE received the DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL for gallant conduct :—

No. 265490 Company-Sergeant-Major J. H. ROLFE.

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He has consistently performed good work in obtaining valuable information during raids, and has set a fine example at all times."

June 13*th*–22*nd*.—The Battalion remained at Berneville training.

June 23*rd*.—The Battalion marched to Gouy (5 miles) and entrained there for Auxi-le-Château, thence marching to Frohen-le-Grand. The DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL was awarded to—

Regimental-Sergeant-Major E. JONES.

"For conspicuous gallantry in action. He displayed great courage and initiative in reorganizing the battalion during a heavy bombardment. He has at all times set a splendid example."

June 27*th*.—The Battalion moved to billets in Rougefay, where it underwent training for the next four weeks.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES[1] BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

Killed or Died of Wounds.—9 officers and 184 other ranks.
Wounded.—13 officers and about 240 other ranks.
Missing (mostly believed killed).—2 officers and about 70 other ranks.[2]

HONOURS AWARDED IN THE ABOVE PERIOD.[3]

MILITARY CROSS, 6.
DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL, 5.
MILITARY MEDAL, 7.
MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES, 4.

[1] Corrected statistics will appear in a later volume.—ED.

[2] Of these 70 only one was ever heard of as being a prisoner of war, and it is therefore presumed that the others were all killed in action.—ED.

[3] Fuller information is given in *A Record of the 2nd Bucks Battalion, T.F.*, by Captain Ivor Stewart-Liberty, M.C.—ED.

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THE SERVICE BATTALIONS.

RECORD OF THE 5TH (SERVICE) BATTALION.

1st JULY 1916 TO 30th JUNE 1917.

(*Maps* 1 *and* 2.)

LIEUT.-COLONEL W. F. R. WEBB, D.S.O. (Indian Army), continued to command the Battalion until March 1917, when he was ordered to rejoin his own regiment in India, and was succeeded in the command by Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Wood (2nd Battalion). The several accounts which follow give details of twelve months' fighting, as severe as any in which the Battalion had been engaged. Its losses were heavy — more than eight hundred of all ranks— but its glory was correspondingly great.

LT.-COL. W. F. R. WEBB, D.S.O.

LIEUT. AND ADJUTANT S. R. SEBASTIAN'S NARRATIVE CONTINUED.

July opened with several wet days in succession, but the trenches were pretty quiet until the 6th, when things began to tune up.[1] On that day the Germans put about 150 five-point-nines on to the left company, and on the following day gave the centre and left companies some 50 of the same sort. On the 9th and 10th they treated all three companies in the line to some heavy shelling, but

[1] On the 7th July Major G. V. Drury, of the 9th K.R.R.C., joined the Battalion, for duty as Second in Command.

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on the 11th and 12th we had a combined shoot on Beaurains and its park with good results. After that we were relieved by the 5th K.S.L.I. and went back to Arras.

On the 14th July 2nd Lieut. Walrond and 7 men were wounded by shell-fire, near the station, when returning from carrying-party duties; next day the Battalion went up into H Sector for the last time. A Company was heavily shelled on the first day in, but the remainder of the tour was decidedly quiet. We had 4 officers of the 10th Sherwoods (33rd Brigade, 11th Division) attached for two days, and a company of the 6th Lincolns also attached for two days' instruction. On the 22nd July we were relieved by the 6th Lincolns, when our Division came out of the line.

After the relief we marched that night to Agnez-lez-Duisans for a short rest and to refit. The weather was delightful, and every one enjoyed the change. All was well with us then. During our long stay at Arras our casualties had been very few, and everybody knew everybody—both officers and men. We were, indeed, a happy family. And, to add to our merriment, some of the band instruments had now arrived, so that a beginning could be made with the band. The noise at first was a trifle crude, but we liked it because the band was our very own.

Besides ourselves there were some Indian cavalry billeted in the village, and amongst the officers some friends of the Colonel who dined with us. We did a route march and a bit of training, played the Somersets both at cricket and at football, and the Divisional Train at football.

On the 27th July we started on the march again, and found the weather uncommonly hot. That day we marched to Sus-St. Leger viâ Avesnes, Grand Rullecourt, etc., and we made a fatal mistake in that we halted for two hours on the far side of Avesnes for the men to have their dinners. This spelt disaster, for heavy food in the sun is bad. After passing Grand Rullecourt the men began to fall out like flies; the heat was too much for them, and 57 were behind when we got in. We halted on the 28th, and next day marched in brigade to Mezerolles, our packs being carried by lorry. All went well until the battalion in front (whose men were carrying their packs) began to fall out, and then perpetual halts commenced. If it had not been for these delays we should have got in before the sun grew really hot, but as it was, the latter part of the march was simply scorching, and we had between 60 and 70 men fall out. However, we collected everybody

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together for dinner in a wood north-east of the village, and afterwards marched in perfectly fit.

Mezerolles was a charming place, and we did a lot of bathing in the river Authie. The billets were not bad, and there was plenty of shade about. There we spent Sunday, and on the 31st July the Battalion marched to Berneuil, making an early start to avoid the heat, and quite enjoying the walk.

At Berneuil we stayed a week, and got through some useful training, especially wood fighting. One day we were taken to witness a demonstration of a Stokes mortar barrage, which was very fine, but also slightly dangerous, as an officer of the R.B. was wounded (though not badly) when standing behind us, and we were some 500 yards from the barrage. As far as amusements went, we had quite a good time, and played cricket matches most afternoons. Then there was the Brigade Lewis-gun Competition, which the Battalion won; and the end of an enjoyable week found us very pleased with ourselves by reason of a most flattering speech made to us by the Brigadier.

While here we were joined (31st July) by three new subalterns: 2nd Lieuts. B. A. Anderson, J. H. Craig, and N. H. Talbot, who were posted to B, C, and A Companies respectively.

BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

(*Map* 1.)

An outline sketch of this great battle, or rather series of battles, has already been given in the earlier pages of this volume. As will be understood from reading the records of the several Battalions of the Regiment, each unit, at one time or another, and sometimes more than once, entered the battle area, fought its fight, was then relieved, and went back to rest and refit. The 5th Battalion, as will be seen, was thrown in for the attack on Delville Wood in August, and again for the attack on Guedecourt in September, losing altogether, before being finally withdrawn, 15 officers and some 300 other ranks.

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FROM LIEUT. SEBASTIAN'S NARRATIVE.

At last came orders for us to proceed to the Somme. We were to go by train, while the transport of the Brigade was to march, leaving a day before us, and spending the night at Ardonnette, north of Amiens. We got off at 5 a.m. (7th August), and marched to Fernvillers for entrainment, but were kept waiting at the station for some four hours, when the King's Shropshire Light Infantry and ourselves were put into a train made up of 3rd-class carriages—by no means bad. Passing through Amiens we slowly entered the Somme battlefield, when everything became of interest. At Ribemont we detrained, and thence marched to Buire, where we found that the transport had already arrived. Now we really were in the battle area, and all was hustle. The number of troops and the amount of transport on the spot filled us with amazement.

At Buire we established Battalion Headquarters in a house near the church, and the orderly-room in the schoolroom, where the schoolmaster, who was also Maire, transacted official business at the same time as our staff was at work. Some of us were billeted in the schoolmaster's house, while the men and the company officers were mostly in tents. The weather for the next four days was glorious, and we were able to put in some excellent training—amongst other things, practising night advance and digging in

On 11th August Colonel Crosse came over to see us from the 52nd, who were at Treux, on the other side of the Ancre, which flowed between us and them. He told us a lot about Delville Wood, which we had every reason to believe was our destination.

One afternoon some of us went up to a wood to witness British forms of frightfulness for trench warfare, and saw a huge *Flammenwerfer* ejecting a flame nearly a hundred yards in length, and also flaming tubs being thrown from mortars. We marvelled at it all, and were pleased at the knowledge that whatever the Hun might try on we would go one better.

Preparations for fighting now went on in earnest; the matter of equipment was settled; and we had some practice with the new wire-cutter—an ingenious device fixed to the muzzle of the rifle.

After a little less than a week at Buire we got our orders to move up to the forward area, and on the 12th August, passing through Dernancourt, Méaulte, Bécourt, and Becordel, reached the high ground just west of Fricourt, where we relieved a battalion of the

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17th Division, and went into bivouac. On the way up we had passed great ammunition dumps and crowds of Hun prisoners—both most striking. The first view of the battlefield was wonderful; the enormous number of men, the guns, transport of all kinds, the work going on---all on a stupendous scale.

Next to us was an Entrenching Battalion of the Guards, whose work interested us considerably, and we had reason to be grateful to them, for they lent us a hut for our headquarters. Here we remained for about a week, furnishing a few working parties, doing a good deal of training, especially in connexion with the attack, and listening to terrible stories of Delville Wood. We also carried out reconnaissances of the surrounding country, including Montauban and Mametz. From the former place the actual battle-line could be seen, and we were all duly impressed by the sight of it, though it was not long before we made a more intimate acquaintance with it.

After this (*19th August*) we moved up to Montauban with orders to take over a part of the defences there. We relieved a battalion of Bantams, and had our headquarters in an old German bake-house, which might have been a good deal worse.

We now heard that we were for an attack, the object of which was to clear the enemy out of Delville Wood, and so the Colonel, Company Commanders, and I set to work to make careful reconnaissances of our front line—Devil's Trench. The particular work allotted to me was the reconnaissance of certain assembly trenches which were supposed to exist, the finding of a dug-out for H.Q., and the taping of an assembly trench, which had to be dug. Every night and most days we had to find large working parties for digging and also for burying cables. We were seldom shelled here, at any rate nothing to speak of. 2nd Lieut. Styles was wounded on the 21st.

On the *22nd August* we were told that we were to relieve the 5th K.S.L.I. next day on the left of the wood, and on the 24th were to join in the Brigade attack.

The 23rd was spent in fitting out all ranks for the coming fight. This was essential because the stores in bulk could not be carried up to the wood, and, even if they could have been, distribution there was not possible. As dusk came on Captain Neale and I went up with a working party to dig the assembly trench. On the way up I was told to find a guide for a carrying party with stores for us. I tried to do both, but it was a failure.

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As Neale and I were going up the road to Longueval a heavy bombardment and S.O.S. went up from our trenches by Guillemont, some 1,500 yards on our right, and bullets began to whistle all around. Both the parties were rushed into the communication trench (Crucifix Alley) to get cover. Soon afterwards the Germans started dropping shells all over the place, so we decided to wait until they had finished. Presently things quieted down, and we went off with the digging party, but the carrying party got lost. After a great deal of trouble the digging party reached the line, and, leaving them there, I went off to find our headquarters. In the meanwhile the relief was going on without trouble.

Battalion headquarters were in the entrance to an old half-finished Hun dug-out, which went down to a depth of about 15 feet, but as the place consisted of nothing but steps it was very uncomfortable. The worst part of it was that it harboured millions of flies, and these, with their buzzing and their wish to plant themselves wherever they were not wanted, proved a perfect curse until we applied copious doses of creasol and got rid of them. In headquarters there were the Colonel, Captain Walter (Signals), and myself, as well as the R.S.M., some signallers, and some orderlies. Outside were the remainder of the signallers and the police, who were acting as a stragglers' post. Close to H.Q. were various dumps, including water. We were just off and to the left of Crucifix Alley, and not far from the ruins of Longueval church. The Colonel selected this spot for headquarters, in preference to utilizing the former H.Q. (which were more in Longueville), because he knew that the Huns were in the habit of dropping their barrage on the Ginchy Road between it and Delville Wood, and there being no communication trench to it, all communication was certain to be cut off. So we merely established a signal station in the old H.Q., and that the Colonel was right was soon proved, for sure enough the German barrage came down on the Ginchy Road.

ATTACK ON DELVILLE WOOD.

I now give briefly the orders that were issued for our attack. In the preliminary operation orders it was stated that the French and the British 4th Army were renewing the attack on the 24th August; that the 14th (Light) Division would operate in conjunction with the 20th Division on its right, and the 33rd Division on its left; the 20th Division to attack the line Guillemont Station to the

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Guillemont-Ginchy road; and the 33rd Division the new German trench (S.12.c.1.9 to S.11.a.3.3) [1] and Tea Trench. The 100th Infantry Brigade to assault one hour after zero.

The task allotted to the 14th (Light) Division was to attack and capture the line :—

(*a*) T.13.c.0.5 to T.13.c.4.9, and from junction Hop Alley and Beer Trench to junction Ale Alley and Beer Trench. To be carried out by 41st Infantry Brigade.

(*b*) Thence along the line Beer Trench, lying about 200 yards north of the north edge of Delville Wood, to the Flers road, at about point S.12.a.4.3. To be carried out by the 42nd Infantry Brigade.

SUMMARY OF OPERATION ORDERS OF THE 42ND BRIGADE.

The objective of the Brigade is about 1,200 yards long and 500 yards from present front line. Two lines have to be captured before reaching the final objective, viz., Inner Trench, about 150 yards inside the northern edge of Delville Wood, and Edge Trench, on the northern edge of the wood.

Inner Trench, as soon as captured, to be consolidated, to form a strong support line against counter-attack.

Edge Trench to be similarly dealt with, and held at first by strong posts only. Dug-outs to be cleared at once by "mopping-up" parties from each battalion, provided with "P" grenades and bombs.

Battalions to attack as follows :—

9th K.R.R.C. on the right, 5th Shropshire in centre, 5th Oxford and Bucks on the left, 9th Rifle Brigade in Brigade Reserve.

Two machine-guns and two Stokes mortars allotted to each assaulting battalion.

Twenty officers only per battalion to go into action, remainder to be near Brigade Headquarters ready as reinforcements if required.

For two hours before zero intense bombardment by heavy and field artillery, and heavy medium and Stokes mortars. During last quarter-hour of this bombardment Devil Trench to be vacated, and all machine-guns and trench-mortars withdrawn.

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[1] Reference Maps : Guillemont 1/20,000; and 1/10,000, X. 16.

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Ten minutes before zero artillery on Delville Wood will concentrate on Inner Trench.

At zero the assault to move forward steadily behind the artillery creeping barrage, which will commence to lift at five minutes after zero, and will continue to lift 25 yards at a time at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes.

Getting clear of the edge of the wood assaulting waves to re-form, and get up as close as possible to the barrage, ready to rush the final objective immediately the barrage lifts off it. Leading line to be kept strong enough to effect this; other lines, following at not less than 100 yards, not to merge prematurely, and to reinforce only when absolutely necessary.

At 1 hour after zero the barrage on final objective will become intense, and 5 minutes later the barrage will commence to lift (25 yards at a time), finally establishing itself 200 yards beyond the objective, as a protective barrage.

The final objective to be consolidated immediately after capture.

Zero will be 5.45 p.m. 24th August.

Battalions to take up their positions of assembly during the night of 23rd–24th August.

Disposition of machine-guns of the Brigade :—

During bombardment prior to assault.—4 in Devil Support Trench; 2 with each assaulting battalion; 3 in position to barrage 33rd Division front; 2 in reserve (1 each at H.Q. of 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks); 1 with 9th Rifle Brigade in Brigade Reserve.

During assault.—4 in Devil Trench; 2 with each assaulting battalion (1 of which to be left in Inner Trench and 1 to be available for strong point after consolidation); 3 barraging 33rd Division front, as before; 1 with Battalion in Reserve, as before.

After assault and capture of final objective.—4 either in Devil Trench or withdrawn to Brigade Reserve; 6 in strong points on Edge and Inner Trenches; remainder in Brigade Reserve.

[The establishment of a forward dump (water, ammunition, bombs, wire, sandbags, etc.), the work to be carried out by the 89th Field Company R.E. and 11th King's Regiment Pioneers, and minor matters were then dealt with in the orders.]

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SUMMARY OF 5TH OXFORD AND BUCKS LIGHT INFANTRY OPERATION ORDERS.

The Regiment to attack on the left of the 42nd Brigade front, and to secure S.12 central to Flers road.

5th Shropshire L.I. on our right; 100th Brigade on our left.

The Regiment to attack in three lines :—

A and C Companies form the first two lines on a two-platoon front.

D in third line.

B in fourth line, as reserve.

Objectives :—

First line will take edge of Delville Wood, leaving a party of Battalion Grenadiers in Inner Trench to deal with any enemy left behind. Second line to follow (at 100 yards), make certain that no enemy capable of resistance remain in Inner Trench, and then pass on to edge of wood, where Battalion Grenadiers of second and third lines will clear out dug-outs. Third line to follow to N. edge of Delville Wood and secure it, being careful about the left flank in N.W. corner of wood. Meanwhile, first two lines of A and C Companies will reform, and, at lift of artillery barrage, will advance and take final objective, 200 yards outside the edge of the wood.

Duties of B Company (reserve) :—

Move viâ Crucifix Alley as soon as third line has moved forward to front line.

One platoon to occupy and consolidate strong point at S.12 central, and one platoon to dig communication trench to it from front line.

One platoon to be placed at disposal of O.C. Stokes mortars for bomb carrying.

Lewis guns to be established in Inner Trench, one to be at S.12 c. central.

Carry forward bombs and ammunition if required by front line.

Supply carrying parties (water, ammunition, bombs, etc.) at dusk for A and C Companies.

Take charge of defence of strong point S.12.c. central and original front line, in which there will be 4 Vickers guns.

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Communication :—

Runners to be employed.

Flares will be lit on reaching edge of Delville Wood on obtaining final objective at 7.30 p.m. 24th August, at 6 a.m. 25th August.

S.O.S. Signal, one golden-rain rocket.

The above were the chief points in the orders; some other matters of detail were :—

2nd Lieut. Weston-Webb, with some battalion bombers, was to clear a suspected strong point on the left of our line; and Sergeant O'Grady, with the remainder, was to hold the right flank.

Lieut. Rodocanachi commanded C Company; Captain Crawford, A Company; Captain Maude, B Company; and Lieut. T. W. C. Foreshew, D Company.

Before the attack the following points were particularly impressed upon the men :—

1. Take prisoners. If the Germans throw up the sponge, the two front companies to pass right through them and carry on. The support companies collect the prisoners.

2. Follow the barrage as closely as possible, and get out of our trenches quickly.

3. Do not go too fast.

The men did as they were told, and all went well.

Two hours before the time for attack, which was 5.45 p.m., the heavy artillery opened. It turned the wood into a perfect hell. I saw the beginning of it. Trees were flying about like matches, and great columns of earth were thrown up.

The attack started. C Company went straight through to the edge of the wood without any difficulty. A Company lost direction slightly, had all its officers put out of action, met with wire and bombs, but succeeded in getting through. D Company reached the Hun trench, and there knocked out any Huns who showed fight. B Company carried out their orders, and finished off a few more Huns—incidentally, they caught a machine-gun team who were trying to mount their gun.

The Huns showed little fight. As A and C advanced crowds of them came running out shouting "Kamerad." A few tried some dirty tricks after their surrender was accepted, but they received short shrift.

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Then the barrage lifted again, and A and C Companies went forward to their final objective. On their right were the K.S.L.I., and on the left the Worcesters.

About a quarter of an hour later the K.S.L.I. fell back to the German trench, and our right flank was left in the air. At this point 2nd Lieut. Jacks took charge of A Company, and he and Rodocanachi decided to form a defensive flank back to the German trench. The difficulty of labour now arose; there was a shortage of men, and tools were none too plentiful, owing, principally, to C Company not having their shovels tied on to them. Rodocanachi asked the Worcesters for help, and got from their Brigade (33rd) a working party of R.E., who helped to dig the defensive flank trench.

In the meanwhile we in H.Q. had been having a poor time, since we could get no news. The first we received was from a man who came down in charge of a party of prisoners, and who told us that all was going well. Then, later on, we had a message from Rodocanachi to the same effect. After a while came word that the K.S.L.I. had fallen back, and in another two hours 2nd Lieut. Tompkins came to H.Q. to explain the situation. By this time Walter and I had gone off down the line to try to get information, and when I returned the Colonel ordered me to find out full particulars as to what had happened, to tell the K.S.L.I. that they must hold on, and to help with the consolidation.

I was accompanied by the Colonel's servant, Private Wiley, a first-rate orderly, who had been with the Colonel all along and knew his work thoroughly. On reaching the old German trench I found that the consolidation of D Company's part (the right) was being carried out well by 2nd Lieut. Ashman, the only officer left in the Company, who had done good work all through, and who had commandeered some K.S.L.I. men to help with the defensive flank. Thence I went on to the front line, where I found Rodocanachi and Jacks quite comfortable.

I returned to H.Q. with Captain Walter, and on the journey back had rather a curious experience. As we were coming into our old support line we heard some one crying, and, thinking that there might be a wounded man lying out, we made a search. Eventually we came across a very young Hun standing in the trench and crying bitterly—apparently absolutely finished, though without any signs of being wounded. Not knowing what tricks he might try on when he recovered himself, we decided that it would not be wise to leave him to his own devices, so made up our minds to take him along

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to the police. Neither of us could speak his language, but Walter suggested that there was a word "Vorwärts," which meant "get on." So we told him to "Vorwärts," but he would not budge, and the more we told him the harder he cried. We felt really quite sorry for the poor fellow, and, by holding on to the back of his coat, I half pushed and half carried him along until, in the end, he collapsed altogether, and we were obliged to leave him. After reporting at H.Q. I came back to look for him, and found that he had died, presumably from some form of heart attack, brought on, doubtless, by the heavy bombardment.

The enemy's artillery was not very efficiently handled on this occasion. When our heavy bombardment had been in progress for about a quarter of an hour the Huns let loose with barrage-fire on the Longueval-Ginchy road, and kept it up for nearly five hours. They altered the whole appearance of the ruins of Longueval village, and they hit the dug-out any number of times, causing us intense annoyance by perpetually putting out our candle. No barrage started on our trenches until ten minutes after the attack had gone forward, when they were, of course, too late. They shelled the edge of the wood, but did not cause us many casualties, as our men were either well inside or out of it altogether.

The following is the Colonel's official report on the operations :—

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS OF ATTACK ON DELVILLE WOOD, 24TH AUGUST 1916.

1. Regimental Orders for Operations are attached hereto. These orders were given verbally to Company Commanders, and subsequently confirmed in writing.

2. Preparations for attack were as follows : On the 23rd instant I was informed that withdrawal from front line would be necessary for the bombardment, and that it could not be used as an assembly trench. I therefore requested that a line should be dug during the night from S.11.d.6.1 to S.18.a.0.85, which work was excellently carried out by the 11th King's Liverpools. A party of the Regiment also dug and improved a trench from S.17.d.6.8 to S.17.d.7.7. Lees Trench from S.18.a.1.7 to Longueval Alley was also improved, and the Regiment was enabled to assemble in these and existing trenches in order of assault.

Battalion Headquarters were in Crucifix Alley, near Longueval Church, at about S.17.b.85.40.

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Telephone communication was established with Brigade Headquarters and visual station in Longueval, and an earth buzzer was installed.

Dumps of ammunition, bombs, water, etc., were established in original front line and in Crucifix Alley in vicinity of Battalion Headquarters.

Medical Aid Post was in a trench at the shrine on Crucifix Alley S.17.d.1.0.

Tapes showing direction of assault were put out by first two lines during night 23/24th August.

3. At 3.45 p.m. (24th August) the bombardment of German lines in Delville Wood commenced by the heavy artillery, and, from observation, appeared most effective.

At 5.45 p.m. the leading line of the assault left their trenches, and were followed by the second and third lines, as directed in Regimental Orders.

The first line was enabled to get close up behind the barrage before it lifted, and at the lift advanced and carried the enemy first line (Inner Trench) and passed on, behind the barrage, to the edge of the wood.

The second line, dropping the bombing squads previously detailed, followed, and merged into the first line outside the edge of the wood.

Under cover of the artillery barrage these lines re-formed, and awaited the lift of the artillery.

Some casualties occurred during the advance. A heavy shell on the extreme left of the line caused some casualties amongst the bombers, and some others occurred from splinters, or from the enemy barrage, which opened at 5.35 p.m., as soon as our intense barrage commenced.

Enemy appear to have barraged in two lines—on our original front line, and also on the assembly trenches in rear, but it was not in sufficient density to stop the succeeding waves, which advanced in good order in spite of some casualties. Enemy barrage was heavier on right of attack than on the left, which was comparatively free from shell-fire.

Enemy were holding Inner Trench in force, but were much demoralized by our bombardment, and surrendered to the first lines without much difficulty, with the exception of about 50 men with a machine-gun, who commenced to fight after third line had passed.

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These men commenced to fire at the leading lines from the rear and at the fourth line, but were speedily put out of action or captured by a part of the fourth line, under Lieut. Anderson (B Company), and a section of the Brigade machine-gunners.

The company forming the right of the first and second lines (A Company) suffered a good many casualties in this first advance, and all their officers were put out of action. The company forming the left of the line (C Company), with the exception of casualties to the bombers who were on their left by the shell mentioned, advanced without much difficulty, taking prisoners on the way, and reached the edge of the wood at 6.5 p.m. They were then some little distance from the Flers road. A small party of the enemy was left in the gap caused by the casualties to the bombers, and gave some trouble until cleared up by C.-S.-M. Hill and a few men.

The third line (D Company) followed the second line at a distance of about 100 yards, and, not finding the enemy trench on the edge of the wood, commenced to consolidate Inner Trench. One platoon of this company lost direction slightly, and met some men of the 9th K.R.R.C. who had come too far to the left, but subsequently rejoined their company. Five officers and 200 prisoners were taken in Inner Trench.

The fourth line (B Company) moved as directed in orders and occupied S.12.c. central, and commenced consolidation and construction of communication trench to old front line. Stokes mortars and carrying parties for bombs were somewhat disorganized by enemy party cleared by Lieut. Anderson, and did not come into action.

The first and second lines reorganized meantime outside the wood in one line in the most perfect order, the conduct of the N.C.O.'s of A Company (particularly Sergeant Lewendon) being most noticeable in this respect; and, on the barrage lifting at 6.40 p.m., advanced and seized the final objective (7.5 p.m.), establishing communication with the 100th Brigade on the left, and the 5th K. Shropshire Light Infantry on the right, and commenced to dig in about 200 yards outside the edge of the wood.

At this period the 5th K. Shropshire Light Infantry, finding that the attack of the 9th K.R.R.C. had failed, and that their right flank was exposed, retired to the edge of the wood. This was carried out in good order, but left the right flank of my battalion in the air.

The officer commanding the first line (Lieut. Rodocanachi) seeing this, sent an officer to find out what had happened. This

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officer (Lieut. Jacks) restored the line by forming a defensive flank with some of the 5th K.S.L.I., aided by a platoon of D Company, from S.12 central southward to Inner Trench, and consolidated this line. The conduct of Lieut. Ashman in reorganizing his company and part of the 5th K.S.L.I. on new front was also very noticeable.

Meanwhile B and D Companies consolidated Inner Trench, in spite of barrage fire, which was considerable and especially heavy on the northern angle of the wood.

The Vickers gun of the Brigade Machine-gun Company advanced as ordered, and was established in S.12.c. central; the other gun suffered casualties, and was unaccounted for for some time. I sent forward the reserve gun to take its place, which was established in Inner Trench, and subsequently all three guns were installed there.

Telephone communication broke down between Battalion Headquarters and Brigade as soon as enemy barrage commenced; a heavy barrage was put up on the line Longueval Church, south edge of Delville Wood. The special earth-buzzer was read at the visual station for some time, but subsequently ceased to act. So all communication was made by runner. The visual station could not be reached or worked, owing to barrage on Longueval. Information from front line, though somewhat delayed, was good, and a fair idea of the situation was obtained from wounded officers passing through and from an officer sent down by Lieut. Rodocanachi to explain the situation with regard to the 5th K.S.L.I. The Adjutant, Lieut. Sebastian, made an excellent reconnaissance at about 2.30 a.m., and confirmed reports previously received as to the situation of the line.

The front entrenched by the first line was extensive, and valuable assistance was afforded by a R.E. Company of the 33rd Division, lent by a battalion of the Worcester Regiment, on the Flers road. A platoon of the 100th Brigade held a portion of the trench on the road.

During the morning of the 25th August enemy registered the new line, and at about 8.30 p.m., evidently fearing an attack in the evening, he opened a heavy barrage-fire from guns of various calibre on our new front and on the old front line.

Prisoners captured were of 119th and 121st Regiments.

When final objective was reached many men were seen retiring in the open, north-west of Flers road, and fired upon. Our artillery barrage, Lewis-guns, and snipers inflicted heavy casualties on these parties.

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

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DIGGING A COMMUNICATION TRENCH IN DELVILLE WOOD.

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During the morning of the 25th enemy were seen entrenched to N.W. of Flers road, probably Tea Support, and attack was at one time thought imminent. They appeared subsequently to be working on the trench.

Good visibility is now possible on the Switch Line trenches and Flers village.

Trenches at S.12.a.9.2 appear old gun-emplacements, as shells in baskets could be seen standing in the vicinity.

Casualties in the Battalion are estimated at: Officers, 2 killed, 1 missing, and 6 wounded; and 160 other ranks killed, wounded, and missing. Some of these occurred on the 25th instant.

W. F. R. WEBB, Lieut.-Colonel,
Comg. 5th (S) Bn. Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

27.8.16.

I have extracted the following from the official documents of the Battalion :—

5TH BATTALION CASUALTIES, DELVILLE WOOD, 24–25TH AUGUST 1916.

Officers Killed.

2nd Lieut. G. BRADLEY. 2nd Lieut. H. WESTON-WEBB.

Wounded.

Captain C. B. CRAWFORD. 2nd Lieut. H. W. ROBINSON
Lieut. T. W. C. FORESHEW. 2nd Lieut. G. B. DE PASS.
2nd Lieut. C. A. CLUTSOM. 2nd Lieut. A. L. THOMAS.
2nd Lieut. B. A. ANDERSON.

Missing.

2nd Lieut. N. H. TALBOT.[1]

N.C.O's and Men.

Killed, 42; wounded, 111; missing, 7.

Total Casualties.

10 Officers; 160 Other Ranks.

[1] 2nd Lieut. Talbot was subsequently presumed to have been killed. He was seen coming down from the front line wounded in the arm, and it is thought that in passing by Crucifix Alley to the dressing station he encountered an enemy barrage. As it was believed that he had gone down country with other wounded, no special search was made for his body, and the Battalion left the area in the firm belief that he was still alive; but he was never heard of again.—S. R. S.

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The following were recommended for good services in the action of 24th August: Lieut. THEODORE RODOCANACHI, M.C., 2nd Lieut. OLIVER LAWRENCE JACKS,[1] 2nd Lieut. BASIL ARTHUR ANDERSON,[1] 10908 C.-S.-M. CHARLES ARTHUR HILL,[1] 10896 Sergeant A. W. LEWENDON,[1] 6346 Lance-Corporal G. KENYON,[2] 16434 Sergeant F. B. B. BLAKE, 11383 Private J. COOK, 16667 Private J. DUCKWORTH, 10484 Sergeant J. A. HOLT, 6077 Private W. DICKER, 17458 Private E. W. MORLEY.

Regimental Orders of 2nd September 1916 contained the names of N.C.O.'s and Men "mentioned," viz.:—

FOR GALLANT CONDUCT.	FOR EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD WORK.
A Company.	
10896 Sergeant A. W. Lewendon.	11382 Private L. Hughes.
10233 Sergeant H. Newman.	11579 Private J. E. Pritchard.
21766 Lance-Corporal J Blackaby.	19080 Private J. Holloway.
	11480 Private E. Vines.
	11293 Private G. Brown.
B Company.	
10484 Sergeant J. H. Holt.	9182 Sergeant W. Russel.
16667 Private J. Duckworth.	8223 Lance-Corporal G. Cappell.
17396 Private C. Morley.	18460 Private H. Mills.
	7954 Private A. Felton.
	17470 Private W. East.
	9510 Sergeant K. Grant.
C Company.	
10908 C.-S.-M. C. A. Hill.	10715 Lance-Corporal R. G. Cox.
16434 Sergeant F. B. B. Blake.	10638 Corporal S. Dyas.
11019 Sergeant H. Vaughan.	
D Company.	
10975 Lance-Sergeant G. E. Colley.	7570 Sergeant C. Bignell.
11383 Private J. Cooke.	19517 Private J. Moulton.
6077 Private W. Dicker.	16542 Private F. Stokes.
	18986 Private F. Hodges.

To continue: On the night of the 24th/25th the Brigadier placed Colonel Morris, of the 9th R.B., in command of the K.R.R.C. and K.S.L.I., with orders to clear the N.E. corner of Delville Wood at all costs. Accordingly he put in some bombers at the Cocoa Lane end, to work down the trench, and reported that no Germans were left in the wood. Later on the 10th D.L.I. (43rd Brigade) discovered Huns at this corner of the wood, and finally turned them out of it by a bombing attack across the open.

[1] Awarded Military Cross. [2] Awarded Military Medal.

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Next morning (25th) all was pretty quiet, but in the afternoon the enemy put in some very heavy shelling, and though there were some casualties, not much harm was done. We were now informed that the Battalion would shortly be relieved by the K.O.Y.L.I. (43rd Brigade). The relief took place without incident, although at one time things looked ugly, as the Huns started an intense bombardment of the wood generally. We were a long time getting away, chiefly owing to the large working parties moving about in the wood.

Passing through Montauban on the 26th we picked up our Lewis-gun hand-carts, and marched back to our old camp near Fricourt. Next day we were moved to Pommier Redoubt (near Montauban) to act as reserve, and a vile march we had, with rain coming down in sheets. Fortunately it cleared up in the afternoon, but all the trenches and dug-outs were running with water. Close by we found our 6th Battalion in bivouac.

On the following day (28th August) the 9th R.B. relieved us, and we returned once again to our Fricourt camp, where we remained a day, and then got orders to go into rest. The day of relief was soaking wet and most unpleasant, but we got away, and marched to Dernancourt for the night. Thence, on the 31st, we marched to Albert, where we took train for our rest area.

We (and I think I may speak for the whole of the 14th (Light) Division) left the Somme feeling extremely proud of ourselves, because we had carried out the allotted task—the clearing of Delville Wood, which had previously defeated no fewer than five other Divisions.

In the Battalion we were particularly proud, for we knew that we had made a really good show, and we considered that our casualties were extraordinarily light. The Battalion had been well tried in action, and every one came out of it with a contempt of the Hun as a fighting man.

After a hot journey we detrained at Arraines, some 30 miles west of Amiens, and marched about 9 miles to Epaumesnil, where we spent a delightful ten days' rest in a lovely country and perfect weather. This gave us an opportunity for a thorough reorganization, and we received drafts, to the number of about 320 (from our 3rd Battalion, our Territorials, and the Sherwood Foresters), who settled down to business very rapidly. Regimental-Sergeant-Major Arlett also joined here.

Much training was carried out, and some sports were held, the Battalion distinguishing itself by winning the Brigade Relay Race.

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A few officers managed to get off to the seaside (Le Treport) on 48 hours' leave, and altogether we thoroughly enjoyed our rest, and carried away with us pleasant recollections of the time, perhaps because it was here that we started (for the first time since leaving England) a battalion officers' mess, which proved an immense success, as was only natural considering the excellent feeling that existed among the officers.

The ten days passed all too quickly, and we were ordered up to the Somme again, this time to take part in the great attack of 15th September.

We sent off the transport the day before, and in the early hours of the morning of the 11th September we marched to Arraines, where, after the usual wait, we entrained. At Mericourt we detrained and marched to some high ground to the south-west of Albert, where we bivouacked for a couple of days, and then moved into tents at a spot near our old Fricourt camp.

On the evening of the *12th September* we received a reinforcement of officers, under Captain G. G. Knighton. Amongst them were the following : Lieut. W. C. Rowe, and 2nd Lieuts. W. C. Lester-Smith, A. H. B. Brooke, C. Atkins, T. Hutchinson, C. C. Harper, C. J. Vidal, W. G. T. Clifton, W. G. Holiday, J. J. Rose, P. Seccombe, J. H. F. Scott, W. T. Brindley, and some six of these were allotted to companies for the coming action.

On the 14th operation orders were issued. As before, I give a summary of them, though I have thought it advisable to enter rather more into detail than I did in the case of the attack of the 24th August :—

SUMMARY OF OPERATION ORDERS.

(14TH SEPTEMBER.)

Objective of 4th Army.—To attack enemy's defences between Morval and Martinpuich, with object of seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Guedecourt,[1] and Flers, and thus breaking through enemy's system of defence.

The French and Reserve Armies are attacking simultaneously on our right and left.

[1] The capture of Morval was allotted to the 6th Division ; Lesbœufs to the Guards ; Guedecourt to the 14th Division ; and Flers and beyond to the 41st Division and New Zealand Division.—S. R. S.

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14TH (LIGHT) DIVISION.

To capture Guedecourt, and establish a line to north and east of it, about 2,200 yards long, and distant from north edge of Delville Wood 3,500 to 4,000 yards.

On the way four definite objectives to be attacked and captured, viz. :—

(*a*) Switch Trench (Enemy 3rd Line).
(*b*) Gap Trench.
(*c*) Gird Trench.
(*d*) Gird Support (about 1,800 yards long, and 3,500 to 4,000 yards north of Delville Wood).

41*st Infantry Brigade* to capture (*a*) and (b).

42*nd Infantry Brigade*, the remainder, 9th Rifle Brigade and 5th Shropshire L.I., capturing (*c*) and (*d*), and the final objective being allotted to 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks.

On the right of 14th Division the Guards' Division (XIVth Corps) will be operating, and on the left the 41st Division.

42ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Assembly Positions :—

(*a*) 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I. York Alley and the Check Line between Trones Wood and Crucifix Alley.
(*b*) 9th K.R.R.C. Montauban Alley, between Bernafay Wood and S.27.b. central.
(*c*) 5th Oxford and Bucks Montauban defences.

Machine-guns and trench mortars.—Two of each to proceed with each battalion. The remaining guns of the 42nd Machine Gun Company to act as follows : (1) 6 guns to follow about 400 yards in rear of 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks, take up positions in Gird Trench until Guedecourt has been reconnoitred, and then move forward to positions selected by O.C. Machine Gun Company; (2) 2 guns to remain in Brigade Reserve, and await orders from Brigade Headquarters.

Artillery Bombardment commenced on 12th instant, and takes place daily from 6 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. At zero on day of attack field artillery opens intense bombardment all along the line.

Movements of 41*st Brigade.*—At zero advance on Switch Trench as close as possible behind the barrage, which moves in front of

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them at 50 yards a minute. "Mopping-up" parties deal with Pint Trench—Tea Support. Brigade halts in Switch Trench until 60 minutes after zero, when barrage starts creeping to Gap Trench, with 41st Brigade following close behind.

Movements of 42nd Brigade.—At zero 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I. advance, and 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks move up into York Alley and the Check Line.

At 1 hour 45 minutes after zero 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I. form up in rear of Gap Trench, ready for further advance; 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks form up clear and N.E. of Delville Wood.

At 2 hours after zero the 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I. advance, keeping as close as possible to barrage. On reaching the line of road from N.33.c.2.0 to N.31.b.4.0 they establish themselves and re-form for capture of Gird Trench. The 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks form up, with their leading lines about 400 yards in rear of the rear lines of 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I.

At 4 hours 30 minutes after zero 9th R.B. and 5th K.S.L.I. advance, following barrage, capture Gird Trench, and consolidate. 9th K.R.R.C. and 5th Oxford and Bucks push on close behind barrage, capture final objective, and dig in at once, under cover of machine and Lewis-guns.

Bombardment of Guedecourt ceases at 5 hours 30 minutes after zero.

O.C. 5th Oxford and Bucks to detail special garrison for defence of Guedecourt.

Other instructions dealt with "mopping-up" parties, protection of flanks, communications, signalling, medical arrangements, etc., and separate memoranda attached to Operation Orders described the "new engine of war—'The Tank'—to be used for the first time," and its tactical employment.

Then followed appendices, the more important of which related to things to be carried into action by assaulting battalions, and methods of communication between infantry and contact aeroplanes.

To be Carried by each Assaulting Battalion.

Each Battalion carries: 240 tools (60 per company), 20 drums per Lewis-gun, with a battalion reserve of 48 drums, 10 complete S.O.S. signals (2 per company and 2 Battalion H.Q.).

Each Officer and effective N.C.O.: 1 ground flare and 6 Véry cartridges.

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Each N.C.O. and Man: Rifle and equipment, less pack; 220 rounds S.A.A. (N.C.O.'s 120 only); haversack on the back containing 2 tins meat and 8 hard biscuits (exclusive of emergency ration); 1 full water-bottle; waterproof sheet with jersey rolled inside fixed on back of waistbelt by the supporting straps of the pack; two sandbags carried under the flap of the haversack; 2 Mills grenades (No. 5), one in each lower jacket pocket, except N.C.O.'s; 2 smoke-helmets.

Each Bombing Squad (8 squads per battalion): 40 Mills grenades (No. 5); 32 Mills rifle-genades (No. 23); 24 rifle-grenades (No. 20); 12 Fulmite grenades; 12 "P" grenades; 400 S.A.A. rounds.

SUMMARY OF 5TH OXFORD AND BUCKS LIGHT INFANTRY OPERATION ORDERS.

1. General Idea.—41st Brigade, 2 battalions capture Switch Line; 2 battalions capture Flers Defences (Gap Trench); a Brigade of the 41st Division is responsible for capture of Flers.

42nd Brigade, 2 battalions capture Gird Trench and Gird Support; 2 battalions capture line N.33 central—N.27.a.6.0—N.20.d.5.6.

2. 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry capture Guedecourt, and establish themselves on left sector of final objective, N.27.a.6.0 to N.20.d.5.6. The 9th K.R.R.C. seize the right final objective.

3. Regiment to assemble in Montauban Defences prior to advance. Order of companies right to left, D, B, A, C, and Headquarters.[1] Formed up ready to move by platoon files, two platoons at a time, at zero, and move independently, taking up artillery formation south of York Trench.

4. At 1 hour after zero advance in artillery formation; four lines, two companies in first two lines, two in second two lines; each company on a two-platoon front in platoon files at 100 paces interval and 100 paces distance between lines.

B and D in front line, B on the left; C and A in second line, C on the left. Battalion bombers form a separate file in centre of third line; remainder of H.Q. a separate file behind Battalion.

[1] Captain Walter commanded D Company; Captain Maude, B; Captain Neale, A; Lieut. Rodocanachi, C; Headquarters, Colonel Webb, Major Drury, and myself.—S. R. S.

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5. Move to Crucifix Alley, through N.W. corner of Delville Wood to Cocoa Lane. Continue in this formation to Gap Trench. The right now directs on Ginchy-Guedecourt road; interval increased to 150 yards from the right. Still in artillery formation, pass through 41st Brigade, and continue to advance to the line of Bulls Road, where leading battalions of 42nd Brigade will be waiting for barrage to lift.

Do not merge into these battalions, but follow with the leading line 300 yards distant from the rear of 5th K.S.L.I.

Barrage lifts at 4 hours 55 minutes after zero.

At Gird Trench first and second lines extend to the left, pass through 5th K.S.L.I., on to Gird Support; then pass through leading line of 5th K.S.L.I., and wait for barrage to lift.

At 5 hours 30 minutes after zero barrage lifts, when first and second lines capture the final objective—Guedecourt.

The third and fourth lines remain in platoon files, unless forced by the situation to extend.

6. Guedecourt to be attacked by B and D Companies, first line moving through the village, second line clearing it up. Platoons of third-line companies move round flanks of villages, coming up into line on the final objective, and connecting by posts with units on left and right. Fourth line remains in reserve on the line of the road running through N.26 central, N.W. and S.E.

7. Lieut. Jacks, with the Battalion bombers, responsible for clearing enemy from Guedecourt cellars, etc.

[Then follow various instructions for carrying the operations through by making a resolute continued advance, and finally a warning that troops must conform to the barrage and not to the "Tanks."]

So much for the Orders. Now for what happened: Late in the afternoon of the 14th September the Battalion moved to the Brigade dump to draw stores. Owing to the appalling congestion on the roads, with a cross-current of traffic, the march was most troublesome, but eventually we drew stores, and equipped, in the dark.

As it fell to my lot to write the official report on the operations I give it in full.

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OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 15TH, 1916.

Map Ref. Albert, 1st Edition, $\frac{1}{40,000}$.

At 6 p.m., 14th instant, Battalion left Camp F.13.d. and marched to F.6.c., near Montauban-Mametz road, to equip for attack. On completion Battalion moved to orchard in S.27.c., near Montauban, and bivouacked for the night.

At 3 a.m., 15th September, Reveille; 4.15 a.m., tea issued; 5 a.m., Battalion moved off, and formed up in artillery formation of platoon files just north of York Alley, S.23.a. and c., with its left resting on road from Longueval to Bois de Bernafay; B Company on left, D Company on right, C following B, A following D; Stokes gun, H.Q.; 2 Vickers in 5th Line from left to right.

In front were the 5th K.S.L.I. with 9th R.B., and on our right the 9th K.R.R.C. behind R.B.

At about 6 a.m. Colonel Webb was wounded by shrapnel bullet, but continued to lead the Battalion.

At zero hour (6.20 a.m.) the Battalion moved off in a N.N.E. direction.

Before reaching Delville Wood the battalion had to split to avoid several batteries of field guns, and joined up again when the wood was reached.

Just inside the wood the leading man of A Company was shot dead by a German who had previously surrendered. The German was shot.

As the last line cleared the wood a few 8-inch shells fell in Longueval and on the Longueval-Guillemont road behind the wood, but did no damage.

The Battalion in the same formation, almost without a halt, continued its march up to the Switch Line between about T.1.c.25 and T.1.d.13, under the personal lead of Colonel Webb, who was in front watching the direction taken. During this march no barrage of any intensity was met with, although a few 4.2 and 7.7 mm. fell just outside the wood

A Tank, out of action, was seen at T.13.a.55. On arrival at Switch Trench the Battalion came under machine-gun fire from the direction of Lesbœufs, but received some protection from the 9th R.B. and 9th K.R.R.C., and suffered few casualties. The Battalion extended and continued its advance, with Colonel Webb in the centre of the second line still directing, until Gap Trench was

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passed between about T.1.a.43 and T.1.b.51, and a line about 300 yards short of Bulls Road, N.31.b.50 to N.32.c.65, was reached about 9.10 a.m., when the Battalion halted. During the advance from Switch Trench enemy were seen moving guns back, and a Tank was observed to engage two batteries in Bulls Road, in which encounter it was set on fire and destroyed after silencing one battery.

During the advance to Gap Trench the 9th R.B. and 9th K.R.R.C. suffered heavily from the machine gun fire, especially with regard to officers, and the 9th R.B. could not advance beyond Gap Trench.

Between Switch Trench and Bulls Road the Battalion came under heavy field-gun fire from Bulls Road and Guedecourt, but, fortunately, had few casualties.

Beyond Gap Trench the two right platoons of A Company were sent up to the right of the Battalion to make connexion with the 9th K.R.R.C., as direction had been lost slightly. These platoons found no one on their right flank.

In this position, under very heavy shell-fire, the Battalion waited until 10.50 a.m., when the 5th K.S.L.I. and 9th R.B. were due to advance to take Gird Trench and Gird Support, between about N.26.a.12 and N.33.c.55.

After waiting a little time an officer went to the O.C. of the 5th K.S.L.I. and asked what had happened, and if he intended to advance.

It was then discovered that one company only of the 5th K.S.L.I. was in front, and that no one was on our flanks. The situation, therefore, was that we, with this one company of the 5th K.S.L.I., were in this position, with no one on either flank. Under these circumstances Colonel Webb decided to advance up to the line held by the K.S.L.I., and dig in there. He ordered A Company to dig in between the 5th K.S.L.I. and the Cross Roads N.32.c.; B and D to make front and support lines between the 5th K.S.L.I. and Road Junction 31.b.51.

On B and D Companies advancing the remaining battery ceased fire. Shortly afterwards a white flag was seen near the battery.

The line then lay across Bulls Road at N.31.d.59½—d.68, and thence to Cross Roads.

About noon the 9th K.R.R.C. came up on our right flank and joined at the Cross Roads.

At 12 noon the enemy in great numbers were seen advancing from Le Transloy, and occupying Gird Trench and Gird Support.

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At about the same time troops were seen advancing towards the flank of the 9th K.R.R.C. from a south-west direction, but these shortly afterwards retired.

Whilst the enemy were advancing our field guns were silent, and, in spite of two S.O.S. rockets, no fire could be got on to them. It turned out afterwards that the majority of the field artillery covering our front were moving forward at the time.

At about 12.15 p.m. Colonel Webb was again wounded, and forced to hand over the command to Major Drury.

At 2 p.m. barrage on Gird Trench and Gird Support was renewed.

At 2.50 p.m. a Brigadier-General of the 41st Division came to Major Drury and asked him to co-operate in an advance to a line N.31.A.0.1.0–N.31.b.40, to protect our left flank. Two platoons of A Company, who were still behind B Company, advanced on the right of the 41st Division, but as these began moving off in a N.N.W. direction, and were to be relieved by a new Brigade, the Company Commander (Lieut. Rodocanachi), after consultation with a Staff Officer of the 41st Division, decided to stop and protect our flank, which was being uncovered.

At 5 p.m. the enemy began assembling for a counter-attack against our right company and the 9th K.R.R.C. This attempt was frustrated by our rifle and Lewis-gun fire.

At 7.20 p.m. a platoon of C Company with one Lewis-gun under a Captain of the Royal Fusiliers dug a trench round the 7.7 mm. battery aforesaid, which was under the control of D Company.

At about 8 p.m. a Company Commander of the 9th K.R.R.C. came to A Company Commander (Captain Neale) and informed him that the Guards, who had apparently joined up, were falling back 400 yards, that he was following, and that A Company was to conform.

Captain Neale refused to retire. Later, other messengers brought the same news, and asked him to retire, but he still refused.

Shortly afterwards the same Company Commander of the 9th K.R.R.C. sent a message to Major Drury with the same information, and asked him to retire, but was told that we would not.

This company of the 9th K.R.R.C. then retired, and also the Vickers that was guarding our flank, but Major Porter, commanding the 9th K.R.R.C., ordered them back, and sent to say that he was not going to retire.

At about 3 a.m. (16th instant) we were relieved by the 43rd Brigade, and went to Montauban.

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At the time when the Battalion was relieved it had destroyed in Bulls Road one mitrailleuse, and had control of eight 7.7 mm. guns in the same place.

S. R. SEBASTIAN, Lieutenant and Adjutant,
5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

30.9.16.

With regard to the above a few explanatory notes may be of interest: When the attack started the 6th Division failed immediately, and thus exposed the flank of the Guards, who suffered heavily, and who lost direction by going too far to the east. This exposed our right flank, so that during our advance all the way up to Bulls Road our Division had nothing on this flank. At one time the Guards were seen coming up towards our right flank, but, meeting a heavy enemy barrage, melted away. Our left flank for some time was also exposed, owing to the fact that the 41st Division were unable to hold Flers. They had entered the village as we crossed Switch Trench, but the Hun artillery made the place too hot for them, and they were forced to clear out. At about noon, however, they came up again, and eventually joined up with us, Flers being retaken by a Tank.

Between 7 and 8 p.m. the Guards occupied Switch and Gap Trenches to our right, and put out outposts in continuation of the line held by us. The outposts were withdrawn at about 8 p.m.

The 9th K.R.R.C. did not advance with us from Gap Trench, but came up on our right some three hours later. At 8 p.m. they fell back, but came up again afterwards.

I mention these points to show how the 14th Division became isolated, and I may add that, in spite of its isolation, it succeeded in holding on to all the ground gained. It received special congratulations because it went farther than any other Division; it cleared the north-east corner of Delville Wood which had been reoccupied by Germans while we were in rest; and, by capturing Switch and Gap Trenches, opened the way for the attack which took place ten days later.

I fancy that the actual capture of Guedecourt on the 15th was nothing more than a wish. Given luck it might have been captured, but that it was not captured was due, I think, principally to the three following causes:—

1. Lesbœufs, which was not attacked, was on high ground dominating Guedecourt.

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2. The heavy barrage on Gird Trenches was to lift at about noon. Long before this the 9th R.B. and the 5th K.S.L.I. had been checked, and although we ourselves might have tried to rush through, there was the great danger of running into our own field artillery barrage, and the further danger of catching the enemy barrage from the direction of Lesbœufs, and thereby being cut off.

3. With the exception of one battery our field guns were unable to move forward east of Delville Wood on account of the state of the ground and the heavy shelling on the Longueval-Flers road.

Be all that as it may, the fact remains that next day (*16th September*) the 43rd Brigade tried three times to get Guedecourt, and failed.

As my report says, after our relief in the early hours of the 16th we marched back to Montauban, the last of the Battalion arriving there at about 8 a.m. Then came the counting of the casualties, which included Colonel Webb, Captain Maude, 2nd Lieuts. Atkins, Beaver, Brooks,, and Turner wounded; other ranks, about 30 killed and 120 wounded.[1]

We had not much of a rest, for at about 3.30 p.m. we received orders to hold ourselves in readiness to go up to the line again in the following message from 42nd Brigade H.Q. :—

"Under orders received from Division, the 5th Oxford and Bucks and 5th K.S.L.I. are placed at the disposal of the 43rd Infantry Brigade. These two battalions will prepare to move forthwith, and inform this office when ready to do so. Separate instructions have been issued as to stores to be carried up by each battalion. Acknowledge."

This was followed very shortly by other messages which stated that the attack on Gird Trench and Guedecourt was to be resumed that evening; that the creeping barrage would lift off Gird Trench at 6.55 p.m., and off Guedecourt at 7.35 p.m.; and that the 5th Oxford and Bucks and 5th K.S.L.I. would support the 43rd Brigade in the attack, the former relieving the 8th R.B., and the latter the 8th K.R.R C. (41st Brigade) in Switch Trench.

Half an hour later this was altered, and the 5th Oxford and Bucks and 5th K.S.L.I. were detailed for the attack on Guedecourt, but

[1] The rewards given for the 15th September were : D.S.O., Lieut.-Colonel WEBB ; MILITARY CROSS, Captains MAUDE, NEALE, and WALTER ; D.C.M., Corporal MILLS ; BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL, Sergt. LEWENDON ; MILITARY MEDAL, Privates DANKS, SMITH, ENDICOTT, and some eight others.—S. R. S.

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at 5 p.m. the order for Guedecourt attack was cancelled, the intention now being to capture Gird Support, and push patrols into the village of Guedecourt.

Immediate steps were taken to get ready for the move, and the Battalion paraded for the march up. As the men passed a point, stores were issued to them and forthwith fixed on, and the Battalion proceeded to the rendezvous.

In my opinion this march up was a wonderful performance. Not a murmur was heard, and the men went forward almost as if they were pleased to be at the Hun again. We heard afterwards that the Brigadier had watched us go by, and had said that a battalion capable of marching up in such a manner could do anything. What the Battalion had already gone through must be remembered : On the 14th all-day preparations for the operations, equipping and marching to the rendezvous, with at the most four hours' sleep. On the 15th advancing some 2½ miles over heavily shelled ground, fighting, and digging-in. Night of 15th/16th no rest possible, and on relief a march back of about 3½ miles over bad ground. On 16th could not settle down until 9 a.m., and turned out between 3 and 4 p.m.

OPERATIONS OF 16TH/17TH SEPTEMBER 1916.

Whilst the Battalion was forming up, Major Drury and I went to H.Q. 43rd Brigade, under whom we were placed. There we received orders to put half the Battalion in Gap Trench and the other half in Switch Trench (2½ miles from Montauban), thereby occupying the right half of the Divisional area. The K.S.L.I. were to be on our left, and we were to act as support to the 43rd Brigade battalions who were in Bulls Road.

The Battalion moved forward, in lines of platoons, through Delville Wood. After going a short distance we ran into a row of field guns, which started barrage fire. We wheeled to the right then to the left, and a half-left-wheel brought us into position. What happened after this will be discovered from the official report sent in to the 43rd Infantry Brigade by Major Drury :—

ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS, NIGHT 16TH/17TH.

5.30 p.m. Received orders in your B.M.34. Occupied right of Gap Trench with 2 companies, and right of Switch Trench with 2 companies and H.Q.

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Patrols ordered to go from each of Gap companies to Bulls Road and forward, to ascertain position and to continue doing so hourly. Patrols similarly ordered from Switch companies to go to Gap Trench.

10.30. Officers Patrol reported [1] your Brigade had taken Gird Trench but not Gird Support, and that plenty of troops were in Gird Trench and Bulls Road. Sent you our OXA-2 at 10.40.

10.40. Message to a Colonel of your Brigade: "Understand you have sufficient force to hold Gird Trench and Bulls Road. Am remaining in support, in Gap Trench 2 companies and Switch Trench 2 companies. 5th K.S.L.I. have similar force."

1.30 a.m. Received your B.M. 29, 31, and 32. Post made on flank as ordered, and connexion made with Guards' Division who were holding Gap Trench as front line. It is doubtful if the trench in which this post was made is Gas Alley, but the post made connexion between the front line and the Guards. Post handed over to 13th Northumberland Fusiliers.

2.25 a.m. Received message from O.C. 10th D.L.I. stating that O.C. Flers believed enemy intending to counter-attack at 2 a.m., and that he required support.

Gap companies, with 1 Vickers gun, ordered to occupy Bulls Road, and to report to O.C. 10th D.L.I., and to return to Gap Trench if O.C. 10th D.L.I. stated in writing that they were not required. O.C. 10th D.L.I. informed that one company from Switch Trench has been sent to Gap Trench.

Two companies returned to Gap Trench, as Colonel Stokoe stated in writing they were not required. One company withdrawn to Switch.

2.53 a.m. sent you my OXA-10 on situation. About 5.30 a.m. 12th Northumberland Fusiliers relieved Switch Trench.

1st Lincolns did not arrive to relieve Gap Trench, but relieved Irish Guards.

Explained situation to O.C. 12th Northumberland Fusiliers, and asked if he objected to Gap Trench being left vacant. As he raised no objection, we evacuated the portion held by us.

G. V. DRURY, Major,
Comg. 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

17.9.16.

To 43rd Infantry Brigade.

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[1] There is reason to believe that this report was incorrect.—S. R. S.

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We had been told at about midnight that the 62nd Infantry Brigade would take over the trenches during the night, but a counter-attack being expected at 2 a.m. (17th September), the relief was not completed until some hours later, and then there was a hopeless muddle, because we had been informed that we would be relieved by a battalion which had received orders to relieve a battalion of Guards on our right. However, as Major Drury's report shows, we succeeded in getting away just before daylight, and marched to Pommier Redoubt, where we had some food, and went straight off to sleep, every one being pretty well done up.

During the afternoon of the 17th we marched to our camp near Fricourt, and were greeted by our Band making a strange but pleasing effort to play the "43rd March."

Next morning we had heavy rain, and in the afternoon we moved to a camp near the Amiens-Albert road (D.18.a.), and a bad camp at that—all mud, and wholly insufficient cover from the rain, which continued to be most persistent.[1]

After three days' stay we were informed that, on the following day, we were to be bussed up north to an unknown destination, and on the 21*st September* the whole Brigade was conveyed in French buses to Grand Rullecourt, thus concluding our experience of fighting on the Somme.

The Battalion had lost 3 officers killed and 12 wounded. But it had done really good work, and had helped to add honour and glory to the 14th (Light) Division.

For the fighting on the Somme the following awards for acts of gallantry were made to Officers, N.C.O.'s, and men of the 5th Battalion: One D.S.O., five Military Crosses, two D.C.M.'s, and twelve Military Medals. Many more were "recommended," as will be seen from the list for the 24th August and from the list of recommendations for Guedecourt (15th September) as follows: Captain EDWIN WALTER MAUDE,[2] Lieut. CECIL HASTINGS WALTER,[2] Sergeant ALBERT WALTER LEWENDON,[3] Corporal VICTOR MARK MILLS, Lance-Corporal HERBERT SMITH.

The remainder of 1916 was uneventful for us, as we did nothing beyond holding quiet trenches in front of Arras, furnishing working parties, training, etc., most of the time being spent at Dainville, Agny, Gouy-en-Artois, Dernier, Sars-le-Bois, and Arras.

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[1] 2nd Lieut. Fitzgerald joined here.—S. R. S.

[2] Awarded the MILITARY CROSS.

[3] BAR TO THE MILITARY MEDAL.

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During these three months the following officers joined the Battalion : 2nd Lieuts. H. R. Parker, J. R. Stammers, J. Stevens, J. R. Peel, R. E. D. Hall, and V. W. Pearson.

On the 27th December Lieut.-Colonel W. F. R. Webb rejoined, on recovery from his wounds, and took over command of the Battalion from Major Drury, who shortly afterwards went to England.

1917.

The Battalion had its full share in the fighting of the first half of this year, suffering the inevitable heavy casualties, but adding still further to its splendid reputation. It took part in the great British offensive which opened on the 9th April, on a ten-mile front, from the south of Arras to the south of Lens; and it was engaged again in the next great offensive on the 3rd May in the same area, losing no fewer than 185 of all ranks in the former and 300 in the latter.

Extracts from the Battalion Diary.

On the 1*st January* 1917 [1] the Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. F. R. Webb, D.S.O., was in the trenches in the neighbourhood of Dainville, near Arras, and on that day was relieved by the 9th Rifle Brigade. During the remainder of the month the Battalion and the 9th R.B. relieved each other every six days, the periods out of the trenches being spent at Dainville or at Agny. Nothing worthy of record occurred, and there were no casualties, although, on the 29th January, the enemy was very active with *Minenwerfer* for some three hours.

The changes among the officers during January were as follows :—

On the 11th, 2nd Lieut. J. L. Bulmer joined and was posted to A Company; on the 12th, 2nd Lieut. J. J. T. Rose went on leave, prior to transfer to the R.F.C.; on the 15th, 2nd Lieut. F. E. Borman joined (C); on the 17th, 2nd Lieut. G. H. E. Palmer joined (B);

[1] *New Year's Honours Gazette:* Captain F. T. Neale and Captain and Adjutant S. R. Sebastian awarded the Military Cross; 7570 C.-S.-M. C. Bignell the Médaille Militaire. The following were mentioned in Dispatches: Q.-M.-S. J. Manton, C.-S.-M. C. Bignell, Sergeant W. A. Russell.

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on the 20th Lieut. W. A. Ford rejoined and took over command of C Company.

February was as uneventful as January, the time being spent in a similar manner.[1] The following officers joined or rejoined the Battalion: On the 16th, Captain Rodocanachi, Lieut. Robertson, 2nd Lieuts. R. A. Buttery and J. H. Jackson; on the 20th, Captain C. B. Crawford and 2nd Lieut. Gray.

March 1st–15th.—The Battalion had one tour of the trenches, losing 1 man killed and 5 men wounded. On the 15th marched to Sombrin, and went into training for the coming offensive.

March 17th–31st.—This period was devoted to strenuous training, including a rehearsal of an attack on the Harp, the German trench system east of Arras at the junction of the front-line system and the Cojeul Switch. On the 17th Major A. T. Mossop joined, but left on the 24th for duty under the A.P.M. at Arras. On the 18th Lieut.-Colonel W. F. R. Webb was ordered to rejoin his own regiment in India, and handed over temporary command of the Battalion to Captain and Adjutant Sebastian. 2nd Lieut. J. W. Guise joined on the 17th, and left again for the 3rd Army Trench-mortar School on the 20th. Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Wood (2nd Battalion) joined on appointment to command the Battalion on the 30th. 2nd Lieut. W. C. Haynes also joined during this month.

April 1st.—A German aeroplane was shot down close to our H.Q. Mess. Working parties dug assembly trenches at night, and suffered considerably from enemy machine-guns and shells, having 5 men killed and 23 wounded.

April 4th.—The Battalion moved to Dunedin Caves—one of the six large caves[2]—accommodating some 5,000 men. Three officers' patrols were sent out at night with orders to reconnoitre the Harp and its vicinity. B Company's patrol, under 2nd Lieut. Anderson, met a party of 10 or 12 Germans, who opened fire with a machine-gun. The patrol lay down, and the enemy, probably alarmed by the proximity of C Company's patrol in his rear, ran across the front of 2nd Lieut. Anderson's party, who hit three with a Lewis-gun (which, however, jambed). The patrol then moved forward and captured the German machine-gun as well as a rifle.

April 5th–7th.—At Christchurch Cave supplying working parties.

[1] The daily movements of the Battalion will be found in the Regimental Diary.

[2] Made by quarrying chalk for the building of Arras. For our purposes they were now connected by tunnels and lighted by electricity.

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BATTLE EAST OF ARRAS.

Attack on the Harp.

The operations now in course of preparation were to take the form of a combined attack to the south of Lens. Elaborate Secret Orders were issued between the 3rd and 7th April, and from the 3rd to the 5th a heavy bombardment was carried out. At 7 a.m. on the 7th the following Operation Orders were issued by the 42nd Infantry Brigade:—

Secret. 7th April 1917.

Ref. Maps, Beaurains Area,
1/10,000, *and* 1/20,000.
Maps "A" and "B," attached.

1. The Third Army is to break through the enemy's defences and advance on Cambrai.

Simultaneously the First Army is making an attack on the Vimy Ridge.

2. (i) The task allotted to the 14th Division and to the 56th Division on our right and 3rd Division on our left is to capture and consolidate the hostile position as far as the Brown Line.

(ii) After the Brown Line has been secured the two southern Divisions of the VIIth Corps and certain Divisions of the VIth Corps have the further task of securing the line Heninel—Guemappe—Monchy-le-Preux.

3. Present information indicates that the hostile forces opposite and near the front allotted to the Division are the 23rd Reserve Division (Saxon) from the Cojeul River to Tilloy with the 11th Division (mixed, Prussians and Silesians) to the north of Tilloy.

4. (i) The assault will be delivered on "Z" day. The preparatory bombardment will be carried out on "V," "W," "X," and "Y" days.

(ii) The hour of zero on "Z" day will be communicated later.

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5. The Division will attack with two Brigades in line, the 43rd Infantry Brigade on the right, and the 42nd Infantry Brigade on the left.

The 41st Infantry Brigade will remain in reserve.

6. (i) Divisional, Brigade, and Battalion Boundaries are shown on attached Map "A."

(ii) The first and second objectives of the 42nd Infantry Brigade are shown on Map "A," and the third objective on Map "B."

7. The 42nd Infantry Brigade is allotted the task of capturing the portions of the Red and Blue Lines within its boundaries.

The 42nd Infantry Brigade will also be responsible for maintaining touch with the 3rd Division during the advance from the Blue and Brown Line, and will do so by occupying an Outpost Line N.E. of the Tilloy-Wancourt Road from N.2.c.70.20 to N.9.c.15.75.

8. (i) The *First Objective* allotted to the 42nd Infantry Brigade is the Red Line, consisting of the String of the Harp from N.1.c.60.50 to N.7.a.80.47, thence S.W. along Negrine Trench and Telegraph Work both inclusive, to N.7.c.25.95, a frontage of 950 yards.

The capture of this objective is allotted to the 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry and 9th K.R.R.C., the 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the right.

The Boundary between the two Battalions is as shown on attached Map "A."

(ii) The *Second Objective* allotted to the 42nd Infantry Brigade is the Blue Line consisting of the rear or eastern face of the Harp from N.7.b.28.92 to N.7.b.10.35, thence along the eastern side of the Cojeul Switch Line to N.7.d.90.25, a frontage of 1,000 yards.

The capture of this objective is allotted to the 5th Shropshire Light Infantry, two companies to capture the eastern face of the Harp, and two companies the Cojeul Switch within the Brigade boundaries.

(iii) The *Third Objective* allotted to the 42nd Infantry Brigade is to clear all ground between the Blue Line and the Tilloy-Wancourt road within Brigade boundaries, and to occupy an Outpost Line N.E. of this road from N.2.c.70.20 to N.9.c.15.75, marked in Violet on Map "B," a frontage of 1,000 yards.

The capture of this objective is allotted to the 9th Rifle Brigade (less two companies in Brigade Reserve).

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9. Each objective will be consolidated as soon as captured, and made secure against counter-attack.

10. The following are the tasks and objectives allotted to the *42nd Machine-Gun Company* on "Z" Day.

(i) From zero to zero plus two hours eight guns will fire on the area Harfleur Trench—Tilloy-les-Mofflaines—Linx Trench—the String of the Harp to its junction with Telegraph Work.

Approximately 250 yards of front will be allotted to each gun, and each gun will traverse and search, in depth only, on its front. It is probable that the enemy will offer targets whilst retiring in front of the 3rd Division, and full advantage will be taken of such opportunities.

At zero plus two hours, these guns will cease fire, but will remain in position until it is clear that the 76th Infantry Brigade on our left have captured the first objective of the 3rd Division, when those six guns will become Brigade Reserve.

(ii) Four guns will follow in rear of the right two companies of the 5th Shropshire Light Infantry, and will take up a position on Telegraph Hill, whence they can cover the area N.8.a., b., and d., and stop any attempt on the part of the enemy to counter-attack from this direction or interfere with the work of consolidating the first and second objectives of the Brigade.

At zero plus six hours thirty minutes, the guns on Telegraph Hill will cease fire, but will remain in position to cover the front of the Brigade. They will only fire after zero plus six hours thirty minutes, if the enemy counter-attacks on the Brigade front.

(iii) If necessary three guns will be sent forward from the Brigade Reserve after zero plus six hours, to N.7.a.25.70 (junction of Jove and Nancy Trenches), where O.C. 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry will detail a guide to meet them, and will instruct them as to where they are required to take up positions to cover the front of the 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

(iv) Three guns will follow in rear of the two left companies of the 5th Shropshire Light Infantry, and will proceed to N.1.c.20.45 (junction of Pol and F.1 Trenches), where O.C. 9th K.R.R.C. will detail a guide to meet them, and will instruct them as to where they are required to take up positions to cover the front of the 9th K.R.R.C.

(v) Six guns will remain in Brigade Reserve.

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11. The 42nd Trench-mortar Battery will be distributed as follows :—

(i) Two guns and 200 rounds of ammunition in Telegraph Lane in dug-out about M.6.d.00.45.

(ii) Two guns and 200 rounds of ammunition in Arras Way in dug-out about M.5.b.94.45.

Should it become necessary to form a defensive left flank on the line F.1 and Wye Lane, these guns will be at the disposal of the O.C. 9th K.R.R.C.

12. (i) Map "A" attached illustrates the time-table for the lifts of the creeping barrage up to and including the capture of the Blue Line.

Map "B" attached illustrates the time-table for the lifts of the creeping barrage from the Blue to the Brown Line.

(ii) The dotted lines indicate the approximate lines on which the barrage will be placed, and the figures on or at the end of these lines indicate the time counting from zero hour at which the creeping barrage will lift off the line concerned, i.e., the creeping barrage lifts off the line marked 2.20 at 2 hours and 20 minutes after zero.

(iii) The creeping barrage comes down on the line marked 2.12 at 2 hours 4 minutes after zero. It, therefore, will remain on this line for 8 minutes. The hour plus 2 hours 4 minutes will be marked by all guns forming this barrage opening with a salvo of shrapnel.

13. At zero the 3rd Division is advancing to the attack of the German First Line System of trenches on their front and on our left flank.

14. (i) At 2 hours 4 minutes after zero the leading infantry of the 42nd Infantry Brigade will advance from their assembly trenches and creep up as close to the artillery barrage as possible, ready to go forward close to the barrage when it begins to creep back.

(ii) At 3 hours 12 minutes after zero the creeping barrage lifts off the last portion of the Blue Line and goes back to form a protective barrage about 300 yards east of the Blue Line. The rate of fire on the protective barrage gradually decreases until the time fixed for the commencement of the advance from the Blue to the Brown Line, when the rate of fire again rises to the rate fixed for the creeping barrage.

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(iii) At 6 hours 48 minutes after zero the troops of the 42nd Infantry Brigade detailed for the capture of the 3rd objective (Violet Line) will creep forward as close as possible to the artillery barrage, and will follow that barrage up to their objective.

At 6 hours 48 minutes after zero all guns forming this barrage will open with a salvo of shrapnel to mark this hour.

15. It is most important for all ranks to realize that, to ensure success and avoid casualties from enemy machine-guns, it is necessary to keep as close as possible to the creeping barrage ready to deal with the defenders of any trench immediately the barrage lifts off that trench.

The leading wave of the assault must take advantage of any pause in the forward movement of the barrage to get forward as close to it as possible.

Every opportunity will be taken to re-form under cover of the artillery barrage, and to gain touch on the flanks.

The protection of the flanks of each unit or formation, however small, is of vital importance.

16. (i) 16 Tanks will assist the attack of the 3rd and 14th Divisions on the Harp, and 4 of these will subsequently assist in the attack on the Cojeul Switch.

(ii) The Tanks will endeavour to be up in time so as to start with the leading infantry.

(iii) All ranks are to be warned that they are on no account to wait for the Tanks should the latter get delayed. The pace of the infantry is to be regulated according to the creeping barrage as explained in para. 14.

(iv) Map "C" (attached to starred copies only) shows the routes to be followed by the Tanks.

(v) Some Tanks will probably pass over the Assembly Trenches of the Brigade whilst still occupied by the infantry. Troops will be warned that this may happen, and that they will close up to either flank to leave a clear passage for the Tank crossing the trench.

17. (i) Contact aeroplanes will be in the air from zero to dusk.

(ii) The distinguishing mark of VIIth Corps Contact planes is a black stripe and streamer under the starboard lower plane.

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(iii) Contact aeroplanes will call by Klaxon Horn for flares to be lit by leading troops as nearly as possible at the following hours :—

Zero plus 3 hours 30 minutes.
Zero plus 7 hours 30 minutes.
Zero plus 8 hours 30 minutes.
Zero plus 11 hours.

(iv) Only Red Flares will be used. Every man will carry one.

18. Special "Mopping-up" Parties will be told off by each Battalion detailed for the capture of the first and second objectives.

They will occupy the trench which they have been detailed to "Mop Up" as soon as the barrage lifts off it, and will work systematically along the trench, picqueting all dug-out entrances, and ensuring that no part of the trench is left unsearched.

Their work is of the utmost importance to the success of the attack.

19. Full use will be made of the various means of communication available. Information regarding the situation will be sent back to the Brigade Command Post as frequently as possible, and at least at each clock hour after zero.

20. Watches will be synchronized daily from "V" day onwards through signals at 9 a.m. and 6 p.m.

Watches will be synchronized at times to be notified later on "Y/Z" night.

21. All Battalions will carry Tables "A," "B," and "C" of Brigade Table of Loads.

Table "D" will be dumped as follows :—

(*a*) For two Battalions in Arras Way in dug-out about M.6.a.00.35.

(*b*) For two battalions at Brigade H.Q. in the Factory (G.34.b.95.70).

All units will draw from (*a*) after the assault, and this dump will be kept supplied from (*b*) under Brigade arrangements.

22. After zero Halifax and Fish Lane Communication Trenches will be reserved for evacuation of the wounded, and no other Communication Trenches will be used for this purpose.

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23. Detailed instructions have been issued to units regarding the supply of rations and water by pack pony on "Z" day for consumption on "Z plus 1 day."

24. Separate orders have been issued regarding :—

(*a*) Approach, march, and position of troops at zero.
(*b*) Water supply on "Y/Z" night.
(*c*) Battle Straggler Posts.
(*d*) Communications.
(*e*) Medical arrangements.
(*f*) Distinguishing badges.

25. The "S.O.S." Signal is a series of Green Véry Lights.

26. No orders, sketches, letters, or papers likely to be of use to the enemy will be taken into action.

27. (i) Brigade H.Q. will be at the Command Post in dug-out in Old German Second Line (M.5.b.55.90) from 12 midnight on "Y/Z" night.

The Staff Captain will remain at the Factory (G.34.b.95.70).

(ii) As soon as Battalions have established their H.Q. after the assault they will notify Brigade H.Q. of their exact position.

The above Orders were followed, on the same day, by detailed instructions concerning the assembly trenches and how they were to be reached by each Battalion of the 42nd Brigade.

1. The units of the 42nd Infantry Brigade will be distributed as follows at zero on "Z" day :—

5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry :—

In Sardine Trench (300 yards).
In Roach Trench (260 yards).
In Trout Trench (250 yards).
In Salmon Trench (150 yards) from its right flank (western end) to M.6.c.61.51, where old German cable trench cuts it at right angles.

Total .. 960 yards.

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9th K.R.R.C. :—

In Minnow Trench (250 yards).
In Perch Trench (300 yards).
In Bream Trench (200 yards).
In Rudd Trench (150 yards).

Total .. 900 yards.

5th Shropshire Light Infantry :—

(*a*) Two companies in Salmon Trench from M.6.c.61.51 to its junction with Telegraph Lane (175 yards).

And Shark less 50 yards from its junction with Telegraph Lane (200 yards).

Total .. 375 yards.

(*b*) Two companies in Pike Trench (275 yards).
Eel Trench (150 yards).
Carp Trench (150 yards).

Total .. 575 yards.

Total for Battalion, 950 yards.

9th Rifle Brigade :—

(*a*) Two companies in London Trench.
Minenwerfer Weg.
Halifax Trench.
Galway Trench.

(*b*) Two companies in Old German Front Line and its dug-outs.

42nd Machine-gun Company :—

(*a*) Four guns with teams in Shark Trench for 50 yards from its junction with Telegraph Lane, and in Telegraph Lane immediately north of its junction with Shark Trench.

(*b*) Three guns with teams in Chub Trench.

(*c*) Eight guns with teams in Old German Second Line.

(*d*) One gun and reserve personnel in shaft connecting dug-outs in Old German Front Line with Brigade Command Post.

42nd Trench-mortar Battery :—

(*a*) Two guns with teams and 200 rounds of bombs in dug-out in Telegraph Lane near its junction with Roach Trench.

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(*b*) Two guns with teams in dug-out in Arras Way about M.5.b.95.45 on west side of trench.

(*c*) Reserve personnel in continuous dug-out in Old German Front Line.

Brigade Pioneer Company :—

In dug-outs in Old Reserve Line off Halifax.

2. Headquarters of units will be as follows at zero on "Z" day :—

(*a*) 42*nd Infantry Brigade H.Q.* at Factory (G.34.b.95.70), with Command Post in dug-out in Old German Second Line (M.5.b.55.90).

(*b*) 5*th Oxford and Bucks L.I.* in dug-out in Middlesex Trench (M.5.b.65.60).

(*c*) 5*th Shrops. L.I.* in continuous dug-out in Old German Front Line, near the shaft leading to the Brigade Command Post.

(*d*) 9*th K.R.R.C.* in dug-out in Old German Second Line (M.5.b.85.98).

(*e*) 9*th Rifle Brigade* in dug-out in Old Support Line off Hunter Street.

(*f*) 42*nd Machine-gun Company* in continuous dug-out in Old German Front Line near the shaft leading to Brigade Command Post.

(*g*) 42*nd Trench-mortar Battery* in dug-out in Village Line off Hooge.

N.B.—The 9th Rifle Brigade will take over the H.Q. of the 5th Oxford and Bucks L.I. as soon as the latter vacate them. During the move of the 9th Rifle Brigade H.Q., O.C. 9th Rifle Brigade will be in the Brigade Command Post.

3. Units will reach their assembly positions as follows on "Y/Z" night :—

(*a*) 9*th K.R.R.C.* from Christchurch Cave by Exit No. 14.E. (G.34.c.90.63). Battalion to be clear of the Cave by 9 p.m. on the 8th inst.

Route to Assembly Trenches.—Rue de Temple—Arras Way and Hunter Street to Old German Front Line—Telegraph Lane and Fish Lane to Assembly Trenches; 200 yards' distance to be maintained between platoons. Battalion to be in Assembly Trenches by 12 midnight 8th/9th inst.

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(*b*) *5th Oxford and Bucks L.I.* from Christchurch Cave by Exit No. 14.F. (G.34.d.02.60). Leading troops to start from Cave at 9 p.m., and be clear of the Cave by 10 p.m.

Route to Assembly Trenches.—Rue de Temple—Hatter's Lane and Halifax to Old German Front Line—Halifax and Arras Way to Assembly Trenches; 200 yards' distance to be maintained between platoons. Battalion to be in Assembly Trenches by 1 a.m. on 9th inst.

(*c*) *5th Shrops. L.I.* from Old Support and Reserve Lines. Leading troops to leave Support Line at 12 midnight 8/9th inst.

Route to Assembly Trenches.—As detailed by O.C. Battalion.

200 yards' distance to be maintained between platoons.

Battalion to be in Assembly Trenches by 2 a.m. on 9th inst.

(*d*) At 2 a.m. on the 9th inst. the 9th Rifle Brigade will withdraw to positions of Assembly given in para. 1.

4. Only "Up" traffic will be allowed in the following trenches between the hours of 8.30 p.m. and 2 a.m. on night of 8th/9th inst.

Halifax, Hunter Street, Arras Way, Telegraph Lane, Fish Lane.

All trenches have been clearly labelled.

5. O.C. Battalions will report by Runner to Brigade H Q. as soon as Battalions are in their Assembly Trenches.

6. O.C. Battalions are responsible that the routes to be used to their Assembly Trenches on "Y/Z" night are prepared and thoroughly reconnoitred so that no unnecessary delays occur.

Any bridges required for the purpose of crossing trenches can be obtained at Brigade H.Q.

O.C. Battalions are responsible for clearing any wire which obstructs their route.

7. As soon as all Battalions are in their Assembly Trenches a ration of hot tea and rum will be served out to the men in accordance with instructions already issued.

8. No shouting or talking will be allowed during the march to Assembly Trenches, nor in the Assembly Trenches.

It is of greatest importance to conceal from the enemy the fact that these trenches are occupied.

Care must be taken that men do not expose themselves in the trenches after dawn on 9th inst., and that bayonets are not exposed over the top of the trench.

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REPORT OF ATTACK ON THE HARP ON 9TH APRIL 1917.

The Battalion left the caves at 9 p.m., and was in position in the Assembly Trenches by 12 midnight. No casualties occurred on the way up. There was practically no shelling of the Assembly Trenches till 5.30 a.m. Between 5.30 and 7.30 a.m. the Assembly Trenches were slightly shelled with whizz-bangs and an occasional 4.2-in. chiefly from direction of Tilloy. During this time one officer and one man were hit. At 7.34 a.m. the advance began. There was a good deal of crowding on the right owing to the Battalion on our right losing direction. This was rectified as much as possible by the company officers on the spot.

During the initial stages of the advance there was practically no enemy artillery fire, but there was a certain amount of machine-gun fire from Tilloy; this, however, was mostly high and caused very few casualties. As soon as the leading line came in view of the Harp three machine-guns opened fire from behind Telegraph Work and the string of the Harp. Lewis-guns and rifle-grenades were immediately turned on to them, and their fire slackened sufficiently to enable the infantry to go forward. On reaching the front line about 50 of the enemy gave themselves up without fighting, and were passed back to the rear.

There was a certain amount of resistance from the back of Telegraph Work and the string of the Harp, but the Germans gave themselves up as soon as our men reached them. About 50 Germans were captured here.

As soon as both objectives had been reached consolidation was at once commenced as follows :—

C Company and a part of D Company from N.7.a.6.6 to N.7.a.5.3.

A Company thence along back line of Telegraph Work to N.7.a.4.1.

Remainder of D Company from N.7.a.2.8 to about N.7.a.2.6.

B Company thence to N.7.a.2.0.

During the consolidation a machine-gun opened fire from about N.7.a.6.9, which caused a certain number of casualties. This gun was knocked out by a rifle-grenade, and was captured in conjunction with a bombing-party of the 9th K.R.R.C.

About 20 minutes after reaching the objective the captured position was heavily shelled with 77-mm. and 4.2-in. for about half

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an hour, and a strong barrage of 5.9 in. put along the bank in M.12.b.1.9 for about one and a half hours. There were no troops advancing over this ground at that time. It only caused a certain amount of inconvenience to communications and very few casualties. About 10 a.m. all hostile artillery fire ceased, and consolidation was completed without further molestation. About this time another machine-gun and its crew were found in a dug-out. They gave themselves up without any trouble.

It is impossible to state accurately the number of prisoners taken by us, but it is estimated there were about 100. Three machine-guns were also captured.

Our casualties were roughly 5 officers killed, 7 wounded, and about 180 other ranks.

The battlefield was cleared of all casualties by 5 p.m., with the assistance of the prisoners.

H. L. WOOD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Comdg. 5th Bn. Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS OR REWARDS.

Captain THEODORE EMMANUEL RODOCANACHI, M.C.[1]; Captain and Adjutant CLAUDE BOISRAGON CRAWFORD; Lieut. HENRY GEORGE STYLES; 2nd Lieut. HENRY NICHOLS PARKER; 2nd Lieut. BASIL ARTHUR ANDERSON, M.C.; Captain JAMES ALPHONSO CONWAY[2] (R.A.M.C.); 10896 Sergeant (Acting C.-S.-M.) ALBERT WALTER LEWENDON[3]; 10489 Sergeant JOSEPH HOLT; 10630 Lance-Corporal ARTHUR THOMAS HICKS; 10647 Sergeant EDGAR GRANT[4]; 8223 Sergeant GEORGE CAPEL[5]; 10994 Sergeant FRANK SKETCHER[4]; 32511 Private CHARLES HENRY BULL[4]; 185 Private FRANK COOPER; 10440 Sergeant WILLIAM LAKE; 16274 Lance-Corporal PERCY JONES[6]; 18908 Lance-Corporal THOMAS BIRD[4]; 17271 Corporal WILLIAM BRADLEY; 16017 Corporal FRANK GILBERT SMITH; 10550 Corporal JOHN BASSETT[4]; 19396 Lance-Corporal LEVI MOSELEY[4]; 10734 Lance-Corporal WILLIAM CARVELL[4]; 23877 Lance-Corporal FREDERICK WRIGHT[4]; 11480 Lance-Corporal EDWARD VINES; 10892 Sergeant JAMES LEWENDON; 10609 Private ROBERT MILLS; 11543 Corporal RICHARD ANGELL; 16838 Private

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[1] Awarded D.S.O. (immediate). [2] Military Cross (immediate).
[3] Bar to Military Medal (immediate). [4] Military Medal (immediate).
[5] Military Medal. [6] Croix de Guerre. Several of the others were subsequently awarded the Military Medal for further acts of gallantry.—ED.

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SIDNEY HOUGHTON; 10488 Private ROBERT MILLER; 10119 Sergeant ERNEST HOUSE; 10982 Sergeant ARTHUR CALEB COOMBS; 32528 Lance-Corporal BROWN; Private SOAMES; Corporal JOHNSTON; 19020 Private ERNEST GEORGE CLARKE; 18577 Sergeant GEORGE SALTER; 18115 Private HENRY JOSEPH MORGAN; 17292 Private ALFRED JOHN CROFT.

CASUALTIES, 5TH OXFORD AND BUCKS LIGHT INFANTRY, 9TH APRIL 1917.

Killed.

2nd Lieut. G. G. GRAY.
Lieut. D. S. HIGGINS.
2nd Lieut. J. H. F. SCOTT.
2nd Lieut. J. R. STAMMERS
2nd Lieut. J. STEVENS.
And 45 N.C.O.'s and Men

Wounded.

Captain L. J. GOODWYN.
2nd Lieut. G. S. GREENE.
2nd Lieut. R. E. D. HALL.
2nd Lieut. H. R. PARKER.
2nd Lieut. H. A. ROBERTSON.
Captain T. E. RODOCANACHI, M.C.
Lieut. H. G. STYLES.
2nd Lieut. C. J. VIDAL.
Lieut. C. H. WALTER.
And 116 N.C.O.'s and Men.

Missing.

11 N.C.O.'s and Men.

BATTALION DIARY CONTINUED.

April 10th.—The following was issued to-day :—

"COMPLIMENTARY ORDER.

"The Commander-in-Chief has personally requested me to convey to all ranks of the 14th (Light) Division his high opinion of the excellent fighting qualities shown by the Division.

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"The commencement of the great offensive of 1917 has been marked by an initial success in which more than 11,000 prisoners and 100 guns have been taken on the first day alone.

"The Division has taken a prominent part in achieving this success and maintained the reputation gained last year on the Somme, and added to the laurels of the gallant regiments of which it is composed.

" V. COUPER, Major-General,
" 10th April 1917. Comdg. 14th (Light) Division."

April 12th–30th.—After two days' marching the Battalion arrived at Liencourt on the 14th, and spent a week in training, then moved to Fosseux and to the Harp, going into the trenches on the 24th.

Casualties.—Three men killed. Major G. G. KNIGHTON died of wounds on the 30th. Captain Maude and 22 men wounded.

The following officers rejoined during April: Major N. Barwell (Second in Command), Captain E. W. Maude, M.C. (again wounded a few days later); and the following joined for duty: Captain J. A. Southey (2nd Battalion), Captain Goodwyn, 2nd Lieut. R. J. Richards; 235 men, in two drafts, arrived, when the ration strength of the Battalion was 25 officers and 905 other ranks.

May 1st.—A and B Companies to baths at Achicourt by lorry. Very warm and fine weather. Private Rixon was killed by a 4.2-inch shell.

VIS-EN-ARTOIS.

ATTACK ON HILLSIDE WORK.

This formed part of the great British offensive which commenced on the 3rd May on a 12-mile front to the east of Arras.[1] Preliminary instructions and maps were issued secretly to certain officers at the end of April, and on the 2nd May (9.15 a.m.) came the final orders from H.Q. 42nd Infantry Brigade. The following is an outline of these orders:—

The attack was to be made by the 21st Division on the right, the 18th in the centre, and the 14th Division on the left, the 14th Division having the 41st Brigade on the right, the 42nd on the left, and the 43rd in reserve, while the 42nd Brigade was to attack with the

[1] See "Sketch of the War," earlier in this volume. Ref. Map 1/10,000, Sheet 51 B, G.S.G.S. 3062, and 1/40,000, G.S.G.S. 3488.—ED.

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5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the right, the 9th Rifle Brigade on the left, and the remaining two battalions in reserve. Special maps showed, in distinctive colours, the front held by the 14th Division and the Divisional boundaries, the position of the leading troops at zero, the boundaries between the brigades of the Division and between the assaulting battalions of the 42nd Brigade, the First Objective and the Second Objective.

Other paragraphs dealt with: (*a*) Information known about enemy troops opposed to the 14th Division; (*b*) Detailed instructions about the assault, employment of Lewis and machine guns for protection of flanks, maintaining touch with adjacent brigades, mopping-up parties, consolidation; (*c*) Tasks and objectives allotted to the 42nd Machine-gun Company; (*d*) Action of 42nd T.M. Battery; (*e*) Artillery creeping and protective barrages; (*f*) Communication with contact aeroplanes; (*g*) Sending back information on the situation; (*h*) S.O.S. signal; (*i*) Battle stragglers; (*k*) Prisoners of war; (*l*) Position of Brigade H.Q. in Stag Trench.

The movements of the 42nd Brigade to positions of assembly on "Y" day and "Y"/"Z" night had been previously notified, thus :—

The 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry from N.14.b viâ Brigade H.Q. (N.15.d.4.4), N.22 central, N.23.d.8.4, along the bank and viâ the railway.

The Battalion will move by platoons in file at 3 minutes' interval. The leading platoon to arrive at Brigade H.Q. at 8 p.m. Water will be issued to men requiring it, under Brigade arrangements at Brigade H.Q.

The Battalion will be clear of Cross Roads N.22.a by 9.15 p.m., and will proceed in file to their Assembly Trenches.

All trenches have been labelled.

All units (less 9th K.R.R.C.) will report by runner to Advance Brigade H.Q. in the Stag as soon as they are in their positions of assembly.

As soon as Battalions are in their Assembly Trenches an issue of hot tea and rum will be made under Brigade arrangements.

The Assembly Trenches were named "zoologically," and the Battalion assembled for the assault in portions of the Ape, the Boar, the Buck, the Lion, and the Bison.

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"Z" day was 3rd May and zero hour 3.45 a.m. The following is Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Wood's Official Report of action of the Battalion:—

At zero the Battalion was formed up as follows: A and C Companies in the front line, A on the right, C on the left; B and D Companies in the second line, B on the right, D on the left; each company in two lines of two platoons. The front line was on the taped line, the second line in Ape Trench.

The German artillery and machine-guns opened fire within 3 minutes of our barrage commencing; most of the artillery fire was between Ape and Bison. Until the advance commenced at zero plus 18 there were only a few casualties from artillery fire in Ape, and none in the companies in front. On the other hand, the machine-gun fire was very heavy and accurate, and came from the left flank (either from St. Rohart Factory or from the Quarry in 0.15.c) and front (from the Quarry at 0.21.b.8.0 or from Triangle Wood).

At zero plus 18 the advance commenced and reached a line about 50 yards west of New Trench, beyond which it was found impossible to advance farther on the left. On the right of the line 2nd Lieut. Peel (A Company) found it possible to avoid the machine-gun fire by crawling, and he got a few men forward and occupied part of New Trench. As touch had been lost with the 8th K.R.R.C., 2nd Lieut. Peel brought up the reserve platoon of A Company on his right flank, and gained touch with them. This was about 4.30 a.m. About this time the remainder of A Company and part of D Company managed to get into New Trench on the left of A Company.

The Germans who had been holding New Trench retired to a line about 40 yards in rear, from which they heavily bombed and opened fire with two machine-guns on New Trench. These were, however, soon silenced by rifle and Lewis-gun fire. It was, however, found impossible to advance owing to the very accurate and unceasing machine-gun fire from the left, and also to a certain extent from the front. The artillery fire also became fairly heavy about this time.

The situation now was as follows: about 50 men of all companies in New Trench, and parties of B and D Companies (about two platoons in all) in a line of shell-holes about 40 yards behind. This party tried to consolidate, but found it impossible to work

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owing to the incessant machine-gun fire, snipers, and heavy Vane-bomb fire, which came from the left flank, probably from Hillside Work.

The situation remained unchanged until about 10.45 a.m., New Trench being shelled continuously, while a very heavy barrage was maintained on the Assembly Trenches.

At about 10.45 a.m. the troops on our right were observed retiring, and a strong enemy counter-attack in 6 or 7 waves (each estimated by those in the front line at about 150 to 200 men) was launched against New Trench. Fire was immediately opened on them with all available rifles, Lewis-guns, and two Vickers which had come up, and many casualties were inflicted, but without stopping the counter-attack. When the enemy had got within 50 yards of New Trench, and our ammunition was practically all expended, the remnants withdrew to the Assembly Trenches, bringing back as many Lewis-guns as possible. The two Vickers had to be abandoned.

Owing to there being no room in the front Assembly Trenches I rallied the Battalion in Buck Trench, where it remained until relieved.

The casualties were :—

A Company (Right leading) 75, out of 129 who attacked.
C Company (Left leading) 84, out of 118.
B Company (Right Support) 57, out of 123.
D Company (Left Support) 62, out of 123.
H.Q. 13, out of 30, including bombers who went over behind the leading company.

H. L. WOOD, Lieut.-Colonel,
6.5.17. Comg. 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS OR REWARDS.

Captain CLAUDE BOISRAGON CRAWFORD ; 2nd Lieut. JOHN HORACE PEEL [1] ; 10892 Sergeant JAMES LEWENDON [3] ; 8223 Sergeant GEORGE CAPEL [3] ; 11049 Private SIDNEY SOUTHERN [3] ; 10996 Lance-Corporal GEORGE EDWARD COLLINS [3] ; 8764 Private JOHN ENTICOTT [2] ; 13106 Private LEONARD UNSWORTH [3] ; 10147 Corporal HOSIA PAUL [3] ; 27912 Private JOHN QUINN [3] ; 32720 Private STANLEY WONNACOTT ; 17311 Private FRANK HENRY WRIGHT ; 26363 Private GEORGE AYRIS.

[1] Awarded Military Cross (immediate). [2] Bar to Military Medal (immediate).
[3] Military Medal (immediate).

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CASUALTIES, 3RD MAY 1917.

Killed.

Lieut. S. ASHMAN, B Company.
2nd Lieut. W. C. HAYNES, D Company.
And 22 N.C.O.'s and Men.

Wounded.

2nd Lieut. J. N. JACKSON (C).
Captain L. J. GOODWYN (D).
Lieut. T. HUTCHINSON (A).
And 158 N.C.O.'s and Men.

Missing.[1]

2nd Lieut. R. J. RICHARDS (B).
2nd Lieut. C. C. HARPER (C).
2nd Lieut. J. L. BULMER (A).
And 111 N.C.O.'s and Men.

Total Casualties.—8 officers and 291 N.C.O.'s and Men, out of 12 officers[2] and 523 N.C.O.'s and Men who went into action.

May 4th–31st.—On the 4th the Battalion was relieved in Niger Trench and moved back to the Harp, where it remained until the 10th, on which day it moved up to Cojeul Switch. The remainder of the month was spent in and out of the trenches, large working-parties being constantly supplied by the Battalion.

Casualties.—1 man killed and 4 men wounded.

The following officers joined or rejoined : 2nd Lieut. Taylor-Rose, 2nd Lieut. Parker, Lieut. H. W. Spurge, 2nd Lieut. D. J. Banks. Attached from the 9th K.R.R.C : Lieut. J. Hetherington, and 2nd Lieuts. J. H. Westall, L. S. Dagg, and J. S. Chown. 2nd Lieuts. C. H. E. Palmer and W. C. Lester-Smith were invalided to England.

June.—King's Birthday Gazette : Lieut. and Quartermaster F. M. ROBERTS awarded the MILITARY CROSS; the following Mentioned in

[1] It was afterwards learned that 2nd Lieut. Richards was captured when wounded and died of his wounds. Fifteen N.C.O.'s and men were also captured, 7 of them being wounded (3 died). The other 2 officers and 96 N.C.O.'s and men were subsequently reported killed.

[2] The four officers who came out of action unwounded were Lt.-Colonel Wood, Captain Crawford (Adjutant), 2nd Lieut. Peel (A Company), and 2nd Lieut. Palmer (B Company).

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Dispatches: Captain (Acting Lieut.-Colonel) S. R. Sebastian, Lieut. S. Ashman, Major G. V. Drury, Major G. G. Knighton, Sergeant J. J. Newman, Sergeant J. S. Shenton, Sergeant-Cook T. J. Schalk.

The first days of June were spent in the trenches, with few casualties, but Corporal PERCY JONES was killed within a few days of receiving his CROIX DE GUERRE. The remainder of the month was devoted to training at various places (*see* Regimental Diary). The following joined the Battalion: Captain O. S. Royal-Dawson,[1] 2nd Lieut S. L. Symonds,[1] 2nd Lieuts. W. Line, J. A. Stace, L. E. Davis, E. V. Mullis, and 101 N.C.O.'s and men (2 drafts); 2nd Lieuts. L. S. Dagg and H. N. Parker left the Battalion.

ROLL OF OFFICERS, 30TH JUNE.

Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Wood; Major N. Barwell, M.C.; Captains B. K. Cooke, C. B. Crawford, J. A. Southey, M. Labouchere, O. S. Royal-Dawson; Lieuts. H. W. Spurge, O. L. Jacks, M.C., B. A. Anderson, M.C.; 2nd Lieuts. W. T. Brindley, R. E. D. Hall, R. A. Fitzgerald, J. H. Peel, M.C., F. E. Borman (with 14th Divisional Depôt Battalion), W. G. Holiday, J. W. Guise, J. J. T. Rose, D. J. Banks, S. L. Symonds, W. Line, J. A. Stace, L. E. Davis, E. V. Mullis; Lieut. and Quartermaster F. M. Roberts, M.C.

[1] Had previously served with the 7th Battalion, and been wounded on the Salonika front.—ED.

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RECORD OF THE 6TH (SERVICE) BATTALION.

1st JULY 1916 TO 30th JUNE 1917.

When the Somme offensive opened on the 1st July, the Battalion was in Zillebeke trenches (*Map* 3), and continued to take tours of duty there and in the neighbourhood of Ypres for the following three weeks. It then moved south to the Somme area and took its share in the fighting. The Battalion was commanded by Colonel E. D. White until October 1916, then by Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Osborne (late 2nd Battalion) until the 19th April 1917, then by Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. Boyle (2nd Battalion), and from the 27th April by Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Dillon, D.S.O. (2nd Battalion). The following is a summary of events as recorded in the Battalion Diary, supplemented by information from the Battalion Order Book:—

July 1st–24th.[1]—The casualties during this period were: 1 officer and 11 men killed; 3 officers and 52 men wounded.

MILITARY MEDALS were awarded to 1400 Lance-Corporal FREDERICK ADAMS and 14991 Private FREDERICK V. PORTER.

July 24th.—Remained at Meteren. Lieut. McIlroy appointed temp. Regimental Sniping and Bombing Officer; 2nd Lieuts. H. Money and V. B. Marsh joined the Battalion for duty, and were posted to D Company.

TO THE SOMME AREA.

(*Map* 1.)

July 25th.—Marched at 6.30 a.m. to Hopoutre Station (near Poperinghe), entrained, and proceeded to Frévent Station (4.30 p.m.), thence marching to billets at Lucheux.

July 26th.—Marched to Vauchelles, and on the 28th to Courcelles.

[1] The movements of the Battalion will be found in the Regimental Diary, page 2.—ED.

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July 29th.—Relieved the 10th South Wales Borderers in the trenches, opposite Serre, at K.29.c.7.7 to K.23.d.2½.2½ (Map Sheet 57*d*), the 10th K.R.R.C. on our left, and 6th K.S.L.I. on our right.

July 30th–31st.—Quiet; 1 man wounded.

August 1st–5th.—The Battalion remained in the same trenches, the days being generally quiet, but at night the enemy was active with trench-mortars, and our artillery was also active.

Casualties.—On the 1st, 1 killed, 2 wounded; on the 2nd, 1 wounded; on the 3rd, 1 officer and 3 men wounded, 2 men killed; on the 4th, Captain J. E. BRYANT killed, 4 men wounded.

August 6th–31st.—On relief from the trenches on the night of the 6th–7th, the Battalion moved to Courcelles, where it remained for a week, training and finding working parties. A move was then made to Ville-sous-Corbie, which was reached on the 20th, and on the 22nd the Battalion took over old German dug-outs and trenches in the Reserve Brigade area. The next ten days were spent in supplying working parties, and carrying parties (for R.E. material) from dumps at Trones Wood to support and front-line trenches. Eighteen men were wounded.

THE ATTACK ON GUILLEMONT.

The original orders, issued towards the end of August, were to the effect that the 20th Division would "capture Guillemont, and then establish itself on the Wedge Wood - Ginchy road from T.26.a.1.7 to T.22.a.1.5." According to these orders, an important part was to be played by the 60th Brigade, but before the final arrangements were made it was found that this Brigade had become so depleted in numbers[1] that it was necessary to take it out of the 20th Division temporarily, and substitute for it the 47th Brigade (16th, Irish, Division). The attack on Guillemont on the 3rd September was, therefore, entrusted to the 59th Brigade

[1] Sir A. Conan Doyle, in his *British Campaign, 1916*, says: "The 60th Brigade had lost heavily in strength from cold, wet, and continual German gassing and bombardment."

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and 47th Brigade, with the 61st Brigade in Divisional Reserve, the 6th Oxford and Bucks (the only battalion of the 60th Brigade of any strength) being attached to the 59th Brigade.

The following is Lieut.-Colonel E. D. White's official account of the Operations of the 3rd–6th September in which the 6th Battalion took part:—

The Battalion was attached to the 59th Brigade for the above operations, and, in accordance with 59th Brigade Operation Orders, left the craters at 11 p.m., 2nd September, and moved into the position of assembly in Arrow and Sherwood Trenches.

In accordance with 59th Brigade Operation Orders the Battalion advanced from its trenches at noon on the 3rd September to attack Guillemont.

B Company, from Arrow Trench, was in the centre, and, from the position of the starting-point, somewhat in advance of A and C Companies on the Battalion's left and right respectively; D Company followed in rear of the centre.

The Battalion was to follow the 10th and 11th R.B. to the first Sunken Road (the first Divisional Objective).

The three leading companies lost all their officers and all their Company-Sergeants-Major before reaching the second Sunken Road. The fourth company (D) also lost its captain at the first Sunken Road.

B Company, in the centre, found the Rifle Brigade battalions clearing dug-outs, and appear to have stopped a short time to assist, and then pushed on to the second Sunken Road. A and C Companies passed right on. A got on beyond the second Sunken Road to the edge of the village, which was the 2nd Objective of the Battalion. Their officers had gone, and in some places the Sunken Road was not easy to locate, being much knocked about.

At 1 p.m. the advance continued. As a matter of fact men were going forward about 4 minutes before the hour, but the barrage ruled the pace. Casualties from our own barrage were slight, if any at all.

By the time the eastern side of the village was reached units were much mixed. There were, besides my own Battalion and the 10th and 11th R.B., some of the 10th K.R.R.C. and Somerset Light Infantry, as well as some of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (5th Division). Units were reorganized here as far as possible. The

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Somerset Light Infantry, at my request, kept back a portion of the battalion in this position, when the advance was continued up to Ginchy—Wedge Wood road, to look after the right flank, as a number of Germans were visible in the open, south-west of Leuze Wood, and our contact with the 5th Division on our right did not seem complete.

At 2 p.m. the whole line went forward up to the Ginchy—Wedge Wood road, and reached it with very little opposition, but a number of prisoners were taken from dug-outs on the road.

The consolidation of the position at once began, but there was a shortage of tools.

It was evident that the 5th Division had not been able to advance up the spur south-west of Leuze Wood, and that that spur and the wood were still in the hands of the Germans. I therefore decided not to move forward from the road to the final objective ordered, that is, with the right flank of the 59th Brigade line just outside the south-west corner of the wood.

The 1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were now in touch with us on the road-line, on our right; the 8th Munster Fusiliers were on our left, at the Cross-Roads.

There were then in the 59th Brigade area on the Ginchy—Wedge Wood road the following troops under Lieut.-Colonel E. D. White: 200 10th R.B., 200 11th R.B., 100 10th K.R.R.C., and 300 6th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. The Somerset Light Infantry were digging themselves in, in support, close behind.

An officer's patrol went up by the Quarry to the south-west edge of Leuze Wood and found no one there.

During the night (3rd/4th September) patrols were working in the valley below us, but could not work up to the ridge and wood in front owing to our artillery fire.

The enemy made no attacks.

Nearly all the losses suffered by the Battalion were from shell and machine-gun fire before reaching the second Sunken Road, and more especially before reaching the first Sunken Road.

During the clearing of dug-outs at the final position one case occurred of a "P" bomb being thrown in at one door of a dug-out and the smoke coming out at the other door without dislodging the Germans, who, however, did come out when Mills bombs were thrown in.

Eight Company Officers, 72 N.C.O.'s, and about 200 men were casualties, mostly early in the attack, and I think that much credit

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is due to the men and to the few leaders left in getting on the right objective.

During the 4th September the consolidation of the position was continued, and not interfered with except for a few shrapnel. The 5th Division was, during the afternoon, working up the ridge opposite us, to Leuze Wood.

At about 7 p.m. battle patrols were established from our line by the 7th Somerset Light Infantry, i.e., from the south-west corner of Leuze Wood to the Guillemont-Combles road.

The night of the 4th/5th September was very quiet. About 5 a.m. on the 5th the Battalion and others in the line were relieved by the 49th Brigade, and the Battalion withdrew to Sherwood Trench, where it remained until the afternoon of the 6th September, when it was relieved by the 6th K.S.L.I., and moved back to the Craters (A.8.b.6.3).

The following did particularly good work during the operations :—

2nd Lieut. B. J. Henry[1] Signalling Officer of the Battalion. When I found how many leaders had been lost, I sent him on to take command of what men he could, and to carry them on. This he did with the greatest gallantry, and I am sure that it was in a great measure due to his leadership that the objective was reached.

Battalion-Sergeant-Major Lee gave me much assistance in re-organizing during the advance.

Sergeants Stainforth, Stevens, and East did particularly good work in reorganizing and leading men on during the fighting.

Sergeant Hannis, though badly wounded early in the action and advised to go back, insisted on remaining with his platoon until he got it up to the final objective and handed it over to 2nd Lieut. Henry.

Corporal Garratt was sent back with two men to get water. He and one of his men were wounded, but he, though badly wounded in the hand and arm, made his way back to the front line with two tins of water before going to have his wound dressed.

Lance-Corporals Dent and Middleton, Lewis-gun Corporals, both did good work in getting their guns into position, to reply to enemy machine-gun fire.

[1] Awarded the MILITARY CROSS, *London Gazette*, 20th October 1916 : "2nd Lieut. BERNARD JOHN HENRY. For conspicuous gallantry in action. When the battalion had lost heavily in officers, he, though signalling officer, went forward reorganized the attack, and led it on to its objective. The successful final advance was mainly due to his gallantry and ability."

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FROM THE BATTALION DIARY.

September 7th–20th.—Changing camp several times and doing a certain amount of training, the Battalion reached Waterlot Farm on the 16th and went into the front-line trenches (The Triangle), from which it pushed forward three advanced posts on the 19th.

Casualties.—6 men killed and 8 wounded.

September 21st.—At 3.20 a.m. the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Coldstream Guards. Two of our Lewis-gun teams remained behind owing to the relieving battalion not bringing guns with them.

Three prisoners from the German 240th Regiment were captured just before the relief and brought back to Battalion H.Q.

At 9 a.m. the Battalion arrived at the Citadel. The following appeared in Regimental Orders this day :—

"The C.O. is glad to be able to publish to the Battalion the following messages which he knows all ranks have well earned during the last few days :—

"20th Division wire : 'Please convey G.O.C.'s appreciation of the good work done by the 60th Brigade during their last tour in the line. They beat off every attack, captured prisoners on several occasions, patrolled actively, and kept going well in spite of casualties and the trying conditions of wet and cold.'

"The Brigadier-General is much gratified in having received the above wire from the Divisional Commander, and he wishes his congratulations and thanks conveyed to all ranks for the fine soldierly spirit shown by them.

"The Commanding Officer has much pleasure in informing the Battalion that the Corps Commander, under authority delegated by His Majesty the King, has awarded the MILITARY MEDAL to 12748 Corporal GARRATT and 9444 Sergeant HANNIS for Gallantry in Action on 3rd September."

September 22nd–30th.—The Battalion moved on the 22nd to Ville-sur-Ancre, on the 25th to the Citadel, and next day to a position behind Morval, where it was relieved by French troops on the 28th, and went back to Carnoy Valley. On the 29th the Battalion paraded in "battle-order,"[1] and marched to the

[1] "Battle-order" consisted of : Jersey (on the man), smoke helmets, braces, pouches, bayonet and frog, entrenching-tool and carrier, canteen (on back of belt with supporting strap) containing day's ration of bread or biscuit, tea and sugar, haversack (carried on the back) containing day's meat ration, 1 pair socks, waterproof, and 220 rounds S.A.A.

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north of Trones Wood, where it went into the trenches until the 6th October.

Intimation was received of the award of the DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL to 16258 Sergeant R. BETTS and 11751 Private E. PARKER.

During September the following officers joined the Battalion for duty, and were posted to companies as stated :—

Joined on 12th September, Lieut. C. G. N. Morris (D Company), 2nd Lieut. A. Skuce (B), 2nd Lieut. E. Moore (D), 2nd Lieut. C. R. Riley (C), 2nd Lieut. O. C. Blencowe (A), F. S. Ferriman [1] (B), 2nd Lieut. E. G. V. Luis (C), 2nd Lieut. A. G. West (A). Joined on 18th September, Captain W. R. Birch (A). Joined on 27th September, 2nd Lieut. F. B. Mitchell (B), 2nd Lieut. F. Ive (D), 2nd Lieut. D. N. Burrell (C).

Rejoined the Battalion for duty: On 18th September, Lieut. A. C. V. Gosset; on the 22nd September, Lieut. R. L. G. Hunt, who took over command of B Company from that date.

On the 29th September Lieuts. Blencowe, Mitchell, Ive, and Burrell were temporarily attached to the 12th R.B. for duty.

Early in October Lieut.-Colonel E. D. White was invalided to England, and Major J. E. Osborne assumed command of the Battalion.

THE ATTACK OF THE 7TH OCTOBER.

On the 2nd October Preliminary Orders, issued by the 20th Division, outlined coming operations. The intention was that the Fourth Army should attack the line Le Transloy-Thilloy-Warlencourt-Faucourt on or about the 10th October, the attack being made by the 4th and 6th Divisions on the XIVth Corps front. To open the way for these operations, it was necessary to establish a forward line (known as the Brown Line), and the task of driving the Germans out of this line was allotted to the Reserve Divisions, with whom the French would be co-operating on the right. This

[1] Lieut. Ferriman was transferred to the R.F.C., and was killed while flying.

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preliminary attack was to be made, about the 5th or 6th October, by the 41st, 12th, 20th, and 56th Divisions (in that order from left to right) against the portion of the German Line known as the Meteorological Trenches, since they had received names such as Rainbow, Cloudy, Misty, Gusty, Rainy, etc.

The weather was so inclement that operations were postponed until the 7th October, on which day at 1.45 p.m., despite the rain and consequent mud, the assault was launched. The Orders issued by the 60th Brigade are given below in detail, and the action of the 6th Battalion is described in the Report which follows. Suffice it to say here, therefore, that the attack as a whole was fairly successful. The two Divisions on the left (41st and 12th) met with such heavy resistance that they were unable to make much progress. The 20th Division, on the right of the 12th, were more fortunate, and, in spite of all obstacles, succeeded in carrying their objectives and consolidating them. The 56th Division, on the right of the 20th, also won ground, though later in the day they and the French were pushed back again by a German counter-attack.

60th Infantry Brigade Operation Orders were issued on the 5th October as follows:—

SECRET. *Ref. Map Sheet 57c. S.W.*

1. The Fourth Army are renewing the attack on October 7th at a zero hour which will probably be in the early afternoon, and which will be communicated later; the 56th Division attacking on the right and the 20th Division on the left. The 12th Division of the XVth Corps will also attack on the left of the 20th Division.

2. The task of the XIVth Corps is to establish a line from which the Transloy system of trenches can be observed and attacked later.

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3. The 60th Infantry Brigade will be the right attacking Brigade of the 20th Division. On the right of the 60th Infantry Brigade will be the 56th Division; on the left will be the 61st Infantry Brigade.

4. (*a*) The attack will be carried out in two stages: 1*st Objective* (Green Line), Rainbow Trench from about N.28.a.1.4 (where touch will be maintained with the 61st Infantry Brigade) to about N.28.c.1½.1½ (where touch will be maintained with the 56th Division). 2*nd Objective* (Brown Line). A line from about N.22.c.8.2 (where touch will be maintained with the 61st Infantry Brigade) to N.28.b.7.1 (where touch will be maintained with the 56th Division). This line includes Cloudy Trench.

(*b*) If good observation of the Transloy system of trenches cannot be obtained from the 2nd Objective, patrols will be pushed forward to secure good observation points for the subsequent attack.

(*c*) The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour all along the line until the Objectives have been reached. The failure of a unit on a flank is not to prevent other units pushing on to their objectives, as it is by such means that those units which have failed will be assisted to advance. To meet the possibility of this happening units must keep parties of bombers near their flanks ready to bomb down and, if necessary, to establish blocks in captured trenches.

5. The right of the 61st Brigade will direct. The 60th Infantry Brigade will, therefore, advance by its left. All ranks will be impressed with the importance of maintaining correct direction. Before each advance, and as far as possible during each advance, all officers should use their compasses; 60° [1] (sixty degrees) is approximately the magnetic bearing for the advance of the 60th Infantry Brigade from 1st to 2nd Objective.

All ranks should also note that the general line of advance is approximately between Beaulencourt and Le Transloy. The angle at which their shadows will be cast by the sun if it be shining during the advance should also be calculated and communicated to all ranks by Commanding Officers when the zero hour is published.[1] Any similar aids for keeping direction must be made use of.

6. The dividing line between battalions will be approximately N.28.c.4.6 in Green Line to N.28.b.4.6½ in Brown Line.

[1] In the Battalion Operation Orders appeared the following: "All ranks should be warned to advance so that the sun, if shining, is just behind their right ear, thus casting their shadows a quarter left of the line of their advance."— ED.

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7. The attack will be preceded by a steady bombardment of the hostile positions by the Corps Heavy Artillery, commencing at 3 p.m. on 6th October, but there will be no intense fire previous to the hour of zero.

8. The infantry will advance to the attack on the 1st Objective at zero, and to the 2nd Objective at zero plus 20.

In both cases the infantry will get close under the creeping barrage which will be established in front of them and which will commence to creep forward at zero plus 2 in the case of the 1st Objective, and zero plus 23 in the case of the 2nd Objective. The barrage will creep forward at the rate of 50 yards per minute.

It is most essential that the infantry should leave their trenches quickly. Commanding officers will, therefore, ensure that good steps or other means of egress are provided beforehand for leaving their trenches.

9. (*a*) The two assaulting battalions will be formed up before dawn previous to the attack on the N.E. side of the road which runs from N.27.c.3.1 (Guedecourt) to road junction N.34.a.1.9, the 6th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the right and the 12th R.B. on the left.

Battalion Headquarters will be established in the forming-up areas.

(*b*) The 12th K.R.R.C. will be in support; two companies will be in the old front line (N.33.b.), two companies in Needle Trench and the trench running from about N.33.c.0.1 to N.33.c.9.4., with H.Q. in Needle Trench.

(*c*) The 6th K.S.L.I. will be in reserve; one company in each of Blighty, Mail, Times, and Punch Trenches, with H.Q. in Punch Trench.

10. (*a*) The 83rd Field Company R.E. is placed at the disposal of the 60th Infantry Brigade.

(*b*) The O.C. this Company will detail 1 N.C.O. and 4 men to assist the 12th R.B., and 1 N.C.O. and 3 men to assist the 6th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry in the construction of strong points as detailed in para. 15 below. These men will form up before dawn with their respective battalions rationed for the day.

(*c*) The remainder of the Company will be just south of Brigade H.Q. (T.8.a.3.5) by 4 p.m.

The O.C. the company will report to Brigade H.Q. at 3 p.m.

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11. One company, 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers), is placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 60th Infantry Brigade. It will be just south of Brigade H.Q. (T.8.a.3.5), or in Serpentine Trench at 4 p.m.

The O.C. the company will report to Brigade H.Q. at 3 p.m.

12. (*a*) The O.C. 60th Machine-gun Company will detail four guns and teams to each of the assaulting battalions. They will form up before dawn with the battalion to which they have been detailed. They should accompany the last wave of the assault, and should be used to hold and consolidate the position gained, paying particular attention to firing to the flanks.

When the 2nd advance takes place each battalion will send forward two of its four guns to help to hold the 2nd Objective, the other two remaining in position for the defence of the 1st Objective, and assisting the advance in every possible way.

(*b*) He will also arrange for four more guns about Needle Trench or farther forward to assist the advance with overhead fire.

13. The O.C. 60th T.M. Battery will place as many guns in position as he can in N.28.c. and 27.d., and will fire rapidly on the German front line from zero to zero plus 2, having carefully registered each gun beforehand.

14. *The Assault.* (*a*) At zero hour both battalions will leave their trenches, and will assault the 1st Objective, each battalion having a frontage of two companies. Each of these leading companies should advance in two waves, if possible. They will assault, capture, and consolidate the 1st Objective. They will be followed as closely as possible by the two remaining companies of each battalion, each company advancing similarly in two lines, forming 3rd and 4th waves. These 3rd and 4th waves will pass right over the 1st Objective, unless they are urgently required to assist in its capture, and they will lie down about 40 yards to 80 yards in front of the captured trench ready to lead the second advance.

(*b*) At the same time the two companies of the Supporting Battalion from N.33.b. will move forward, and will enter and hold our vacated front line as soon as the hostile barrage permits.

(*c*) During the halt at the 1st Objective all officers and N.C.O.'s must pay particular attention to ascertaining the direction of their next advance

(*d*) At zero plus 20 the two companies of each battalion, who will then be in advance of the 1st Objective, will advance in two waves

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to capture the 2nd Objective. The second wave will be followed as closely as possible by the original two companies of each battalion who captured the 1st Objective, who will then form a third wave.

(*e*) The two companies of the Supporting Battalion will move up into the 1st Objective and hold it.

(*f*) The captured line must be consolidated, and held as lightly as possible, full use being made of Lewis and machine guns. Posts should also be pushed forward and dug in.

15. Strong points will be established in Rainbow Trench by the 12th R.B. at N.28.a.2.3, and by the 61st Infantry Brigade at about N.27.b.4½.7½, and in the 2nd Objective by the 6th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry at N.28.b.7.2, and by the 12th R.B. at N.28.b.0.7, and 61st Infantry Brigade at about N.21.d.6.7.

16. The assaulting troops will wear fighting order; others should carry greatcoats.

Every infantryman will carry 220 rounds S.A.A., 2 Mills grenades, one *Yellow* flare, and one Véry pistol cartridge.

Water-bottles will be filled.

Fifty per cent. of the assaulting troops will carry forward picks and shovels (1 pick to 4 shovels).

17. The 9th Squadron R.F.C. will have a contact aeroplane in the air from zero to 5.30 p.m.

Flares will be lit as follows :—

(*a*) On attaining each Objective.

(*b*) At 5 p.m.

18. Medical arrangements will be communicated later. Battalion Commanders will arrange for their own Regimental Aid Posts.

19. Prisoners of war will be sent to Brigade H.Q., and thence to Corps Cage at the Craters (A.8.a.), where they will be taken over by the A.P.M.

20. Watches will be synchronized at 7 p.m. on the 6th instant and 9 a.m. on the 7th instant by wire from Brigade H.Q. Units not on the telephone to Brigade H.Q. will send a representative to check time at the above hours.

21. There will be a dump of S.A.A., Mills bombs, water, and a few S.O.S. rockets and flares at old German gun-pits about N.33.b.6.3.

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Battalion Operation Orders, issued on the 6th October by Major J. E. Osborne, commanding, contained extracts from the above Brigade Orders, and some additional instructions, the more important of which were:—

The general line of advance from the 1st to the 2nd Objective is on a magnetic bearing of 58°. Officers must make every effort to work by compass, as the advance is very blind.

Battalion H.Q. will be situated in dug-out about point N.27.d.9½.5 (in the Sunken Road), to which reports will be sent by runner.

As soon as the 2nd Objective is gained, officers commanding companies will mark their dispositions as near as possible on the map issued for the purpose, and send it to Battalion H.Q.

A Battalion Aid Post will be established at N.33.b.9.4. Company stretcher-bearers are to be used chiefly for collecting wounded in shell-holes and binding them up. They should not be used for carrying back wounded in the earlier stages of the operations.

On gaining the objective men should keep in the shell-holes and make them good without exposing themselves. The Brigadier-General attaches great importance to this.

Zero hour to-morrow will be 1.45 p.m.

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 6TH OXFORD AND BUCKS LIGHT INFANTRY.

BY MAJOR J. E. OSBORNE, COMMANDING THE BATTALION.

[*Ref. Map Sheet* 57*c. S.W.*]

On the 7th October zero hour was 1.45 p.m., when, in accordance with 60th Brigade Operation Orders, the Battalion left its trenches and attacked Rainbow Trench (1st Objective), which runs from about N.28.a.1.4 to about N.28.c.1½.1½. The leading waves moved out of the British line close up to our barrage, arrived at the German barbed wire (about 40 yards in front of our trench), and lay down. The enemy had manned his parapet some 60 yards to our front, and was delivering a very hot fire from 6 machine-guns and from rifles, to which our troops replied. Shortly afterwards the advance began again; some men were able to crawl through the wire; others were able to move round through the gaps; others, by placing their feet

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on the top strand of the wire, were able to get through. The wire obstacle was one single length of barbed concertina wire, extending along the whole of the frontage of the Battalion's left company. It was about 2½ feet high, and appeared more of an alarming obstacle than it actually was.

During the period zero to zero + 4 minutes the enemy's machine-gun fire was very intense, but at the latter time it was silenced. The enemy then left their trenches unarmed, and ran back towards their second line. During their retreat our Lewis-guns did considerable damage to them; large numbers were seen to fall, and few Germans got back, those remaining in their front line being bayoneted or captured.

The advance from the first German line to the second, a point about N.22.c.8.2. to N.28.b.7.1., was accomplished with comparatively little loss, although some casualties occurred from snipers on our extreme right, who took advantage of that flank being temporarily in the air. Shortly afterwards a portion of the Division on our right pushed forward their attack and commenced digging in; thus, by joining up with our troops, they made our extreme right secure.

The consolidation of this position was at once commenced, our troops having reached their final objective.

This attack was launched in conjunction with the 56th Division on our right and the 12th Division attacking on our left.

The Battalion lost most of its officers early in the attack; the Company Commanders of A, B, and C were killed, and D Company Commander was severely wounded.

The *casualties* amounted to 13 officers and 230 other ranks.

Battalion Diary continued.

October 8th–31st.—The 8th was spent in consolidating the captured position, and at night the Battalion moved to Bernafay Wood, thence marching next day to a camp on the Bray-Albert road, and on the 15th to Daours. Continuing the march, Vignacourt was reached on the 19th, and there training was carried out until the end of the month. On the 17th 2nd Lieuts. F. Bevington and W. V. Amos joined the Battalion.

November was devoted to continuous training at various camps. On the 1st the G.O.C.-in-Chief awarded the Military Cross to

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

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2nd Lieut. T. N. C. HARRIS [1] and 2nd Lieut. H. MONEY [2]; on the 5th the G.O.C. 20th Division presented ribbons of medals to the following :—

12636 Sergeant F. C. STANTON, DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL.
20783 Sergeant W. FRENCH, MILITARY MEDAL.
12133 Corporal A. T. JONES, MILITARY MEDAL.
11662 Private J. ELKERTON, MILITARY MEDAL.
12743 Private A. KIMBLE, MILITARY MEDAL.
12280 Private E. W. SPOONER, MILITARY MEDAL.

On the 19th intimation was received that the following had been awarded the MILITARY MEDAL in the *London Gazette* of the 27th October :—

7707 C.-S.-M. W. WOODCOCK.	12732 Sergeant W. WISE.
11747 C.-S.-M. E. GEORGE.	15907 Corporal E. PATIENT.
12646 C.-S.-M. J. EAST.	12528 Lance-Corpl. H.W. SEAR.
12747 Sergeant W. EDGINGTON.	12584 Private G. WHITE.
12993 Sergeant C. FOX.	12744 Private H. SMITH.

17053 Private U. KINCHIN.

December.—On the 10th the Battalion moved from Mansell Camp to Guillemont, and went into the trenches until the 15th, when it moved back to Carnoy. It had one more tour of the same trenches, and spent the remainder of the month at Méaulte training.

The following officers joined during this month : 2nd Lieuts. L. F. D. Owen and H. W. H. Willes, Lieut. G. D. Boissier, 2nd Lieut. E. C. J. Allday, Lieut Griffith-Williams, 2nd Lieuts. S. E. Storrar, R. C. Warren, J. A. Sellar, G. E. Rowbotham. Of these Lieut. Griffith-Williams and R. C. Warren were re-posted to the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment. Five men were wounded in December, and about 140 were admitted to Field Ambulance suffering from "trench-foot."

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[1] Temp. 2nd Lieut. THOMAS NOEL CLEATHER HARRIS.

For conspicuous gallantry in action. He assumed command of and led the right of the line forward with great courage and determination. He set a splendid example to his men.

[2] Temp. 2nd Lieut. HARRY MONEY.

For conspicuous gallantry in action. He led his men with great courage and initiative, successfully reaching his objective. He set a splendid example throughout the operations.

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1917.

January.—Marching to dug-outs in the vicinity of Bouleaux Wood on the 1st, the Battalion moved up into the line next day, and remained in the trenches until the 4th, when it went back to Bronfay Camp. Three further tours in the same trenches, alternating with rest periods at Bronfay, were carried out, and the Battalion then marched to Méaulte for training.

Casualties.—2 men killed and 19 wounded.

The following officers joined : 2nd Lieuts. A. T. W. Allsop, A. H. Standage, G. A. Higlett, A. M. Duxbury.

February.—On the morning of the 3rd Captain H. J. SUTHERLAND was found dead in his bed. A post-mortem examination and court of inquiry found that death was due to poisoning from carbonic acid gas from a brazier which was in his room. He was buried on the following day at Grove Town.

During this month the Battalion took several tours of duty in the trenches in front of Guillemont, losing 8 men killed and 2nd Lieuts. Higlett, Skoulding, J. W. Wright,[1] and 26 men wounded.

The following joined the Battalion in February : Lieut. G. E. Middleditch, 2nd Lieuts. H. E. Wells, A. C. Skoulding, J. W. Wright, E. C. Cook, R. H. Coad, F. S. B. Moase, and Major C. R. C. Boyle. A draft of 103 men also joined.

March.—Up to the 15th the Battalion continued in and out of the line as before, with camps at Carnoy and Guillemont; on the 16th the Morval Sector, with three small posts, was taken over, after which the Battalion continued to move gradually forward after the retreating Germans until Barastre was reached on the 28th.

Casualties.—2nd Lieut. H. E. RAYNER and 4 men killed, and 8 men wounded.

Joined the Battalion in March : 2nd Lieuts. Cunningham, H. Money, M.C. (rejoined), H. E. Rayner,[2] R. G. Pluckrose, J. E. Zeron, Captain A. B. Baines (rejoined), 2nd Lieuts. Mitchell and Brookes, and Captain J. H. Samuel. Drafts numbering 48 men were received.

On the 29th Major C. R. C. Boyle took over the command of the 12th K.R.R.C.

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[1] 2nd Lieuts. Skoulding and Wright had been with the Battalion less than a week.

[2] 2nd Lieut. RAYNER was killed four days after joining the Battalion.

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April.—The advance continued throughout this month. On the 1st the Battalion moved from Barastre up into the outpost line. On the 3rd, at 12.30 a.m., Captain A. B. BAINES and 2nd Lieut. J. A. SELLAR went to the 12th K.R.R.C. (on the left) to locate a new piquet. They started back, but failed to rejoin their companies, and were reported missing. Next day a piquet of A Company recovered their bodies, the Germans having apparently taken everything they possessed, including their equipment. 2nd Lieut. A. G. WEST was also killed on the 3rd by a stray bullet at "stand-to" in the morning.

Moving forward, the Battalion reached Havrincourt Wood on the 22nd. On the 24th 2nd Lieut. C. S. BENSON went forward into the village of Trescault to reconnoitre. He appears to have lost his way, was heavily fired on, and killed.

The *casualties* in the ranks during the month were 2 killed and 8 wounded.

On the 19th Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Osborne relinquished the command of the Battalion on being sent to the base, sick, and Major (acting Lieut.-Colonel) C. R. C. Boyle assumed command until the 27th, when Major (acting Lieut.-Colonel) H. M. Dillon, D.S.O. (2nd Battalion), joined and took over command.

May.—The first part of this month was spent in Vallulart Wood training, after which the Battalion moved to several different places (*see* Regimental Diary), and had two uneventful tours in the trenches, losing 6 men wounded. 2nd Lieut. Scogings joined the Battalion on the 4th.

June.—Nothing of particular interest occurred in this month. The Battalion was in reserve, support, and front-line trenches once, while at other times it carried out training. The last few days of the month were spent at Achiet-le-Petit, and on the 30th a move was made by train to Montrelet.

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RECORD OF THE 7TH (SERVICE) BATTALION, 1916–1917.

The following account of the Battalion's doings has been supplied by Major C. Wheeler, D.S.O.:—

GENERAL SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

(*Map* 4.)

By May 1916, the Salonika defences being in an advanced state of development, the Allied forces were able to devote more time to training and other preparations for offensive action. The Bulgars had remained on the northern frontier of Greece, where, by strenuous work and clever use of a naturally strong position, they had prepared an excellent defensive system. In May 1916, by arrangement with Greece, they came through the Rupel Pass and extended their left flank down to the Ægean Sea, thus blocking the best line of approach into Southern Bulgaria. The screen of Allied troops was pushed forward to the northern frontier of Greece, and patrol encounters with the Bulgars became frequent.

LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR E. GROGAN, BART. Commanding April–June 1916.

Towards the end of July the preparations for a big attack on the Doiran-Vardar front had to be altered so as to meet the menace on the western flank, where the Bulgars had crossed the frontier and advanced half-way along the Monastir - Salonika Railway. Rumania's entry into the war (August) compelled the Bulgars to withdraw troops to the north just at the time when they were wanted to follow up this success; and as they withdrew the French and Serbs pressed forward in pursuit until checked when north of Monastir.

Meanwhile minor operations were in progress along the remainder of the Allied front, of which the British were now responsible for the eastern portion extending from the Ægean Sea to the Vardar River, the XIIth Corps (22nd and 26th Divisions) holding the Doiran-Vardar front. But nothing of importance occurred until

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

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the spring of 1917, when General Sarrail launched his great offensive, in which the French and Serbs attacked in the Monastir district while the British attacked on the Doiran-Vardar front. Bad weather and stubborn Bulgar resistance proved too much for the Allies, and on the 24th May General Sarrail ordered the offensive operations to cease.

Major Wheeler's Diary of Events.

July 1st–24th, 1916.—The Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Robinson, was in camp half a mile west of the Greek village of Dremiglava, and about a mile north of the Birdcage Line



THE VARDAR GORGE.

as the trench system around Salonika was called. The camp was pitched on stubble in an open plain; the dust, heat, and flies made life under a bivouac-sheet very trying, and yet, as we discovered later on, the site had its good points when compared with other sites in Macedonia. Fortunately there were a few vineyards and mulberry groves on its outskirts, and in a gully close by we managed to improvise a very effective shower-bath. Then gradually there arrived some tents, marquees, and a certain amount of R.E. material, and in the end we had quite a passable standing camp. But malaria began to be a worry, and all ranks were dosed with

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quinine two or three times a week; every possible precaution was also taken to prevent the flies breeding; but few, if any, precautions were taken to get rid of the breeding-places of mosquitoes.

We were all pleased at having a change from the incessant digging of the last six months, and we settled down to some useful training during the next three weeks, preparatory to a move nearer the front.

We stored all our surplus kits, and made huge dumps of mess furniture, orderly-room gear, meat safes, and every description of thing which we could not take with us, and I may as well say at once that we never saw any of these treasures again.

July 25th.—After spending the day in clearing the camp and adding further stores to the dumps, the Battalion marched out at 4.30 p.m. in welcomer ain. Transport, half pack and half limber; men in full marching order (greatcoats left on the dumps); a blanket and a bivouac-sheet per man with 2nd Line Transport. The march to Ambarkeui was only 7 miles, and we camped on a very stony piece of ground just above the village.

July 26th.—After handing over the camp to the advance party of the 79th Brigade the Battalion marched at 8 p.m. to Sarigol (8 miles) by a bad road. Camp better than the last one.

July 27th.—Leaving at 8 p.m. we had an easy march of about 8 miles to Milovci.

July 28th.—Our camping-ground was on a spit of sand in the bed of the River Gjol Ajak, which, draining Lake Doiran into Lake Ardzan, has cut its way through the plain between the Krusha Balkans and the Vardar River. Since the plain itself is under observation from the Bulgar position on Grand Couronné, and from their balloon which hovers over its western shoulder, the bed of the Gjol Ajak is used as a camping-ground for a great number of both French and British troops. The Entente Cordiale was much in evidence, and our men and the Frenchmen mixed freely during the day. The latter were a fine lot, and most of them had seen service in France, Gallipoli, and Serbia.

The situation here at present is as follows: The Allies are holding a line of hills (about 13 miles long) running from the south of Lake Doiran to the Vardar. These hills, averaging some 900 feet in height, are absolutely treeless, though covered with scrub, usually dwarf, prickly-leaved, evergreen oak, and their slopes are seamed with deep, steep-sided ravines. Away in the distance stood the

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

Horseshoe Hill. PANORAMA OF PIP RIDGE FROM PITON ZOUAVE. Part of La Tortue.

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great rocky peak known as Grand Couronné (Kala Tepe), which, for the next three years, was to be the evil eye of our existence, for not only could it see every movement in our front line, but it overlooked our lines of communication, our railroads, our aerodromes, and even the Ægean forty miles away.

A mile west of Grand Couronné was the peak known as P.2 ("The Dub"), which was the second peak on a great ridge running south-south-east into No Man's Land. This ridge, some two miles long, was bisected by the boundary between Greece and Serbia, and was called by us the Pip Ridge, because the French, before our arrival, had named its five most prominent peaks Pitons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, which we abbreviated to P.1, etc.[1] About 300 yards south-east of P.5 was Horseshoe Hill, a mile to the south of which lay Kidney Hill.

To Grand Couronné itself the distance from the Allied line was about 6,000 yards, but to the advanced Bulgar positions scarcely half that distance; and, as will be seen from the map, the capture of Grand Couronné necessitated first the capture of the Pip Ridge.

July 29th.—The Battalion moved at dusk to Cugunci, a ruined village half a mile north of the Kilindir-Karasuli Railway, and went into bivouac alongside the French reserves and transport, ready to relieve their troops in the line the following night. Battalion H.Q. were established at Table Hill; D Company held Asagi Mahala, and Bujuklu Ravine; B held Le Commandant; C Palliasse, with an outpost platoon on Bagatelle. The French described the situation as *très calme*, with little artillery fire and only occasional patrol encounters.

July 30th.—The French began early to dribble away, and we were glad to have the line to ourselves, as the camps had been too full to be comfortable.

July 31st.—Busy clearing up camp areas. It is very difficult to locate the Bulgar front-line trenches, which are most inconspicuous, and we have no aeroplane photographs, and only poor maps to help us.

August 1st.—Enemy artillery showing some activity. The French have placed four batteries of 75's in our area; our own gunners are also choosing battery positions, so we shall not have a quiet time much longer.

Captain Henry went to Brigade H.Q. as acting Staff Captain.

[1] "P. 1" became "Pip One" in signaller's jargon.—C. W.

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August 2nd–3rd.—Patrols went out towards the enemy outpost positions, and found Kidney Hill unoccupied.

August 4th.—Major C. Wheeler, Lieut. Miller, and six men went out just before dawn to reconnoitre the country with a view to an attack on Pip Ridge from the south-west. They were out for nearly twelve hours, and suffered considerably from the heat and the difficult going. Major Wheeler came to the conclusion that an attack either by day or by night would have little chance of success.

August 5th.—Colonel Robinson and Colonel Dene (7th R. Berks), with Lieut. Miller, reconnoitred Kidney Hill, and were fired on by a Bulgar 77-mm. field-gun, but, fortunately, succeeded in getting back unhurt.

August 5th/6th.—2nd Lieut. Manning, with 25 men of A Company, left Commandant Hill at 8.45 p.m. to reconnoitre the approach from Kidney Hill to Horseshoe Hill and to locate the enemy's position on the latter hill. 2nd Lieut. Eagle, with 25 men of B Company, followed in support, with orders to establish connexion by wire between Kidney Hill and Battalion H.Q.

As the patrol was approaching the top of Kidney Hill and was still on ground which on two former occasions we had patrolled without incident, the enemy was found to be holding the top of the hill. Our patrol at once charged, and four of the enemy were bayoneted and two shot. Then, in accordance with Manning's orders, the patrol fell back to reorganize at Castle Hill 800 yards in rear. This was practically impossible under the circumstances, the patrol having become scattered, and the country bewildering. Sergeant H. J. Smith, the leader of the patrol screen, who behaved very gallantly throughout, collected a party of 7 stragglers (3 of whom were wounded), and eventually came in at the extreme left of our line, 400 yards west of Castle Hill. One man (Private F. Wood) did not return, and must have been killed. Seven other ranks were wounded.

This is the first time that the bayonets of the Division have been used in action.

Patrols sent out during the day to look for Private Wood found no trace of him.

August 7th.—Last night's patrols found Kidney Hill unoccupied, but the enemy's outposts were seen on the skyline of Horseshoe Hill.

General Duncan inspected and congratulated 2nd Lieut. Manning and his patrol on their successful patrol action.

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August 8th.—Orders received that the Battalion is to assault and consolidate Horseshoe Hill.

Our artillery is very active.

August 9th.—Beginning at dawn the combined artillery maintained a very heavy bombardment on the enemy's positions.

Major Debenham took over the duties of Second in Command from Major C. Wheeler, who went to hospital suffering from slight sunstroke contracted on his recent daylight patrol. Captains Salvesen and Simpson took over the command of D and B Companies respectively. Lieut. Molyneux became Transport Officer and Lieut. Bonner Quartermaster, in place of Lieuts. Maltby and Peirson to hospital, sick.

The Battalion was relieved after dusk by the 11th Worcesters, and moved into a position of readiness in Bujuklu Ravine.

August 10th.—A French Colonial Division established itself on La Tortue (the big, flat-topped hill midway between Lake Doiran and the Pip Ridge), and a company of the R. Berks occupied Kidney Hill without much trouble. This will simplify our bound forward to Horseshoe Hill, and gives our patrols a good starting-point from which to reconnoitre Horseshoe.

The transport joined the Battalion in Bujuklu Ravine—a dangerous place for it, as the enemy's guns can enfilade the ravine from end to end, and the steep sides will concentrate the effect of bursting shells.

August 11th.—Enemy artillery very active. At dusk the inevitable happened, and a 5.9 howitzer commenced firing with the utmost deliberation and accuracy into our mule lines, causing appalling confusion. Sergeant Bovington, with other transport men, behaved very gallantly, and did all that was possible to control the animals while the shelling continued. Sergeant Bovington and some of the men were wounded, and Privates D. Faulkner, W. Smith, and others at once went into the ravine and rescued the wounded from under the very feet of the panic-stricken mules.

Sergeant BOVINGTON unfortunately died of his wounds at the 79th Field Ambulance, and his death deprived the Battalion of the services of a valuable old regular soldier of the best type. Five men were wounded, and of the mules 11 were killed, 16 wounded, and one broke away altogether.

During the night working parties buried the dead mules—a difficult job in this rocky country. Much to our relief the Brigade ordered the transport to return to Cugunci.

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Captain Evans (R.A.M.C.) and Lieut. Wicks admitted to hospital, the place of the former as Medical Officer being taken by Captain R. A. Mansell (R.A.M.C.).

August 12th.—All day a French battery just above us fired steadily on La Tortue, but without drawing any reply from the enemy, and we were left alone except for a few stray shells.

Two strong patrols, going out to reconnoitre from Kidney Hill towards Horseshoe Hill, encountered a party of Bulgars. The patrols withdrew to the trenches of the R. Berks on Kidney Hill and the enemy was beaten off.

August 15th.—The French carrying out a bombardment and making an attack on La Tortue, which they had failed to hold against determined counter-attacks on August 10th/11th.

August 16th.—The attack by the French Colonials still continued successfully, though their casualties were heavy. Their attack extended from Doiran Lake to Horseshoe Hill (exclusive), and by the end of the day they had consolidated on La Tortue, but had failed to cross the Jumeaux Ravine, or to establish themselves in Doldzeli, which was included in the left of their attack . One company did, however, get into Doldzeli, but never returned.

ATTACK ON HORSESHOE HILL.

August 17th.—Definite orders were received from the Brigade as to the Battalion's advance against Horseshoe Hill. These were altered during the day, but finally we were given to understand that we should meet with no opposition on the hill, and that we would be required merely to occupy it and dig in. For this reason the two companies of the R. Berks who were to have come with us were withdrawn. It was decided to attack with A and B Companies, while C and D would come out lightly equipped, to carry tools, and return before dawn.

August 17th/18th.—The enemy had been fighting the French all day in and around Doldzeli, and were apparently unprepared for a night attack.

The Battalion, with attached R.E. and Machine-gun Company Sections, proceeded in two parties to the point of assembly at the south end of Pillar Hill, one party going each side of Castle Hill. Time was lost through a scare due to French transport returning from their front line being mistaken for the enemy, and also through

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clumsy loading of the mules of the troops attached to us. The first stage of the assault was, therefore, delayed from 10.30 p.m. to 11.15 p.m., which was most unfortunate, as the moon was now well up.

Telephone communication with Brigade H.Q. was successfully established. A French officer from our right assured us that we would encounter no opposition, but no sooner had 2nd Lieut. Hoey's platoon reached the higher slopes of C.3 than he was fired upon from the direction of the boundary mark on the east arm of the Shoe. Lieut. Bowman and his platoon, with a Lewis-gun (under Corporal Hudson), were sent to assist him. The enemy (an advanced post) was driven out, but not before it had knocked out Bowman and about 15 men from the two platoons. Major Debenham now went forward, and, finding that we were out of touch with the French on our right, went off to remedy this. On the way he and a Bulgar scout stalked each other until Debenham bagged him with the first shot from his revolver. Unfortunately he had had to send his runner to H.Q. with a message, for shortly afterwards he (Debenham) was blown up and partially buried by a big shell, and he was only just able to struggle back to H.Q. before collapsing.

Heavy shelling had now opened up all along the French line. We had reports of a French withdrawal, but a message from 2nd Lieut. Garland, who was liaison officer with the French, denied this.

Meanwhile Manning was heavily fired on as he approached C.1, but he soon made good his objective, where shortly afterwards he was joined by two more platoons of A Company under 2nd Lieuts. Collier and Ker.

The remainder of B Company under Captain Simpson now joined Hoey, whose force was considerably depleted. Simpson was hit at the telephone almost as soon as he arrived, and Eagle also was hit soon afterwards.

All telephone wires were cut almost as fast as they were laid, and had it not been for the really fine work of the runners, it would have been impossible to arrange for a simultaneous attack on C.2 from both C.3 and C.1 after an intense bombardment of C.2 from 1.15 to 1.30 a.m.

Symonds, who had been sent up to fill the gap between our right and the French, reached B Company, and found them so much in need of assistance that, on reference to Battalion H.Q., he was ordered to support Hoey, who was now the only officer left with

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B Company. As soon as our artillery lifted from C.2 Hoey and Symonds moved forward with B Company and No. 14 Platoon, but were met by heavy rifle and grenade fire. Part of the line was checked, and Symonds was wounded. Corporal Hudson, who was immediately behind, rushed through the broken line and, with great gallantry, fired his Lewis-gun from his hip. This enabled Hoey to push on, and C.2, the toe and dominating point of the whole shoe, was captured without much further trouble. Meanwhile Ker and Manning had swept up and round from C.1 and met Hoey's force on the top of C.2. Manning was at once sent out with a covering party. Martin, with Keeble, Steele, and about 30 men of C Company, arrived a few minutes later, after a difficult advance through a heavy barrage and up the steep slopes of C.2 between the two arms of the shoe. Arnett, with the remainder of A Company, arrived about the same time.

Martin now was faced with the problem of reorganization and consolidation with only about an hour before dawn. Most opportunely, however, Boor and No. 15 Platoon arrived from H.Q. with tools and sandbags, and so work was at once begun on adapting the Bulgar trench which almost completely encircled the top of the Hill C.2. Hoey and B Company were sent back to Battalion H.Q., fifteen minutes away. A Company held C.3 and C.1 with two platoons, the other two, together with two platoons of D Company and part of C Company, forming the garrison of C.2 and local reserve.

Providentially there was a natural terrace about 70 yards down the steep southern slope of C.2, and slits dug into the bank of the terrace gave valuable cover from the steady fall of shrapnel which was kept up more or less continuously for the next three days. It was soon found that the Bulgar trench was cut in solid rock, and as it was only about three feet deep, Martin decided to concentrate on a main line of trench on the reverse slope of C.2. A day post (1 officer and 3 men) was left in the trench on the north slope, where they spent a miserable time lying prone among the rocks in the blistering heat, with the constant expectation of being blown out at any moment. Next day Wrinch, who was acting as artillery liaison officer, was mortally wounded here. We could not get him in, and Mansell very nobly came and remained with him for three hours—until he died.

Symonds, who had returned to C.2 after having his hand dressed, and Boor did most useful work in the day post, and the presence of

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their two platoons gave Martin a confidence which otherwise he would not have had.

August 18th was spent—not very successfully—in trying to get a little rest, in anticipation of the coming night. At dusk Sergeant-Major Merritt brought up the remainder of C Company to C.2, while Salvesen, with his other two platoons, arrived about 1 a.m. and escaped the enemy's barrage by a minute. They brought up for the men hot stew, which was much appreciated, although, after its three-mile journey, it arrived quite cold. A certain amount of water was also brought—about sufficient to rinse the dust from one's mouth and throat. Two sections R.E. ran out some concertina wire, while the garrison improved the trenches, and Miller got through a lot of useful work co-ordinating our Lewis-guns and the 4 machine-guns of the 78th Machine-gun Company. Being in touch with the French on our right, we now felt more happy about our flanks.

Baker, with a small party of A Company, formed a post on Whaleback, a long spur running south-west from Horseshoe, and he remained on this very unpleasant job for three nights.

August 19th.—About 12.45 a.m., without any very marked warning from their artillery, some 200 or 300 Bulgars charged down the neck joining C.2 with P.5. Fortunately we managed to get our artillery on to them, and the wire put up by the R.E. broke up the enemy's formation, since, ignorant of its actual weakness, they tried to go round it instead of over it. Their casualties must have been heavy, for we were all waiting for them, and they met a volume of fire from our guns, machine-guns, and rifles.

At 2.45 a.m. a party of Bulgars coming from P.5 was driven by our fire down the north-east slope of C.2. Here they seem to have collided with a company about to attack our right flank, for we heard a good deal of shouting and saw the occasional flash of an electric torch. The result was that we had not much difficulty in beating off this flank attack when it came about 3 a.m. Probably it was a case of bad synchronization by the two parties. During these attacks the barrage put down by the enemy between C.2 and Battalion H.Q. was very heavy, and almost invariably cut our wires; consequently Ditchburn and his signallers and runners had a very hard time.

The rest of the night passed without incident, and just before dawn the survivors of B Company, who had been sent back to

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Battalion H.Q. on Salvesen's arrival at C.2, were able to reach Bujuklu Ravine. Hoey was wounded by a splinter of shell while standing-to with his company during the counter-attack at 3 a.m.

The daylight hours of August 19th were uneventful, but the intense heat, lack of water and sleep, and absence of cover gave every one a very trying time. At 8 p.m. the intermittent shelling became an intense bombardment, and we stood-to and waited for about twenty minutes, when there came a sudden and complete lull. We expected an immediate counter-attack, but it did not come. This performance the enemy repeated several times, and at 1 a.m. (August 20th) he did make a feeble attack, which our Lewis-guns broke up at once.

Shortly afterwards we were relieved on C.2 and C.3 by the 9th Gloucesters. Baker and Ker remained for another 24 hours on C.1, while C and D Companies went back to fresh camps at Troupel. Martin handed over to Salvesen and joined Battalion H.Q. to help in the completion of the relief by the Gloucesters. This was completed by about 1.30 a.m., just before another unsuccessful Bulgar counter-attack.

August 21st.—By 8 a.m. the whole Battalion was in camps just south of Troupel, having come through the first serious operation in its existence. It had the honour of striking the first blow for the British in the second round of the Balkan campaign; moreover, as C.2 was just over the frontier, the Battalion had the further honour of recovering a part—albeit a very small part—of Serbia.

CASUALTIES.

Killed.

7 Other Ranks.

Wounded.

Major F. DEBENHAM.	2nd Lieut. H. S. EAGLE.
Captain B. L. SIMPSON.	2nd Lieut. J. T. S. HOEY.
Lieut. T. BOWMAN.	2nd Lieut. C. P. BAKER.
2nd Lieut. S. L. SYMONDS.	And 91 Other Ranks.

The Battalion received letters of congratulation on its success from the Commanders of the XIIth Corps, 26th Division, and 78th Brigade.

A draft of 22 men arrived from England.

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August 22nd–28th.—This week was spent under bivouacs south of Troupel, two companies always ready to move at night to reinforce the Horseshoe garrison, while the other two companies worked on the Hill 420—Commandant line.

August 29th.—After dusk the Battalion moved to Bujuklu Ravine.

August 30th.—Took over the sector on the west of Horseshoe Hill. Posts very much in the air, and, if the Bulgar is enterprising, we are likely to have some excitement.

August 31st.—Battalion H.Q. moved to Clichy Ravine.

September 1st–3rd.—Collier and 6 men patrolled to Krastali, to discover if the village was held, but owing to the undergrowth and stony ground found progress difficult. They were out from dusk until 4.20 a.m., and were fired at from the southern outskirts of the village. No casualties.

September 4th–5th.—Busy improving trenches and wiring. Enemy inactive.

September 6th.—Collier took out his patrol again, and was fired at again from Krastali.

September 7th.—Lieut.-Colonel ROBINSON and Company-Sergeant-Major E. B. WOOTTEN attended a French investiture and received the CROIX DE GUERRE for good work on Horseshoe Hill. 2nd Lieut. J. T. S. HOEY should also have attended for the same purpose, but was still in hospital.

September 8th/9th.—The Battalion was relieved by the 12th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. A heavy thunderstorm from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. and other difficulties made the relief very slow, and the last company did not get away until 3 a.m.

September 9th.—The Battalion was not reported present at Jenikoj until 6.30 a.m. Every one very tired.

Yesterday Colonel Robinson, who had sprained his ankle badly on the 7th, was evacuated to hospital. He had a miserable journey down to the dressing-station, as he had to be carried by bearers nearly three miles over rocky paths in heavy rain.

September 10th.—The Battalion (less D Company) marched at dusk 4 miles to camp at Mihalova, to form Corps Reserve with the 11th Worcesters. The 22nd Division has now taken over the line as far west as the Vardar, and the XIIth Corps thus holds all the Doiran-Vardar front, except La Tortue, which is still held by French Colonials.

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September 11*th*.—D Company (left to clear up the last camp) and the transport rejoined the Battalion.

September 12*th*–19*th*.—This period was spent in training of all kinds, especially in loading mules, a most important matter when pack transport is in constant use, and we have had a good deal of trouble, during night marches, from bad loading.

On the 12th a draft of 88 other ranks joined from England, and on the 13th another draft of 114 arrived. They seem a pretty good lot, and about 5 per cent. of them have seen service in France.

Each company now has 2 Lewis-guns, and a certain amount of reorganization of companies has taken place. The strength of the H.Q. Company has been reduced to 65, it having become too large, thus causing overlapping as well as depletion of the fighting strength of the other companies. Companies are now 180 strong, including the recent drafts.

September 20*th*.—Colonel Robinson rejoined from hospital.

September 22*nd*.—We sent our first candidate for a commission to the Cadet School, Egypt, viz., 11806 Sergeant East.

September 23*rd*.—Captain G. B. MARTIN and Lieut. G. C. MILLER were awarded the MILITARY CROSS for Horseshoe Hill [1]; and 15421 Sergeant H. J. SMITH the MILITARY MEDAL for patrol work on Kidney Hill.

September 24*th*–30*th*.—Training and road-making.

October 1*st*–8*th*.—Training and road-making continued. The whole Battalion was inoculated against cholera on the 1st and 2nd; a draft of 18 other ranks from the Wilts Yeomanry joined on the 3rd, and 15 of the 2/3rd Scottish Horse on the 5th. The nights are now much colder, and the men glad of their second blanket. Sun-helmets were withdrawn on the 4th.

October 9*th*.—Companies marched independently to new camps in rear of Hill 420 Sector, D at Zouave, A at 420, C at Bujuklu, B and Battalion H.Q. south-west of Troupel.

October 10*th*.—Weather delightfully bracing now. All idea of an offensive on this part of the front has been abandoned, the Allied reserves being all required for the push for Monastir.

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[1] The official announcement in the *London Gazette* of 14th November 1916 was as follows: "Capt. George Bellis Martin. He reorganized the captured position with great courage and skill. Later, he rendered very valuable assistance during an enemy counter-attack." "Lt. Gerald Cedar Miller. He fought his machine-guns with great courage and skill, rendering most valuable services

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The enemy's artillery has been more active, but he has made no further effort to regain lost ground.

October 11th.—A and D Companies went up at dusk to Doldzeli Sector to man the trenches while their present occupants (11th Worcesters) raided Mamelon. The raid took place at midnight, the Worcesters entering the enemy trenches, inflicting casualties, and bringing back identifications. The enemy shelled Mamelon and our trenches very heavily. The Worcesters had 40 casualties, and we four men wounded. A and D Companies returned to their camps just before dawn.

October 12th.—Second cholera inoculation.

October 14th.—Relieved 11th Worcesters in Doldzeli trenches (D Sector); 3 companies in the line, 1 company in reserve. One man wounded.

October 15th.—The trenches are dug on the farthest limit of the French advance in August, and there are dead Frenchmen still lying about.

Doldzeli is a small ruined village about 700 yards down the eastern slopes of P.5, and some 200 yards in front of our line. French Colonials are on our right, and share Senelle Ravine with D Company.

October 16th.—D Company's trenches and camp were shelled, and a direct hit knocked out a Lewis-gun. Two casualties.

October 17th.—Day quiet and uneventful, but at 9 p.m. the enemy artillery put down a very heavy barrage about 200 yards in rear of our front line west of Vladaja Ravine. Our advanced posts on the left, seeing the enemy coming on, withdrew, and rifle and machine-gun fire was opened from our trenches, but all communication with our artillery had been cut by the enemy shells in the first few minutes, so the S.O.S. was sent up.

At about 9.45 p.m. the enemy shelling died down, but at 10 p.m. opened again. For a quarter of an hour our trenches were heavily bombarded, and our sole remaining wire to the rear was cut, while simultaneously the enemy opened steady rifle and machine-gun fire on our trenches. By 11 p.m. all firing had ceased, and our officer's patrols went out and searched the ground in front, but found nothing of interest.

The night was intensely dark, and from our trenches little could be seen of the enemy's movements, but two of our advanced posts

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brought back some information. Lance-Corporal Harrison, of C Company, who was in charge of an advanced post of 6 men in front of our wire, saw about 30 Bulgars making for his post, so at once brought fire to bear on them and successfully checked them, and continued to engage them until his ammunition was exhausted, when he effected the withdrawal of his party to our trenches.

Lance-Corporal Griffith, bringing back B Company's left advanced post, missed the gap in our wire, and from the slopes of Horseshoe watched the enemy's attack. He saw four waves advancing against our left, but they were soon checked, and after a while they retired carrying their casualties with them.

It would seem that the Bulgars meant either to carry out a raid, or to make a demonstration with a view to discovering in what strength we were holding this part of the front. If they were making a raid, their plans were evidently ill-prepared; but if, on the other hand, they wished to ascertain the volume of our fire, they certainly achieved their purpose, for they received no fewer than 18,000 rounds S.A.A. The fact is, that we found fire-control extremely difficult, because of the narrowness of the trenches and the impossibility of keeping touch with the Machine-gun Company, whose guns were dispersed about the trenches and the crews under the impression that until their own officer ordered them to cease they were to blaze away for all they were worth.

We also discovered the difficulty of intercommunication in this sort of country during a fight. Except from the noise of the firing, Battalion H.Q. (only 100 yards away) had little knowledge of what was going on until the second in command (Martin) went round the Sector. Of course, Battalion H.Q. were really much too close to the front trenches.

Casualties.—2 men killed and 11 wounded.

October 18th–19th.—Two men were wounded on the 18th, and two on the 19th. 2nd Lieut. Hatfield and 4 men were accidentally wounded at the Corps Trench-mortar School.

October 20th.—Major-General Mackenzie-Kennedy, commanding the 26th Division, visited the trenches and presented MILITARY MEDAL ribbon to :—

Com.-Sergt.-Maj. H. J. SMITH.	11372 Private W. HALES.
13970 Private F. J. RIVERS.	15875 Private F. C. CARTER.

A Bulgar deserter who came in to-day said that the Bulgar attack was made by three companies.

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October 21st.—At 1 a.m. the enemy repeated last Tuesday's attack in almost every detail. Our communications held, and the fire-control was much better, the total S.A.A. expenditure being only 700 rounds; 5 men were wounded. No trace of the enemy was to be found when our patrols went out after the shelling ceased.

October 22nd.—Another Bulgar deserter came in.

The Battalion was relieved by the 7th R. Berks, and spent the night in camps of the 420 line. Every one dead beat, as it has been a strenuous time. The accuracy rather than the intensity of the shelling has been the chief annoyance. Besides dominating us from Grand Couronné, the enemy on Petit Couronné and P.5 practically enfilade us from the two flanks.

October 23rd.—Marched to Mihalova, and relieved the 11th Worcesters in Corps Reserve.

October 24th–November 7th.—At Mihalova, training and supplying large parties for road-making. Weather much colder, and leather jerkins very welcome.

SILVER MEDAL OF THE SERBIAN ORDER OF THE WHITE EAGLE has been awarded to 14373 Private A. W. JOHNSON and 16782 Private E. T. HILL for gallantry on Horseshoe.

November 8th.—The Battalion marched to Rates, exchanging camp with the 7th R. Berks, but still in Corps Reserve.

November 9th–14th.—This period was spent in making winter quarters with sand-bag walls and corrugated iron roofs. Braziers and a certain amount of charcoal have been issued.

November 15th.—Relieved the 11th Worcesters in Doldzeli trenches, which are in a very wet and bad condition.

November 16th.—Received news that regular leave to England has been opened, though only one officer and 7 men will go with the first party.

November 17th–22nd.—In Doldzeli trenches. Enemy artillery active day and night. Our men busy repairing trenches, wiring, etc. Patrols constantly out at night; 6 men were wounded on the 18th; 1 killed and 3 wounded on the 19th; 3 killed and 14 wounded between the 20th and 22nd. A draft of 53 men joined from England.

November 23rd.—Three Bulgar deserters came in—the usual story of not being true Bulgars.

The Battalion was relieved by the 7th R. Berks.

Four men wounded.

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November 24th–December 8th.—Camps have been much improved, and the whole Battalion is now in weatherproof shelters. Most of the time now occupied in digging and in work on winter shelters.

Drafts of 15 and 38 men arrived from England.

December 9th.—The Battalion relieved the 9th Gloucesters in Doldzeli trenches. Weather better, and trenches much improved.

December 10th–16th.—In trenches. Enemy artillery less active, except on the 13th, when the whole Sector was heavily shelled. Work chiefly on improvement of wire. During this period we had 1 man killed and 3 men wounded.

December 17th.—Captain G. B. MARTIN was presented with his MILITARY CROSS ribbon by Brigadier-General J. Duncan.

The Battalion was relieved by the 7th Berks, and moved to Rates, in Corps Reserve.

December 18th–23rd.—The whole Battalion in one camp at Bald Hill. The men had their first hot bath since May in the new baths just finished by the R.E.

A good deal of training is now being done; 150 men for road-making daily.

December 25th.—Cold, but fine. After Church Parade C and D Companies played an exciting game of football, which ended in a draw. Every one had an excellent Christmas dinner, including a liberal allowance of plum pudding provided by the "Daily Telegraph" and "Daily News," and the day was brought to a close with a most successful camp-fire concert.

December 26th.—Relieved the 8th R. Scots Fusiliers in Horseshoe Sector, which is now lettered E, Doldzeli being D, and the other Battalion Sectors in our Corps front being lettered A, B, C. Dispositions: Battalion H.Q. at the foot of the south slope of Pillar Hill; D and A Companies in the trenches; C in support at Kidney Hill; B in reserve with Battalion H.Q.

December 30th.—2nd Lieut. Thursfield was badly wounded in the neck while in charge of a working party on the new fire-trench which will link up the Doldzeli and Horseshoe Sectors.

The defences in these parts are hopelessly inadequate at present; for instance, against an enemy attacking from P.5 we have fire-bays for not more than 20 men. To put matters right on this sector would require 500 men continuously at work for two months.

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The Bulgar, however, does not show much inclination for further offensive action, and it is thought that, having reconquered the Dobrudja and Macedonia, he is quite content to hang on to what he has got. With this in view, he has strengthened his naturally strong positions with every possible device suggested by German engineers and German gunners.

1917.

January 3rd.—We remained in the Horseshoe Sector until to-day, when we were relieved by the 7th R. Berks, after a quiet tour, during which we had 3 men killed and 4 wounded.

On relief, the Battalion moved into Brigade Reserve; C, B, and D Companies at our old camps in Commandant Sector; A (reserve) under canvas halfway between Cugunci and Table.

January 4th–11th.—Spent in Commandant Camps, the men being employed principally in digging, at which they work for eight hours a day. A working party of 100 are road-making with the 8th Battalion of the Regiment, and another 100 are undergoing training.

We are well supplied now with commodities from the Expeditionary Force Canteen, and the beer supply is also fairly regular.

January 12th–19th.—In the trenches of Horseshoe Sector. Little activity, but weather disagreeable, with a strong and icy wind.

January 19th.—A Bulgar deserter came in. On relief, the Battalion returned to Commandant Camps.

January 20th.—The Commander-in-Chief visited Battalion H.Q. and presented Lieut. G. C. MILLER with the MILITARY CROSS ribbon. D Company supplied a very smart guard of honour.

January 21st–26th.—Usual work and training.

January 27th–February 4th.—In Horseshoe trenches again. Patrols reconnoitred P.5, and on the evening of the 3rd 2nd Lieut. C. P. Ker took out about 12 men of A Company with the object of reaching P.5 before the Bulgars did so. Unfortunately he was delayed and arrived a little too late, for as he approached the enemy wire he had a very warm reception from bombs and rifle-fire, which make it impossible to rush the gap in the wire. Ker was wounded in the thigh, and Sergeant Birmingham was slightly wounded.

Casualties during this tour.—1 officer and 5 men wounded.

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February 5th–9th.—Commandant Camps. Usual work. Information received that in the New Year's *Gazette* Lieut.-Colonel A. T. ROBINSON was awarded the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER for good work in connexion with the capture of Horseshoe Hill.

February 10th.—Relieved the 7th R. Berks in D Sector (Doldzeli), the relief being much delayed by a raid being carried out by the 10th Devons, who succeeded in clearing Petit Couronné. This sector is much less pleasant than Horseshoe, and the trenches are very muddy. Our patrols were active during the tour, which terminated on the 17th, and we had 5 men wounded.

February 18th.—On relief, went into Brigade Reserve (420 Sector), and remained there until the 26th, when the Battalion returned to D Sector.

February 27th.—The German aeroplane squadron of 23 aeroplanes, known as "Richthofen's Travelling Circus," was much in evidence, doing a certain amount of damage to transport lines, etc. Our aeroplanes cannot compete with them at present.

February 28th.—The enemy shelled us heavily yesterday and to-day. This evening 2nd Lieut. H. ECCLES was killed by a large piece of shell which hit him in the throat. He had just set his working party to their tasks of clearing Doldzeli Avenue, our main communication trench, when he was hit. These working parties always have a man on the look-out for flashes from the guns opposite, and he gives warning by blowing a whistle. It is probable that Eccles did not hear the warning, as no one else was hit.

Stukeley patrolled towards Hill 380, but the snow, which had been falling for about four hours, made it impossible to get near the enemy wire.

March 1st–6th.—The snow and wind played havoc with the trenches, which became completely blocked, and in most places the only cover for the men was behind the parados, the tops of which were three feet above the ground level. These were used as breastworks, and the men behind them were well-nigh frozen; a curtain of icicles hung from the rim of their helmets, and their greatcoats were frozen stiff. It took three days to make the trenches tenable again, but they were not put in proper order for two or three months, the weight of the snow having broken down trench walls and parados in every direction.

During this tour four men of the Battalion were wounded.

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March 7th.—Relieved by the 11th Worcesters, and moved into winter shelters and tents at Cugunci. A draft of 7 men joined from the base.

March 8th–13th.—This period was spent chiefly in training in trench-to-trench attack. The weather was intensely cold and windy, and it was very difficult to work up much enthusiasm.

March 14th–16th.—Back again to D Sector trenches. Weather wet and cold with some snow.

March 17th.—From 8 a.m. to 11 a.m. the enemy bombarded our trenches from Doiran to Horseshoe very heavily. From 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. they delivered five-minute bursts of rapid fire twice every hour. From 5 p.m. till dark the continuous bombardment was resumed. The comparative inaccuracy and obvious lack of definite purpose in the shooting were most unusual, and we concluded that the whole thing was more a spectacular shoot than a bombardment preliminary to an attack, for we had heard that Prince Boris, the Bulgarian heir-apparent, was visiting Grand Couronné that day. We had one man killed and one wounded. Later we learned that the whole of the British front was similarly bombarded.

March 19th.—The 22nd Division relieved our Brigade in D and E Sectors. We handed over to the 8th K.S.L.I., and took over camps in Pearse Ravine from the 79th Infantry Brigade, whom our Brigade relieved in C Sector (Tortue). This meant a vast amount of movement during the night, and we were not in our new camps until 4 a.m.

March 20th–23rd.—In fairly good camps in Pearse Ravine, which is situated between Hill 420 and La Tortue. The only drawback was that there were several batteries in the ravine, and these drew enemy fire. We were shelled a good deal, twice with gas shells, and, consequently, box-respirators were issued.

We are working on a new communication trench (about a mile long) leading to Senelle Ravine, to enable foot traffic to avoid the Vladaja Ravine. Other similar trenches are being dug to converge on B and C Sectors. The Bulgars must be wondering what we are doing, knowing that we have managed to do without these trenches for the past seven months.

March 24th.—The Battalion relieved the 7th R. Berks in the right half of C Sector, of which the greater part of the trenches are on the northern slopes of the big round-topped hill known as

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La Tortue, very appropriately named from its resemblance to a tortoise. These slopes are very convex, and in places fall almost precipitously into Jumeaux Ravine, though the slopes on the opposite side of the ravine, i.e., up the Petit Couronné, are even steeper. Petit Couronné is the end of a long ridge running out to the south-east from Grand Couronné, and forms a very strong natural bastion which is the key of the eastern half of the outer defences of Grand Couronné. The distance from our line to the Bulgar line on Petit Couronné varies from 350 to 900 yards as the crow flies, but the intervening ground drops 300 feet to the bed of the ravine.

March 25th–April 7th.—All platoon commanders took out patrols at different times into the Jumeaux Ravine, with the object of familiarizing as many officers and men as possible with the best points for crossing the ravine. During the first few mornings Bulgar snipers showed a good deal of activity, especially when we were standing-to, but Ker organized retaliation shoots with Lewis-guns, and soon persuaded the Bulgars that the game was not worth while.

Casualties.—2 men killed and 8 wounded.

April 7th–12th.—On relief the Battalion returned to Pearse Ravine and remained there until the 12th, suffering somewhat from shell-fire, probably intended for our batteries close by. Two men were wounded.

This period was spent in training for the coming offensive. We did six hours by day, and one hour each night was given to the movement of the Battalion across ravines.

April 13th.—Relieved 7th R. Berks in the right sub-sector of C Sector.

April 14th–20th.—Preparations for the offensive are proceeding vigorously, and many batteries are now in position on the southern slopes of La Tortue. Battalion H.Q. at Bude Camp have been shelled a good deal in consequence.

Every night we have sent a patrol into Jumeaux Ravine, for the double purpose of protection and reconnaissance. The Bulgars seem to patrol very rarely, relying for warning of attack on a very liberal use of Véry lights. Enemy trench-mortars on Petit Couronné annoy us more than ever, whereas our trench-mortars fire scarcely at all.

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We now know the general scheme of attack,[1] which is briefly as follows :—

After three days' preliminary bombardment the 26th and 22nd Divisions will assault at night the enemy's front line from Lake Doiran to the Pip Ridge inclusive. Three battalions of the 79th Brigade will attack from the Lake to Petit Couronné inclusive; while, farther west, two battalions (7th R. Berks and 11th Worcesters) of the 78th Brigade will attack trenches opposite 0.5 to 0.6; C and D Companies of the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry to carry ammunition and tools for the 7th R. Berks and the 11th Worcesters respectively. The remainder of the Battalion to be in Brigade Reserve.

On the 17th two large drafts (total 195 men) joined the Battalion from the Base. Most of the men are old casualties of the Battalion, and have been employed with entrenching battalions pending rejoining.

April 21st.—The first day of our bombardment. The wire-cutting batteries did good work. The enemy's aeroplanes were very active, and his artillery retaliated heavily throughout the day, doing a lot of damage to our trenches.

April 22nd.—Second day of preliminary bombardment. Our artillery rehearsed its barrages for the various phases of the attack and subsequent consolidation. We infantry very much questioned the wisdom of this rehearsal, for it showed the enemy the stages and limit of our intended advance.

The enemy's retaliation continued, and his aeroplanes came over and bombed our batteries immediately south of La Tortue, but without doing much damage.

During the night enemy searchlights were very actively used.

April 23rd.—Third day of preliminary bombardment. The continuous fire of our guns during the night has made it impossible for the enemy to repair the gaps made in his wire, and his trenches are very much knocked about. The bombing squadron came over again to-day, but did little damage.

April 24th.—The artillery duel continued, and our trenches suffered considerably. One of the greatest troubles is the laying of the telephone wires. Owing to the rocky nature of the hill it has not been possible to dig special cable trenches, and, consequently,

[1] See Sketch Map No. 5.

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we have had to fix the wires to the rocky sides of the trenches with staples. One of our communication trenches has no fewer than forty telephone wires running up it. The staples are constantly coming out, and it will be surprising if signal communication lasts long after the attack begins.

ATTACK OF THE XIITH CORPS ON 24TH/25TH APRIL.

The enemy steadily bombarded our trenches all day. About dusk there was a lull, followed by a bombardment, which reached its maximum just as our assaulting troops were leaving the trenches.

C and D Companies of the Battalion (with No. 4 Platoon of A Company attached to C) carrying bombs, barbed wire, iron screw pickets, and tools, left our trenches at 9 p.m., and followed the reserve companies of the 7th R. Berks and 11th Worcesters respectively. The objectives of these two battalions were, firstly, the Bulgar trenches opposite 0.5 to 0.6, and secondly his trenches behind.

When C Company (Durno-Steele), less No. 12 Platoon, which was carrying for the R.E., reached the junction of Hand 2 and 5 Ravines, they found that the right company of the 7th R. Berks had been checked by the barrage in the Jumeaux Ravine. Meanwhile the other two assaulting companies of the 7th R. Berks and 11th Worcesters had gained the greater part of their first objective, as well as part of their second objective. And the Medical Officer of the 7th R. Berks had established his dressing-station in Mortar Ravine.

The Bulgars counter-attacked very heavily, but until midnight we were able to hold the ground we had gained. Things now became critical, as the two companies of the 7th R. Berks had suffered heavy casualties and had lost all their officers.

Two platoons of D Company, under Pickford, were sent up to help a party of the Worcesters under Pearson,[1] while Stevenson did most useful work with the other two platoons, making three journeys back to Exeter Ravine for further supplies of bombs.

Eventually (about 2 a.m.) Pearson had to withdraw, as the Bulgars had counter-attacked in such force and with such vigour that gradually all our men were pushed back into the Jumeaux Ravine, and he was in danger of being surrounded. Pickford, although

[1] Captain F. S. Pearson joined the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry from the 3rd Dorsets, 4th April 1917, and was transferred a week later to the 11th Worcesters.

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badly wounded, refused to be carried away, as the situation was so critical, and every available man was needed in the line. He was last seen doing what he could to cheer on his men.

Durno-Steele did all he could to relieve the situation on the right, but not being allowed to take his company into the actual fight, he himself went back to our trenches for further orders, as three runners sent for that purpose had all failed to return. At 4 a.m. he was ordered to withdraw, and brought his company back, with all that was left of the loads they had carried out.

On the extreme right the 79th Infantry Brigade had failed to establish themselves in 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, while the 10th Devons, after having their two leading companies almost completely wiped out by shell-fire in the Jumeaux Ravine, captured 0.4, the eastern-most of the two bumps of Petit Couronné.

At 1.30 a.m. an orderly reached our trenches with the following message :—

"To 79th Brigade. Either keep 0.5 under continual bombardment or get 78th Brigade to take it. I am unable to take it, having entirely lost two companies, and with heavy casualties among remainder. Send S.A.A. and grenades most urgently to 0.4.

"T. N. HOWARD, Lieut.-Colonel 10th Devons. 11.35 p.m."

This message was at once transmitted to our Brigade, who ordered us to send two platoons with the ammunition asked for. Hutchins and E. L. D. Robinson were sent with their platoons to 0.4. Hutchins, in his endeavour to locate the 10th Devons, got actually into the trenches on the north side of 0.4, but found neither the Devons nor the Bulgars. Returning about 4 a.m. he met Colonel Howard, who had in the meantime received orders from his Brigade to evacuate the hill.

April 25th.—As dawn broke all who could walk were back in our old lines, and thus ended the attack of the 26th Division. Not an inch of ground had been gained, and the casualties in the two brigades engaged amounted to 81 officers and 2,200 men. On our left flank the 22nd Division had made good the general line of their objectives from Hill 380 to P.4½.

The chief reasons for the failure were the preparedness of the Bulgars, the inadequate force employed in comparison with the strength of the enemy reserves, the great difficulty of the ground, rendered the more difficult by the darkness, and, lastly, the impossibility of keeping our men supplied with bombs and ammunition.

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It would seem that the Bulgars were kept well informed of our plans, for, a month before the attack, its general outline was common gossip in Flocas, the most popular restaurant in Salonika. After the attack persistent rumours stated that the Bulgars, by means of their listening apparatus, discovered the actual date and time of our assault.[1] Certainly it was a strange thing that their barrage-fire became intense just as our assaulting troops were leaving their trenches.

It is evident that the Bulgars completely outnumbered our people, and were quite confident in the strength of their position, greeting our men with shouts of "Come on, Johnny!"

The *casualties* in the Battalion were as follows :—

Killed, or Died of Wounds.

2nd Lieut. H. T. R. PICKFORD (at first reported wounded and missing).

And one Other Rank.

Wounded.

Captain J. S. STEVENSON, M.C.

And 68 Other Ranks.

Missing.

10 Other Ranks.[2]

Total Casualties.

81 of All Ranks.

We are now holding the whole of C Sector (Tortue) with A and B Companies; C and D are back in Tortoise Camp. A good deal of shelling during the latter part of the day. Some of our stretcher-

[1] After the armistice a Bulgar officer, who was attached as liaison officer to Colonel Villiers-Stuart, British Military Representative in Sofia, said that his people with their listening sets could hear practically everything spoken over the telephone on our front, and that during the last months of the war this had been his particular job opposite us. He was quite familiar with the gossip of our Battalion, and knew all about our pantomime, our football prospects, and so on, from hearing our telephone operators chatting to each other at night when things were quiet. During the last year of the campaign screen buzzers were installed in our front line, but the Bulgar officer said that a German operator invented a method of neutralizing their effect.

[2] Of these ten missing eight are presumed to have been killed, as the Bulgars captured only two men of the Battalion, both wounded (one blinded).—ED.

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bearers have helped, during daylight, to bring in wounded from Jumeaux Ravine, the Bulgars, as usual, rigidly respecting the Red Cross. All bodies have been cleared from the trenches, but none of our missing have come in. It is quite easy to see the trenches begun by our Brigade on the line of the final objective.

CAPTAIN C. A. SALVESEN'S ACCOUNT[1] OF THE ATTACK.

On the night of 24th April the first general attack on the Bulgar positions on the Doiran front was made. Briefly, the first intention was to seize the Bulgar front-line position, which ran along the bottom of a hill known to the army as Grand Couronné, and a ridge, running north and south, known as Hill 535. This Bulgar position included the hill Petit Couronné, the real key to the whole Bulgar front-line position, as well as the key to the town of Doiran. Again briefly, the position was to be attacked by two Divisions, the 26th on the right and the 22nd on the left. The 26th Division sent two brigades to the attack on the frontage from Lake Doiran to Petit Couronné inclusive, and the 22nd Division sent one brigade on the frontage from Petit Couronné exclusive to Krastali (a village on the western slope of the ridge) Hill 535 exclusive.

The attack of the 22nd Division was successful, and was carried out with insignificant losses. That of the 26th Division failed, but this account will be confined to the part played by the 78th Infantry Brigade, and more especially the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

The 78th Infantry Brigade was ordered to attack and hold the Bulgar position from Petit Couronné (exclusive) westwards to the point of junction with the 22nd Division. A battalion of the 79th Infantry Brigade—the 10th Devons—attacked Petit Couronné. Roughly, the frontage to be attacked was about 800 yards long, there being two battalions in the attack, one in close support. Our Battalion was employed thus: (1) one company garrisoning our own trenches, with all available Lewis and machine guns; (2) one company in general reserve; (3) two companies providing carrying parties. It will be easier to follow each of these three separately, reversing the above order in their treatment.

The two companies employed as carrying parties were detailed one to each battalion in the attack. They were intended to carry water, wiring material, tools, and ammunition. By the time these

[1] Written shortly afterwards.—ED.

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

PANORAMA FROM PITON ZOUAVE

(Continuation of panorama on page 355.)

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carrying parties went over the top the enemy barrage had reached its heaviest. The behaviour of these two companies was magnificent, and they carried out their work in splendid style. However, casualties were so heavy in the leading battalions that the materials taken out were not required, and those two companies were committed to the attack in support of the two leading battalions. It was only when the general withdrawal and the abandonment of the attack were ordered that these two companies returned.

The company in general reserve (B Company—my own) received orders about midnight to take out as much ammunition and as many bombs as possible to the 10th Devons, who were attacking Petit Couronné. Every man carried 500 rounds of S.A.A. in a sandbag, or 18 Mills grenades. In this way, by keeping to the open, and avoiding tracks and nullahs, 20,000 rounds of S.A.A. and 450 bombs were taken out to the 10th Devons, only four men being wounded on the way out. The journey out from the company's camp to Petit Couronné took over an hour and a half, owing to the roughness and steepness of the ground, the darkness of the night, and the added darkness produced by smoke. By 2 o'clock in the morning the whole company was out on Petit Couronné, each man with his load. But the order to withdraw had already been sent to the 10th Devons, and the company had to return. Every man, in spite of the heavy artillery fire, the extreme difficulty of the ground, and the heavy weight of his load, returned and handed in everything complete. That there were only four casualties in the company of approximately 100 men during this journey in No Man's Land led to the decision as to the direction and way that our Battalion should take when sent to attack Petit Couronné on the night of 8th/9th May.

The remaining company which garrisoned our own trenches was not moved, and was wonderfully fortunate in escaping casualties.

Major Wheeler's Diary continued.

April 26th.—A few more wounded were recovered from the ravine during the night. The Bulgars are still very nervy.

The following letter from Brigadier-General J. Duncan, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the 78th Infantry Brigade, was received :—

"To O.C. 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. Please convey to all ranks who took part in the operations on the night of the 24th/25th April 1917 my appreciation of their gallant and steady

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conduct. The manner in which they carried out their duties was admirable, and was of the utmost assistance to the two attacking battalions."

April 27th.—The 9th Gloucesters took over the left half of C Sector, and C and D companies relieved A and B. A good deal of artillery activity on both sides.

April 28th.—Quiet day, except for intense artillery activity during evening stand-to.

April 29th.—Three patrols to different parts of Jumeaux Ravine returned with nothing unusual to report.

A draft of 90 men arrived.

April 30th.—Lieut.-Colonel Robinson rejoined from leave and resumed command of the Battalion. I took over command of D Company.

May 1st.—The 7th South Wales Borderers (22nd Division) took over the left half of C Sector.

May 2nd–3rd.—Salvesen and Miller reconnoitred crossing-places in Jumeaux Ravine. The Bulgar artillery has been busy trying to knock out a wire-cutting battery which is 150 yards from our Battalion H.Q. As there is only one bomb-proof for the whole of the H.Q. the camp had to be evacuated.

May 4th.—The Battalion was relieved by the 7th R. Berks, and went into bivouac half a mile south of Vladaja. Everybody is very stale, as we have been in the trenches for the last six weeks except for a break of six days.

May 5th–6th.—Vladaja village is in ruins, and although there are many large shell-holes quite near, we are in a delightfully snug and quiet camp. Our bivouacs are dotted about in vineyards and mulberry groves; a good stream, running down into the Vladaja Ravine, enables the men to wash once more; the weather is perfect; a blaze of flowers covers the countryside; and nightingales and cuckoos make our temporary resting-place quite idyllic. Were it not for the guns and the obvious preparations for another offensive we might think ourselves at peace.

Each night we rehearsed the advance across ravines, then the assault and consolidation. Twenty per cent were told off to fall out as casualties, and so the make-believe went on. There was something grim about it all, for as we marched back there were few whose

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thoughts did not wander to the Jumeaux Ravine, which at that very moment the Bulgar was lighting up with his flares and turning into an inferno with his trench-mortars and heavies. Some there were who thought that our imagination might have gone further by practising the consolidation with ninety per cent. of the officers and N.C.O.'s imaginary casualties instead of twenty per cent.

After voluntary Church Parade on Sunday the C.O. had a pow-wow of company commanders, and gave the general outline of the attack that our Division is to make during the coming week. Brigadier-General Duncan addressed a parade of officers and N.C.O.'s and wished us good luck. He presented medal ribbons to those who had won them at Horseshoe, and subsequently he handed over the command of the Brigade to Colonel Howard (10th Devons), as he had been appointed to the command of the 22nd Division.

SECOND ATTACK ON THE DOIRAN FRONT.

8TH/9TH MAY 1917.

The following is Captain C. A. Salvesen's account:—

On 3rd May, after doing twenty-three days on end in the front-line trenches, and being through the attack of 24th/25th April, the Battalion was relieved and went back two miles to a camp near Vladaja village. Although no definite information that a fresh attack was to be made was given, it was easy enough to anticipate and make the necessary preparations. On 6th May company commanders were given their orders. On 7th May the Battalion moved up to the front line again, taking over a short sub-section for the night. May 8th was spent in making all the necessary final preparations.

Briefly, the plan of attack was that A and B Companies should form the assaulting waves, A Company being on the right, B Company on the left and directing, C Company in support behind B Company, and D Company in reserve. With this latter company came Royal Engineers, pioneers (for wiring), machine-gunners, etc.

The first objective was the Bulgar front-line position on the eastern and higher summit of the hill known as Petit Couronné. That line was to be taken and held, and then the Bulgar support line on the same hill. After the capture and consolidation of these two lines, the Battalion was to wheel to the left and capture the lower summit of Petit Couronné. This latter objective was subse-

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quently allotted to another battalion, which at the eleventh hour was ordered out.

The Bulgar position was roughly circular, one half of the perimeter forming the front line, the other half the support line. Communicating trenches ran back across the summit as chords to the circle, with an observation-post (entered by a tunnel from the reverse slope) near the centre of the circle. This gives a rough idea of the Bulgar trench position, but the great strength of it lay in its topographical situation. The position was on the higher mound of the hill Petit Couronné, which was separated from the hill on which the British line lay by a very deep ravine called the Jumeaux Ravine. Although the trenches of the two positions were only 600 yards apart as the crow flies, yet distance by the shortest path from the one to the other was at least 2,000 yards.

The slope of Petit Couronné is precipitous. The only way to get up is to scramble, half walk, half crawl. Large boulders crop up now and then, and the lower part of the slope is covered with thick brushwood, which can only be penetrated by the few old goat-tracks which exist. Towards the top the brushwood had been completely cleared by successive bombardments.

An hour before the Battalion moved to the attack the 77th Infantry Brigade had been launched against the Bulgar position from Petit Couronné (exclusive) to Lake Doiran. Action by the Battalion was intended to be dependent on the success met with by the 77th Brigade. The 77th Brigade were not successful either at first or ultimately, but the Battalion was moved to the attack as previously decided.

At 10.15 p.m. A and B Companies moved out of their camp area, and at 10.30 p.m. the heads of these columns were moving out of the trenches. The companies went by different routes; both had to pass out by one gap, and so had to move in single file. A Company went out well to the right, and doubled, by an almost precipitous track, down into a very steep but dry ravine, which ran between their position and that of the enemy. This was crossed, and the ascent of the other side begun. B Company went out by a gap on the left and doubled down, through thick brushwood, by a track made and used previously by the Bulgars. This track was the only possible way of going through the undergrowth. During the whole time the company was passing through this gap the enemy kept up a slow barrage-fire with shrapnel. It was miraculous that only one casualty—and he the first man to move out—should

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have occurred. C Company followed B Company by the same track; D Company went out by a route close to, and parallel to, the route taken by A Company.

The intention was to assault the Bulgar position five minutes before midnight after an intense bombardment of ten minutes. Shortly before the time of assault the Bulgars started dropping heavy trench-mortar shells amongst the two companies who were now formed up. One shell wounded the second in command of the Battalion (who was in charge of the assault) and both commanders of the leading companies.

Casualties continued to be regular and fairly heavy during the wait for our bombardment to lift. Punctually to time the bombardment lifted, and the first position was taken with comparative ease and little fighting. For ten minutes the artillery played on the Bulgar support line and the companies moved to the attack again. During the second wait of ten minutes the Bulgar barrage of heavy, medium, and light trench-mortars, and of artillery of calibres up to 8-inch guns, descended on the captured line. Casualties then became very severe. From the left the Bulgars made several determined bombing counter-attacks along a communication trench. These attacks were safely held, but the company on the left (B) was so badly knocked about during these ten minutes that C Company (in support) had to be pushed in as well.

When the attack on the Bulgar support line was launched, the casualties in A, B, and C Companies had reached well over 40 per cent. of their original strength, and only three officers out of twelve were able to go on. D Company had been moved up into close support and suffered heavy casualties also. The attack on the Bulgar support line was successful on the right, but on the left no more than a temporary footing was ever gained. This gain could not be held. Bulgar counter-attacks drove the Battalion back, and a stand was made in the old Bulgar front line. From 12.10 a.m. until five in the morning the Battalion held to this position, throwing back five or six determined Bulgar counter-attacks. By this time the division of the Battalion into companies had automatically come to an end, as there remained only between 60 and 70 men fit to carry arms, and all officers and a very large proportion of N.C.O.'s had become casualties. At 5 a.m. three companies of another battalion (7th Berks) were sent to attack the Bulgar support line. This attempt broke down almost immediately—due to the very determined counter-attack by the Bulgars.

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At 7 a.m. the Commanding Officer (Lieut.-Colonel Robinson), being unable to obtain accurate information of the situation, arrived on the scene, and found that all the officers had become casualties.

At 9 a.m. orders came for our Battalion to withdraw, while the Berkshires hung on. Colonel ROBINSON, however, declined to withdraw until it was beyond doubt that the Berkshires could not make good and hold the position. Shortly after 9 a.m. the Colonel was hit—a wound from which he subsequently died.

Just after Colonel Robinson had been taken off the field, orders again came for our Battalion to withdraw, and the withdrawal, which was organized by the Berkshires (no officer of our Battalion being left), was slowly carried out by the few survivors, our last party leaving the hill about 4 p.m.

Magnificent work was done by the R.A.M.C. and battalion stretcher-bearers in removing the wounded.

The action was of short duration, but the casualties were extraordinarily heavy. The Battalion went into the attack about 600 strong. The casualties numbered (roughly) 487 N.C.O's and men and all the 17 officers. Only two of the missing have been heard of as wounded and prisoners of war, and over twenty-five per cent. of the casualties were posted as "missing," which speaks volumes for the behaviour of the men and their determination to succeed.

I cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of the above account, but it describes what occurred as far as my recollection goes.

MAJOR WHEELER'S DIARY CONTINUED.

May 7th.—The day was spent in getting rid of superfluous kit. After dusk we relieved the 7th Berks in the right half of C Sector, B and C Companies going to Torquay, A, D, and Battalion H.Q. to Tortoise, Elbow, and Bude Camps respectively. Much artillery activity. Lieut. N. J. Peirson and 4 men were wounded during the relief.

May 8th.—The day was spent resting and making the last preparation for the attack. While everybody realized the seriousness of our particular task, there was a marked spirit of confidence throughout the Battalion. After tea, during the wait till dusk, two of the companies had impromptu sing-songs. By 9 p.m. the whole Battalion was in position of assembly in Torquay Camp. While Lieut. C. P. Baker and a few men were making the necessary gaps in our wire, the 77th Brigade began their attack on 0.1, 0.2, 0.3,

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which formed about 1,000 yards of trench connecting the south-east face of Petit Couronné with Lake Doiran. No Man's Land was here comparatively flat, with an occasional short, deep ravine, which made progress difficult. Originally it was the intention only to attack Petit Couronné, if the attack of the 77th Brigade was successful. The 12th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were the centre of the three attacking battalions, and they actually reached their final objective. Owing, however, to difficulty with the wire and very heavy machine-gun fire, the two flank battalions were unsuccessful, and the centre had to fall back, so that by 2 a.m. the Bulgar was able to concentrate on the defence of Petit Couronné.

While waiting in Torquay Camp a few lachrymatory gas shells fell in the camp and caused a good deal of inconvenience. Had they been put into Jumeaux Ravine our crossing would have been almost impossible, as it would have been appallingly difficult to climb the slope of Petit Couronné more or less blindfolded. Actually, the crossing was effected very quickly and with very few casualties. This was due to the good reconnaissance and organization of company officers. The Bulgar was manifestly uneasy, and was steadily shelling Dorset Ravine and the Jumeaux between us and the Black Watch—the left battalion of the 77th Brigade.

About 11.30 p.m., as A and B Companies were getting into wave formation, the enemy opened fire with his trench-mortars. Major A. D. Homan (commanding the assaulting companies), Captain C. A. Salvesen (B Company), Captain G. C. Miller (A Company), and Company-Sergeant-Major Smith were all seriously wounded. 2nd Lieut. H. J. Hodges (C Company) soon afterwards was incapacitated, thus leaving only six officers with A, B, and C Companies. After consultation with Lieut. White, artillery liaison officer, Lieut. C. P. Ker signalled back at 11.40 p.m. asking that our barrage might lift as soon as possible, as no good could result from having to wait. This, however, could not be arranged.

Except for one 6-inch gun which appeared to be firing erratically, our barrage was very accurate, so that our first wave was able to creep within about 20 yards of the enemy's trench before assaulting. The wire was no obstacle at all, and our first wave had no difficulty in disposing of the few Bulgars still in Z.27 and Z.28. These were brave men, as the fire-trench had almost disappeared, our shell-fire during the last month having destroyed it completely. Nowhere was the trench more than 3 ft. deep, and its width had grown to 8 ft., while all its dug-outs had their entrances choked with débris.

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Our bombers pushed out along our flanks, and the first wave of B Company manned the parados preparatory to forming for the advance to Z.33 and Z.34. A very heavy enemy barrage now began, and, during the enforced 20 minutes' wait before our barrage lifted from the second objective, B Company suffered very severely. 2nd Lieut. A. W. Kelly had been badly wounded in the leg just before the assault, and 2nd Lieut. C. A. Hutchins, the only officer remaining with the company, was wounded and partially buried during this wait. 2nd Lieut. W. Garland (C Company) now took command of B Company, bringing up a platoon of C on B's left.

At 12.40 a.m. the second assault took place, A Company gaining its second objective (the support trench Y.9–Y.10, on the northern slope of the hill) without much difficulty. B Company, on the other hand, was held up by the very heavy barrage between them and their second objective, and although Captain F. A. DURNO-STEELE (commanding C Company) and 2nd Lieut. W. GARLAND both behaved magnificently, B and C Companies together were unable to remain on this second objective, being literally blown back by the fire concentrated on the 80 yards of trench. Steele, suffering from two wounds, improvised a tourniquet for his thigh, and carried on until he was hit a third time and fell. Garland was last seen near the junction of Z.33 and Z.34 helping to bomb back a counter-attack.[1]

Meanwhile D Company (the reserve company), who had been originally detailed to carry up S.A. ammunition and bombs, having deposited its loads at Green Pan, a natural hollow on the south-east slope of the hill, reached advanced H.Q., about 80 yards south of the junction of Z.27 and Z.28, Major C. Wheeler, its commander, now assuming command of the attacking companies.

Communication had been established, by electric torch, with Lieut.-Colonel Robinson, at Rockley Observation Post, and with the 115th Brigade, R.F.A., at C.6, but it was impossible to send back any very definite information.

A Company, it will be remembered, had captured its second objective, and here the company (under Lieut. C. P. Baker and 2nd Lieut. A. T. W. Stukeley) had firmly established themselves. They had beaten off a counter-attack of about 200 Bulgars coming from Deep Ravine, but now, owing to the failure on their left, they found themselves in danger. The hill fell away sharply to 0.3 on

[1] This phase of the fight has been very difficult to reconstruct, as no officers and very few N.C.O.'s or men survived.—C. W.

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their right, and as a Lewis-gun from D Company had been sent to protect this flank, they would have held their ground quite easily but for the exposed left flank. Lieut. W. Hyslop, 2nd Lieut. L. F. Bishop, and Sergeant Hudson were all sent up by Major Wheeler to ascertain the state of affairs. All three were wounded, but Hudson struggled back with the information that the situation was critical.

2nd Lieut. C. A. Hutchins, who had been knocked out earlier in the fight, had now recovered sufficiently to take command of B and C Companies.

Further reports that the 6-inch gun referred to above was again firing into our left flank were confirmed by shouts from the men, who began to fall back on the left. The "lengthen barrage" signal had to be put up to save disaster, and although Lieut. White signalled to C.6 explaining the reason, the whole affair was most unfortunate, for at that moment the Bulgar must have been concentrating for the counter-attack which came about 1.30 a.m., just as the two platoons of the 8th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry were preparing to wire in front of the ground captured. Instead of wiring they and D Company had to be thrown into the fight, and two more attempts were made to regain the top of 0.4.

The Bulgars now had the advantage of the high ground, and, as our only available officers and most of the N.C.O.'s were wounded, it was decided that we should hold the fire trench Z.26, Z.27, Z.28 until the 7th R. Berks, due at 3.30 a.m., should arrive. A Company had done splendidly, and only conformed to the failure on their left when Lieut. C. P. BAKER and all his sergeants were out of action. Baker's end is uncertain, but it is thought that he was killed while trying to gain touch with B Company on his left.

The enemy should now have pushed us off the hill, as our men had to stand up to fire, owing to the convexity of the slope. They contented themselves, however, with barraging the Jumeaux Ravine, so that our lamp communication was obscured by smoke for more than an hour. Reorganization was very difficult, for, although the slope gave us protection from artillery fire, we were under constant fire of bomb and trench-mortar. The night was a dark one, and, with blackened faces and no easily recognizable marks on officers or N.C.O.'s, it was almost impossible to distinguish anyone.

Whateley and his sections of the 78th Machine-gun Company gave most valuable assistance in looking after our left flank, which

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otherwise would have been very much in the air. It was a great relief when Major Gillespie arrived with two companies of the 7th R. Berks at about 3.20 a.m., and it was then decided that the remnants of our companies should remain where they were, with the R. Berks companies about 80 yards down the slope. Then, if we could arrange matters with our artillery, we would make a joint attack from south and east, with the object of recapturing 0.4.

About 4.15 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Dene (O.C. R. Berks) arrived and took command. About 5 a.m. the joint assault was launched and gained its objective, but only to lose it again very shortly afterwards. It would seem that we met a Bulgar party preparing to counter-attack from Y.12 and Z.35. Major Gillespie and his leading wave never came back, and trench-mortar and artillery fire eventually drove the supporting waves back to our line, just south of Z.27, Z.28.

Meanwhile Colonel Robinson joined the Battalion, and the survivors of the two battalions dug themselves in. Of the original officers the only two remaining at duty were 2nd Lieuts. Ker and Stukeley, both of whom had been wounded nine hours previously.

At 9.30 a.m. orders were received to evacuate the hill, but as there were still nearly a hundred stretcher-cases to be taken across the Jumeaux Ravine, this could not be carried out until 3 p.m. About 10 a.m. Colonel A. T. Robinson was hit in the neck by a splinter of shell. He tried to carry on, but eventually had to leave the hill. To our universal regret he and Major A. D. Homan, who had done so much to organize the attack, both died of their wounds at the Casualty Clearing Station.

So ended a magnificent effort, in which the Battalion was tried to the uttermost. All ranks behaved with extraordinary bravery, and what acts of gallantry were performed in the darkness of the night no one will ever know, but it is certain that it was only the dogged determination of the individual soldier that kept the line.

The following stand out among the many lessons which this dearly bought experience taught :—

1. The control of the barrage in a single battalion operation, in such very difficult ground, should be with the assaulting party. Had it been so in this case the two disastrous waits could have been avoided.

Moreover, if the Jumeaux Ravine had been gassed, we should have been as late as we were early, and the barrage would have lifted before we were ready to assault.

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2. The trench-mortars, which caused about sixty per cent. of our casualties, should have been dealt with as early as possible, and it would have been better to have had the two battalions assaulting together, their second objective being these trench-mortars (there were only three or four), which were not more than 200 yards away from the fire-trench.

3. The effectiveness of trench-mortars in stationary hill warfare. They can co-operate more easily and more quickly with the infantry they are supporting, and can often search ground which even howitzers are unable to touch.

CASUALTIES.[1]

Killed or Died of Wounds.

Lieut.-Colonel A. T. ROBINSON.	Lieut. C. P. BAKER.
Major A. D. HOMAN.	2nd Lieut. W. GARLAND.
Captain F. A. DURNO-STEELE.	And 107 Other Ranks.[2]

Wounded.

2nd Lieut. L. F. BISHOP.	2nd Lieut. C. P. KER.
2nd Lieut. H. J. HODGES.	Lieut. G. C. MILLER.
2nd Lieut. C. A. HUTCHINS.	Captain C. A. SALVESEN.
Lieut. W. HYSLOP.	2nd Lieut. A. T. W. STUKELEY.
2nd Lieut. A. W. KELLY.	Major C. WHEELER.

And 349 Other Ranks (47 of whom remained at duty).

In connexion with the above operations the following complimentary letters were received by the Battalion :—

From the Commander-in-Chief, British Salonika Force.

"The Lieut.-General Commanding-in-Chief has desired that his appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and of the determination to succeed on the part of the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry

[1] Of the officers and other ranks of the Battalion who crossed the Jumeaux Ravine Captain J. Loftus (R.A.M.C.) and about 60 O.R. were unwounded.—C. W.

[2] It was discovered later that three of the 107 were captured. One of the three died of his wounds.—C. W.

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and the 7th Royal Berkshire Regiment should be conveyed to all ranks of these battalions. The splendid example set by them is worthy of the highest commendation.

"P. J. HANBURY, Lieut.-Colonel,
"11.5.1917. Gen. Staff, 26th Division."

From Brigadier-General J. Duncan, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 22nd Division, formerly Commanding 78th Infantry Brigade.

"I would like you to let all the survivors know how grieved I am at the loss of so very many gallant officers and men.

"The manner in which the Battalion fought was quite magnificent —nothing could have been finer. The way they stuck to Petit Couronné when subjected to such a devastating fire, and in the face of such terrible losses, will always remain an example of how British soldiers can put their sense of duty before any selfish thought of personal safety.

"I feel very proud at having had such a magnificent battalion under my command.

"I am deeply grieved at the losses. It was sad that the ground which had been captured with such great sacrifice had to be given up, but it must be a proud remembrance that the Battalion did not retire until they had been ordered to by higher authority, although all their officers had become casualties.

"J. DUNCAN, Brigadier-General,
"12.5.17. 22nd Division H.Q."

From Lieut.-Colonel T. N. Howard, D.S.O., Commanding 78th Infantry Brigade.

"The Officer commanding the Brigade congratulates all ranks of the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, 7th R. Berkshire Regiment, and the 78th Machine-gun Company on the plucky way in which they tackled a difficult task. He desires to express to all his sympathy with the losses sustained, and wishes the wounded a speedy recovery. He feels sure that very severe losses were inflicted on the enemy.

"The manner in which the wounded were brought off Petit Couronné reflects the greatest credit on those who carried out this duty.

"H. PONSONBY, Captain,
'10th May 1917. Brigade-Major."

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The following report indicates the heavy knock inflicted on the Bulgars, and what might have happened had reserves been available to follow it up :—

15186 Lance-Corporal J. Rolfe reports that after our attempt to recapture the high ground of 0.4 about 2.30 a.m. on 9th May, he lost touch, having apparently worked too far to the right.

In Z.25 he found Private Horne of his own company. They dug themselves in on the parados of the Bulgar fire-trench. Here they remained throughout Wednesday, 9th May, and all Thursday, 10th May, returning to our trenches at about 10.30 p.m. on that date.

They did not receive the order to withdraw on Wednesday, and presumed that we were holding on on the left. They did not see any of the enemy, except dead, after the morning of the 9th. On the morning of the 10th they noticed that our artillery was shelling the enemy trenches on their left, and realized that our troops must have withdrawn. They therefore withdrew to the shelter of some rocks at the head of Y Ravine, and when darkness fell they returned to C.3, which they reached at about 10.30 p.m.

They saw no wounded British, but many dead. There were three dug-outs in the parapet of the trench, beyond which they took up their position. These had all been completely blown in.

They heard a Bulgar shouting in Y Ravine, apparently for help, but up to the time of their withdrawal no one had been to his assistance.

From Major E. Riley's Diary.

May 9th.—A day of bitter memories for those who remained with the Battalion. None of those who were still in the trenches and camps on Tortue Hill will ever forget the endless stream of wounded officers and men coming back from Petit Couronné. The procession began in the early hours of the morning, and continued until darkness had fallen. At about 10 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel Robinson came down mortally wounded, supported by Father Day (a Roman Catholic padre well known throughout the Salonika Force).

Meanwhile a handful of men, consisting of the survivors of our Battalion and the 7th R. Berks, remained on Petit Couronné, holding the hill, but uncertain whether they were to be reinforced or not. At 9 a.m. a company of the 7th South Wales Borderers arrived in Torquay Camp, with Captain Dickie in command, having instructions that they were to constitute the reserve to the

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Petit Couronné force, and that later they would receive their orders to reinforce the small garrison. As they had spent the whole of the previous night in a raid on 0.6, N.W. of Petit Couronné, they were rather weary for a reserve force. About midday the Brigade confirmed their order that the hill was to be evacuated. The message was passed on to those who remained on the hill, and the evacuation was carried out with difficulty, as the Bulgars subjected all the ravines to a heavy artillery bombardment. At 4 p.m. the last men left the hill—a small party of our Battalion. The survivors were collected in Tortue Camps, and thence, with the excep-



DISTANT VIEW OF PIP RIDGE.

tion of loading parties, were sent back in two's and three's to a reserve camp in Vladaja Ravine.

During the evening the 11th Worcestershire Regiment arrived to take over the trenches, and the remainder of our Battalion then proceeded to the Vladaja Camp.

May 10th.—Cleaning up, sorting and counting Battalion stores, checking lists of wounded and missing, and recording the stories of the survivors while the events were still fresh in their minds.

Major E. F. B. Witts, 9th Gloucestershire Regiment, reported for duty, and assumed command of the Battalion.

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May 11*th.*—Inspections and light training. It was now found necessary to form and train new Lewis-gun teams, as practically the only surviving Lewis-gunners were the men of the nucleus teams, which had been left behind.

We heard to-day, with deep regret, of the deaths of Lieut.-Colonel A. T. ROBINSON, D.S.O., and Major D. A. HOMAN, our O.C. and Second in Command respectively, both having died of wounds received on Petit Couronné. It was also learned that Lieut. F. A. DURNO-STEELE had been promoted Acting Captain, vice Captain G. B. Martin, to hospital, 26th April 1917. Captain Steele was reported "missing, believed killed," though there was no doubt as to his death. He never heard of his long-overdue promotion.

There joined the Battalion to-day 25 men of the 8th Battalion and 19 of the 7th, all from the 10th Entrenching Battalion.

May 12*th.*—Thirty-four other ranks of the Battalion reported for duty from the Royal Berkshire Regiment, to which they had been temporarily posted a few days ago.

Captain R. A. Wheeler was sent to hospital suffering from the effects of shell-shock received on the night of the 8th/9th May. This left but three company officers, viz., 2nd Lieut. E. Riley, commanding both A and C Companies, and also acting as Lewis-gun Officer, 2nd Lieut. E. L. D. Robinson, commanding D Company, and 2nd Lieut. Weston, commanding B Company.

May 13*th.*—(Sunday.) A Memorial Service was held for those who had fallen during the operations of the past week.

Captain G. B. Martin rejoined the Battalion from hospital, and took command of C Company in addition to the duties of Second in Command of the Battalion.

Nineteen other ranks joined for duty.

May 14*th.*—Training programme extended, and classes for specialists commenced.

May 15*th.*—The Battalion moved from Vladaja Camp to Bare Hill, Rates.

2nd Lieut. R. F. Millard, 3rd Border Regiment, reported for duty and was posted to C Company.

May 16*th.*—2nd Lieut. L. A. Gibson rejoined from hospital, and took over the duties of Lewis-gun Officer.

May 18*th.*—Battalion H.Q. and B Company moved to a camp at Pivoines.

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May 19th.—2nd Lieut. G. Hulm, 7th Wilts, and 2nd Lieut. C. J. S. McLaren, 4th Queen's, joined for duty and were posted to A and C Companies respectively. Lieut. R. F. Millard took over command of D Company from 2nd Lieut. E. L. D. Robinson.

LIEUT.-COLONEL P. VILLIERS-STUART.

May 20th.—Lieut.-Colonel P. Villiers-Stuart, Royal Fusiliers, joined the Battalion and took over command from Major E. F. B. Witts.

The Battalion, under orders to move to the Snevce area, where the 78th Infantry Brigade relieves the 79th Independent Infantry Brigade, marched at 7.50 p.m., and passing through Kilindir and Patarec, reached Moravea at 2 a.m. (21st), and bivouacked for the night and following day.

May 21st.—At 6.30 p.m. the march was resumed, and the Battalion reached the position of readiness at Ereselli at 1 a.m. (22nd) and bivouacked.

May 22nd.—In the evening the Battalion relieved the 8th D.C.L.I. in the right centre sub-section of the Snevce area. A Company on the right, with the 9th Glosters on its flank, B in the centre, C on the left, with 7th R. Berks on its flank, and D in reserve.

May 23rd–24th.—The front now held by the Battalion differs from that just left. Here British and Bulgars are established on either side of the Butkova Valley or Plain, which separates the Krusha Balkans (2,000 feet) from the Belashitza range (5,500 feet). Along this valley the Salonika-Constantinople railway runs due east from Doiran. The British trenches are on the northern slopes of the Krusha Balkans, south of the Plain, particular care being taken to guard each of the numberless deep ravines which cut their way through our lines, and constitute the sole weakness of the position. The main Bulgar lines are at the foot of the Belashitza range, north of the Plain, and their trenches are on a higher level than even the summits of the hills held by us. So, also, the whole of the Butkova Plain is dominated by the great and apparently impassable Belashitza Mountains, which rise, like a massive wall, 4,000 feet above the Plain. In this natural position of immense strength the Bulgars know that they are secure, and they know also that we are not likely to advance on to the Plain, which is a hotbed of malaria.

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But they are not content to pursue an inactive policy, and they have established along the railway a line of posts quite two miles in advance of their main-line trenches, probably hoping to entrap unwary patrols and scouts. Our patrol work is very difficult, owing to the thick and high undergrowth and numerous trees and woods which cover the country in our front. Still, we are enjoying life, as the Italians left us very comfortable quarters, and the country is much more pleasing than what we have been accustomed to.

May 25th–31st.—Nothing particular happened during the remainder of the month. Constant patrols went out to Cakli and elsewhere, and occasionally met with small parties of the enemy, but no serious engagement took place. Thanks to being in such a



No. 11 PLATOON COOK AT LA TORTUE.

quiet part of the front, the Battalion is rapidly recovering from its almost overwhelming blow of the 8th/9th May.

2nd Lieut. Hulm now commands B Company (Acting Captain). On the 24th Lieut. G. C. English (7th N. Staffords) and 2nd Lieut. R. A. W. Kennedy (2/5th H.L.I.) joined the Battalion and were posted to C and A Companies respectively. On the 25th Lieut. J. C. Bartlett rejoined the Battalion from the Base, and was posted to D Company. Eleven other ranks rejoined from the Base on the 25th and 28th.

On the 31st Lieut.-Colonel P. Villiers-Stuart received the Order of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour from General Sarrail, C.-in-C. Allied Forces, at Guvezne (advanced British G.H.Q.).

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June 1st–6th.—The Battalion remained in the Snevce Sector.

June 7th.—On relief by the 1st K.O.Y.L.I. the Battalion marched to Moravca and bivouacked for the night.

June 8th.—Marched in the evening to Hirsova.

June 9th.—To Dache Camp, arriving at 11.30 p.m.

June 10th–30th.—The Battalion remained at Dache Camp, in Brigade Reserve, training, and digging and wiring on the U.–V. line.

During the month of June 214 other ranks rejoined the Battalion from the Base, and 49 joined from the Gloster Regiment, while 15 other ranks were invalided to England, 6 were transferred to the 78th Machine-gun Company, and 3 to the 78th T.M. Battery. One man was wounded.

OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE 7TH (SERVICE) BATTALION BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

I.

WITH THE BATTALION, 1ST JULY 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel A. T. ROBINSON (E. Surrey Regiment), Commanding the Battalion; awarded French Croix de Guerre, 7th September 1916, and D.S.O., 1st January 1917; *died* on 11th May *of wounds* received on Petit Couronné on the 9th May 1917; Dispatches.

Major C. WHEELER, Second in Command, 1st July 1916 to 20th February 1917, and acting in the same capacity until 1st May; D Company Commander, 1st–8th May; *wounded*, 9th May 1917; awarded D.S.O., 24th May 1917; rejoined from being wounded, 22nd June 1917.

Major F. DEBENHAM, D Company Commander; Second in Command of the Battalion, 9th–18th August 1916; *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 18th August 1916.

Captain G. B. MARTIN, C Company Commander; awarded M.C., 22nd September 1916; gazetted Captain, Manchester Regiment 21st October 1916.

Captain L. J. ELLIS, Adjutant.

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Captain C. A. SALVESEN, B Company Commander; commanded D Company, 9th–22nd August 1916; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917; rejoined, 25th June 1917.

Captain M. G. ARNETT, A Company Commander; Instructor at the Base, 24th January 1917.

Captain B. L. S. SIMPSON, B Company; commanded it, 9th August 1916, until *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 18th August 1916.

Captain H. A. HENRY, D Company; Acting Staff Captain, 78th Infantry Brigade, 1st–22nd August 1916; commanded D Company, 22nd August to 22nd September 1916; to Egypt, 25th November 1916.

Lieut. R. B. PEMBERTON, D Company; Transport Officer; rejoined from Malta, 6th October 1916; attached H.Q., 78th Infantry Brigade, 8th October 1916; Captain, 31st October 1916.

Lieut. C. L. WICKS, B Company; Acting Captain in command of D Company, 18th December 1916 to 19th March 1917, when invalided to England.

Lieut. G. C. MILLER, A Company; Lewis-gun Officer; invalided to Malta, 20th September 1916; awarded M.C., 22nd September 1916; rejoined, January 1917; command of A Company (Captain), 20th March 1917; *wounded* on Petit Couronné.

Captain F. A. DURNO-STEELE, C Company; to B Company, 14th November 1916; to command of C Company (Acting Captain), 4th May 1917; *killed* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

Lieut. N. J. PEIRSON, A Company; Acting Quartermaster; invalided to Malta, August 1916; rejoined, November; commanded A Company, November 1916 to January 1917, and 9th–21st March 1917 (Acting Captain); *wounded* at Vladaja, 7th May 1917; rejoined, 25th June 1917.

Lieut. A. H. DITCHBURN, B Company; Battalion Signal Officer; invalided to England, 5th September 1916.

Lieut. J. H. C. KEBLE, C Company; invalided to England, 24th September 1916.

Lieut. C. P. BAKER, A Company; *wounded*, 18th August 1916 (remained at duty); commanded A Company, 9th–22nd February 1917; *killed* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

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

OFFICERS, 7TH (SERVICE) BATTALION.

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Lieut. T. BOWMAN, B Company; *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 18th August 1916.

2nd Lieut. C. P. KER, A Company; Lewis-gun Officer; Acting Adjutant, October 1916; *wounded* on P.5, 3rd February 1917; rejoined, 4th March 1917; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917; promoted Lieutenant, 10th May 1917; awarded M.C., 24th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. S. L. SYMONDS, B Company; *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 18th August 1916.

2nd Lieut. W. GARLAND, C Company; in command of C Company, January to March 1917; *killed* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. E. RILEY, C Company; rejoined from Malta, 6th September 1916; in command of A Company (Acting Captain), 25th May 1917; promoted Lieutenant, 10th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. J. T. S. HOEY, B Company; *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 19th August 1916; awarded French Croix de Guerre, 7th September 1916.

2nd Lieut. A. P. BOOR, D Company; transferred to Royal Flying Corps, 28th November 1916. [*Died of wounds* near Imara, Egypt, 31st October 1917.]

2nd Lieut. C. A. W. MANNING, A Company; Intelligence Officer; attached to H.Q. 78th Infantry Brigade, 22nd January 1917; invalided to England, 27th January 1917; Dispatches.

2nd Lieut. P. L. MOLYNEUX, D Company; Acting Transport Officer, August 1916; Transport Officer, 25th October 1916; transferred to Indian Army, 16th March 1917.

2nd Lieut. A. J. COLLIER, A Company; invalided to Malta, 17th October 1916.

2nd Lieut. L. A. GIBSON, B Company; promoted Lieutenant, 10th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. T. BONNER, D Company; Acting Quartermaster, 9th August 1916 to 30th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. S. EAGLE, B Company; *wounded* at Horseshoe Hill, 18th August 1916.

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2nd Lieut. N. S. MALTBY, D Company; Acting Transport Officer; invalided to England, 25th October 1916.

2nd Lieut. H. A. HASLEHAM, C Company; Transport Officer, 16th March 1917. [Had previously served with Yeomanry in Gallipoli.]

Captain D. A. EVANS (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer; invalided to England, 24th March 1917.

2ND LIEUT. P. L. MOLYNEUX.

II.

JOINED OR REJOINED THE BATTALION BETWEEN 1ST JULY 1916 AND 30TH JUNE 1917.

Captain R. A. MANSELL (R.A.M.C.), attached from 78th Field Ambulance, 11th–22nd August 1916; awarded Serbian Order of the White Eagle (3rd Class).

2nd Lieut. E. W. MIDELTON (Manchester Regiment), joined 10th August 1916; D Company; invalided to England, 22nd August 1916.

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2nd Lieut. C. F. HAY (11th Gloucestershire Regiment), joined, 7th September 1916; D Company; attached to 78th Company, Machine-gun Corps.

2nd Lieut. M. B. HATFIELD (11th Gloucestershire Regiment), joined, 7th September 1916; *accidentally wounded* at XIIth Corps Trench-mortar School, 19th October 1916.

2nd Lieut. D. B. MERRIE (11th Gloucestershire Regiment), joined, 15th September 1916; B Company; Signalling Officer, 1st January 1917; promoted Lieutenant, 10th May 1917.

Captain O. S. ROYAL DAWSON, rejoined from England, 22nd September 1916; D Company Commander; invalided to England, December 1916. [*Died of wounds* near Poperinghe, 25th August 1917, when serving with the 5th Battalion.]

Lieut. J. C. BARTLETT (9th Battalion), joined, 1st October 1916; D Company.

2nd Lieut. A. A. NEALE (9th Battalion), joined, 1st October 1916; B Company; invalided to England, 11th November 1916.

2nd Lieut. A. T. W. STUKELEY, joined, 20th October 1916; A Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. T. HENNEY, posted from the 9th Gloucestershire Regiment, 30th November 1916; attached to 78th Company Machine-gun Corps; invalided to Malta, 30th December 1916; never actually served with the Battalion.

2nd Lieut. E. THURSFIELD (9th Gloucestershire Regiment), joined, 30th November 1916; *wounded*, 30th December 1916.

2nd Lieut. A. PENSOM (9th Gloucestershire Regiment), joined, 30th November 1916; rejoined his own Regiment, 9th March 1917.

Captain J. J. O'NEILL (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer, 3rd November to 3rd December 1916.

Captain H. A. C. SWERTZ (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer, 3rd to 8th December 1916.

Lieut. W. O. F. SINCLAIR (R.A.M.C.), Medical Officer, 9th to 18th December 1916.

2nd Lieut. H. ECCLES, joined, 29th December 1916; B Company; *killed*, near Doldzeli, 28th February 1917.

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2nd Lieut. C. A. HUTCHINS, joined, 29th December 1916; B Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917; awarded M.C., 24th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. A. W. KELLY, joined, 9th January 1917; B Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

Major A. D. HOMAN (1st Royal Irish Regiment), appointed Second in Command, 20th February 1917; commanded Battalion, 23rd February to 30th April 1917; *died of wounds* received on 9th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. R. F. WOOD, joined, 21st February 1917; D Company.

Captain J. S. STEVENSON, M.C. (2nd Garrison Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment), joined, 20th March 1917; commanded D Company until 1st May 1917; *wounded*, 24th April 1917, but remained at duty; to hospital, 5th May 1917; posted to 3rd Echelon, Salonika, for duty.

Captain R. A. WHEELER (2nd Garrison Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment), joined, 20th March 1917; invalided, 12th May 1917.

Lieut. J. LOFTUS (R.A.M.C.), joined, as Medical Officer, 25th March 1917.

Captain F. S. PEARSON (3rd Dorsets), joined, 4th April 1917; B Company; transferred to 11th Worcesters, 10th April 1917.

Lieut. W. HYSLOP (9th E. Surreys), joined, 4th April 1917; D Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. J. HODGES (7th Suffolks), joined, 4th April 1917; C Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917; rejoined, 19th June 1917.

2nd Lieut. H. T. R. PICKFORD, joined, 8th April 1917; D Company; *killed* on the Scabbard, 24th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. E. L. D. ROBINSON, joined, 12th April 1917; B Company.

2nd Lieut. C. WESTON, joined, 12th April 1917; B Company.

2nd Lieut. L. F. BISHOP (5th Wilts), joined, 29th April 1917; D Company; *wounded* on Petit Couronné, 9th May 1917.

Major E. F. B. WITTS (9th Gloucesters), in command of the Battalion, 10th–20th May 1917.

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Lieut. R. F. MILLARD (3rd Border Regiment), joined, 15th May 1917; C Company; command of B Company, 19th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. GLYN HULM (7th Wilts), joined, 19th May 1917; C Company; command of B Company; 9th–22nd June 1917 (Acting Captain).

2nd Lieut. C. J. S. MCLAREN (4th R. West Surrey), joined, 19th May 1917; A Company.

Lieut.-Colonel P. VILLIERS-STUART (Royal Fusiliers), joined, on appointment to command the Battalion, 20th May 1917; French Legion of Honour, 30th May 1917.

REV. FATHER DAY, M.C., AND REV. T. C. PHILLIPS, M.C.

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Lieut. G. C. ENGLISH (7th North Staffords), joined, 24th May 1917; C Company; to XII Corps H.Q.; for duty as Liaison Officer with 122nd French Division, 2nd June 1917.

2nd Lieut. R. A. W KENNEDY (2/5th H.L.I.), joined, 24th May 1917; A Company.

Lieut. R. HARRIS (from R.Q.M.S. 12th Hants), joined, as Quartermaster, 24th May 1917.

Major L. T. C. WILLIAMS (3rd Monmouthshire Regiment), joined, as Second in Command, 5th June 1917; invalided, 7th June 1917.

2nd Lieut. F. H. ROWE, joined, 18th June 1917; A Company.

CHAPLAINS.

Captain H. E. C. CLARK (C.F.; C. of E.), 19th December 1916 to 20th April 1917.

Captain H. C. DAY (C.F.; R.C.), 18th December 1916 to 28th February 1917.

Captain T. C. PHILLIPS (C.F.), 29th April 1917.

Note to Map 4.

The spelling of place-names on this map follows that of the 1/250,000 War Office map, and in some cases differs slightly from the more conventional spelling used in the text of this volume.

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RECORD OF THE 8TH (SERVICE) BATTALION (PIONEERS).

JULY 1916 TO JUNE 1917.

(*Maps* 4 *and* 5.)

The general situation on the Salonika front has been discussed in the 7th Battalion Record a few pages back, so needs no further remarks. The particular duties of a pioneer battalion in a country practically without roads necessitated a considerable amount of work ahead of the force before any movements could take place, and the arduous nature of the work of the 8th Battalion is described in the diary of Lieut. T. N. Watts-Watts which follows.

July 4th.—The Battalion, which at this time numbered 35 officers and 950 other ranks, received orders to proceed towards the Struma front to construct a light railway. All heavy baggage was at once dumped in camp and left in charge of a guard under 2nd Lieut. C. Sheppard, the Battalion, with light kit only, and without tents or bivouacs, marching out of camp the same evening at 18.30 hours.[1] The surplus baggage was handed over to 78th Brigade, and the guard rejoined the Battalion a few days later.

The night was spent at 25th kilo. stone on the Seres road just N. of Guvezne. The following day was occupied in endeavouring to survive the intense heat in a spot which afforded no shade of any description; bivouacs had not been issued, and improvised shelters made of blankets hung between the front and rear half of limbers only afforded shade to a favoured few. This day was undoubtedly the hottest and most uncomfortable spent by the Battalion to date, and the effect on all ranks was most marked

[1] i.e., 6.30 p.m. Lieut. Watts-Watts in his diary describes time in the official method in use on this front, viz., counting from midnight by the 24-hour clock. Thus 1 a.m. is 01.00 hours, 2 p.m. is 14.00 hours, 3.45 a.m. is 03.45 hours, 11.45 p.m. is 23.45 hours, etc.—ED.

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when the march was resumed that evening at 18.30. An advance of ten miles was made along the Seres road; the heat of the night was intense, the route was almost entirely uphill, and the men were carrying full packs; little water was available, and frequent halts were called in order to keep the Battalion together.

At the 40th kilo. stone the Battalion halted at midnight, bivouacked again in the open, and resumed the forward march the following morning (6th July) to the camp site allotted near the 43rd kilo. stone, about 2 miles W. of Likovan. Water here was

SALONIKA.

very scarce, great difficulty was experienced in finding sufficient for the animals, and the quality of the water available for the men was doubtful. Mosquitoes were numerous at night, and no adequate protection in the way of netting had been issued; sickness was increasing at a steady pace, and several cases were admitted to hospital daily. The highest shade temperature was 112° F.

July 25th.—From July 7th to 24th the Battalion had worked daily on the construction of a Decauville line from 43rd kilo. stone on the Seres road to Merova, a village about 10 miles distant, at

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which were established the H.Q. of the XVIth Corps. The Battalion being detached from the 26th Division, communication was established by heliograph with the 78th Infantry Brigade at Dremiglava (about 20 miles distant), and by telephone viâ the 16th Corps lines to 26th Divisional H.Q. The companies of the Battalion were located in various camps along the line of railway, and were accommodated in bivouacs, which arrived on the morning of July 6th. These bivouacs travelled in Indian A.T. carts, 6 of which, with their native drivers, were attached to the Battalion until the end of the month.

On 25th July orders were received to rejoin the Division, which was advancing farther north towards Doiran. Accordingly the Battalion reassembled that night and marched with its transport back along the Seres road, camping in the early morning at the same spot above Guvezne as on the forward journey This ground, previously fresh, had become by this time exceedingly foul from the large number of troops which had passed through in the interim, and, accordingly, when daylight came (26th July) a new site was selected. (Orders were received that the Battalion would remain at Guvezne for a few days.)

July 28th.—March resumed viâ the N. side of Deve Kran to the village of Amberkeui (1145/1505), arriving about midnight 28/29th.

July 29th.—Marches resumed across the River Galiko to Sarigol (138/160) by night; heavy rain commenced in the afternoon and continued for several hours; the Battalion had to ford the river, now in flood, and the greatest difficulty was experienced with the transport; men and officers alike waded waist-deep through the rushing stream, and several mule-teams were nearly swept off their feet; in some other units casualties actually occurred, riders and animals being carried away and drowned in the flood.

July 30th.—Battalion resumed the march to Dragomir viâ Kirec at 19.30 hours after heavy rain all day. Roads almost impassable in places, and camp not reached until 04.00 hours. Following day spent clearing up the camp site. Transport did not arrive until daylight owing to great difficulties on the road and the darkness of the previous night. Great heat prevailed through this month, shade temperatures of about 106° F. being common experiences.

August 1st.—Battalion remained at Dragomir employed on work at Corps H.Q. Kirec, on aviation ground at Kirec, and various other smaller works in the neighbourhood.

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August 2nd.—B Company moved to Kalinova to work on roads for the 79th Infantry Brigade (Kalinova to La Patte d'Oie).

On this date the first issue of gas helmets and anti-lachrymatory goggles was made to the Battalion. B Company also constructed a limber-track across Gidemli Ford; this work, being "in view," had to be carried out by night.

August 8th.—D Company moved to Corps H.Q. Kirec for work on the Corps Camp.

August 9th.—A Company proceeded on detachment to Cugunci to make roads and tracks between Kalinova and Asagi-Mahala, the latter place being under close observation from a Bulgar balloon and subject to frequent shelling.

August 11th.—C Company moved to Hadzi-Junuj to commence work on Decauville line being established between Vanes and Kalinova.

August 13th.—A man was wounded by shell-fire—our first casualty in the war.

August 17th.—Only Battalion H.Q. remained at Dragomir after the 11th, so on 17th the Battalion H.Q. moved to new camp site at Mihalova, just south of the Ford, and was joined the same day by C and D Companies. Work immediately resumed upon the Decauville line, and every available man turned out each day to ensure completion of line at the earliest possible date. A large dump at Kalinova was so placed as to be in danger of shelling, and an assured line of supply by Decauville was a matter of great urgency. Task work was resorted to to ensure the greatest possible output from each man, and the line was practically completed by 28th August. Where the line crossed the Gjol Ajak (a wide and swift river in wet weather) a large and heavy timber bridge was constructed. This bridge and, indeed, much of the line was in full view of the Bulgar positions, but shelling was of infrequent occurrence. (After two years this bridge is still in constant use, and though many times fired at has never been hit.)

August 29th.—Information received from deserters showed that a surprise Bulgar attack was impending, and the Battalion (less A and B Companies) was ordered to move forward immediately in reserve. With as little transport as possible the Battalion moved off at dusk and took up a position at the foot of Mort Homme, standing-by all night in readiness for an emergency. Nothing of

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importance occurred, however, during the night, and the same programme was followed the next night, the day being spent in sleep and rest.

August 31st.—The Battalion, still in its temporary advanced camp, paraded at night and marched over the top of the peak known as Mort Homme, down the valley to Wagon Hill, and spent the night in digging new front-line trenches. Patrols were furnished by the Battalion in the line, and nothing of interest occurred beyond a little shelling of adjoining positions. This front-line trench-work was continued by D Company, the Battalion H.Q. and C Company returning to their Mihalova camp on 1st September.

September 2nd.—Work resumed upon the Decauville line by C Company and by all the available men on H.Q. (chiefly Lewis-gunners). Occasional storms did much damage to the embankments, and making good and draining in various places provided occupation for many men daily.

September 5th.—Lieut. G. P. Morris left for transfer to R.F.C.

September 6th.—C Company moved from Mihalova to new camp site near Malovci to continue work upon the Decauville line.

September 8th.—D Company moved from Kalinova to Vergetor for the same purpose.

September 12th.—Captain Bartrum proceeded to England on special leave and did not return, owing to continued ill-health.

September 13th.—Lieut. A. Calder left on transfer to R.F.C.

About this time the question of a suitable site for a winter camp for H.Q. and transport was considered, and an excellent site decided upon about half a mile to the east (point 1257/1732), in the ravine of the Gjol Ajak, half a mile above the wooden bridge on the Decauville line at Mihalova.

Here an excellent camp was made, paved lines being laid for the mules, and standings being dug for each officer's horse in a deep mill-race which ran through the camp. This race had long since been out of use and was quite dry; it formed a perfect protection for the animals against the bitter Vardar winds and the blizzards of the winter months. The men's lines were sited facing south with a steep cliff on the north side; in every respect the camp, for winter purposes, was ideal.

This camp remained the permanent H.Q. of the Battalion throughout the winter of 1916/17.

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September 17th.—Lieut. P. Y. Brimblecombe to hospital, and subsequently evacuated to England with malaria. Captain Tardrew appointed to command A Company.

September 24th.—C Company moved from the Mihalova summer camp to the winter camp described above, and was joined by Battalion H.Q. on 26th September.

September 27th.—C Company moved to camp site E. of Kalinova for road work under 77th Infantry Brigade near Table Hill.

September 29th.—D Company moved from Vergetor and relieved B Company at Kalinova, latter company rejoining H.Q. same day. The distribution of the Battalion was now as follows: H.Q., with B Company, at the camp on the Gjol Ajak; A Company at Cugunci; D Company at Kalinova; C Company at Table Hill (adjoining the village, in ruins, of Asagi Mahala).

At this time D Company was working on the Patte d'Oie road (commenced by D Company); C Company on roads in the vicinity of Table Hill, and on front line wiring for 77th Brigade for this work. Captain Giffard, then O.C. C Company, acted as officer in charge of defence works for the Brigade, and Infantry Battalions of that Brigade acted under his orders, working with C Company nightly on the improvement of the defence system, which work included the siting and construction of new trenches at various points of the 77th Brigade front. B Company, after relief by D Company on 27th September, carried on with maintenance work on the Decauville line near Mihalova. A Company were employed in the Kalinova-Asagi Mahala road, and on other tracks in the vicinity of Cugunci. Shelling of the A Company work was of frequent occurrence, but no casualties were sustained.

September 30th.—The effective strength of the Battalion was 33 officers and 796 other ranks.

October 2nd.—B and D Companies both working on maintenance of Decauville line between Malovci and Kalinova.

October 4th.—Twenty O.R. from Wilts Yeomanry and 30 O.R. from Scottish Horse arrived on transfer for transport duties. These men replaced an equal number of the original transport drivers of the Battalion, and constituted the first draft of importance received by the Battalion since leaving England.

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October 10th.—2nd Lieut. C. Sheppard and 2nd Lieut. G. L. Huggen, with 53 O.R.,. representing all the available men with railway experience in the Battalion, proceeded on detachment to Janes to form the nucleus of the permanent staff of the Janes-Kalinova light railway. The line was under the charge of 2nd Lieut. Sheppard for several months, and the men were ultimately transferred to the R.E.

October 11th.—H.Q. represented by the C.O., Adjutant, and M.O., with A and B Companies, moved to Hill 420 for work on a second-line system of trenches and defence works. (Remainder of H.Q. personnel, with D Company and transport, stayed at H.Q. camp on Gjol Ajak.)

On arrival at Hill 420 the half Battalion stood by all night in support for an attack being made by 11th Worcesters (78th Infantry Brigade) on the Doiran front. The following day was spent in settling into camp, and at night (October 12th) both companies marched viâ Vladaja Church to Hill 316 (just N.E. of Hill 420), afterwards named Pioneer Hill, to commence work upon the new second-line trench system (under 78th Infantry Brigade). This work consisted of five support and communication trenches, with deep barbed-wire entanglements, and occupied A and B Companies for the next two months. The work was all done at night; the march to and from Hill 420 occupied an hour each way, and the track viâ Col de Rates and Vladaja Church was of the worst description. The weather was unusually wet and cold, and marching proved heavy work in the deep mud. Damage to the work was caused by enemy shelling in the daytime, but beyond the destruction of an occasional fire-bay, no serious hindrance resulted. B Company were employed during this period also in making emplacements for a Battery in Pearse Ravine, and in constructing a rough track by which the guns could be lowered by hand to their new positions in the steep sides of the ravine.

October 19th.—Some shelling of French heavy battery just south of Hill 420 occurred, the shells burst on the foothills below our camp, but no damage was occasioned, either to the French or ourselves.

2nd Lieut. Curtis left Battalion on transfer to R.E.

October 25th.—D Company moved from Kalinova to new camp site at Vergetor to make good damage caused to the Decauville line by recent heavy rains.

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October 27th.—2nd Lieut. C. Moore joined the Battalion from Egypt.

November 1st.—Detachment of D Company (Lieut. Miller and 52 O.R.) proceeded to Armutci to construct hangars for the 47th Squadron R.F.C., and for general clearing work on the flying ground; rejoined Battalion on 17th November.

Captain R. G. Dunthorne invalided to England; this officer was subsequently transferred to a unit in France.

Effective strength of Battalion, 32 officers and 849 other ranks.

November 6th.—Half A Company commenced construction of battle H.Q. for G.O.C. Division on the western slopes of Hill 420. This consisted of a series of splinter-proof dug-outs, with communication trenches and an observation post. The work being in view, only night work was possible until cover for the working-parties had been provided, screening of the whole of the work had to be carried out as it proceeded, and most of the excavated earth had to be carted away and tipped out of view. The work occupied three months or so. On February 21st all men were withdrawn from the work except twelve. The whole of the dug-outs and C.T.'s were excavated from solid rock, and much trouble was experienced from water which, even at this elevation, continually percolated through the walls and floors.

November 9th.—By this date the original work upon which A and B Companies were employed on Pioneer Hill (Hill 316) was completed, and on the following night C.T.'s were commenced to connect Hill 316 with the defensive works on Hill 288 on the E., and with Pearse Hill on the W. (These latter works were carried out simultaneously on our right and left by infantry units of 78th Brigade.) All the work was under observation from Hill 535 and from Grand Couronné, and done, therefore, at night only during the early stages. From 17th November onwards sufficient cover was provided to enable day work to be carried on.

November 20th.—First officer to obtain leave to England, Captain Thompson, proceeded on this date, and rejoined December 23rd.

November 22nd.—First party of O.R. (9) proceeded on leave to England.

December 1st.—Exceptionally wet weather for several days, work of all companies greatly interfered with, and on one or two occasions

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entirely suspended. Heavy shelling occurred (1/12/16) of the anti-aircraft batteries in vicinity of our 420 camp, but no casualties by the Battalion were sustained. B Company, while at work by day on Junction Hill (Hill 288, just E. of Pioneer Hill), adjoining Vladaja Ravine, were heavily shelled and narrowly escaped casualties.

Effective strength of the Battalion, 31 officers and 858 other ranks.

Battalion Equipment.—During November 1916 travelling kitchens were loaned to the Battalion (one per company), and remained permanently on charge, though not included in establishment. Extra teams were not provided, but the kitchens proved of great value, especially in the matter of economy of fuel during bad weather and as a convenience during moves.

December 12th.—Acting R.-S.-M. G. J. BECKETT awarded MILITARY SERVICE MEDAL.

December 13th.—Lieut.-Colonel B. Cruddas proceeded to Base for leave to England; following day H.Q. moved back to transport camp at Mihalova, and Major A. E. Burt assumed temporary command.

Reinforcements.—On 13th December 112 O.R. draft from Royal Fusiliers arrived from England and received one month's training before joining their companies. Parade ground used by draft was shelled on 17th December, and new ground had to be selected.

December 18th.—Lieut. Haggen rejoined from the Decauville detachment, Janes, and was replaced later by Lieut. Edwards, who was ultimately transferred to the R.E.

December 20th.—B Company moved to new camp site at Dobrovica to work on second-line wiring between Rifle Pit Hill and Doiran Lake. All this work was performed at night; being in full view, the work was occasionally shelled. On the lake side the wire extended some distance into the water, the men on this section being provided with waders.

One platoon, A Company, remained at Hill 420 to continue work on command post; remaining 3 platoons moved (20/12/16) to Piton Rocheux to work on a diversion of the main Kilindir-Doiran road, in the neighbourhood of Dobrovica, the main road under enemy observation from Grand Couronné being subject to shelling and only

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available for use by night. The diversion was taken through a low-lying swamp which necessitated the use of brushwood and fascines to obtain a solid foundation for the road-bed. Considerable drainage work had to be carried out also, but an excellent road was completed by the middle of March (total length about half a mile).

December 21st.—Half D Company moved to Hill 420 to work a quarry for 78th Brigade near Three Trees Fountain, Rates.

December 22nd.—Captain A. H. Lowe proceeded on leave to England, and was subsequently struck off the strength on account of continual sickness, which commenced during his leave. This officer was promoted Major whilst away on leave, but before he came off the Battalion strength.

December 25th.—Second Christmas Day spent on active service by the Battalion. An excellent dinner was provided for the Battalion from the funds of the Regimental Institutes and a half-day's holiday granted.

At this time D Company, employed on Malovci-Cugunci main road, had one company of the 2/18th London Irish (T.F.) attached for work.

C Company, previously working under 77th Brigade, came under C.R.E. for road work in the neighbourhood of Table Hill.

December 29th.—B Company's transport lines at Drobrovica were shelled, and some damage was done to the pack saddlery and transport equipment. These lines were moved to a new site the same day, farther away from the Doiran road, parts of which were in view from Grand Couronné, and were subject to occasional shelling.

At about this time A Company, working on the Doiran road diversion, commenced the demolition of the stone walls and ruined cottages in Dobrovica village to provide metal for the road. The village was in view of Grand Couronné, and as the demolition was carried on in daylight, and involved limbers and teams entering the village, enemy fire was ultimately drawn. Some limbers, being filled with stone, were taken off at a great pace by the drivers, who went down hill and up again in their endeavours to dodge the shells. No casualties occurred, and the incident caused much amusement to those of the company who were merely spectators.

December 31st.—Effective strength of the Battalion, 32 officers and 983 other ranks.

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1917.

January 1*st*, 1917.—At this time companies were distributed as under :—

A Company : Piton Rocheux (Kilindir), working on Doiran road; detachment of A (35 O.R.) at Hill 420; Div. O.P.

B Company : Dobrovica; second line wiring for 79th Brigade.

C Company : Table Hill; roads under C.R.E.

D Company : Mihalova; (H.Q. camp) working on Cugunci-Malovci road. Detachment (1 officer, 46 O.R.) camped at Hill 420 quarrying at Rates for roads; rejoined D Company 16th January.

Training of the draft, which arrived 13th December, was completed by the middle of January, and the men were distributed to the companies on 16th.

Weather during the month was chiefly cold and wet, with periodical visitations of the bitter Vardar wind for which Macedonia is notorious.

January 9*th*.—Captain Giffard and 8 O.R. proceeded to England with the third leave party.

January 27*th*.—Two platoons C Company moved to Grand Ravine (foot of Mort Homme) to construct ammunition shelters for the Corps Artillery.

January 31*st*.—7 O.R. proceeded to England with fourth leave party. Effective strength of Battalion, 32 officers and 977 O.R.

February 16*th*.—Lieut.-Colonel B. Cruddas rejoined from leave in England.

B Company moved from Dobrovica Camp to new camp at Rates to work on the road from Three Trees Fountain to the Col de Rates. This road (unmetalled at this date) was in an appalling state, and had to carry heavy lorry traffic with gun ammunition, etc., in addition to all supplies for troops in the Vladaja area.

Continued wet and frosty weather alternating, rendered the metalling of this road absolutely imperative, and the greater portion of this stretch was finished in two months.

February 21*st*.—Detachment of A Company at Hill 420 (less 12 men) rejoined A Company at Piton Rocheux to assist in the diversion of the main Doiran road near Dobrovica.

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February 22nd.—D Company (camped at H.Q. camp, Mihalova) completed the reconstruction of the Malovci-Cugunci road, and commenced repairs to the old Turkish main road between Cugunci and Kalinova.

This road has a special interest attaching to it, as it appears to be the only road in Macedonia which has been constructed in recent times under Turkish rule.

When the British force landed at Salonika in 1915 only two roads of any importance existed, one to Seres and the other to Monastir. Outside the town of Salonika there is no evidence of development of any kind, and no attempt has been made to open up the country. But this road, which commences at Kilindir and runs through to Karasuli (connecting the two lines to Seres and Uskub respectively), a total distance of about 15 miles in length, was apparently constructed by the Turkish Government as a strategic road, running as it does throughout its length roughly parallel to the frontier line between Macedonia and Serbia.

The original road was well laid, and intended to carry heavy traffic. It is built on Roman lines, well drained and bridged, and is provided with a hand-packed foundation. It is remarkable that, in a country in which the Turk chiefly devoted his attentions to cutting down timber and to a general disregard for the requirements of the future, he should expend time and money on the construction of a work of so permanent a nature. The original width of the road as laid out (about 12 feet) has been doubled by British and Allied labour since February 1917, in order to meet the requirements of modern military transport.

February 23rd.—Draft of 34 O.R. from York and Lancaster Regiment arrived. About this time a bombing squadron arrived on the Bulgar front, and frequent raids were carried out over our lines. Formation Headquarters, camps, transport lines, and dumps received a great deal of attention, and life at times was most unpleasant.

This bombing squadron, consisting of about 30 machines, stayed about three months, and was ultimately withdrawn, presumably for more pressing work in the Western theatre.

March 3rd.—Captain Giffard and 8 O.R. rejoined from leave in U.K.

March 8th.—3 platoons D Company moved from H.Q. Camp to join B Company at Rates and to work on the same road.

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March 10th.—C Company (3 platoons) moved from Table Hill, where they had been camped since the previous September, to a new camp near Kilindir, to construct new Headquarters for 26th Div. Staff at Buck Hill. On 15th March they moved again to Piton Rocheux, their camp site being handed over to another unit.

March 15th.—H.Q. moved from the winter camp at Mihalova to Piton Rocheux (near Kilindir), joining the 2 platoons of C Company same day. This move was necessitated by the change of the Divisional front, which now comprised the Doiran Sector, recently taken over from the French, and also in preparation for the spring offensive. The two platoons of C Company on detachment at Kalinova rejoined C and H.Q. on 21st March.

March 12th.—Lieut. C. S. W. Rayner to hospital with malaria; rejoined Battalion 4th April.

Draft of 25 O.R. arrived.

March 23rd.—The new pattern Box Respirators (anti-gas) were issued to the Battalion, and several parades held about this time for training all ranks in their use.

The weather had now greatly improved, and fine warm days were increasing in number.

The offensive, which was due to commence the following month, was now responsible for numerous preparations of all kinds and for various company moves.

March 31st.—Effective strength of the Battalion, 29 officers and 1,012 O.R.

April 5th.—D Company from Rates to new camp in Pearse Ravine, just south of Pioneer Hill, to do road work in Pearse Ravine for 78th Infantry Brigade in connexion with the forthcoming operations. B Company moved from Rates and joined H.Q. at Piton Rocheux. On 8th March B Company moved again to new camp at Hill 221, near Bath Valley in the Vladaja Ravine, for road work in Bath Valley and on the forward end of the Doiran road under the 79th Infantry Brigade.

April 10th.—D Company's camp shelled by Bulgar artillery searching for our batteries in Pearse Ravine. Two shells fell among a group of men in the camp, killing 2 O.R. and wounding 8. (Of the latter 2 O.R. subsequently died in hospital.)

The following day D Company moved back to a new camp near the Col de Rates, but continued the road work for 78th Brigade in Pearse Ravine.

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April 12*th*–22*nd*.—The senior officers of each company reconnoitred "No Man's Land" between Doiran Lake and the west side of Petit Couronné on their respective company fronts, as allotted for the operations commencing 24th/25th April.

April 17*th*.—Lieut.-Colonel B. Cruddas left to assume temporary command of 9th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment.

April 22*nd*.—Enemy bombing planes very active; bombs were dropped at each end of our H.Q. Camp, but outside the area of bivouacs, etc. An adjoining unit had very narrow escapes, and A Company, at Piton Rocheux, had one bomb actually in their camp, which wounded some of the transport animals. No other casualties occurred, however, all ranks being sheltered by the bombardment slits which formed a part of every camp.

April 23*rd*.—To prepare for the offensive of the following days A, C, and H.Q. Companies moved to Vladaja Ravine (Hill 221) and joined B Company.

D Company moved the same day to Elbow Ravine to operate with 78th Infantry Brigade.

The work of A, B, and C Companies (attached to 79th Brigade), as planned, consisted of 3 separate communication trenches to be dug after the capture of the enemy's front-line trench to connect the latter with our own. The intervening ground varied in width from about 200 to 600 yards, and between the lines on B Company's front a wide and deep ravine had to be crossed. On the fronts of A and C Companies the ground was easier, but it provided no cover from view or from fire, and everywhere only a few inches of earth overlay the rocky subsoil.

D Company, away a mile to the left, had assigned to them the task of making a track for pack transport down Hand Ravine into the Jumeaux Ravine.

All officers were dressed in the uniform of the ranks, and carried a rifle and bayonet. Every man carried, in addition, a pick, shovel, or crowbar; and extra tools (spares) were dumped near the positions of assembly.

April 24*th*/25*th*.—At zero hour (21.15) Battalion H.Q. and A, B, and C Companies moved off from the camp in Vladaja Ravine, marching direct across country to their respective assembly positions: A and B Companies, with Battalion H.Q., to Swindon Camp (7th Wilts H.Q.); C Company to Sunken Road (12th Hants advanced H.Q.).

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The march to these assembly positions was an inspiring event: the battle was in full progress; the whole battle front was in view from the high ground of the Hampshire Ridge, across which we passed; and the night was at times almost like day with the incessant use of Véry lights by the enemy. These searchlights were constantly playing on our positions from points in rear of the enemy lines, and these were on several occasions directed straight at us as we advanced across the open. By calling an immediate halt, however, our presence was not detected, and all the companies arrived at their assembly positions with a total loss of only 3 other ranks, wounded from stray bullets. As we descended the forward slopes of the Jumeaux the air was thick with "strays," but they passed generally well overhead. One humourous incident cheered us greatly on our way: in one of the breathless moments when the searchlight played upon us, when guns and shells were creating a deafening noise all around, and stray bullets were humming in the air, it was passed up from the rear of one company, "Private —— does not feel well."

A little unconscious humour at such a time proved very popular.

Another remark, made in all seriousness by an N.C.O. who had not previously been under fire, was to the effect that "there seemed to be a lot of bees about to-night." This in reference to the "strays" which "pinged" on all sides.

D Company, meanwhile, moved from its camp in Elbow Ravine at zero hour and commenced work upon the track in Hand Ravine. It was found that this ravine was the target for heavy shelling on the part of the enemy; when work was no longer possible in the ravine, Lieut. N. W. Elliott, i/c of the party, showed great coolness and resource in removing wounded men to safety.

From their assembly positions A, B, and C Companies moved forward during the early stages of the attack to prepare to take up positions for commencing their work. C Company, on the left, stood-by on the N. slope of the Jumeaux until about 1 a.m., when they were ordered to occupy our front line to support the attack. Later they were ordered to prepare to join in the attack, but this order was cancelled when it was decided to withdraw our troops from the enemy front line owing to our inability to hold out against the heavy counter-attacks of the enemy C Company ultimately covered the retirement of our attacking troops on that portion of the front.

A Company, operating with the 7th Wilts Regiment, were unable to commence their work owing to the inability of the attacking

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troops to establish themselves in the enemy front line, and were obliged to return from our front-line trenches to Swindon Camp to relieve the congestion which was caused by wounded returning and carrying parties going forward.

B Company, also under 7th Wilts, assembled in Doiran Road Camp (just behind the front-line trenches at B.4), and later occupied the support trenches at B.4, and provided a platoon to protect the right flank of the attack, on the Doiran road, close to the lake edge.

None of the companies carried out its programme of work, and at 6 a.m. on the 25th A, B, and C were recalled and marched back to camp in Vladaja Ravine viâ the Out Trench and Rifle Pit Ravine, D Company returning to camp in Elbow Ravine.

Total casualties.—3 O.R. killed, 9 O.R. wounded.

The day of 25th April was spent in resting by all companies except D. The latter moved back from Elbow Ravine to their old camp at Col de Rates.

April 27th.—Captain Donald, R.A.M.C., left the Battalion for England, and was replaced by Captain G. Davidson, R.A.M.C.

The next three weeks (with the exception of 8/9 May) were spent by A, B, and C Companies in working nightly on the construction of saps and trenches in advance of our front line. This work was carried on in the face of a certain amount of destructive and harassing fire from the enemy, and proved very unpleasant. The digging was all in rock, and in the early stages of the work no cover of any kind was available for the working parties, whose drills and sledge-hammers made considerable noise. The work was on the forward slopes of our positions and in full view of the enemy by day. A good deal of sniping had to be endured, and this, though generally ineffective, was very trying to work under. During this period D Company remained under the 78th Infantry Brigade on road work, 2 platoons moving on 7th May to Stonehenge (on the Doiran road) in preparation for the second attack. During this time also B Company employed a small party each night constructing search-light positions on La Tortue and Rifle Pit Hill, and some machine-gun emplacements on La Tortue.

May 8th/9th.—The offensive operations of 24th/25th April were resumed, and the Battalion "attended" what is known as the Second Battle of Doiran.

The general plan of this attack differed only in minor details from the first, except that the assaulting battalions had a smaller

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front allotted them, and reserves from another Division were in waiting. The tasks allotted to the companies of the Battalion were precisely the same, and the approach from the 3 company camps in Vladaja Ravine was carried out in the same manner as before, each company marching out at "X hour" to the following positions :—

A Company to Swindon Camp for attachment to 12th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (77th Brigade).

B Company to Doiran Road Camp for attachment to 11th Scottish Rifles (77th Brigade).

C Company to Silbury Fort for attachment to 10th Black Watch (77th Brigade).

Half D Company to second-line trenches Hampshire Ridge under 107 Company R.E.

Half D Company under 78th Brigade to La Tortue for consolidation work on Petit Couronné.

Battalion H.Q. were situate in Swindon Camp.

On the way to the foregoing positions of assembly only 4 O.R. casualties were sustained.

A Company at 23.30 hours received orders to move forward to B.8 (front line), where they remained until 00.30 hours. They were then ordered back to Swindon on account of the congested state of the trenches. This company stood-by until 06.37 hours (9th), when they were sent back to camp in Vladaja Ravine. The progress of the attack on their portion of the front had not been sufficiently successful to allow any work to be done on C.T.'s.

B Company reported to 11th Scottish Rifles at 22.30 hours, and remained in Doiran Road Camp until 05.30, when orders were received for them to proceed to B.2 in support. This order was almost immediately cancelled, however; and at 06.45 they, too, left for Vladaja Ravine, having endured a night of shelling, but having been quite unable to carry out work, owing to the inadequate success of our assault. The attacking battalion on this portion of the front had an impossible ravine to cross (Patty Ravine), which in places was about 100 feet deep, with almost vertical sides of rock near the bottom.

This ravine, constantly deluged with trench-mortar shells, proved a veritable death-trap out of which few survivors returned, and its existence seriously affected the operations of our right flank. With the failure of the attacking battalion to establish itself

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beyond the ravine in sufficient numbers, work for B Company was impossible.

C Company reported to 10th Black Watch at Silbury Fort at 22.15, and proceeded to Sunken Road (a track on the N. side of the Jumeaux Ravine) at 23.30. Here they spent two hours lying down in such cover as could be found among the rocks while the attack proceeded, and awaiting orders.

About 01.30 hours C Company were withdrawn to man Silbury Fort in case of a counter-attack in force by the enemy, and to cover our own withdrawal to our original line. Here the company remained until about 06.00 hours, when they were relieved by the attacking troops.

D Company for the attack were divided into two parties: the first, under Lieut. N. W. Elliott, was attached to a Field Company R.E. at Stonehenge Camp on the Doiran Road. At the hour of the attack this half-company moved forward to the second-line trenches on Hampshire Ridge in readiness for the construction of bridges across the Jumeaux and other ravines, but, owing to the limited success of the attack, they were not called on, and returned to camp at dawn.

The second half of the company, under Lieut. Miller, was under the orders of 78th Infantry Brigade, and was attached to the 7th Battalion of our Regiment as a consolidating party. The 7th Battalion attacked and captured the precipitous height known as Petit Couronné, on the north side of the Jumeaux Ravine, losing in the attack their C.O. (killed) and Second in Command (mortally wounded). The counter-attack by the enemy necessitated the use of this half company of D as reinforcements for the 7th Battalion; trench-mortared, machine-gunned, and shelled, they stayed on the position with little or no cover until after noon on the day following. Concentrated heavy shell-fire, however, ultimately rendered the position untenable, and the surviving troops were withdrawn later. In this attack D Company suffered 34 O.R. killed or wounded, and Lieut. Miller wounded.

Sergeant SMITH received the D.C.M. for conspicuous gallantry in this attack.

May 10th.—H.Q. and D Company moved to Transport Camp near Piton Rocheux.

May 11th.—A Company joined H.Q. at the above place.

May 16th.—A Company moved forward to Hill 221 (Vladaja Ravine).

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May 18*th*.—Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Dobbs (2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers) assumed command of the Battalion.

May 23*rd*.—The advance party moved to Karasuli (Vardar Front) to take over the camp site of the 1/12th N. Lancs. (Pioneers).

May 28*th*.—The Battalion moved to the new Divisional area on the Vardar front; D Company to camp near Kalinova; A to near Selimli Dere Bridge; B, C, and H.Q. to Pulpit Hill. All companies were employed on quarrying and road-making.

May 31*st*.—B Company moved to camp between Oreovica and Sal de l'Abri. Effective strength of Battalion: 25 officers and 963 O.R.

June 11*th*.—A Company moved to new site near P.N., on the Karasuli-Kilindir road, near Lake Ardzan.

June 18*th*.—Half D Company moved to Caussica, to work on marsh road leading to Galavanci.

June 29*th*.—26th Divisional Horse Show held at Divisional H.Q., Sal de l'Abri.

June 30*th*.—Effective strength of the Battalion 26 officers and 979 O.R.



ANCIENT FORTIFICATIONS AT SALONIKA.

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Nº 5



Grand Couronné
P1
Dub
Hill 535
P2
P3
P4
P4¼
P5
LAKE
DOIRAN
TOWER
DOIRAN
Doiran Hill
The Hilt
The Tongue
Vladaja R.
Sugar Loaf
Jumeaux Ravine
Sabre Ravine
The Scabbard
Hill 340
O1
O2
O3
O4
O5
O5½
Mamelon
Berk's Hill
Doldzeli Ravine
Senelle Ravine
Petit Couronné
Deep Ravine
Jumeaux Ravine
DOLDZELI
KRASTALI
Horseshoe Hill
C2
C1
C3
Pillar Hill
Exeter Hill
Christmas R.
La Tortue
Rockley Hill
Dorset Ravine
Vladaja Ravine
Elbow Ravine
Pearse Ravine
Boundary Ridge
Krastali Nullah
Whale Back
Kidney Hill
Castle Valley
Whaleback Nullah
Worcester Nullah
Escort Hill
Church Hill
Church
Junction Hill
Vladaja
Pioneer Hill
Pearse Hill
Castle Hill
Sporran Hill
Worcester Post
Pearse Ravine
Krastali Nullah
Worcester Nullah
Rook Hill
The Commandant
Piton des Zouaves
Hill 420
Col de Rates
BÜJÜKLÜ
GÖKCELLI
Crow Hill
Les Bagatelles
Canteen Hill
CEPELLI
Troupel
Clichy
Clichy Ravine
Shelter Ravine
Gun Ravine
Bujuklu Ravine
Scales
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THE

OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY

ROLL OF HONOUR

July 1916 to June 1917

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ROLL OF HONOUR.

OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY.

July 1916 to June 1917

2nd Lieut. CHARLES GORDON ABREY (*Bucks Battalion*) was killed in action while serving with the 1/1st Bucks Battalion on the 21st July 1916.

2ND LIEUT. C. G. ABREY.

He was born in 1892, and was gazetted 2nd Lieut. in the Battalion, 29th October 1915.

2ND LIEUT. STANLEY ASHMAN (*5th Battalion*) was killed in the attack on Hillside Work, Vis-en-Artois, on the 3rd May 1917.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 18th November 1915, and joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 21st April 1916. Mentioned in Dispatches, 15th May 1917.

Lieut. GEOFFREY WILLIAM ATKINSON (*Bucks Battalion*), who was killed on the 20th July 1916, in his 20th year, was the son of Mr. W. E. Atkinson, Hazelville Road, Hornsey Lane, N., and was educated at Berkhamsted School.

He joined the Inns of Court O.T.C. soon after war was declared, and obtained his commission as 2nd Lieutenant on the 20th February 1915. Accompanying the 2/1st Bucks Battalion to France in 1916, he was promoted temp. Lieutenant on the 2nd April of that year.

After having been wounded, he proceeded to bind up the wound of one of his men, and while doing so was again hit, and killed.

Captain ATHELSTAN BASIL BAINES (*6th Battalion*), who was killed on the 3rd April 1917, in his 29th year, was educated at Charterhouse, and was called to the Bar (Inner Temple) in 1914.

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Joining the Cambridge O.T.C. he was gazetted from it to be 2nd Lieutenant, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, 9th September 1914, and was posted to the 6th Battalion. He was promoted Lieutenant, 5th February 1915, went to France in July, and was promoted Captain on the 1st October of the same year.

In September 1916 he was wounded, and invalided to England, but on recovery rejoined the 6th Battalion in France.

LIEUT. C. P. BAKER.

Lieut. C. P. BAKER (*7th Battalion*) was killed on the 8th May 1917, on the Doiran Front.

He was one of the original members of the Battalion, to which he was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 9th November 1914.

Lieut. CHARLES JOHN BARTON (*2/4th Battalion*), killed on the 7th April 1917, was the only son of Mr. and Mrs. W. J. Barton, of Hillesden, Banbury, and was 20 years of age.

He was educated at Berkhamsted, and joined the 4th (T.F.) Battalion of the Regiment on the 1st April 1914, mobilizing with it at the outbreak of war, and being promoted Lieutenant, 28th November 1914.

2ND LIEUT. E. G. H. BATES.

2nd Lieut. E. G. H. BATES (*Bucks Battalion*), killed on the 23rd August 1916, was the son of the Rev. H. J. Bates, of Abergavenny. Educated at Denstone, he gained a Modern History Exhibition at Selwyn, Cambridge.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Bucks Battalion, 27th July 1915, and was serving with the 1/1st Bucks at the time of his death.

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Captain P. H. H. Beck (*2/1st Bucks Battalion, attached from the 6th Gloucestershire Regiment*) was killed on the 2nd April 1917. He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant 23rd October 1914, and was promoted temp. Captain on the 17th November 1915.

2nd Lieut. Cyril S. Benson (*6th Battalion*), second son of Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Benson, 27 Chalfont Road, Oxford, was killed while reconnoitring at Trescault on the 24th April 1917, aged 25. He was educated at Oxford High School and Pembroke College.

Joining the O.T.C., from it he was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, in December 1914, and was posted to the 6th Battalion, with which he served in France until wounded in October 1916, when he was invalided to England. On recovery, he rejoined his Battalion in France about two months before he was killed.

Captain R. W. Birch (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), who was killed on the 7th October 1916, was the youngest son of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Birch, of Corville, Chester, and was educated at Radley and Oriel College, Oxford. At the outbreak of the war he enlisted in the City of London Territorials, but was given a commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the 5th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the 22nd August 1914, and was promoted Lieutenant on the 1st October of the same year.

He accompanied the Battalion to France in May 1915; was wounded (losing the sight of one eye) on the 2nd August 1915; invalided to England; promoted Captain, 17th December 1915; and on recovery from his wound joined the 9th Battalion for duty at home. Returning to France in September 1916, he was posted to the 6th Battalion, and was commanding his company at the time of his death.

He was hit just before reaching the German trench, and rolled over into a shell-hole, where he was shot through the head by a sniper. He was twice mentioned in Dispatches.

Captain Edward Vivian Dearman Birchall, D.S.O. (*Bucks Battalion*), died on 10th August 1916 (his 32nd birthday) of wounds received in action on the 23rd July.

He was the third son of the late Mr. J. D. Birchall, of Bowden Hall, Gloucester, and was educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. After leaving Oxford (where he took an honours degree) he devoted his time to social work in Birmingham and London, and he subsequently held an appointment under the Board of Trade at Bristol.

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He had served in the Buckinghamshire Battalion for eight years before the war, and was promoted Captain on the 5th October 1913. Accompanying the 1/1st Bucks Battalion to France in March 1915, he served with it continuously up to the time of his death. The day before he died he was informed officially that he had been awarded the D.S.O. (immediate award), and the notification appeared in the *London Gazette* on the 25th August, as follows :—

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in action. He led forward his company with great dash under heavy fire, entered the enemy's trenches, and, though dangerously wounded, refused any assistance till assured that the position won was firmly held."

CAPTAIN E. V. D. BIRCHALL, D.S.O.

Captain Birchall was unmarried, and resided with his sister at Saintbridge House, Gloucester. He left considerable sums to charities, and amongst his bequests was "£2,000 to the Chairman of the Buckinghamshire Territorial Association for the benefit of the wounded men of the 1st Bucks Battalion and for the widows and dependents of those killed in the war."

Captain Jerrold Edwin Blake (*4th Battalion*), who was killed in action on the 23rd July 1916, in his 25th year, was the eldest son of the late E. F. Blake, of Toronto, Canada, and grandson of the late Hon. Edward Blake.

At the outbreak of war he was studying for the Bar in Canada, and, after training with the O.T.C., he came to England in June 1915, obtaining his commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the 4th Battalion of the Regiment on the 24th July 1915. He went to the front in November 1915, and was in temporary command of a company for some months prior to his death.

2nd Lieut. Oswald Charles Blencowe (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), killed in action on 7th October 1916, aged 26, was the youngest son of the Rev. Charles Blencowe, Marston St. Lawrence, Banbury, and was educated at St. Edward's School, where he was Senior Prefect, and Captain of the XI and XV.

At the outbreak of war he enlisted in the Royal Fusiliers, Public Schools Brigade, and served with them in France for some

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months. He received his commission as 2nd Lieutenant, 9th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, 2nd June 1916; was posted to and joined the 6th Battalion in France on the 18th September 1916; and at the time of his death was temporarily attached to the 12th Rifle Brigade.

2nd Lieut. GORDON BRADLEY (*9th, attached 5th Battalion*), who was killed at Delville Wood on the 24th August 1916, was the second son of Mr. H. J. Bradley, of 290 Iffley Road, Oxford.

When war broke out he enlisted in the 4th Battalion, and five months afterwards received a commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the 9th Battalion (26th January 1915), joining the 5th Battalion in France in February 1916.

2nd Lieut. H. R. N. BREWIN (*2/1st Bucks Battalion, attached from the Wiltshire Regiment*) was killed on the 19th July 1916. His commission as 2nd Lieutenant was dated 22nd December 1915.

Captain BASIL BENJAMIN BURGOYNE BROOKS (*4th Battalion*), who was reported missing and afterwards reported killed on the 24th July 1916, aged 21, was the eldest son of Alderman and Mrs. E. J. Brooks, of Oxford.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 4th Battalion, 2nd September 1914; promoted temp. Lieutenant, 15th May 1915; temp. Captain, 20th February 1916.

Captain JOHN EVELYN BRYANT (*6th Battalion*) was killed on the 4th August 1916.

He was appointed to the 6th Battalion as Lieutenant, 13th October 1914, and was promoted Captain, 18th January 1915.

2nd Lieut. JOHN LEGGE BULMER (*5th, attached from 4th Battalion*), reported missing on 3rd May 1917, and subsequently reported killed, was born in 1894.

He was educated at Marlborough (of which he was head in 1913), and at Merton College, Oxford, where he gained a Post-mastership. Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 4th (T.F.) Battalion, 7th October 1915, he served at first with the 3/4th (T.F. Reserve) Battalion at home, and was subsequently posted to the 5th (Service) Battalion, which he joined in France on the 10th January 1917.

2nd Lieut. GILBERT C. CALLOWAY (*2nd Battalion*), eldest son of Mr. and Mrs. C. Calloway, of High Wycombe, was killed in action on the 27th/28th April 1917, aged 21.

He joined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 7th February 1917.

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2nd Lieut. WILLIAM KEITH CARRUTHERS (*Bucks Battalion, attached to Lincolnshire Regiment*), who was killed in action on the 3rd April 1917, aged 25, was the third son of Mr. and Mrs. W. Carruthers, 127 Hornsey Lane, Highgate, N.

His commission as 2nd Lieutenant was dated 19th December 1916.

Lieut. D G. CHADWICK (2/1*st Bucks Battalion*) was killed on the 20th July 1916.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 31st October 1914; promoted Lieutenant, 18th August 1915; and proceeded with the Battalion to France in May 1916.

Lieut. J. P. CHAPMAN (*Bucks Battalion*) was killed in action on the 21st July 1916, while serving with the 1/1st Bucks Battalion, in the attack on the enemy's position between Ovillers and Pozières.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 1st June 1915, and was appointed temp. Lieutenant on the 4th December of the same year.

2nd Lieut. W. L. CHOWN (*3rd Dorset Regiment, attached to 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry* since February 1916), who was killed while serving with the 2nd Battalion on 30th July 1916, was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 3rd Dorset Regiment, on 26th June 1915.

Captain H. CHURCH (2/1*st Bucks Battalion*), killed on the 20th July 1916, was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 31st October 1914, and was promoted temp. Captain, 25th July 1915.

When an undergraduate at Trinity College, Oxford, in 1902, he was a prominent Rugby football player.

2nd Lieut. WILLIAM GERARD TALBOT CLIFTON was the eldest son of Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Clifton, of Stoke Poges, Bucks, and 21 Elm Park Gardens, London.

He joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 12th September 1916, and transferred to the Royal Flying Corps on the 12th December 1916.

Whilst flying at the front on the 31st March 1917 he was wounded and taken prisoner, and died the same day in the field hospital at Corbehem.

2nd Lieut. REGINALD BURSTON COOPER-SMITH (1/1*st Bucks Battalion, attached from Essex Regiment*) was killed on 10th March 1917.

2nd Lieut. HERBERT GUY HELE COPEMAN (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), missing, believed killed in action on 3rd September 1916, was the youngest son of the late Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Copeman, of Aylsham, Norfolk, and was born in 1891. He was educated at Bedford and Trinity College, Oxford, where he took

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his degree in 1914, and was reading for Holy Orders when war broke out. He immediately enlisted in the Public Schools Corps, from which he obtained his commission as 2nd Lieutenant, 25th January 1915.

Captain LIONEL WILLIAM CROUCH (*Bucks Battalion*), who was killed in action on the 21st July 1916, in his 30th year, was the elder son of Mr. W. Crouch, Clerk to the Bucks County Council, and of Mrs. W. Crouch, of Friarscroft, Aylesbury, and was educated at Marlborough.

By profession he was a solicitor, practising in Aylesbury, and was Deputy Clerk of the Peace for Bucks; but he was at the same time a keen Territorial officer, having joined the Bucks Battalion (then called the 1st Bucks Rifle Volunteer Corps) as 2nd Lieutenant in 1907. He was promoted Lieutenant in 1908, and Captain in 1912, having been in command of the Aylesbury Company since 1909. At the outbreak of war he mobilized with his Battalion, trained with it, and accompanied it to France in March 1915.

Captain Crouch was an enthusiastic collector of stamps, and at the age of nineteen was awarded the gold medal at the exhibition of the Junior Philatelic Society. He was afterwards the Vice-President of the Society.

2nd Lieut G. H. DALTON (*2/4th Battalion, attached from 3rd R. Irish Regiment*) died of wounds received in action on the 14th August 1916.

2nd Lieut. H. DAVIES (*9th, attached 2nd Battalion*) was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 12th July 1915, and joined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 25th August 1916.

He was reported missing, believed killed, on the 13th November 1916.

CAPTAIN F. A. DURNO-STEELE

2nd Lieut. D. W. DINWOODIE (*1/4th Battalion, attached from the 8th Scottish Rifles*) was killed in the attack on Guillemont Farm on the 19th April 1917, and was buried at Ronssoy.

He had served with the 1/4th Battalion since September 1916.

Captain F. A. DURNO-STEELE (*7th Battalion*), who was killed

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on the 8th May 1917, joined the Battalion as Lieutenant, 17th December 1914, accompanying it to France, and serving with it continuously in France and the Mediterranean up to the time of his death



CAPTAIN L. W. CROUCH.

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2nd Lieut. HENRY ECCLES (*7th Battalion*) was killed in action on the 28th January 1917. He was the eldest son of Mr. William Eccles, J.P., and Mrs. Eccles, of Glory Mill House, Woburn, Bucks.

Two of his brothers served in the ranks of other battalions of the Regiment, viz., Corporal John Eccles and Lance-Corporal J. H. Eccles.

2ND LIEUT. H. ECCLES.

Lieut. VIVIAN EDWARD FANNING (*2nd Battalion*), younger son of Mr. and Mrs. F. C. Fanning, of Compas, Oxford, was killed in action on the 14th November 1916, aged 19.

He was educated at Radley and Sandhurst, and was gazetted to the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant, 16th June 1915. Doing duty for some months with the 3rd Battalion in England, he was promoted Lieutenant, 30th July 1916, and joined the 2nd Battalion in France in the following month.

Lieut. C. W. FITT (*2nd Battalion, attached to Machine-gun Corps*), joined the 2nd Battalion as 2nd Lieutenant, 30th August 1916; transferred to Machine-gun Corps, 6th October 1916; and was promoted Lieutenant, 20th December 1916.

He was killed while serving with the Machine-gun Corps in May 1917.

2nd Lieut. G. M. FRIEAKE (*1/4th Battalion*) died on the 1st August 1916 of wounds received at Pozières (Sickle Trench) on the 23rd July, and was buried at Rouen.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 7th April 1915, and, after serving with the 3/4th Battalion at home, joined the 1/4th Battalion in France in March 1916.

2nd Lieut. A. C. FRY (*2/4th Battalion*), husband of Mrs. Fry, of Boundary Cottage, Headington Hill, Oxford, died of wounds received in action on the 28th February 1917.

He was at Hertford College, Oxford, from 1911 to 1914, and shortly after the outbreak of war enlisted in the University and Public Schools Corps, but was discharged on account of ill-health in 1915. A few months later he re-enlisted in the R.A.M.C., and

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worked for more than a year at the Base Hospital, Oxford. In October 1916 he obtained a commission as 2nd Lieutenant, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and joined the 2/4th Battalion in France in January 1917.

2nd Lieut. JOHN WILLIAM HUGO FUSSELL (*3rd, attached to 6th Battalion*), killed in March 1917, at the age of 19, was the elder son of Mrs. Fussell, of the Slopes, Caversham.

He was educated at Blundell's, and on the outbreak of war was in Angola, whence he came home at once and enlisted in the H.A.C. On the 14th June 1915 he was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment, and was subsequently posted to the 5th Battalion, and attached to the 6th Battalion.

2nd Lieut. WILFRID GARLAND (*7th Battalion*), killed in action on the 8th/9th May 1917, was educated at Lancing and Keble College, Oxford.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 7th Battalion, 24th November 1914; served with it in France; and in the autumn of 1915 accompanied it to Salonika.

He was at first reported "missing, believed killed," and afterwards was unofficially reported "killed."

2ND LIEUT. W. GARLAND.

2nd Lieut. G. G. GRAY (*5th Battalion*), eldest son of Dr. G. G. Gray, J.P., of 33 Wellington Square, Hastings, and the Vines, Udimore, was educated at Tonbridge, and obtained his commission, from the University and Public Schools Brigade, on the 22nd December 1914.

He went to the Front in October 1915, was severely wounded on the 22nd November of that year, but rejoined the 5th Battalion on the 20th February 1917. On the 11th April 1917 he was again severely wounded, and died the same day.

2nd Lieut. CECIL HENRY GREEN (*6th Battalion*), youngest surviving son of the late Mr. W. S. Green and of Mrs. Green, of Grove Road, Leighton Buzzard, died on the 9th of wounds received on the 7th October 1916, aged 29.

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He was educated at Berkhamsted, and joined the Public Schools Brigade in September 1914, receiving a commission on the 25th January 1915. For the first few months he served with the 7th Battalion of the Regiment at home and with the 9th Battalion, after which he was posted to the 6th Battalion in France in December 1915, and fell in one of the later actions of the battle of the Somme.

Captain REGINALD GEORGE GREGSON-ELLIS (*Bucks Battalion*), who died on the 17th April 1917 of wounds received on the previous day, was the eldest son of the late Mr. C. Gregson-Ellis and of Mrs. Gregson-Ellis, of Claremont House, High Wycombe. He was educated at Horris Hill and Eton, and joined the Inns of Court O.T.C. in August 1914. Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Bucks Battalion, on the 21st September 1914, he was promoted temp. Lieutenant 10th June 1915 and temp. Captain 22nd July 1916.

CAPTAIN R. G. GREGSON-ELLIS.

He accompanied the 1/1st Battalion to France in March 1915 and served with it up to the time of his death.

At Eton he was in the Cricket XI in 1901 and 1902, being captain in the latter year.

Captain Gregson-Ellis married (1913) the eldest daughter of Mr. L. W. Reynolds, of the Priory, High Wycombe.

Lieut. CHARLES HALL (*Bucks Battalion*), who died on the 13th August 1916 of wounds received on the 17th/18th July, aged 40, was the son of the late Captain Charles Hall, 1st Royal Dragoons. He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 18th June 1915, and was promoted temp. Lieutenant, 4th December 1915

LIEUT. C. HALL.

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2nd Lieut. THEODORE NEWMAN HALL (*4th Battalion*), who died on 15th August of wounds received on the 23rd July 1916, aged 21, was the only child of the late Rev. W. A. Newman Hall, of St. Philip's, Dorridge, Warwickshire, and was educated at Eastbourne and Oriel College, Oxford.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 1st February 1915, from the Oxford University O.T.C.

Lieut. CHARLES FERDINAND REISS HANBURY-WILLIAMS (*2nd Battalion*), son of Major-General Sir John Hanbury-Williams, K.C.V.O., C.M.G. (late 43rd Light Infantry), died, after a long illness, in London, on the 19th December 1916.

He was born on the 9th November 1890, was educated at Wellington College, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the Regiment (from the Special Reserve) 22nd May 1912, joining the 2nd Battalion at Aldershot. On the 26th May 1914 he was placed temporarily on the half-pay list, on account of ill-health, but was restored to the establishment on the 6th August 1914 as Lieutenant, and on the 26th August was posted to the 5th (Service) Battalion. Being medically unfit for service overseas, he was transferred to the 9th (Reserve) Battalion, May 1915, and was subsequently employed on recruiting up to the time of his last illness.

Captain JOHN BALFOUR HARDCASTLE (*2nd Battalion*) was the only son of John N. Hardcastle, of Broughton Hall, near Lechlade, and Hill Court, Edenbridge, his mother being a Balfour of Balbirnie, Fife. He was educated at Winchester College (1906–10), subsequently spending two years at Wye Agricultural College, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalion on the 17th June 1914. After serving with that Battalion for six months from the date of mobilization, he entered the R.M. College, Sandhurst, and

CAPTAIN J. B. HARDCASTLE.

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was gazetted to the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant, 11th August 1915, joining the 2nd Battalion in France, 5th October 1915.

He was promoted temp. Captain on the 14th March 1916, and was killed in the attack on Guillemont on the 30th July 1916, aged 23.

2nd Lieut. C. C. HARPER (*5th, attached from 3rd Battalion*) was reported missing, and afterwards presumed killed, in the attack on Hillside Work (Vis-en-Artois) on the 3rd May 1917.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 3rd Battalion, 7th October 1915, and joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 12th September 1916.

Lieut. N. S. HARRISON (*9th, attached 2nd Battalion*) was killed on the 30th July 1916 when acting Grenade Officer of the 2nd Battalion.

He was appointed temp. 2nd Lieutenant, 10th East Yorkshire Regiment, 29th August 1914, and was transferred to the 9th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry as temp. Lieutenant, 23rd December 1914. Posted to the 2nd Battalion in France, he joined it on the 12th March 1916.

2nd Lieut. WILLIAM CLAUDE HAYNES (*5th Battalion, attached from 3rd*) was killed in the attack on Hillside Work (Vis-en-Artois), 3rd May 1917, aged 28.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 25th January 1917, and joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 16th March 1917.

2ND LIEUT. W. R. HEATH.

2nd Lieut. WALTER ROWLAND HEATH (*Bucks Battalion*), killed on the 23rd August 1916, was the fourth son of the late Richard Heath, of Yoke House, near Rochester, and of Mrs. Heath, of Handford, Herne Bay. Educated at the Royal Naval School and Durham University, where he took honours in classics and philosophy.

He was a fine athlete, and excelled in football, swimming, and rowing. For a short time he was a master at All Saints, Bloxham, and from 1903 until he joined the Army he was

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at Cairo in the service of the Education Department of the Egyptian Government.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Bucks Battalion, 19th July 1915, and for some time was an inspector of physical training and bayonet fighting, with the temporary rank of Captain. He joined the Battalion in France about four weeks before he fell.

Captain DOUGLAS STANLEY HIGGINS (*5th Battalion, attached from 9th*), who was killed in action in the attack on the Harp, 9th April 1917, was the youngest son of Mr. and Mrs. G. Randell Higgins, of Burcote, Oxon, and was 37 years of age.

He was posted to, and joined, the 5th Battalion in France on the 25th December 1915, and was promoted temporary Captain on the 3rd July 1916.

Educated at Dulwich, he was, before the war, joint-manager of the firm of Jones and Higgins, of Peckham.

Captain NICHOLAS WEATHERBY HILL, M.C. (*2nd Battalion*), only son of Mr. H. L. C. Hill, of Batts Close, Winchester, was killed on the 16th/17th January 1917, aged 20.

He was educated at Horris Hill and Winchester, where he gained a Scholarship in 1909, and an Exhibition in the following year. In December 1914 he obtained a Scholarship at New College, Oxford, but did not take it up, as he entered Sandhurst in the spring of 1915. Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, on the 20th October 1915, he joined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 5th June 1916, and was appointed Acting Captain (A Company Commander), 31st July 1916.

He was awarded the MILITARY CROSS for conspicuous gallantry in action a fortnight before his death, but the statement did not appear in the *London Gazette* until the 13th February 1917.

2nd Lieut. J. D. C. HOLLAND (*2nd Battalion*) received his commission as 2nd Lieutenant, on promotion from Corporal, 1st King Edward's Horse, on the 23rd April 1916, and joined the 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry in France on the 29th April.

He was reported wounded and missing on the 13th November 1916.

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MAJOR A. D. HOMAN.

Major A. D. HOMAN (*7th Battalion, attached from 1st Royal Irish Regiment*), second in command, 20th February 1917; in command, February to April 1917; died of wounds received in action, 9th May 1917.

2nd Lieut. ROLAND BURTON HUDSON (*Bucks Battalion*), killed on the 19th July 1916, was 25 years of age.

At the outbreak of war he joined the Public Schools Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, and obtained a commission in the Bucks Battalion, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, as 2nd Lieutenant, 26th June 1915.

Captain R. L. G. HUNT (*6th Battalion*), killed in action on 7th October 1916, was educated at Bromsgrove and Lincoln College, Oxford, and previous to the outbreak of war was articled to his father, Mr. J. Hunt, solicitor, of The Green, Banbury.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 12th September 1914, and posted to the 6th Battalion; promoted Lieutenant, 5th February 1915, and accompanied the Battalion to France in the following July. He saw much fighting in and about the Ypres salient, and in April 1916 was severely wounded by a bullet which passed through his left side.

Rejoining the 6th Battalion early in September 1916, he was posted to the command of B Company (Acting Captain), and was killed while leading it into action.

Lieut. LESLIE WHITAKER HUNTER (*4th Battalion*), who was killed on 13th August 1916, aged 30, was the elder son of Mr. and Mrs. L. Hunter, of Barnes, S.W., and was a Fellow of New College, Oxford.

He was educated at Winchester, whence he went to New College, and distinguished himself in classics. In addition to first in Moderations and in *Lit. Hum.* he obtained both the Gaisford prizes —that for Greek verse in 1906, and that for Greek prose in 1908; the Chancellor's prize for Latin verse in 1907; a Craven scholarship in 1908; the Derby scholarship in 1909; the Chancellor's prize for

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a Latin essay in 1910; and the Passmore Edwards scholarship in 1911. He was elected to a Fellowship at Magdalen, but returned to New College as Fellow and Lecturer in 1912.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 4th Battalion, 6th May 1915, and was promoted Lieutenant, 15th December 1915.

2nd Lieut. D. M. HUTCHINS (*1/4th Battalion, attached from 5th Middlesex*) was wounded at Pozières (Sickle Trench) on the 23rd July 1916, and died of his wounds on the 2nd August. He had served with the Battalion barely a month.

2nd Lieut. THEODORE A. IONIDES (*3rd Battalion, attached to 2nd Battalion*), only son of Mr. and Mrs. A. C. Ionides, of 34 Porchester Terrace, W., died of wounds received in action on the 16th November 1916, aged 19.

He was educated at Radley, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 3rd Battalion (Special Reserve), on the 14th July 1915, joining the 2nd Battalion in France on the 5th June 1916. As a Platoon Commander in D Company he took part in the Battle of the Somme, and on the 13th November, in one of the last engagements of the long battle, received wounds from which he died three days later.

2ND LIEUT. T. A. IONIDES.

2nd Lieut. FRANK IVE (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), who was killed on the 7th October 1916, aged 19, was the youngest son of Mr. Harry Ive, of Rostrevor, St. Andrew's Road, Henley-on-Thames. He joined the Public Schools Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, and went to the front in the ranks of that regiment. After five months' active service he came home to a cadet training corps, and on the 5th August 1916 was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 9th (Reserve) Battalion of the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, being posted to the 6th Battalion, which he joined in France. On the 29th September he was temporarily attached to the 12th Rifle Brigade, with whom he was serving when killed.

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CAPTAIN R. B. KITE, M.C.

Captain RALPH BERTRAM KITE, M.C. (*2nd Battalion*), who died on the 10th December of wounds received on the 13th November 1916, aged 21, was the only son of the Rev. J. B. Kite (formerly Dean of Hobart) and Mrs. Kite, of St. Peter's Vicarage, Ealing.

He was educated at Marlborough and Keble College, Oxford, and went to Sandhurst at the outbreak of war. He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the Regiment, 11th November 1914, and joined the 2nd Battalion in France, 23rd March 1915, being promoted temp. Lieutenant, 6th September 1915, when in charge of the 5th Brigade Bombing School. Returning to Regimental duty he eventually commanded D Company.

His services have been given in previous volumes of the CHRONICLE. He was twice mentioned in Dispatches, and was awarded the Military Cross in the *London Gazette* of the 20th October 1916 "for conspicuous gallantry during operations. He did fine work organizing the attack, and displayed great coolness and utter disregard of danger. When the bombers holding one of our saps had become casualties, he went at once to the spot, organized the defence, and threw bombs himself."

Major GERALD GODFREY KNIGHTON (*5th Battalion*), second son of Mr. F. A. Knighton, The Views, Queen's Walk, Ealing, was born in 1888, and was educated at Aldenham School and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he obtained a Second Class Honours Science Degree, and was a member of the O.T.C. for four years. On leaving Cambridge, he became Science Master at St. Andrew's College, Toronto, which appointment he held for three years. Returning to England in 1913 he read for Holy Orders. He joined the University and Public Schools Brigade from Bishop's College, Cheshunt, at the outbreak of war, and obtained his commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the 9th (2nd Reserve) Battalion of the Regiment on the 26th October 1914. Joining that battalion he was promoted Lieutenant, 15th December 1914, and Captain the same date, being retained

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with the Battalion at home on training duties until September 1916.

He joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 12th September 1916, was promoted Major, 1st October 1916, and took part in the several engagements in which the Battalion was present during the following seven months.

On the 28th April 1917 he was mortally wounded, and succumbed to his wounds two days later.

He was subsequently (15th May 1917) mentioned in Dispatches.

Lieut. REGINALD ST. GEORGE LAKE (*4th Battalion*), who was killed in action on the 17th November 1916, was the second son of Mr. Reginald J. Lake, of Watford. Born in 1887, he was educated at Berkhamsted School, and for a time was under articles as a solicitor, but in 1907 entered Child's Bank. From 1906 to 1908 he was Lieutenant in the 4th Bedfordshire Regiment (Militia), and on the outbreak of war joined the Inns of Court O.T.C. In September 1914 he obtained a commission as Lieutenant in the New Army, but failed to pass the medical examination; he was, however, gazetted 2nd Lieutenant 4th Battalion (T.F.), 9th March 1915, and joined the 1/4th Battalion in France in June 1915. He was promoted temp. Lieutenant, 20th February 1916.

Lieut. CHARLES LAKIN (*4th Battalion*), who died on 21st August 1916 of wounds received on the 13th, was the eldest son of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Lakin, of 26 Stanley Road, Oxford, and was educated at the High School and the Non-Collegiate Delegacy, taking his B.A. degree in 1913. When war broke out he was employed in the University Registrar's Office, and on the 6th May 1915 he was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 4th Battalion.

He was a good all-round athlete, a sound batsman,

LIEUT. C. LAKIN.

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a fine football player, a strong swimmer, and above the average at hockey.

His father was an old 43rd soldier, who left the Regiment as Colour-Sergeant in 1892 to take up an appointment at Brasenose College, which he still holds.

2nd Lieut. W. J. LIDSEY (*4th Battalion, attached to R.F.C.*) died of wounds received in action on the 22nd March 1917.

He proceeded overseas with the 1/4th Battalion in March 1915, received his commission 12th February 1916, and served as 2nd Lieutenant with the Battalion from June to November 1916, when he joined the Royal Flying Corps.

2nd Lieut. ERIC GEORGE VINCENT LUIS (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), who was killed on the 7th October 1916, was the younger son of the late Colonel John Luis, of Newstead, West Ferry, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant 9th Battalion on the 5th August 1916. Being posted to the 6th Battalion, he joined it in France on the 12th September.

2nd Lieut. GEOFFREY S. LA WARRE LYLE (*2nd Battalion*) died on the 29th of wounds received in action on the 28th April 1917, aged 25.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant from the R.M. College, Sandhurst, 19th July 1916, joined the Battalion in France on the 23rd September 1916, and was posted to D Company, which he subsequently commanded for a short time.

2nd Lieut. V. B. MARSH (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*) was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 10th June 1915, and was posted to and joined the 6th Battalion in France on the 24th July 1916.

He was present during the earlier stages of the battle of the Somme, and was killed on the 3rd Septmber 1916, in the attack on Guillemont.

2nd Lieut. R. S. L. MAUL (*2nd Battalion*) was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, on promotion from Corporal, 2nd King Edward's Horse, 5th March 1916, and joined the 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry in France on the 10th March.

He was killed on the 30th July 1916 in the attack on Guillemont Station.

2nd Lieut. KENNETH IRVINE THOMSON MORLAND (*6th Battalion*), who was killed in action on the 3rd September 1916, aged 32,

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was the second son of Mrs. Morland, of Staverton House, Oxford, and of the late Edward Morland, of Abingdon and West Ilsley, Berks. He was educated at Haileybury and Oriel College, Oxford, where he graduated in 1908. He spent six years in Ceylon tea and rubber planting, and belonged to the Ceylon Mounted Rifles. Early in 1915 he returned to England and enlisted in the Hon. Artillery Company, in which he served for over a year, nine months of the time being spent in France. He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 6th Battalion, 7th May 1916.

2ND LIEUT. K. I. T. MORLAND.

His brother, Captain W. E. T. Morland, M.C., of the 1st Battalion, was taken prisoner at Kut, while serving on General Townshend's staff.

Lieut. CHARLES GEOFFREY NOEL MORRIS (*9th, attached 6th Battalion*), killed in action on the 7th October 1916, was the only child of Mr. and Mrs. H. Morris, of Brecon Road, Hay, Breconshire. Born in 1893, he was educated at Hereford Cathedral School and Keble College, Oxford, his intention being to take Holy Orders.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, 24th November 1914, but was subsequently transferred to the 9th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and was promoted temp. Lieutenant on the 7th April 1916.

Lieut. ROBERT CECIL NORWOOD (*Bucks Battalion*), son of Mr. G. R. Norwood, 204 Iffley Road, Oxford, was reported missing, and afterwards reported killed on the 17th/18th July 1916. He was educated at Oxford High School and Jesus College, Oxford, where he was in his third year working for honours in chemistry, and was expecting shortly to take his degree, when war broke out. He rowed in the Jesus College Torpid Eight, and was in possession of the medal of the Royal Humane Society for saving life.

He obtained his commission as 2nd Lieutenant, Bucks Battalion, from the O.T.C., 2nd September 1914; promoted Lieutenant, 11th January 1916.

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MAJOR R. M. OWEN.

Major REGINALD MANSFIELD OWEN (*2nd Battalion*), Acting Second in Command of the 2nd Battalion, who died of wounds on the 2nd August 1916, was the younger son of the Dean of Ripon and Mrs. Mansfield Owen, and was educated at Cheltenham College and Sandhurst.

He was born on the 23rd June 1891, and was gazetted to the Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant, 20th May 1911, joining the 2nd Battalion at Aldershot shortly afterwards, and being promoted Lieutenant 18th April 1914. Accompanying the Battalion to France at the outbreak of the war, he took part in the Retreat from Mons and the battles of the Marne and Aisne, being wounded at the latter on the 14th September 1914. On recovery he rejoined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 22nd May 1915; was promoted temp. Captain, 22nd June 1915; and Captain, 25th November 1915.

He commanded A Company in the attack at Givenchy (battle of Loos), September 1915, and from the 18th December 1915 to the 5th March 1916 was temporary G.S.O., 3rd Grade, 2nd Division. As Second in Command of the Battalion he took part in the attack on Guillemont (battle of the Somme), 30th July 1916, and came out untouched, only, however, to fall mortally wounded at Waterlot Farm three days later. Severely wounded by a shell at 9 a.m., he died within a few hours in the Clearing Station at Divies Copse.

Major Owen was a great-grandson of Captain W. S. Moorsom (52nd), who wrote the Historical Record of the Regiment, and great-nephew of Captain W. R. Moorsom, who served in the 52nd from 1853 to 1858 and was killed at Lucknow.

2nd Lieut. FREDERICK RICHARD PARKER (*Wiltshire Regiment, attached to 2/1st Bucks Battalion, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry*) was killed in action on the 19th July 1916.

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He was educated at Oxford High School and then was apprenticed to the L. and N.W. Railway Works at Crewe. Shortly after the declaration of war he joined the Inns of Court O.T.C., and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 3rd Wiltshire Regiment, 10th July 1915.

CAPTAIN K. PEPLOE.

Captain KEITH PEPLOE (*2nd Battalion*), who was killed on 9th November 1916 by a sniper while visiting an advanced post at night, aged 23, was the second son of Mr. and Mrs. Peploe, of 22 Sloane Gardens, S.W., and was educated at Marlborough and Trinity College, Cambridge.

He went to Sandhurst in September 1914 and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 17th February 1915. Joining the 2nd Battalion in France in June 1915, he was promoted Lieutenant 30th July 1916, and at the time of his death was temp. Captain in command of B Company.

2ND LIEUT. H. T. R. PICKFORD.

Lieut. CHARLES PERCY PHIPPS (*Bucks Battalion*), killed on the 20th July 1916, aged 20, was the second son of the Rev. Canon and Mrs. Constantine O. Phipps, the Lee Vicarage, Bucks.

He was educated at Winchester College, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 31st October 1914, was promoted temp. Lieutenant, 2nd April 1916, and proceeded to France in May 1916.

2nd Lieut. H. T. R. PICKFORD (*7th Battalion*), who was killed on the 24th April 1917, was appointed to the Regiment on the

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24th September 1916, and joined the 7th Battalion on the 8th April 1917.

2nd Lieut. GODFREY MARSHALL RAWLINSON (*4th Battalion*), who died of wounds on the 16th July 1916, was educated at Eltham College, and went into business with a firm of stockbrokers in London.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 4th Battalion, 4th August 1915.

Captain HUBERT WYATT HAY RAWSON (*3rd Battalion, attached to 2nd Battalion*), who was killed on the 15th November 1916, was the younger son of the late Admiral Sir Harry H. Rawson, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., and was 29 years of age.

CAPTAIN H. W. H. RAWSON.

He was educated for the Navy at Stubbington, but, owing to defective eyesight, was unable to enter either the Navy or the Army. During the time Admiral Rawson was Governor of New South Wales he finished his education at Armidale School and at St. Paul's College, Sydney University, N.S.W., where he served in the University Scouts. He afterwards took up rubber-planting at Taiping and, later, at Singapore; while there he served in the Volunteers.

He was gazetted Lieutenant, 3rd Battalion (Spec. Res.), 10th May 1915; joined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 5th October; and was promoted Captain, 6th November 1915. He commanded the 5th Brigade Sapping Company, formed early in 1916, being at the same time in command of the Battalion Sapping Platoon.

Captain Rawson married, in June 1915, Mildred Paley, daughter of the late Algernon Paley and Mrs. Paley, of Grenville Lodge, Henley-on-Thames.

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2nd Lieut. HADYN ERIC W. RAYNER (*6th, attached from 3rd Battalion*), who was killed in action on the 17th March 1917, was the youngest son of Mrs. Rayner, of 72 Albany Mansions, S.W.

2nd Lieut. R. J. RICHARDS (*5th Battalion*) was reported missing after the attack on Hillside Work (Vis-en-Artois) on the 3rd May 1917, and was subsequently reported to have died of wounds when a prisoner of war in German hands.

He joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 16th April 1917.

Lieut.-Colonel ARCHIBALD TYRREL ROBINSON, D.S.O. (*7th Battalion, attached from the East Surrey Regiment*), died of wounds received in action on the Salonika front on the 11th May 1917, while in command of the 7th (Service) Battalion, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.

He was the son of the late Major-General D. G. Robinson, R.E., and was born in 1872. He served in the East Surrey Regiment for 21 years, was wounded at Ypres in February 1915, and was promoted Major in April 1915. Posted to the command of the 7th Battalion in June 1916, he was awarded the D.S.O. and the Croix de Guerre in January 1917.

LT.-COL. A. T. ROBINSON.

2nd Lieut. JOHN HASTINGS FOLLIOTT SCOTT (*5th Battalion*) was the son of the Rev. R. C. F. Scott, of Antcote Rectory, Woburn Sands, Bedfordshire, and was killed in the attack on the Harp, near Arras, on the 9th April 1917, aged 22.

2nd Lieut. J. A. SELLAR (*6th Battalion*) was killed in action on the 3rd April 1917.

Captain EDWARD ALFRED SHAW (*6th Battalion*), eldest son of the Bishop of Buckingham and Mrs. Shaw, was killed in action on the 7th October 1916, aged 24.

He was educated at Marlborough and Brasenose College, Oxford, and was gazetted temp. 2nd Lieutenant, 6th Battalion, 17th September 1914; promoted temp. Lieutenant, 5th February 1915;

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temp. Captain, 19th November 1915. He accompanied the 6th Battalion to France, and, except when for some months in charge of a bombing school, he served with his company in the field continuously.

Captain Shaw was a noted cricketer, having been for five years in the Marlborough XI, the last three years as Captain, and, when at Oxford, having kept wicket for the University in 1912 and 1914. He also played for Buckinghamshire for several years.

2nd Lieut. A. C. SKOULDING (*6th Battalion*) died of wounds received in action on the 21st February 1917.

2nd Lieut. JOSEPH RALPH STAMMERS (*5th Battalion*), elder son of the late Mr. Stammers, Head Master of Stonesfield School, and of Mrs. Toone (formerly Stammers), of 1 Acorn Street, Melton Road, Leicester, was killed in action in the attack on the Harp, near Arras, on the 9th April 1917, aged 24.

He was educated at Burford Grammar School, and for a time was Assistant Master at Woodstock School. He then went to Culham College, and had just completed his two years' training for schoolmaster when war broke out. Joining the Culham Company of the 4th Battalion as a private, he went to France with the Battalion in March 1915. Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 3rd October 1916, he was posted to the 5th Battalion, and joined it in France on the 4th October.

2nd Lieut. JAMES STEVENS (*5th Battalion*) was killed in the attack on the Harp, near Arras, on the 9th April 1917, in his 27th year.

He was a native of Wootton (Oxon), where he attended the village school, and obtained a County Council scholarship tenable at Burford Grammar School, where he spent four years. On leaving school he entered the Civil Service, and subsequently obtained a post in one of the London banks. Soon after the outbreak of war he enlisted in the Public Schools Battalion, received rapid promotion, and, as a sergeant, went to France with the Royal Fusiliers.

Selected for a commission, he came home for training with the Cadet Battalion at Cambridge, and in August 1916 was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, joining the 5th Battalion in France on the 20th October 1916.

Captain H. J. SUTHERLAND (*6th Battalion*) died on the 3rd February 1917 of asphyxia, from sleeping in a closed room with a charcoal brazier.

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2nd Lieut. NORMAN HALE TALBOT (*5th Battalion*), who was killed in the attack on Delville Wood on the 24th August 1916, while serving with the 5th Battalion, was the eldest son of Mr. Alfred George Talbot, of 12 Lewisham Hill, S.E., and was born in 1888.

Previous to the outbreak of war he had made a reputation in South Africa as a singer and entertainer, and was known as "Norman Hale—the man with a voice." He remained in South Africa until the news of the sinking of the "Lusitania" reached him, when he was spurred to action. Coming to England he enlisted in the H.A.C., and was given a Commission in the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry in July 1916, joining the 5th Battalion in France on the 31st of that month.

2nd Lieut. T. THOMAS (*9th Battalion, attached Machine-gun Corps*) was killed on the 3rd November 1916.

His commission as 2nd Lieutenant was dated 26th January 1915.

Lieut. REGINALD JOHN ELLIOTT TIDDY (*4th Battalion*), who was killed on the 11th August 1916, aged 36, was the elder son of Mr. W. E. Tiddy, of Ascott-under-Wychwood. He was educated at Tonbridge and Oxford, and, before the war, interested himself in the Folk Dance and Song Movement in Oxfordshire.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant (from the Oxford University O.T.C.), 16th February 1915; promoted Lieutenant, 29th July 1915; and for some months in 1916 was employed on Instructional duties.

He had a distinguished University career, going to Oxford as a scholar of University College, and taking a first class in Classical Moderations in 1900, and in Literæ Humaniores in 1902. He was Passmore-Edwards scholar in 1903, became Fellow of University, and later Fellow of Trinity, where he was Lecturer in Classics and English. He was also University Lecturer in English.

2nd Lieut. ALAN HERBERT TILLEY (*2/4th Battalion*), younger son of Mr. and Mrs. J. W. Tilley, of the Knoll, Northwood, died on the 10th April 1917 of wounds received on the 7th April, aged 20. He was educated at Bradfield College, and was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant (from the Inns of Court O.T.C.), 23rd November 1916.

2nd Lieut. WILLIAM CHARLES TRIMMER (*Bucks Battalion*), who was killed on the 21st July 1916, in his 20th year, was the only son

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of Mr. and Mrs. W. S. Trimmer, of Runwick House, Farnham, Surrey. He was educated at Cheltenham College, which he left in December 1914, and joined the ranks of the H.A.C.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 27th November 1915.

Captain DUNCAN JOHNSON TUCK (*3rd, attached to 5th Battalion*) was the third son of the Rev. F. J. Tuck, of Sedgeford Vicarage, King's Lynn, and was born at Eton College in 1893. He was educated at Radley, where he held a scholarship, and at Hertford College, Oxford. On the 8th August 1914 he was gazetted, from the O.T.C. (Oxford University), 2nd Lieutenant on the Supplementary List of the Regiment, joining the 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalion, and serving with it at Portsmouth until March 1915, when he was attached to the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry in France. He was wounded in the shoulder on the 23rd April 1915 at the second battle of Ypres, and was invalided home.

Joining the 5th Battalion on the 24th September 1915, in the neighbourhood of Ypres, he served with it until the 17th June 1916, when he was severely wounded while inspecting wire entanglements. He was hit in the chest and right arm while attending to the wounds of another officer, and died of his wounds on the 3rd July.

2nd Lieut. B. VOKES (*1/4th Battalion*) was killed on the 15th February 1917, near La Maisonette, and was buried at Flaucourt.

He belonged to C Company, and had served with the Battalion less than a month.

2nd Lieut. FRANCIS HILLIER WALROND (*5th Battalion*), younger son of the late Robert Walrond and of Mrs. Walrond, of Kemp Town, Brighton, was severely wounded by shrapnel on 24th July 1916, was transferred to England on the 27th, and died in London on 15th August 1916, aged 34.

He was educated at Merchant Taylors School, after leaving which he spent thirteen years in Canada and the Argentine. Four days after war was declared he sailed for England and enlisted in the 2nd King Edward's Horse, obtaining his commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the 5th March 1916, and joining the 5th Battalion in France on the 14th March.

2nd Lieut. E. H. WALTERS (*2/1st Bucks Battalion, attached from the Manchester Regiment*) was killed on the 26th September 1916.

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2nd Lieut. BASIL CHARLES CONROY WARDE (*3rd, attached 2nd Battalion*) was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant on the 26th June 1915, and joined the 2nd Battalion in France on the 30th March 1916.

He was reported missing, believed killed, on the 30th July 1916, in the attack on Guillemont Station.

Captain JOHN DOUGLAS BARFORD WARWICK (*1/1st Bucks Battalion, attached from the Hunts Cyclists*) was killed on the 10th March 1917.

He joined the Battalion on the 10th September 1916, and commanded A Company.

CAPTAIN J. D. B. WARWICK.

Captain WILLIAM AMBLER WAYMAN (*1/4th Battalion*) was killed on the 14th August 1916, and was buried at Pozières.

He was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 2nd September 1914, and trained with the Battalion at home until it went to France in March 1915; promoted Lieutenant, 26th October 1915; rejoined the Battalion in France in January 1916; and promoted temp. Captain (D Company Commander), 12th June 1916.

LIEUT. A. O. W. WEBSTER-JONES.

Lieut. ALFRED OWEN WEBSTER WEBSTER-JONES (*3rd, attached to 2nd Battalion*), son of Mr. A. W. Webster-Jones, was educated at Holmwood, Bexhill, and University College School. Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 9th May 1915, he joined the 2nd Battalion in France, 19th October 1916, and was killed on the 13th November 1916, in the attack on the Ancre (near Beaumont Hamel) at the age of 34.

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In civil life he was a solicitor at Hastings, and, previous to obtaining his commission, he served for eight months in the 19th Royal Fusiliers (O.T.C.).

2nd Lieut. ARTHUR GRAEME WEST (*6th Battalion*), eldest son of Mr. A. B. West, of 4 Holly Terrace, Highgate, N., was killed in action on the 3rd April 1917, aged 25.

2nd Lieut. HARRY WESTON-WEBB (*9th, attached 5th Battalion*), son of Mr. R. Webb, Briarwood, Solihull, Birmingham, was killed at Delville Wood on the 24th August 1916.

Gazetted 2nd Lieutenant, 9th Battalion, 10th June 1915, he was posted to and joined the 5th Battalion in France on the 14th February 1916.

Captain (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) CHARLES JOSEPH WILKIE (*Res. of Off., late 2nd Battalion*) was killed in action whilst in command of the 17th (Service) Battalion the Welsh Regiment on the 18th/19th October 1916.

Born on the 8th January 1869, he was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant (from the Militia), 9th April 1892; promoted Lieutenant, 19th July 1893; and Captain, 23rd October 1899. He served with the 52nd in the Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, 1897–8; with Tirah Expeditionary Force; and received the medal with two clasps.

Captain Wilkie was Adjutant of Volunteers from 1902 to 1907, and retired on the 8th May 1907 to take up the appointment of Secretary of the Glamorganshire Territorial Force Association.

On the 26th November 1914 he was appointed to the command of the 17th Battalion (1st Glamorgan) Welsh Regiment, which he trained and took overseas.

2ND LIEUT. S. WISEMAN.

2nd Lieut. STANLEY WISEMAN (*1/1st Bucks Battalion, attached from the 4th Essex Regiment*) was killed in action, with A Company, on the 10th March 1917.

The only son of Mr. and Mrs. J. W. Wiseman, 19 Queen's Road, Jesmond, Newcastle-on-Tyne, late of Ilford, Essex, he joined the Battalion on the 12th September 1916.

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OBITUARY, 1916–1917.

THE REVEREND HENRY NEVILE SHERBROOKE, M.A.

Died at Bristol on the 2nd October 1916, aged 70.

He joined the 43rd Light Infantry, as Ensign, 18th April 1865; Lieutenant, 28th October 1868; retired, 4th February 1871.

He took Holy Orders in 1876, was for some years Incumbent of Portman Chapel, Marylebone, and Vicar of Clifton from 1891 to 1897.

When new Colours were presented to the 43rd at Shorncliffe in 1887, Mr. Sherbrooke officiated at the ceremony of Consecration.

COLONEL HOWARD KINGSCOTE.

Died on the 17th March 1917 at the Elma, Iver, Bucks, in his 72nd year.

He joined the Indian Army, as Ensign, 4th March 1862, and was promoted Lieutenant, 6th April 1863; transferred to the 52nd Light Infantry, 21st November 1865; Captain, 2nd September 1868; Major, 1st July 1881; Lieutenant-Colonel, 20th May 1885; Brevet-Colonel, 21st May 1889; Colonel, 9th July 1890. Commanded the 2nd Battalion, 1885–89; placed on half-pay, 6th August 1889; Assistant-Adjutant-General, 1890–95; in command of the 43rd Regimental District, 1895–99; retired, 13th September, 1899.

Colonel Kingscote served (with Indian troops) in the Bhootan Expedition, 1864–5, and was wounded at the action of Buxa. He received the medal, with clasp.

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